Rational Conflict Research Articles

Introducing convex BiLSTM-based controller applied to 3-PSP spatial parallel robot manipulator

The idea of modeling first and then finding a control approach might have made sense when systems were changing on a vast scale, but not in today’s world where we are in danger of being run over on a highway called the information highway. The feedback phenomenon, which involves a system’s future being influenced by its past, presents a rational conflict in this context. However, we can move beyond these challenges by leveraging the system’s inherent ability to randomly repeat and re-create parts, allowing new features to emerge and the best repetition to become the standard. To address the mentioned challenges, this paper proposes a new structure based on bilateral long short-term memory (BiLSTM) to provide supervising feedback on the nonlinear components comprising friction, Coriolis, and Centrifugal forces in addition to gravity for adapting uncertain variations in the robotic system dynamics. A key characteristic of the proposed BiLSTM-based controller is the incorporation of memory. A new formulation is developed for determining when to recover old memories and to what extent, ensuring the controller remains both adaptive and efficient. Furthermore, given that for system identification, speed is vital; the proposed approach has dealt with the speed category by introducing a convex combination of BiLSTM layers. The stability of the whole structure has also been analyzed, and the updated learning rules have been derived. The simulation results show improved tracking performance and learning time compared to alternative approaches.

Bird Cottage

Bird Cottage

Rationality in games and institutions

Against the orthodox view of the Nash equilibrium as “the embodiment of the idea that economic agents are rational” (Aumann, 1985, p 43), some theorists have proposed ‘non-classical’ concepts of rationality in games, arguing that rational agents should be capable of improving upon inefficient equilibrium outcomes. This paper considers some implications of these proposals for economic theory, by focusing on institutional design. I argue that revisionist concepts of rationality conflict with the constraint that institutions should be designed to be incentive-compatible, that is, that they should implement social goals in equilibrium. To resolve this conflict, proponents of revisionist concepts face a choice between three options: (1) reject incentive compatibility as a general constraint, (2) deny that individuals interacting through the designed institutions are rational, or (3) accept that their concepts do not cover institutional design. I critically discuss these options and I argue that a more inclusive concept of rationality, e.g. the one provided by Robert Sugden’s version of team reasoning, holds the most promise for the non-classical project, yielding a novel argument for incentive compatibility as a general constraint.

Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity

AbstractCould it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict.

Power and conflict in inter‐organisational information systems development

AbstractThe need for inter‐organisational information systems projects, which are complex undertakings often riddled with poorly understood power struggles and conflicts that hinder project success, has increased in previous decades. Through the lenses of systemic and episodic power, together with an organisational conflict model, this longitudinal, qualitative case study explores the dynamics of power and conflict and their effects in an inter‐organisational information systems development project. This study highlights that the bureaucratic, social and technical setup of the project forms a foundational system from which specific power practices emerge, in this case, the practices of hiding, storytelling and bargaining. The power practices have both restrictive and productive effects on conflict, but the practices cannot easily escape the confines of the foundational system and continue to cause the resurfacing of different manifestations of latent conflict inherent in the system. As a result, both ‘power to’ (systemic power) and ‘power over’ (episodic power) can escalate project conflict, and rational conflict management for gaining ‘win‐win’ resolutions may not be in the stakeholders' interests. Thus, strategies for openly managing political conflicts should be considered.

You gotta fight for your right? Publicly assigned but privately enforced property rights

Establishment and enforcement of property rights is often seen as a key tenet of a productive society. Many argue that the absence of formal public institutions to establish and enforce property rights necessarily leads to conflict and violent private enforcement of property rights. By re-examining the decision problem of the “early entrants” into the property market, we argue that the mitigation of violent conflict begins when the property is first claimed though the claimants’ anticipation of the likelihood that their ownership will be challenged in the future. We perform a large-scale empirical test of the implications of this model (and of similar papers) by looking at the effect of the Homestead Acts—an exogenous increase in publicly assigned, but privately enforced, property rights—on the occurrence of violence on the American frontier. Exploiting variations in the assignment of homestead grants across states and time, we find that increases in homestead claims cause a statistically significant but economically insignificant increase in homicides. We conclude that there is no evidence that the assignment of privately enforced property rights meaningfully increases violence, and that settlers of the American West, as a whole, behaved in a manner consistent with rational conflict avoidance.

Theory of Mind Deficits and Reactive Aggression in Child Psychiatric Inpatients: Indirect Effects Through Emotion Dysregulation

Nationwide, there is a pressing need to develop more efficacious treatment regimens for reactively aggressive youth receiving inpatient psychiatric services. Identifying the relevant clinical characteristics of youth with reactive aggression is an important first step in this process. Past research findings and theoretical formulations have suggested that deficits in both social skills and emotional regulation abilities are significantly associated with the development of reactive aggression in children. Utilizing a highly aggressive child inpatient sample (65 males and 36 females) receiving crisis-stabilization services, we tested the hypothesis that emotion dysregulation statistically mediated the relationship between theory of mind deficits and reactive aggression. As hypothesized, results of bootstrapped mediational analyses indicated that theory of mind deficits were associated with higher levels of reactive aggression via the indirect influence of dysregulated affect. These findings suggest that intervention programs for reactively aggressive children should promote both theory of mind skills and emotion regulation abilities. Children that develop more thoughtful styles of perspective taking coupled with an enhanced ability to modulate their emotions may develop a greater ability to employ the rational conflict resolution skills that underlie peaceful social relationships.

Rational conflict and pre-commitment to peace

There is an abundance of historical and contemporary examples of consensual institutions that reduce the probability of adversarial conflicts between contesting parties. For instance, feudal lords in the medieval period supported monarchies which kept in check their mutual predatory tendencies. Contemporary nation states invest in the United Nations and NATO to contain conflicts between themselves. This paper experimentally investigates the feasibility and effectiveness of such an institution. We modify the two-agent ratio-form rent-seeking model to incorporate a pre-conflict stage in which participants voluntarily choose a level of public investment towards the establishment of the peacekeeping mechanism. A modified Tullock contest is played in the second stage, where the aggregate investment made in the first stage assists the victim in the case of a unilateral aggression. We find that the peacekeeping mechanism is effective in reducing conflict expenditures, and is least effective when the contestants initially have close but unequal endowments, as opposed to equal or widely unequal endowments.

R for Risk

The concepts of risk and uncertainty are rather subtle, and so are their applicability to the social sciences. By reviewing the historically significant example of the St. Petersburg Paradox, this note suggests that when mathematical models of rationality and intuitions about rationality conflict, sometimes the former must be bent to fit the latter. This line of reasoning is all the more relevant when confronting the kind of uncertainty which many refer to as “ambiguity”.

Culture, Wasta and perceptions of performance appraisal in Saudi Arabia

This article explores the relationship between Arabic culture and employees’ perceptions of performance appraisal in a Saudi Arabian company named SACO. Using an interpretive and qualitative methodological framework, the article suggests that Western models of performance appraisal rooted in rationality and objectivity conflict with aspects of Saudi Arabian culture. Specifically, the personal relations implicated in the social practice of Wasta. However, the article also shows how SACO employees are beginning to reject Saudi Arabian cultural norms and adopt alternative values which are linked to notions of organisational justice and individual egalitarianism. These values are compatible with Western models of performance appraisal.

Russian

The Drama Theory is an important branch of game theory invented by an English mathematician Nigel Howard (1934–2004). The study was done to find a rational conflict resolution strategy in the early 90s of the last century. Unfortunately, N. Howard didn't manage to finish his work; the theoretical part of his Drama Theory requires further logical-mathematical modernization and development. The article is the first step in this direction, which features the logical structure of Drama Theory and new theorems have reapproved its basic theorems.

“Missing signposts?”

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is first, to explore communicative practice in conflict resolution in its unitary and pluralistic forms; and second, to highlight ways in which interpersonal conflict negotiation and resolution may be recapitulated in organisational or international experiences of conflict resolution.Design/methodology/approachThe methods of research are qualitative discourse analysis in the new critical paradigm. The approach to the topic is one of reflective interlocution of defined topic areas.FindingsA tension exists between unitary and pluralistic components of rational arguments in organisational communication. This is observable in the claims to relational authenticity in both scientific arguments and in the management of conflict negotiations. The main drivers of this tension are the scalability of arguments and the contexts in which they occur. Determining the ontological validity and mutually understood “reference points” of participant perspectives are essential in reaching understandings that have elements of successful communication, clarity and mutuality.Research limitations/implicationsThe research is theoretical in design and mimetically reflects developments in pedagogy and practice in its designated area.Practical implicationsScientists, media commentators need to be mindful of argumentational bias. Conflict resolution negotiators will have a better understanding of the ethical dynamics of their interaction and processes.Social implicationsAs the title suggests, the article highlights tensions between the unitary and pluralistic components of rational arguments and conflict resolution in organisational communication.Originality/valueThe originality and value of the paper is its analysis and juxtaposition of the communication ethics of rational arguments used by scientists, and conflict resolution negotiators.

The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change

The conventional explanation for controversy over climate change emphasizes impediments to public understanding: Limited popular knowledge of science, the inability of ordinary citizens to assess technical information, and the resulting widespread use of unreliable cognitive heuristics to assess risk. A large survey of U.S. adults (N = 1540) found little support for this account. On the whole, the most scientifically literate and numerate subjects were slightly less likely, not more, to see climate change as a serious threat than the least scientifically literate and numerate ones. More importantly, greater scientific literacy and numeracy were associated with greater cultural polarization: Respondents predisposed by their values to dismiss climate change evidence became more dismissive, and those predisposed by their values to credit such evidence more concerned, as science literacy and numeracy increased. We suggest that this evidence reflects a conflict between two levels of rationality: The individual level, which is characterized by citizens’ effective use of their knowledge and reasoning capacities to form risk perceptions that express their cultural commitments; and the collective level, which is characterized by citizens’ failure to converge on the best available scientific evidence on how to promote their common welfare. Dispelling this, “tragedy of the risk-perception commons,” we argue, should be understood as the central aim of the science of science communication.

Integrating social conflict into economic theory

The generalisation of Coasian theorem to the power relationship amounts to depicting conflict as a bargaining process between conflictual parties that are, simultaneously, both partners and adversaries. This perspective leads to different models of ‘rational conflicts’ i.e. a threat of conflict without any real clash. An alternative approach is developed by different models inspired by the Public Choice School, which build upon the logic of coercive power within the framework of a self-interested behaviour. The integration of ‘social conflicts’ in a narrowly defined individual cost/benefit theoretical framework has resulted in reducing ‘social conflict’ to real private (but not social) conflict. In other words, economic theory has considered social protesters either as potential or actual looters but rarely as a group of people struggling for a common cause. Integration of social conflict into economic theory will require: (i) abandoning the ubiquitous market model when describing conflictual relationships; (ii) accepting the logic of force or coercive power as a starting point; and (iii) expanding the idea of interest to include encompassing (including class) interest.

The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions

A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected.

Normative Influence and Rational Conflict Decisions: Group Norms and Cost-Benefit Analyses for Intergroup Behavior

The present paper articulates a model in which ingroup and outgroup norms inform ‘rational’ decision-making (cost-benefit analysis) for conflict behaviors. Norms influence perceptions of the consequences of the behavior, and individuals may thus strategically conform to or violate norms in order to acquire benefits and avoid costs. Two studies demonstrate these processes in the context of conflict in Québec. In the first study, Anglophones’ perceptions of Francophone and Anglophone norms for pro-English behaviors predicted evaluations of the benefits and costs of the behaviors, and these cost-benefit evaluations in turn mediated the norm-intention links for both group norms. In the second study, a manipulated focus on supportive versus hostile ingroup and outgroup norms also predicted cost-benefit evaluations, which mediated the norm-intention relationships. The studies support a model of strategic conflict choices in which group norms inform, rather than suppress, rational expectancy-value processes. Implications for theories of decision-making and normative influence are discussed.

The banks of Frankfurt and the sustainable city

The purpose of this article is to understand better the political content of the now ubiquitous term, sustainable development. Perhaps the most elegant definition of sustainable development yet devised is that by planner Scott Campbell. His definition is illustrated by a simple equilateral triangle in which the competing demands of the three Es – environmental protection, economic development, and social equity – occupy the triangle’s corners. The three Es have been conceptually related by a public discourse associated with the environmental movement over the past thirty years. What is novel about Campbell’s contribution to this discourse is the triangulated structure of the three variables and his proposal that correspondingly, a series of three rational conflicts occupy the triangle’s sides. Campbell’s point is that sustainable development lies at the geometric centre of the triangle and can be achieved only by negotiating and thus balancing the dynamic conflicts that naturally exist between the networks of interest nested in each corner.1 Although Campbell’s definition is extremely helpful, we will argue that it does not go quite far enough. Implicit in Campbell’s logic is the idea that sustainable development is a discursive mode of conflict resolution. Such an activity, we argue, is inherently democratic because it assumes that citizens in conflict will rationally resolve their disputes in public space. To develop further this hypothesis we rely on the description of Strong Democracy developed by the political philosopher, Benjamin Barber.2 Barber argues that the history of Western liberal democracy is constituted of three dispositions – anarchism, realism, and minimalism. In this political taxonomy, each liberal disposition distinguishes itself by opting for alternative modes of conflict resolution: anarchists tend to deny the existence of conflict, realists tend to suppress it, and minimalists tend to tolerate it. This distinction will be further developed below.

Iraq and rational conflict termination: War without end states?

(2002). Iraq and rational conflict termination: War without end states? Defence Studies: Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 131-136.

Mediation as a Basic Element of Crime Control: Theoretical and Empirical Comments

Mediation as a Basic Element of Crime Control: Theoretical and Empirical Comments

Aggregation bias and the capacity for formal crime control: The determinants of total and disaggregated police force size in Milwaukee, 1934–1987

Recent longitudinal analyses of total police force size, both cross and within jurisdictions, raise serious questions about the explanatory power of the rational choice and conflict theories of crime control. Generally the empirical literature suggests that current levels of police force size are explained well by previous manpower levels and are relatively unresponsive to changes in the social structure of macro social units. This study explores the possibility that the failure to decompose police force size into its component parts may be masking the influence of structural conditions on crime control bureaucracies. We examine changes, over time, in the size of the total and disaggregated (patrol, detective, and civilian) police force in Milwaukee from 1934 to 1987. The findings suggest that police administrators may have more discretion to make adjustments to specific units than to total manpower levels. We discuss the implications of these results for rational choice and conflict theories.