Rational Perception Research Articles

Social value orientation and intelligence: A test of the goal prescribes rationality principle

AbstractThe present study examines the influence of pre‐existing individual differences in social value orentations, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to oneself and others (McClintock, 1978), on perceptions of rationality in a social dilemma. In Experiment 1 conducted in Groningen (the Netherlands), it was found that people with pro‐social orientations expected more cooperation from another described as intelligent than from another described as unintelligent, whereas individualists and competitors expected relatively more cooperation from another described as unintelligent. The cross‐cultural generalizability of this finding was examined and supported in Experiment 2 which was conducted in Santa Barbara (U.S.A.). Results from both studies are consistent with the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle (Van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990) which assumes that people with pro‐social (cooperative) orientations would perceive rationality in social dilemmas primarily from the collective perspective, whereas individualists and competitors would take a strong egocentric perspective on rationality. In addition, we found a strong relationship between expectations of other's cooperation and own cooperative behaviour when the other was described as intelligent. The strength of this relationship was reduced, particularly for individualists and competitors, when the other person was described as unintelligent.

Phenomenal and Rational Perception of Some Object Relations by Preschoolers

The distinction between phenomenal and rational perception of the objective world by humans is one of the classic distinctions in describing the nature of consciousness. Rational perception is usually understood to mean perception based on scientifically accepted methods of fixation, measurement, and interpretation of objective and causal relations. Such perception may differ substantially from phenomenal perception, i.e., perception of the same relations unmediated by scientific conceptions.

Models of rationality and mental health rights

The sudden and often controversial development of mental health rights may blind us to the fact that these rights have developed unevenly. For example, the right to treatment for those involuntarily committed to mental institutions has emerged much more quickly and comprehensively than has the right for these individuals to refuse treatment. Why is this the case? The emergence of rights is related to changes in ideologies. It is also related to the mobilization of legal resources. This article focuses on the link between ideological change and the uneven emergence of these two rights. The ideologies are based on psychiatrists’ beliefs and perceptions of mental patient rationality. The right to treatment and the right to refuse treatment respectively are related to two quite different models of rationality. Psychiatric textbooks and other general work in mainstream psychiatry show that the model of rationality consistent with the right to treatment has been far more prevalent and central to practicing psychiatry than has the model that is closer to the right to refuse. The first part of the paper briefly documents the uneven emergence of the two sets of rights. Part II develops the models of rationality and shows how the respective rights are related to the models. The third part demonstrates the prevalence and centrality of one of the models consistent with the right to treatment, while Part IV looks at how and why the other model is subordinated.