Rational Emotive Theory Research Articles

Level of Non-Adherence to Tuberculosis Treatment among TB Patients in Selected Chest Clinics in Mombasa County, Kenya

Purpose: The aim of this study was to explore the levels of non- adherence to tuberculosis treatment among TB patients in selected chest clinics in Mombasa County, Kenya.
 Methodology: The research adopted correlational design. The study was conducted in selected three chest clinics in Mombasa County. All tuberculosis patients diagnosed with active tuberculosis disease who are registered and collect their medicines from selected chest clinics in Mombasa County was the targeted population. Convenience sampling and simple random sampling was used. The sample size involved 200 TB patients. The research adopted questionnaire which consisted of both open ended and closed ended questions. The study adopted a questionnaire in collection of data. The questionnaire contained both open ended and close ended questionnaire. The researcher used descriptive statistics to help in organizing of data and it would also be helpful in summarizing of data for ease of making interpretations. Statistical Package for Social Science version 25 aided in data analysis. Frequency, percentages and moment was used in data analysis.
 Findings: Data analysis from this study that was summed and transformed into categories revealed 83% of the respondent’s experienced moderate non-adherence, 12.2% low non-adherence while 4.8% had high incidences of non-adherence.
 Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: Rational Emotive Theory may be used to anchor future studies relating to levels of non-adherence to TB treatment among TB patients. In this study, anxiety over the Tb diagnosis would be the activating agent, patient belief about treatment and treatment course and Non-adherence the consequence of the irrational belief. The study recommended that there is need for patients to be empowered with information on the importance of adherence to TB treatment to mitigate incidences of treatment failure and multidrug resistant tuberculosis through health education using health practitioners.

SELF-ESTEEM, LIFE SATISFACTION AND NEED FOR ACHIEVEMENT AMONG PEOPLE IN EARLY ADULTHOOD

One of the most widespread theoretical concepts in psychology and psychotherapy is the rational-emotive theory. It provides explanations of how the individual evaluates the things that happen to him or her through the system of beliefs, and this makes it different in relation to other cognitive-behavioral theories and psychotherapeutic directions. The system of beliefs can be rational and irrational. Rational beliefs are characterized by: logical consistencies, flexibility and correspond with reality, while irrational beliefs are characterized by: logical inconsistencies, absolutism and do not correspond with reality. Self-esteem is often seen as a conditional concept which implies that a person is respected on the basis of the good things that he or she has done. A healthy alternative is unconditional self-acceptance. The need for achievment has its own irrational component because a person has a constant tendency toward personal achievements that will reflect his value as being. People in their early adulthood have a number of challenges that they face in everyday life, and they are very often related to the degree that reflects the respect towards oneself, the way in which life lives and how satisfied they are, as well as the intrinsic need for achievement. What was important to determine is how irrational beliefs affect the self-esteem of an early-aged person, the connection of self-esteem with life satisfaction, as well as gaining insight into whether the need for achievment with its irrational nature influences positively or negative for people who are in early adulthood. The survey included 100 respondents aged 30 to 40, of whom 50 male and 50 female. The following measuring instruments were used: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, Life Satisfaction Scale and General Attitude and Beliefs Scale. From the obtained results, we can see the following: self-esteem is in a negative significant correlation with irrational beliefs (p < .01); self-esteem is in a positive correlation with life satisfaction (p < .01) and self-esteem is in a negative significant correlation with the need to achieve (p < .05).

Irrational Beliefs in Major Depression and Generalized Anxiety Disorders in an Iranian Sample: A Preliminary Study

Previous research on Rational Emotive Theory using western samples has shown that irrational belief systems are associated with emotional disorders such as anxiety and depression. In a replication of this work the present study was conducted to compare the scores of 29 clinically depressed, 31 clinically anxious, and 34 normal controls on the Irrational Beliefs Test in an Iranian sample. Consistent with Ellis's theory, depressed and anxious patients scored higher than the controls on scores for the full scale and all 10 subscales of the Irrational Beliefs Test. Also, the two patient groups differed significantly in their endorsement of 2 out of 10 irrational belief subscales but not in overall score on irrational beliefs. Results were interpreted in light of previous literature.

Are inappropriate or dysfunctional feelings in rational-emotive therapy qualitative or quantitative?

A reply is made to Cramer and Fong's (1991) findings that inappropriate or dysfunctional feelings, as hypothesized in rational—emotive theory, are quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from appropriate or functional feelings.

Evolutionary psychology and rational-emotive theory: Time to open the floodgates

Main tenets, issues, and controversies for evolutionary psychology (EP), particularly its cognitive aspects, are introduced, clarified, and applied to the theory and philosophy of rational-emotive therapy (RET). Specifically, key concepts in EP are applied to Ellis' genetic postulate for cognitive demandingness and grandiosity, and are incorporated into Ruth's (1992) RET evolutionary proposal. The following issues are examined for demanding and grandiose thinking: nature (genetic) vs. nurture (learned), plasticity vs. unmodifiability, acquisition ease and modification-elimination difficulty, natural inseparability of cognition and emotion, natural inseparability of cognitive content and process, social selection pressures and the human psyche, competitive individualism vs. natural self-interest, evolutionary counter-balancing and false mutually exclusive dichotomies, epigenetic rules and Darwinian algorithms, current adaptions vs. ancestral remnants, child and adult adaption, Darwinism vs. Lamarckism, and ethical considerations.

Confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses of irrational language with clinical and nonclinical subjects.

Recent formulations of rational-emotive theory posit a four-factor stylistic model of irrational thinking. These factors include Demandingness, Awfulizing, I-Can't-Stand-It-Itis, and Self-Damnation. This study involved a semantic analysis of 16 linguistic variates hypothesized by Ellis and Dryden (1987) and frequently used in clinical practice to represent the four factors. Four variations of a 6-point, Likert-type questionnaire were developed to tap the four factors and the linguistic variates. Subjects were 260 university students and 150 clinical patients, who completed either all four variations (one variation every 2 weeks over a 6-week period) or a single variation only. Confirmatory factor analyses generally failed to support the four-factor model. Exploratory factor analyses suggested that a general factor of irrationality may exist in clinical populations.

THE PATTERN OF IRRATIONAL BELIEFS ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER

In light of Rational-Emotive Theory, this study was undertaken to determine the pattern of irrational beliefs underlying Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). A total of 126 subjects (50 males, 76 females) volunteered to participate. Patients clinically diagnosed with MDD (unipolar type) and a control group of non-depressed patients were solicited from the inpatient and outpatient facilities of several Ottawa and Montreal hospitals; the normal control group comprised students and civil servants. The subjects completed questionnaires to measure irrational belief endorsement (IBT, RBI) and symptom severity (STAI, BDI) and to verify the depression diganosis (IDD). Multivariate statistics were used to determine the pattern of beliefs which best discriminates between the MDD group, the psychiatric control group, and the normal controls. Discriminant analysis of the IBT revealed a pattern of four irrational beliefs generally known as demand for approval, frustration reactivity, anxious overconcern, and helplessness over past. The implications of such findings for RET theory are discussed.

Cognitive variables related to suicidal contemplation in adolescents with implications for long-range prevention

In a series of studies with college and high school students (Total N=808) consistent and strong relationships were found between suicidal contemplation and the irrational beliefs considered by Rational-Emotive Theory & Therapy (RET) to underlie emotional distress. Suicidal contemplation was measured first by an item from the Beck Depression Inventory and subsequently by the Suicide Probability Scale. Irrational beliefs were measured by the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test and, in the third study, by the new Attitudes & Belief Scale-II as well. Groups formed on the basis of increasing indices of suicidal contemplation were found to be consistently, increasingly more irrational on both measures. Also groups created according to low, medium, and high levels of irrational beliefs (the “B” in RET) were found to be markedly different on “C” variables such as anxiety, depression, hopelessness, anger, psychosomoatic symptoms and suicidal contemplation. The findings were interpreted as strongly inferring a causational relationship from attitudes and beliefs to emotional distress and the contemplation of suicide. The implications of the findings for RET theory and for therapeutic and preventive strategies related to emotional distress and suicidal contemplation are clear. Other approaches to the explanation of suicide are cited and reference is made to a previous critical summary of them (Woods & Muller, 1988).

Feminism and the Cognitive Theory of Emotion: Anger, Blame and Humor

Feminists, especially radical feminists, have advocated the use of anger, rage and blame yet undermine humor and positive emotions. This position appears to lack a substantial basis in contemporary theories of emotion. It is argued that the cognitive, or Rational Emotive Theory (RET), would be one of the best theories of emotion to help advance an enlightened and humanistic feminism.

Values, “Irrationality,” and Religiosity

The predictive validity of rational-emotive understandings of religiosity, values, and irrational beliefs was found to be limited. Two rational-emotive irrationalities, both of which were consistent with an adaptive intrinsic religious motivation, correlated negatively with a number of other irrationalities. Subjects from a religious college and those with a more intrinsic commitment were not uniformly more irrational than those from a state university and those who were indiscriminately antireligious. Indices of individualism and a relativistic hedonism, both of which are value systems recommended by rational-emotive theory, were not identified as clearly positive in their psychological influences. Overall, these data support previous suggestions that the personality effects of particular beliefs must be examined within the ideological surround in which they operate (Watson, Morris, &amp; Hood, 1990).

The Application of Rational-Emotive Theory and Therapy to School-Aged Children

This article explains rational-emotive theory and therapy and its applications to school psychology. The theory's distinction between disturbed and nondisturbed emotions and the distinction between...

The endorsement of irrational beliefs in a general clinical population

Burgess' Attitude and Belief Scale, a measure of Ellis' irrational beliefs, was administered to a large sample of outpatients. All 13 subscales demonstrate very adequate internal consistency. A factor analysis yielded one factor accounting for 83% of the variance, which was labeled “irrationality”. Clients endorsed “focused” items more than “overgeneralized” items, “self-referential items more than “non-self-referential” items, and “preferential” items more than “irrational” items. Clients also received higher scores on the irrational process of demandingness than they did on the irrational process of awfulizing, self-worth and low frustration tolerance. The results were consistent with new formulations in Rational-Emotive theory. Suggestions were made for the construction of measures of irrational beliefs.

A Rational-Emotive Theory of Addictions: Rational-Emotive Therapy with Alcoholics and Substance Abusers

A Rational-Emotive Theory of Addictions Rational-Emotive Therapy with Alcoholics and Substance Abusers. Albert Ellis, John F. Mclnerney, Raymond DiGiuseppe and Raymond J. Yeager (Eds.). New York: Pergamon Press, 1988. (162 pp.) The back of this book describes Albert Ellis as the 'founder' of Rational Emotive Therapy and estimates that he has written over 40 books and 400 journal articles. A few pages earlier the estimate is 50 books and 600 journal articles. It is easy to lose count. Dr. Ellis is a prolific writer and can lay fair claim to being one of the founders of cognitive psychotherapy. To my knowledge, this is his first book on the applications of RET to alcoholism and substance abuse. His co-authors are all closely associated with the Institute of RET in New York. Ellis was familiar with the work of the Stoic philosophers when he developed RET and their influence on his theory is clearly discernible. The Stoics, it will be recalled, were people of great fortitude, able to resist much hardship and temptation. Alcoholics are unfortunately no stoics. Indeed the problem with alcohol and substance abusers, according to RET, is their intolerance of discomfort or "discomfort anxiety" (DA)-the kind of anxiety we all experience when we arre deprived of our favorite additions. DA is produced by such irrational beliefs as "I can' t stand being deprived" or "Life is too hard: I deserve a drink." It is not easy for therapists to identify DA partly because there is a 'semantic hole' in the English language which makes it difficult for clients to describe the experience: there is no word or phrase for DA in common parlance. Thus therapists easily miss this core problem and become entangled in secondary issues such as the alcoholic' s guilt about his drinking. The first step in therapy is to find the client's own word for DA: the word might be "craving." Although RET is rightly famous for the ABC model of cognitive analysis and disputing, which makes its appearance on the second page of the book, therapists of this persuasion routinely use a whole variety of cognitive, emotive and behavioral techniques. Many of these techniques are clearly and succinctly described in the succeeding chapters. They include the use of imagery, shameattacking exercises, role reversal, humor, referenting, coping self-statements and operant conditioning RET style. The authors caution against the use of implosive techniques, which are otherwise favored by rational-emotive therapists, in this rather vulnerable population. They do not confine themselves to the alcohol and substance abuser. One chapter describes "the enabler," who may be the spouse or parent of the abuser. …

Rational-emotive theory: II. explication and evaluation

In contrast to previous formulation of rational-emotive theory, the present formulation is based on comprehensively critical rationalism (rather than logical empiricism), identifies negative evaluations (bad, wrong, awful) as the specific etiology of unwanted (dysphoric) emotions, and clarifies the definitional nature of such evaluations. In contrast, other cognitive-behavioral theories emphasize external events, faulty inferences, or the client's perception or construal of the situation as the source of the undesired emotional responses. It is difficult to choose among these theories because the purported etiological agents are confounded, and we do not have adequate measures of the degree to which people hold and understand various beliefs. Individuals can confirm the theory by noting their emotional reactions to those specific beliefs identified as irrational in this formulation. Dysphoric emotions (anger, anxiety, depression, guilt, jealousy, and shame) result, to a considerable extent, from fundamentalist, absolutistic, moral beliefs, and might be largely eliminated if children were no longer indoctrinated with these points of view.

Rational-emotive theory: I. an integrated psychological and philosophical basis

Rational-emotive theory (RET) is reformulated on an epistemological basis (comprehensively critical rationalism [CCR] instead of logical empiricism) consistent with current mainstream philosophy and with the practice of rational-emotive therapy. The irrational beliefs that lead to dysphoric emotions can be defined logically and independently of their consequences. They are of two kinds: (a) grandiose beliefs that some object, state, or event in the world should be other than it is, because one wants it to be, and (b) beliefs that evaluations such as good, bad, right, wrong, wonderful, and awful are factual (inherent in the object of the evaluation) rather than definitional. Evaluations are arbitrary designations that we add to the value of a measure of some characteristic of an object or event. Dysphoric emotions (anger, anxiety, depression, guilt, jealousy, and shame) result from evaluative attributions that individuals believe to be inherently true, rather than definitional.

Effects of Irrationality on a Trail Making Performance Task

45 rational and 45 irrational thinkers as defined by Ellis's (1962) theory and assessed by their scores on the Irrational Belief Test were compared on a series of Trail Making tasks. Both groups were assigned to one of three conditions which involved presentation of irrational, neutral, and rational self-referent statements. Superior performance displayed by the rational group provided support for the rational-emotive theory position that irrational beliefs (ideas) generalize their adverse effect to actual performance situations. Except for the first trial the data did not support the expectation that types of self-statements differentially influence efficiency of performance.

Sin and Self-Functioning, Part 3: The Psychology and Ideology of Irrational Beliefs

Irrational beliefs identified by Rational-Emotive theory (Ellis, 1962) as pathogenic were related to religious motivations and to orthodox beliefs having to do with sin. An extrinsic religious motivation and beliefs referring to the guilt of others appeared to predict problematic self-functioning. On the other hand, intrinsicness and beliefs about grace displayed complex linkages with irrational thinking and were also associated with less depression. A direct analysis of how subjects evaluated specific beliefs relative to their religious commitments suggested that positive correlations of intrinsicness and of grace with at least some irrational beliefs may not be indicative of true “irrationality.” Instead, religious individuals may be reasoning from a world view that is ideologically incompatible with Rational-Emotive theory.

Hot Cogs and Divine Proportions

Hot Cogs and Divine Proportions Advances in Cognitive-Behavioral Research and Therapy (Vol. 5). P. C. Kendall (Ed.). Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1986. (285 pp.) This is the fifth volume of an annual series devoted to reviewing cognitivebehavioral topics that may be of interest to research workers and clinical therapists. It contains a diverse collection of seven contributions, whose value may be best conveyed and appreciated by a brief description of the content of each. The first article, by Robert Schwartz and Gregory Garamoni, suggests that psychological well-being may be a function of holding both positive and negative cognitions in the divine proportion (the so-called "golden section hypothesis" of Pythagoras) of roughly three to two, that is, three positive cognitions to every two negative ones. They argue that this cognitive asymmetry enables one to feel generally positive while at the same time being prepared to cope with any negative events that may arise, and they present evidence that seems to support this rather intriguing idea. They go on to develop a "states of mind model" which proposes that certain psychological problems are the result of deviations from this proportion. For example, hypomania and mania are the consequences of holding too many positive self-statements. Although the implications of this model are not drawn out for the practicing clinician, it suggests that the more astute therapist may be able to monitor the progress of therapy by paying careful attention to the evaluative content of the client's comments. In the following contribution, Timothy Smith and Kenneth Allred provide a useful and detailed critical review of the appropriate empirical evidence on the original version of Ellis's rational-emotive theory. This simple and attractive theory suggests that inappropriate emotional distress arises from holding irrational beliefs. Despite its appeal, there is at present little methodologically sound support for it. Most of the relevant research is cross-sectional in design, assessing the presence of emotional distress and irrational beliefs at one point in time, which means that it is not possible to infer the causal nature of any obtained relationship. In addition, the two most frequently used measures of irrational beliefs, the Irrational Beliefs Test and the Rational Behavior Inventory, do not appear to possess strong discriminant validity. This may be partly attributable to the affective content of some of the items on these tests, which overlaps with that of the psychological distress measures. Consequently, the observed relationship between emotional distress and irrational beliefs may be to some extent a function of overlap in content of general dissatisfaction. Although not reported here, there are now measures of irrational beliefs that should overcome this problem. The third article, by John Marzillier, is most probably of greatest general interest to the clinical practitioner. In it, he begins by outlining Beck's cognitive theory of the accompanying therapy for depression. He suggests that it may be more appropriate for the cognitive therapist to view the dysfunctional beliefs that are associated with the patient's depression as reflecting an alternative set of values rather than being illogical in themselves. For example, the dysfunctional statement, "If I make a mistake, it means I am a complete failure as a person," may not be illogical or untrue as such but may embody a very high value being placed on perfection as a way of guiding one's life. He backs up this point of view by describing Rowe's personal construct therapy. She makes a distinction between rational beliefs and metaphysical beliefs, and argues that it is metaphysical beliefs (such as, "No matter how good or nice I appear, I am really bad") that are central to depression. Unlike rational beliefs, these cannot be changed by reasoned argument or empirical validation. What the therapist can do, however, is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of holding such a philosophy and to suggest alternative and less harmful sets of values that may be held instead. …

Reductions in type a behavior, anxiety, anger, and physical illness as related to changes in irrational beliefs: Results of a demonstration project in industry

A series of stress management workshops was conducted in a Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) format for an entire department in a large corporation (N=49). The population was rather general, i.e., nonstudent, nonclinical, and nonvolunteer. Measures were obtained before the program began and three to four months following completion on the “dependent” variables of Type A behavior, anxiety, anger, depression, assertiveness, and physical illness symptoms, and on the cognitive “independent” variables of irrational beliefs. Major changes were obtained on all “dependent” measures supporting previous work on the usefulness of an RET approach in reducing various types of distress. Further, these changes were shown to be strongly related to changes in irrational beliefs and changing such irrational beliefs was the major focus of the program. It is concluded, therefore, that a fundamental assumption of Rational-Emotive Therapy and theory is given additional empirical support.

Effects of profanity, touch, and sex of the counselor on perceptions of the counselor and behavioral compliance: Implications for rational-emotive therapists

The present study investigated the effects of profanity, touch, and sex of the counselor on perceptions of the counselor and on behavioral compliance. Ninety six undergraduate psychology students attended a self help presentation on principles of mental health, according to rational-emotive theory. At the end of each presentation the counselor recommended that the subject pick up a book request card (initial compliance) and mail it away (delayed compliance) in order to receive a free copy ofA New Guide To Rational Living. The subjects were also asked to rate their preceptions of the counselor on the dimensions of expertness, attractiveness, and trustworthiness. The results indicated that the use of profanity led to significantly lower perceptions of trustworthiness and a significantly lower level of delayed compliance. Female counselors were rated as more expert, attractive, and trustworthy as compared with male counselors. There was no effect of touch on any of the dependent measures. Implications of these findings for the rational emotive therapist are discussed.