Rational Cognition Research Articles

Between Mind and Brain:Final and Efficient Causation in Relation to Neuroplasticity

Reductionism is usually taken for granted in many areas of science, neuroscience and psychology being no exceptions. It is often assumed as scientific orthodoxy that human behavior can be reduced to “what the brain does” without recourse to a consideration of cognition. Although many philosophers and ethicists may seek to reduce or eliminate the concept of mind, other philosophers and ethicists have continually pointed out the logical inconsistencies of such an approach. Via a discussion of efficient and final causes in Aristotelian philosophy, I seek to argue that the understanding of human beings as rational and social creatures has guided and should continue to guide our approach to the care and treatment of the mentally ill. Observations concerning rational behavior and cognition, by necessity, have provided the benchmarks by which clinicians evaluate the effectiveness of somatic/pharmacological or psychological/ behavioral interventions: Eliminative reductionism is inappropriate in this area. In approaching issues pertaining to the relationship between human cognitive functioning and neural functioning, the distinction between capacity and vehicle will be used. However, the fact that mental and behavioral functioning can alter neuronal functioning (and vice versa) necessitates that those working with the mentally ill need to know both the efficient causes—the vehicles of certain capacities—and the role of the capacities themselves and how they relate to possible final causes in giving explanations for behavior. These issues become more significant when considering the ethics of treatment choice for those with mental disorders.

Does Justification Aim at Truth?

Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer ‘Yes’; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In ‘The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism’ they argue that justification bearsnointeresting connection to truth; justification doesnotevenaimat truth. ‘Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding’ of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no ‘connection to the truth.’ A ‘truth-aimed… epistemology is not entitled to carry the day’ (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is ‘out of step with a very common view on the part of epistemologists, both internalist and externalist alike’ (C&P 2004, 136), as nearly all ‘epistemologists have claimed that truth and falsity play a crucial role in distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs [for] believing truths is the ultimate aim of human rational cognition’ (C&P 2004, 125; cf. Audi 1988).

Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa (review)

Reviewed by: Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa Jacob Klein Henry Dyson. Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa. Sozomena: Studies in the Recovery of Ancient Texts, 5. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009. Pp. xxxiii + 265. Cloth, $99.95. According to the Stoics, the psychology of adult human beings is unified in a striking sense: each of the soul's perceptive, discursive, and motivational functions belongs to the single faculty of reason. Reason, in turn, is constituted by a set of conceptions (ennoiai) and preconceptions (prolêpseis) acquired on the basis of experience. The few secure sources that bear on this theory in the early Stoa suggest that certain of these empirically acquired conceptions function, somehow, as a criterion of truth in human perception and rational cognition generally. The conceptions associated with this cognitive role are sometimes said to be shared or common (koinai). These tenuous but intriguing claims are the focus of Henry Dyson's book, which surveys most of the surviving evidence for the old Stoic theory of concepts. Dyson's central aims are two: first, to offer a reconstruction of the early and orthodox Stoic theory, for which available evidence is slight; second, to establish this theory's relation to a body of later evidence, including that of Cicero and Epictetus, which has sometimes been regarded as contaminated by Platonist influence. Chapters 1 to 3 of Dyson's book are largely occupied with taxonomical concerns. Here Dyson argues, contra Sandbach and others, that the set of common conceptions as conceived by early Stoic theory is in fact identical with the set of preconceptions, which comprise a form of tacit knowledge shared by all humans qua rational. This conclusion appears to be in tension with Dyson's further suggestions that the Stoics describe as common conceptions only those preconceptions made articulate by dialectic, and that common conceptions and preconceptions are in fact functionally distinct. These latter claims amount to a plausible reading of the sources, but they tend to support the conclusion Dyson is concerned to refute: that common conceptions are, after all, better characterized as a proper subset of preconceptions. Chapters 4 and 5 offer a more detailed account of the role of preconceptions in early Stoic theory. Dyson accepts the now standard view that the Stoic account of concept acquisition amounts to a form of dispositional innatism: we are providentially disposed by nature to acquire the conceptions in which reason consists. Dyson argues further that although preconceptions do not themselves underwrite the perception and discrimination of "natural kinds or sensible qualities" (108), they nonetheless support a range of subsequent inferences about the necessary features of natural kinds. Accordingly, when rendered explicit by dialectic, the knowledge encoded by preconceptions provides a basis for philosophical definition and demonstration. In Dyson's view, the resulting position may be fairly described as a form of psychological but not epistemological empiricism: though preconceptions are acquired solely though experience on the Stoic account, they provide epistemic warrant for a range of non-sensory cataleptic impressions. Finally, Dyson presents the distinction between psychological and epistemological empiricism as the key to understanding the relation of the early Stoic theory to later evidence. In his view, the alleged Platonism of later sources in fact reflects a rationalist element equally present in the older Stoa. Though this is an attractive suggestion, it appears for the most part to be a guiding supposition of Dyson's method rather than a conclusion for which he argues in [End Page 115] detail. While early fragments are interpreted in the light of later material, little attention is given to later accounts as such. On the whole, Dyson's book advances discussion of the Stoic theory of concepts at a number of points and provides a helpful synthesis of much recent scholarship on the subject. Unfortunately, it is marred by an untidy presentation of its main conclusions and by a heavily layered manner of exposition. Dyson tends to address one topic or question by introducing new ones (section 5.2 is a case in point), and a number of central proposals appear in a rather unusual summary of "interim conclusions" interposed between chapters 3 and 4. Much of this material would...

Meta-Synthesis Pattern of Analysis and Assessment of Earthquake Disaster System

Abstract Earthquake disasters are typical giant open complex systems. In this article, the system analyzes the structure features from its framework, motion, and space-time. Its entirety characteristics' such as open, complexity, high dimension, uncertainty and emergence, are discussed. Based on the discussion of the earthquake disaster system's components, elements and influencing factors, the Hall for Workshop of Meta-synthetic Engineering, which is composed of a specialist system, a machine system, and a knowledge system, is constructed to analyze earthquake disaster, and then designs the meta-synthesis analyzing processes, with the following steps: starting from experts' experience and data statistics to obtain perceptual cognition, after that, building models to reach rational cognition, and then, re-practicing through computer operation, eventually, via experts' assessment, data processing, and the modifying model to achieve goals on recognition. Based on the analysis and assessment of well-known earthquakes, earthquake risk, bearing capacity of region disaster, essential information of earthquake, scope of disaster influencing, geological environmental security, carrying capacity of resource environmental, economical influence, social influence, and the benefit of disaster reduction are found to be the essential contents of assessment of earthquake disaster. The framework of the meta-synthesis assessment of earthquake disaster systems and the “men, machine, methods, techniques, data” based on meta-synthesis assessment system are constructed.

Field monitoring on the train-induced vibration response of track structure in the Beiluhe permafrost region along Qinghai–Tibet railway in China

Abstract Analyses of characteristics of vibration response of track structure from train traffic and its attenuation laws, based on the field monitoring of the vibration acceleration response of rail, sleeper, and embankment at the Beiluhe permafrost testing section along the Qinghai–Tibet railway in China, are performed in this paper. The reasonable fitting formula of attenuation relationship of embankment vibration is put forward in a negative exponential function form. The quantitative understanding of the vibration property is obtained according to the statistic of the two well-defined eigenvalues of vibration acceleration response, as well as the analysis of the acceleration time histories and the corresponding frequency spectra. The results suggest that: the effect of rail gap on the maximal vertical vibration response of rail is not evident; vibration response of sleeper near the rail gap is obviously larger than that of other sleepers, especially having intensive shock pulse, and the maximum is more than three times that of the vibration response of the sleeper lying in the very middle of the two rail gaps from one compartment passing by; the rail vibration energy concentrates within 10 Hz, and the rail predominant frequencies mainly correlate with train speed and bogie spacing; the dominant frequencies of the embankment vibration, varying from 40 to 70 Hz for the embankment shoulder and reducing with the distance increasing from the track, are influenced chiefly by train speed and sleeper spacing. The results mentioned above have important significance for rational cognition of vibration response characteristics of track structure at permafrost site, and moreover for the dynamic stability evaluation for the long-term operation of the Qinghai–Tibet railway. Meanwhile, the investigation provides basic data for the further research on the rail transit dynamics and the improvement of railroading criterion in cold regions.

Perspektywiczne kierunki rozwoju biologii człowieka w Polsce, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem auksologii

Protoculture has already existed in animals and is manifested by using a natural object as a tool or by coping the habits of another animals being successful in doing something. At the beginning it was the practice of everyday life, the act of survival, what can be understood as “technique”. After that the process of rational cognition (theory) takes place, and innovative theories propagate the “science” development. Science discovers rules in our nature and society as well as in human activity called culture. Science is a certain sphere of consciousness including self-consciousness, thus science could be created together with consciousness, as a product of thinking mind. Such mind is possessed by humans only. Probably, science has been developed till nowadays following the technological progress. Most likely generalizations of tools behaviors and social contacts have caused brain development and favored abstraction, future vision and articular speech. Since the beginning of Civilization, science had been created not because there was a demand for it, but as the reflection on human life, the result of technical achievements, and as the answer for the question “why does it happen?” When man has protected his basic requirements and received nutritional surplus above daily needs, he has gained a little free time for contemplation, and his reflections have directed the civilization development. In this case, the only way: “thinking is the action” is not adequate. Science, as a turn, causes a revolution in technology, but does not serve for small engineering improvements, as revolutions have also a destructive face. As long as evolution strengthens and improves existing system, revolution destroys the old system, and the new one may fail to be good. If science has been interfered in technique continuously, the technical progress which makes our life easier would have been stopped. Science takes into account cognition of existence, as well as, the realities which are still unknown according to their being and functions. Propagation of knowledge belongs to education, whereas invention of artifacts (things which do not come into existence simultaneously) belongs to technique, engineering and art. ŠThe main aim of science is the summary (generalization) of technical and engineering achievements, which may serve as verification of the process of cognition. Science, as a tool of intellectual cognition, should provide a better contact with surrounding world, nature and universe. It should also serve human development and help to understand the sense of our existence, promote ability of thinking and intellectual self-realization. In the context of previous considerations, there are four, very important problems in human biology, especially in auxology. ŠThe first one concerns directions of studies on the basis of current information concerning mechanism of ontogeny causing variation in body build and functions of contemporary human populations. ŠThe second one deals with dissemination of knowledge in human biology, on the university and general levels. ŠThe third problem is about application of human biology and ecology in medical and pedagogic practice, as well as concerns the evaluation of planned engineering actions, changes in human life environment. ŠThere is also a fourth problem, which varies in particular countries, and it includes the state of each scientific anthropological atmosphere. In most of countries, physical anthropology is still understood as natural history on Man, his variation in time and space, and as the biological base for social practices. However, the main accent which included anthropogenesis, rasogenesis, and ethnogenesis has changed into mechanisms of adaptation to changing environment (also understood as living conditions and social surroundings) during ontogeny, and causes the mechanisms of evolution (phylogeny is recapitulated during the first phases of ontogeny).

The Fit of Thinking Style and Situation: New Measures of Situation-Specific Experiential and Rational Cognition

Decades of research provide strong evidence that consumers process information in two distinct and qualitatively different ways, rational and experiential. However, little research has addressed situational influences on thinking style, and there have been no attempts to simultaneously measure and validate two-dimensional situation-specific thinking. We develop and validate a new instrument for measuring situation-specific thinking style using performance tasks, consumer Web activities, and differing motivations. We establish differences in thinking style across types of tasks and motivations, and congruence effects related to the fit of situation-specific thinking style and the nature of the task on performance and attitudinal outcomes.

Akrasia and Perceptual Illusion

de Anima III. 10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (imagination) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis, I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3, arguing that its account of akrasia as involving ignorance is compatible with, and in fact crucially supplements, the more straightforward account we find elsewhere in the corpus of akrasia as a struggle between desires.

Cognition in Aristotle's Poetics

AbstractThis paper examines Aristotle's understanding of the contributions of perceptual and rational cognition to the composition and reception of poetry. An initial outline of Aristotle's cognitive psychology shows that Aristotelian perception is sufficiently powerful to sustain very rich, complex patterns of behaviour in human as well as non-human animals, and examines the interaction between perception (cognition of the particular and the 'that') and the distinctive capacity for reason (which makes possible cognition of the universal and the 'why') in human behaviour. The rest of the paper applies this framework to a number of problems in the Poetics: (i) If Aristotelian tekhnê is defined as a productive disposition involving reason, how can poetic tekhnê be manifested in the work of poets who work by non-rational habit or talent? (ii) Why does Aristotle believe that the pleasure taken in imitation qua imitation involves rational inference? (iii) What does Aristotle mean when he contrasts history (concerned with the particular) and poetry (concerned with the universal)? (iv) How is Aristotle's insistence on universality and rationality in the construction of poetic plots to be reconciled with his willingness to tolerate irrationalities and implausibilities?

Platon und die bildende Kunst: eine Revision

Plato’s statements on art have met with countless commentators and almost as many different interpretations. In most cases, comments and hints that are scattered through various dialogues are taken out of context and played off against each other – depending on whether the intention is to portray Plato as a modern art lover or as an ageing political reactionary. In the face of the confusing range of contending opinions, there is an urgent need to examine and clarify the textual basis in Plato. For this purpose, a meticulous analysis of Book 10 of the Politeia is initially carried out – the only part of the corpus of Plato’s works that is concerned with art in detail and exclusively. The results are surprisingly clear. The corrupting and dangerous aspect of art is not attributed to individual artists or a specific artistic orientation, nor to the style of the depiction, nor to the content that is narrated or presented ; instead, it is ascribed to its essential nature as the μίμησις of a μίμησις. Since even the objects of sense perception are imitations of the archetypal Ideas, which are ultimately accessible only to rational cognition, the artist is an imitator of something imitated. He merely touches on the (subjective) appearance of a reality that is in turn already a defective, mutable and ephemeral imitation of the only true, immutable and eternal archetypal Ideas. As the imitation of an imitation, art is insurmountably distant from truth and knowledge, ontologically and therefore also epistemologically worthless and useless – and also damaging, because it attempts to shackle us and domesticate us at a level three steps below truth. However, it not only holds us captive, but also corrupts us even further by appealing not to reason, but to the lower part of the soul with its desires and affections. It is because of this that it is corrupting and dangerous, initially for the individual character and individual spiritual welfare, and ultimately – through the individual – also for human society as a whole. Art thus creates precisely the situation which for the philosopher represents the fundamentally distorted condition from which he is attempting to liberate people. Art is constantly re-fastening the shackles that the philosopher releases. This is why art has to be excluded from Plato’s ideal state, with philosophy alone taking its place. The condemnation of all forms of art could not be expressed more clearly. Despite this, repeated efforts have been made to weaken the condemnation or even disprove its existence, either in order to save art from Plato or, conversely, to save Plato from condemning art. To achieve this, alleged contradictions between Books 10 and 3 of the Politeia have been pointed out (1) ; a differentiation or alteration in Plato’s understanding of the concept of μίμησις has been postulated ; and reference has been made to passages in Plato’s works in which, it is claimed, the philosopher concedes that art has direct access to the world of the Ideas (2) or in which he speaks of the artist’s divine inspiration (3), as well as the numerous passages that discuss Beauty (4). Finally, it is claimed that Plato did not condemn all art, but only a certain contemporary trend in art (5, 6), or more generally, only illusionistic art in contrast to an abstract form of art (7) – namely Egyptian art (8). In the second part of the study, these lines of argumentation are discussed individually and in detail and their content is tested. In each case, the findings obtained initially in the analysis of Book 10 of the Politeia are confirmed. The present study does not offer any new hypotheses ; instead, its goal is to use a detailed and differentiated examination of the relevant texts to clearly distinguish Plato’s view of art from later neo-Platonic views, as well as from obfuscations created by modern interpreters, in order to obtain a secure basis for future investigations of Plato’s view of art in particular, as well as of ancient aesthetics in general. The extensive review of the secondary literature also documents part of the history of twentieth-century scholarship.

Changing society by changing the thinking culture about mining hazard: a review essay on 'Safety-culture and the logic of hazard'

This review essay discusses Shepperson's article in terms of Peirce's pragmaticism, a logical theory that interprets thought in terms of operation and control. Peirce's central proposition is that there is an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational purpose. In his view, the function of thinking is to produce habits of action. Most importantly, perhaps, for him the rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future-the ultimate test of what truth means.1

Empirical psychology, common sense, and Kant’s empirical markers for moral responsibility

This paper explains the empirical markers by which Kant thinks that one can identify moral responsibility. After explaining the problem of discerning such markers within a Kantian framework, I briefly explain Kant’s empirical psychology. I then argue that Kant’s empirical markers for moral responsibility—linked to higher faculties of cognition—are not sufficient conditions for moral responsibility, primarily because they are empirical characteristics subject to natural laws. Next, I argue that these markers are not necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Given Kant’s transcendental idealism, even an entity that lacks these markers could be free and morally responsible, although as a matter of fact Kant thinks that none are. Given that they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions, I discuss the status of Kant’s claim that higher faculties are empirical markers of moral responsibility. Drawing on connections between Kant’s ethical theory and ‘common rational cognition’ (4:393), I suggest that Kant’s theory of empirical markers can be traced to ordinary common sense beliefs about responsibility. This suggestion helps explain both why empirical markers are important and what the limits of empirical psychology are within Kant’s account of moral responsibility.

Role of affect, expectancies and dual processes of cognition in predicting adult cigarette smoking

This study examined the role of affect, smoking expectancies and mode of cognition in predicting cigarette use in a sample of 185 Australian adults. Mediation analysis indicated that the relationship between respondents' affective associations about smoking and their cigarette use was partially mediated by smoking expectancies. The present results also indicated that preferred mode of cognition (rational vs. experiential) moderated the relationship between affective associations and cigarette use. Affect was a significant predictor of cigarette use for all respondents except those with a strong, exclusive preference for rational cognition. No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that preferred mode of cognition moderated the relationship between smoking expectancies and cigarette use. The results of the study are discussed in the context of Epstein's (1994) cognitive experiential self theory and Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor's (2002) affect heuristic model.

The Peikovian Doctrine of the Arbitrary Assertion

Abstract The doctrine of the arbitrary assertion is a key part of Objectivist epistemology as elaborated by Leonard Peikoff. For Peikoff, assertions unsupported by evidence are neither true nor false; they have no context or place in the hierarchy of conceptual knowledge; they are meaningless and paralyze rational cognition; their production is proof of irrationality. A thorough examination of the doctrine reveals worrisomely unclear standards of evidence and a jumble of contradictory claims about which assertions are arbitrary, when they are arbitrary, and what ought to be done about them when they are. A wholesale rejection of the doctrine is recommended.

The Peikovian Doctrine of the Arbitrary Assertion

Abstract The doctrine of the arbitrary assertion is a key part of Objectivist epistemology as elaborated by Leonard Peikoff. For Peikoff, assertions unsupported by evidence are neither true nor false; they have no context or place in the hierarchy of conceptual knowledge; they are meaningless and paralyze rational cognition; their production is proof of irrationality. A thorough examination of the doctrine reveals worrisomely unclear standards of evidence and a jumble of contradictory claims about which assertions are arbitrary, when they are arbitrary, and what ought to be done about them when they are. A wholesale rejection of the doctrine is recommended.

Pleasure, Freedom and Grace: Schiller's “Completion” of Kant's Ethics*

Kant famously begins his analysis of what he calls “common rational cognition” about morality by proclaiming that only the good will has unlimited value (Gr 4: 393; 49).1 The good will's supreme va...

Consumer Thinking Style, Task Congruence, and Performance: New Measures of Task-Specific Experiential and Rational Cognition

Decades of theoretical and empirical research in social and cognitive psychology provide strong evidence that consumers process information in two distinct and qualitatively different ways: rational and experiential. However, there has been surprisingly little research attention devoted to explicitly measuring how situational influences directly impact thinking style. Further, attempts to simultaneously measure the two dimensions of thinking style as either situation-specific or as an enduring state are even fewer and lack validation in a broad context. In five studies, we develop and validate a new instrument for measuring experiential and rational situation-specific thinking style in the context of a range of performance tasks designed to induce primarily rational or experiential cognition, as well as in the context of differing motivations toward the same task. We establish congruence effects related to the fit of situation-specific thinking style and the nature of the task on performance outcomes; also, we show that the prediction of task performance and related outcomes from dispositional thinking style is completely mediated by situation-specific thinking style.

Analysis in theCritique of Pure Reason

It is widely supposed that the principal task of Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasonis to carry out some kind of analysis of experience. Commentators as profoundly at odds on fundamental points of interpretation as P. F. Strawson and Patricia Kitcher share this supposition. In a letter to J. S. Beck, Kant seems to endorse this view himself, referring to some unspecified stretch of theCritiqueas an ‘analysis of experience in general’. The idea that theCritiqueis engaged in an analysis of experience accords well with an attractive conception of Critical philosophy as making something explicit that is generally only implicit in our cognitive lives. After all, the categorical imperative is no innovation of Kant's practical philosophy, but rather is meant to be revealed as the animating principle of ‘ordinary moral rational cognition’. Likewise, the principles revealed in Kant's theoretical philosophy should be nothing other than the principles that necessarily animate ordinary empirical cognition; and Kant says that experience is, or is a mode of, empirical cognition. For this reason, it is undeniably compelling to think of theCritiqueas offering some kind of analysis of experience.

Editorial

Editorial

Violations of coherence in subjective probability: A representational and assessment processes account

Coherent judgment is a cardinal feature of rational cognition. Six experiments revealed systematic violations of coherence in probability judgment in which participants assigned different probabilities to mathematically equiprobable events. Experiments 1–5 revealed a strict refocusing effect: Compared to an occurrence frame, a non-occurrence frame resulted in higher estimates if base-rate evidence favored occurrence, lower estimates if evidence favored non-occurrence, and similar estimates if evidence supported indifference. Moreover, Experiments 5 and 6 revealed a pessimistic bias in which the less favorable of two equiprobable events was assigned greater probability. The findings support a Representational and Assessment Processes account (RAP) in which subjective probability is influenced by the perceived compatibility between representations of focal events and representations of evidence.