Rational Choice Model Research Articles

A rational choice model of the biased recall of information

This study introduces a rational choice model for a behavioral phenomenon known as differential retrievability, or biased recall. The phenomenon is characterized by the fact that individuals are more likely to recall information which is consistent with their initial preference, expectation, or belief. The model endogenizes the recall of information and ascribes utility functions to agents who must allocate scarce memory resources to pieces of information that are relevant to a future decision. While the biased recall of information was a detriment to groups in a group decision paradigm known as the hidden profile problem, this work shows that this is due to the discrepancy between the subjects' priors and the skewed information structure they were presented. A second model finds the optimal bias in information recall for a single decision maker who must use information from two distinct times to make a policy decision.

Beyond Rational Decision-Making: Modelling the Influence of Cognitive Biases on the Dynamics of Vaccination Coverage.

BackgroundTheoretical studies predict that it is not possible to eradicate a disease under voluntary vaccination because of the emergence of non-vaccinating “free-riders” when vaccination coverage increases. A central tenet of this approach is that human behaviour follows an economic model of rational choice. Yet, empirical studies reveal that vaccination decisions do not necessarily maximize individual self-interest. Here we investigate the dynamics of vaccination coverage using an approach that dispenses with payoff maximization and assumes that risk perception results from the interaction between epidemiology and cognitive biases.MethodsWe consider a behaviour-incidence model in which individuals perceive actual epidemiological risks as a function of their opinion of vaccination. As a result of confirmation bias, sceptical individuals (negative opinion) overestimate infection cost while pro-vaccines individuals (positive opinion) overestimate vaccination cost. We considered a feedback between individuals and their environment as individuals could change their opinion, and thus the way they perceive risks, as a function of both the epidemiology and the most common opinion in the population.ResultsFor all parameter values investigated, the infection is never eradicated under voluntary vaccination. For moderately contagious diseases, oscillations in vaccination coverage emerge because individuals process epidemiological information differently depending on their opinion. Conformism does not generate oscillations but slows down the cultural response to epidemiological change.ConclusionFailure to eradicate vaccine preventable disease emerges from the model because of cognitive biases that maintain heterogeneity in how people perceive risks. Thus, assumptions of economic rationality and payoff maximization are not mandatory for predicting commonly observed dynamics of vaccination coverage. This model shows that alternative notions of rationality, such as that of ecological rationality whereby individuals use simple cognitive heuristics, offer promising new avenues for modelling vaccination behaviour.

Duhem como precursor de Popper, Kuhn e Lakatos sobre a metodologia da escolha racional de teorias: da dualidade à trialidade metodológica

A tese é de que a concepção de Duhem da ciência antecipa, entre outros elementos, o modelo de escolha de teorias científicas associado com as concepções de Popper, Lakatos e Kuhn. No contexto do seu debate com Poincaré, Duhem propõe um modelo metodológico de escolha racional de teorias formado, também, de componentes extralógicos. O modelo substitui a metodologia bipartida, teoria e natureza, por uma tripartida, confrontação entre duas teorias e natureza. Tal metodologia verifica-se adequada para descrever o processo de escolha de teoria formado das etapas da refutação e rejeição. Ambas as propostas revelam seu enfoque histórico-crítico cuja tese é a interdependência entre história e teoria da ciência. A interdependência configura-se num laboratório para a elaboração, a avaliação e teste das propostas metafísicas e metodológicas para a construção de uma teoria da ciência.

Riker and Rokkan

This special issue studies the strategic interaction between major state-wide and regional parties in a political setting defined by multiple, potentially cross-cutting, political issues pertaining to the economy and the territorial organization of multi-national states. Through this framework, this special issue locates itself decisively in the behaviorist tradition of studying political competition. Stemming from the classical works of Riker and the Rochester school, and focusing on rational choice models, this tradition has influenced a lively literature on party strategies. This concluding article of the special issue argues that the findings of the substantive contributions create a bridge between the strategic, Rikerian literature they stem from and seek to engage with, and more sociological approaches to the study of political parties that focus on the structural features of politics reaching back to the works of Lipset and Rokkan. I suggest that, ultimately, this special issue demonstrates the socially, historically, and institutionally bounded opportunities of political parties. Fundamentally, the special issue makes a significant contribution to the strategic literature by suggesting structural limits to strategic behavior.

The rational adolescent: Strategic information processing during decision making revealed by eye tracking

Adolescence is often viewed as a time of irrational, risky decision-making—despite adolescents’ competence in other cognitive domains. In this study, we examined the strategies used by adolescents (N=30) and young adults (N=47) to resolve complex, multi-outcome economic gambles. Compared to adults, adolescents were more likely to make conservative, loss-minimizing choices consistent with economic models. Eye-tracking data showed that prior to decisions, adolescents acquired more information in a more thorough manner; that is, they engaged in a more analytic processing strategy indicative of trade-offs between decision variables. In contrast, young adults’ decisions were more consistent with heuristics that simplified the decision problem, at the expense of analytic precision. Collectively, these results demonstrate a counter-intuitive developmental transition in economic decision making: adolescents’ decisions are more consistent with rational-choice models, while young adults more readily engage task-appropriate heuristics.

Prejudice, Exclusion, and Economic Disadvantage

A central hypothesis about discrimination is that prejudice forces the stigmatized into low-paying, undesirable jobs. Prejudice clearly leads to exclusion. But surprisingly, evidence linking exclusion to disadvantage is mixed. We address this issue theoretically, providing a formal rational choice model combining arguments from sociology (on prejudice) and economics (on competition). Our theory suggests that economic organization is crucial. In economies dominated by monopoly, oligarchy, tradition, or government, prejudice may reduce some workers’ pay, and a disadvantageous secondary labor market may emerge. By contrast, in competitive free markets, exclusionary discrimination often occurs but does not reduce workers’ pay, nor does it induce a disadvantageous secondary labor market. Our theory suggests the conventional analytic approach to discrimination is misguided: Exclusion does not necessarily imply disadvantage; a shortfall in pay does not necessarily imply that the lower paid worker is disadvantaged; and analysis should focus on the overall subjective well-being or utility derived from a job, not on pay alone.

On the Heuristic Use of Formal Models in International Relations Theory

What is the epistemological status of rational choice models in International Relations (IR) theory, and by what standards should they be evaluated? The literature using these models is becoming increasingly bifurcated between their use to generate predictive hypotheses, which are then evaluated by empirical, usually quantitative, analysis, and their use to contribute to a generalized deductive model of international politics based on the assumptions of rational choice theory, narrowly defined. A third use of these methods, as heuristic models, based on a Weberian philosophy of social science, remains an eminently useful tool in the study of IR, but is becoming increasingly marginalized. The application of evaluative standards designed for other uses of rational choice modeling is inappropriate to the use of this technique for heuristic purposes. An evaluative standard of usefulness in helping us to understand particular political events or discourses, rather than one of predictive accuracy or contribution to a broader effort to model IR, is appropriate for the heuristic use of rational choice models.

SEXUAL SELECTION. Irrationality in mate choice revealed by túngara frogs.

Mate choice models derive from traditional microeconomic decision theory and assume that individuals maximize their Darwinian fitness by making economically rational decisions. Rational choices exhibit regularity, whereby the relative strength of preferences between options remains stable when additional options are presented. We tested female frogs with three simulated males who differed in relative call attractiveness and call rate. In binary choice tests, females' preferences favored stimulus caller B over caller A; however, with the addition of an inferior "decoy" C, females reversed their preferences and chose A over B. These results show that the relative valuation of mates is not independent of inferior alternatives in the choice set and therefore cannot be explained with the rational choice models currently used in sexual selection theory.

The assumption of rational choice theory in Alfred Adler's theory of crime: Unraveling and reconciling the contradiction in Adlerian theory through synthesis and critique

Abstract Alfred Adler is often introduced and discussed incorrectly as one of Freud's students and as a psychoanalytic theorist in criminology and psychology textbooks. While thinkers such as Freud and Jung theorize about crime in tangential ways, as almost an afterthought to their accounts of neurosis and personality, Alfred Adler was one of the few pioneers in the history of psychology who had an actual theory of crime. Yet, Adler's writings on crime, its causes and assumptions have been largely overlooked in contemporary research. While Adler espoused the view that crime represents a “useless” response to the social demands of life, we argue that Adler's theory of crime presupposes a rational choice model of criminal behavior, thus mirroring the Classical School perspective on crime. This paper provides a synthesis and a critique of Alfred Adler's theory of crime.

Prejudice, Exclusion, and Economic Disadvantage: A Theory

A central hypothesis about discrimination is that prejudice forces the stigmatized into low paying, undesirable jobs. Prejudice clearly leads to exclusion. But surprisingly, evidence linking exclusion to disadvantage is mixed. We address this issue theoretically, providing a formal rational choice model combining arguments from sociology (on prejudice) and economics (on competition). Our theory suggests that economic organization is crucial. In economies dominated by monopoly, oligarchy, tradition, or government, prejudice may reduce some workers' pay and a disadvantageous secondary labor market may emerge. By contrast in competitive free markets, exclusionary discrimination often occurs but does not reduce workers' pay, nor does it induce a disadvantageous secondary labor market. Our theory suggests the conventional analytic approach to discrimination is misguided: exclusion does not necessarily imply disadvantage; a shortfall in pay does not necessarily imply that the lower paid worker is disadvantaged; and analysis should focus on the overall subjective well-being or utility derived from a job, not on pay alone.

Neo-classical sociology

This article calls for a new theoretical synthesis that overcomes the fragmentation, specialization and professionalization within the social sciences. As an alternative to utilitarianism and the colonization of the social sciences by rational choice models, it proposes a new articulation of social theory, the Studies and moral, social and political philosophy. Based on a positive anthropology that finds its inspiration in Marcel Mauss’s classic essay on the gift, it recommends a return to classical social theory and explores articulations between theories of reciprocity, care and recognition.

Culture as a Solution to Estonia's 'Singing Revolution': An Extended Rational Choice Model

Does culture play a role in successful revolutionary collective action? In rational choice theory revolutionary movements are paradoxical because each potential revolutionary faces a participation problem, and a first mover or leadership problem. In previous rational choice models, revolutions succeed where participants deliberately designed institutions that increased individuals' incentive to participate. This paper extends the framework of the existing rational choice models to account for the role of culture in each participant's cost-benefit calculation of revolutionary participation. I explore the case of The Singing Revolution in late 1980's Soviet Estonia, and find that ethnic Estonians used ostracism, and their ancient cultural traditions and beliefs to overcome the two collective action problems when they successfully organized mass singing protests against the Soviet regime in the summer of 1988.

Endogenous Parliamentarism

What are the factors driving the choice of the form of government? So far, it has been argued that higher income inequality makes a parliamentarian system less likely. Using a rational-choice model and focusing on a set of assumptions that fits well with unstable democracies, this paper finds that the composition of the constitutional assembly does play a key role for the choice of form of government. Who holds the majority in the constitutional assembly has a strong effect on the choice of form of government, especially when the policy conflict within the society (measured by income inequality in the model presented here) is high. This finding supports the case for a stronger focus on institutional details.

Lobbying on the integrated reporting framework

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine formal participation in the early phase of the International Integrated Reporting Council’s (IIRC’s) standard-setting. The objective of the paper is to shed light on the characteristics of lobbying parties and the determinants of their lobbying behavior toward the IIRC. Additionally, the most important points of contestation regarding the IIRC’s initial proposal for integrated reporting are identified and discussed. Design/methodology/approach – The authors analyze comment letters issued toward the IIRC’s 2011 discussion paper on the basis of a content analysis. The analysis is guided mainly by Sutton’s (1984) rational-choice model of lobbying and by findings from extant financial accounting lobbying research. The analysis of the data is both quantitative and qualitative. Findings – The paper improves the understanding of the political nature of standard-setting in the context of integrated reporting. Among other things, the authors find that comment letters toward the IIRC’s discussion paper are mainly written by large multinational firms (as opposed to small- and medium-sized ones) and by preparers (as opposed to users). The authors also observe active lobbying by sustainability service firms and professional bodies which tend to take a critical position vis-à-vis the discussion paper’s emphasis on investor needs and shareholder value creation. Moreover, the qualitative analysis reveals that respondents voice different concerns regarding, for instance, the scope of audience of integrated reporting, issues of materiality and the relationship between integrated reporting and other existing reporting frameworks. Research limitations/implications – The analysis is limited to a consideration of the 2011 discussion paper of the IIRC. The IIRC’s more recent and forthcoming proposals will likely provide a basis to extend the paper’s findings and allow investigation of the role of lobbying for the further development of the framework. Originality/value – The paper is, to the best of the knowledge, the first one to explore lobbying behavior by means of comment letters in the context of integrated reporting.

Dissenting (in part) with the Dissent: A Response to James Johnson

AbstractAs James Johnson largely restates many of my points raised in my overview of rational choice contributions to political science, I focus in my response on one point of disagreement. While Johnson implies that rational choice models have no empirical content, I argue that this is based on a very partial reading of several contributions. As Johnson refrains from offering any indications on what social science theory, according to his standards, actually has empirical content, his critique is unsatisfying.

Editorial — Behavioral and psychological aspects of b2b pricing

In this paper we define core research questions falling within the domain of behavioral and psychological aspects of B2B pricing. We then present the papers accepted for this special issue. Central research questions are, in our view, all those instances where decisions about price violate basic principles of rational choice. Decisions about price involve two main actors. First is the customer. We are interested in how customers' purchase decisions in B2B exhibit behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with rational choice models. Second is the manager. Managers set prices and in this process are equally susceptible to violating fundamental principles of rational choice. For this special issue we have been able to accept six papers. We welcome the debate that these papers are likely to start.

Toward a general theoretical framework for judgment and decision-making.

Over the past 30 years, behavioral and experimental economists and psychologists have made great strides in identifying phenomena that cannot be explained by the classical model of rational choice—anomalies in the discounting of future wealth, present bias, loss aversion, the endowment effect, and aversion to ambiguity, for example. In response to these findings, there has been an enormous amount of research by behavioral scientists aimed at modeling and understanding the nature of these biases1. However, these models, typically assuming situation-specific psychological processes, have shed limited light on the conditions for and boundaries of the different biases, substantially neglecting their relative importance and joint effect. Much less attention has been paid to the investigation of the links between different biases. As a consequence of this approach, it is not always clear which model should be used to predict behavior in a new setting, and maybe a more general theory is needed. We believe that the field of neuroeconomics, which has experienced a rapid growth over the past decade, can play an important role in bridging these gaps, contributing to the building of a general theoretical framework for judgment and decision-making behaviors.

Comparing theories' performance in predicting violence

The stakes of choosing the best theory as a basis for violence prevention and offender rehabilitation are high. However, no single theory of violence has ever been universally accepted by a majority of established researchers. Psychiatry, psychology and sociology are each subdivided into different schools relying upon different premises. All theories can produce empirical evidence for their validity, some of them stating the opposite of each other. Calculating different models with multivariate logistic regression on a dataset of N=21,312 observations and ninety-two influences allowed a direct comparison of the performance of operationalizations of some of the most important schools. The psychopathology model ranked as the best model in terms of predicting violence right after the comprehensive interdisciplinary model. Next came the rational choice and lifestyle model and third the differential association and learning theory model. Other models namely the control theory model, the childhood-trauma model and the social conflict and reaction model turned out to have low sensitivities for predicting violence. Nevertheless, all models produced acceptable results in predictions of a non-violent outcome.

Assessing Racial Disparities in Parole Release

In a rational choice model of parole release, a color-blind parole board seeking to minimize violations would release all prisoners below a certain risk threshold. To test this prediction, we extend the outcome-test methodology used in assessing discrimination in police searches. We overcome the inframarginality critique by taking advantage of strategic timing of release: within each racial group, violation rates are equalized for a given sentence length. We use the National Corrections Reporting Program data, which record all parole-release decisions in the United States. We find that violation rates are consistently higher for African American parolees, a result not consistent with a parole board bias against African Americans. This conclusion is robust to a variety of tests, including ruling out postrelease discrimination. Evidence on the timing of release suggests a policy aimed at limiting racial disparities in time served rather than in violation rates, which favors fairness over efficiency.

Youth finding meaning through a larger sense of community.

In his 1998 book, The Corrosion of Character, Richard Sennett observed the following: Adjustment and change is woven through human history. Natural disasters, wars, economic depressions have upset the status quo and engendered anxieties. Sennett proposed a collective solution to this state of precarity: A larger sense of community, and a fuller sense of character, is required by the increasing number of people who, in modern capitalism, are doomed to fail. This article begins with a discussion of the implications of the new economy for mental health and draws from Sennett's first image in which individuals are on their own to manage lives made precarious by flexible capital. The remainder of the article draws examples from my program of work on adolescents' political theories and interpretations of the social contract that binds them with fellow members of their society. The case is made that civic engagement is beneficial for young people and for democracy, and draws attention to the practices in developmental settings that enable adolescents to experience a larger sense of community. Rational choice models of human behavior reflect a rather negative view of human beings-that people are driven by self-interest and will make decisions that maximize benefits to the self at the expense of benefits to others or to the common good. Both individuals and society benefit when teenagers feel like they are connected to other people and institutions in their community. (PsycINFO Database Record Language: en