Rational Choice Explanations Research Articles

Filling in the Background

Commonsense rational choice explanations exploit a form of intentional causation, an idealized version of which underpins the formal rational modelling of modern economic theory. Following John Searle, it is argued that the deliberations and activities of economic actors do not bottom out in intentional states, but in various nonintentional or 'Background' capacities and dispositions. It is shown why the formal version of rational choice theory employed in economics does not have the resources to address such capacities and dispositions, and that the prevailing commitment to this theory thereby reinforces their neglect. Examples are given of the impact of Background phenomena in the economic realm.

An Analytic Revolution in Comparative Politics?

Over the last decade rational choice and formal theory have gained increasing prominence in comparative politics, portending a potential analytic revolution in the field. Like the behavioral revolution of the 1960s, the analytic revolution of the 1990s is motivated in part by the desire to make comparative politics more rigorous by utilizing analytical tools such as game theory and spatial models developed largely by economists and positivist scholars of American government. The three books under review exemplify this new approach. They share a common commitment to rational choice explanations based on the principle of methodological individualism and are sensitive to the dilemmas of collective action and credible commitment. Their particular innovation, however, lies in their claim that these new analytic techniques are complementary to historical and case-oriented approaches and, together with them, produce explanations superior to either in isolation. Furthermore, in building upon the pathbreaking insights of Douglass North they share a broad interest in institutions and historical institutional change.' This review will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the new approach and assess its implications for the future of comparative politics. The most significant contribution of these books is their combination of research strategies that are generally perceived to be incompatible. Indeed, these books claim that, by linking rigorous analytical theories more closely to historical, empirical, case-oriented data, scholars can achieve a new methodological happy medium, even a best of all worlds.2 The particular significance of this innovation is its potential to establish (or capture) a theoretical and methodological middle ground in political science and bridge frequently isolated debates within the discipline. It is

Representation by Deliberation: Changes in the Rules of Deliberation in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1844

In a legislative setting, open access to the floor of a legislature and full debate are hallmarks of republican liberty. Yet the early U.S. House of Representatives closed access to the floor and restricted debate. A rational choice explanation of control based on the degree of party conflict is tested using a database of all rule change proposals regarding floor access and debate in the first through the twenty-eighth congresses. I find that easements are not connected to partisan conflict or the lack of the same, but restrictions are. The majority party initiated restrictions to strengthen its powers on the floor to compensate for its weakness. The minority party took advantage of divided majority-party coalitions to limit the severity of majority control.

Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions

As stated elsewhere in this issue, we cannot claim to explain an institution's origin just by the functions it serves. In part thismay be because of the cognitive limitations of those actors who are instrumental in institutional formation and institutional change. But even more clearly, it is the case that rational instrumental choice does not imply functional institutions. Just as rational choice in a prisoner's dilemma may result in inefficient policies, rational choice by actors with conflicting preferencesfor institutions may result in institutions that are suboptimal. Examples of rational choice explanations of dysfunctional institutions are provided in the area of bureaucracy, regulation, healthcare, and budgeting. I argue that the paradoxes and impossibility results of rational choice theory offer the best insights currently available into the persistent inefficiencies of the world ofpolitics.

Elite Opinion and Media Diffusion

The existing literature on environmental attitudes is dominated by two theoretical frameworks: cultural and rational choice explanations. This article proposes and examines two additional explanatory models: elite opinion leadership and media diffusion explanations. Compared to the dominant models, the two hypotheses introduced in this article have received little attention in the literature. Using the 1989 Harris survey, this article seeks to explore whether and how well public environmental attitudes are determined by elite opinion leadership and media diffusion in a cross-national context. The results of multiple regressions at both aggregate and individual levels demonstrate strong and significant direct elite influence on public environmental attitudes but challenge the direct media effect views in recent public opinion research.

Rational Choice v. Republican Moment Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73

A conventional wisdom within environmental law scholarship states that rational actor theories of politics cannot explain the major federal environmental laws that were enacted in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The reason: large groups of self-interested citizens, each anticipating only modest gains from such laws, would not surmount collective action obstacles so as to prevail over small groups of industrial concerns, each facing substantial costs if stringent laws were passed. A common alternative theory posits that these laws were the product of a republican moment when government enacted laws based on moral or political principles. This article reassesses that debate and concludes that rational choice explanations have been too easily dismissed. For citizens, the critical action is casting a vote for candidates committed to protecting the environment. The article analyzes ways in which citizens whose concern about the environment is self-interested could surmount collective action problems to provide the catalyst for environmental legislation through their ballot box power. Empirical evidence from the relevant time period suggests that conditions at that time were consistent with this explanation. Hence, the battle over explanations of our environmental laws remains unresolved. The best explanation is most likely one that acknowledges the role both of self-interest and of political principle.

Political Culture Versus Rational Choice: Explaining Responses to Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

There has been considerable disagreement among political scientists over the relative merits of political culture versus rational choice explanations of democratic and liberal norms and commitments. However, empirical tests of their relative explanatory power using quantitative evidence have been in short supply. This article employs national probability sample surveys conducted in 1994 to assess differences between Czechs and Slovaks in the expression of democratic norms and liberal attitudes with respect to economic, political, social and ethnic issues. The applicability of an explanation focusing on long-standing cultural differences between the two countries is compared with a rational choice explanation based on national differences in their recent experiences of political and economic transition. It is shown that differences in the expression of support for marketization and democracy in the two countries can be explained relatively parsimoniously in rational choice terms. The explanatory contribution of political culture appears to relate only to a narrow range of attitudes and values.

Vote splitting as insurance against uncertainty

The present article offers a rational choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a tool risk-averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.

Incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout: An empirical test

This study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective. It reviews the “paradox of voting” and finds one model, which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders, to be a promising solution. It tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout, using an ecological analysis of turnout in five Montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections: the 1993 Canadian federal, the 1994 Quebec provincial, and the 1994 Montreal municipal elections. Data on mobilization are taken from semi-directed interviews with association leaders in each community. The results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election. The overall results are weak, indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout.

Interpreting the dynamics of public housing: Cultural and rational choice explanations

This article uses culture of poverty and rational choice theories of poverty to explain how quickly nonelderly household heads leave public housing. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics serve as the basis for the analysis. Although a significant proportion of all household heads have public housing spells lasting five or more years, the majority have spells lasting less than five years. The availability of other housing options has a strong impact on how quickly individuals move out of public housing. Family structure and human capital play a more modest role. To the extent that one's childhood experiences affect the likelihood of exiting public housing, they appear to do so mostly through their effect on the acquisition of human capital. Finally, the evidence presented is inconsistent with the notion that public housing is a trap from which it is more difficult to escape the longer one lives in it.

Rethinking Religious Social Action: What Is "Rational" about Rational-Choice Theory?

The rational-choice/market-model of religions really consists of two, separable parts: a model of religious behavior plus a rational-choice explanation of why that behavior occurs. This article examines three key theoretical assumptions of the latter explanation. It shows two of these to be false and the third to be so vague as to be useless. This undercuts a rational-choice psychology as an explanation for religious actions. It undercuts, however, neither the utility of the market-model itself nor of a rational-choice model of human behavior (as opposed to action). Together these can describe the overall structure of the religious marketplace, but cannot — and need not — describe the subjective actions of religious persons.

Algumas limitações das explicações da escolha racional na Ciência Política e na Sociologia

O artigo tem por objetivo construir uma análise crítica das explicações da teoria da escolha racional nas ciências sociais. O argumento consiste em quatro partes. Primeiro, os teóricos da escolha racional não conseguem reconhecer completamente a diferença entre uma pessoa agindo como se fosse racional e uma pessoa agindo movida pela racionalidade. Em segundo lugar, embora a maioria desses teóricos aceite que a racionalidade está algumas vezes incorporada ao conhecimento prático das pessoas, no momento da apresentação de seus resultados estes mesmos pesquisadores acabam por invocar propósitos ou objetivos. Além disto, uma vez aceita a possibilidade de conhecimento prático, não fica claro em que medida a teoria é distinta de outras teorias rivais. Terceiro, é possível reconstruir qualquer tipo de ação em termos de uma narrativa racional, e portanto não fica claro quais formas de ação são possíveis falsificadoras da teoria. Em quarto lugar, os teóricos da escolha racional assumem erroneamente que a racionalidade não muda culturalmente.

Sociological Rational Choice Theory

Although rational choice theory has made considerable advances in other social sciences, its progress in sociology has been limited. Some sociologists' reservations about rational choice arise from a misunderstanding of the theory. The first part of this essay therefore introduces rational choice as a general theoretical perspective, or family of theories, which explains social outcomes by constructing models of individual action and social context. “Thin” models of individual action are mute about actors' motivations, while “thick” models specify them ex ante. Other sociologists' reservations, however, stem from doubts about the empirical adequacy of rational choice explanations. To this end, the bulk of the essay reviews a sample of recent studies that provide empirical support for particular rational choice explanations in a broad spectrum of substantive areas in sociology. Particular attention is paid to studies on the family, gender, and religion, for these subareas often are considered least amenable to understanding in terms of rational choice logic.

How Bumble-Bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation

This paper confirms the existence of public interest groups as a theoretical puzzle for an Olson type (economically-driven) rational choice explanation. It systematically reviews different theoretical approaches that challenge this appearance of paradox. The paper also introduces some British survey data. It concludes that rational choice analysis must subsume non-material incentives, but shows that discussions predicated on conceptions of rationality other than that used by Olson do not imply that participation is a problem to be explained. It also points to the importance of group activity in shaping the preferences of potential members and in stimulating membership.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TIANANMEN SQUARE

The authors offer a rational choice explanation of the 1989 Chinese crackdown on peaceful, pro-democracy student protesters in Tiananmen Square. The explanation is based on strategic considerations within the larger context of conflict between the central and provincial governments. The central government's reaction to the student uprising provides information to the provinces regarding its subsequent willingness and ability to use force against a province. They analyze a game-theoretic model illustrating the argument and present evidence documenting the growing central-local rivalry in China. The authors also apply insights from the analysis to other transitions.

Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory

Prospect theory, a psychological theory of decision making that has shed new light on foreign policy choices, maintains that people tend to take high risks when facing losses, while proceeding with great caution when anticipating gains. This article introduces prospect theory to the study of comparative politics in order to account for the bold economic policy choices that presidents made in crisis-ridden Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, and the surprising degree of popular support that such risky and costly measures commanded in these countries; and conversely, to explain the cautious course of reform recently pursued in Chile, a country with better economic prospects. Theories based on rational choice, the leading approach to political decision making, did not anticipate these decisions. Particularly, these theories predicted that fear for their political survival would prevent democratic leaders from enacting tough economic policies. This article thus suggests that hypotheses derived from prospect theory serve as a useful alternative to extant rational choice explanations in elucidating decision making during crises. Why did democratic governments in contemporary Argentina, Brazil, and Peru run enormous risks by enacting tough shock programs of neoliberal adjustment and restructuring?1 These reforms impose high costs on many sectors of society, can elicit fierce resistance from powerful groups, and have a low likelihood of success. Why did governments in fledgling democracies jeopardize their fate by embarking on such risky measures? And why did large numbers of people who knew they would be hurt by neoliberal reforms endorse their adoption? Why, on the other hand, did many Venezuelans protest violently against similarly harsh adjustment measures which their president, Carlos Andres Perez, boldly enacted in 1989? Why, by contrast, has the government in Chile's new democracy avoided all risk and accepted the basic outlines of the free-market model imposed by General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), which it had severely criticized before coming to power? And why have most Chileans supported this highly cautious stance?

Explaining the distribution of State funds for national road investments between counties in Norway: Engineering standards or vote trading?

Road investment planning in Norway is officially based on cost-benefit analyses, but the results of such analyses have been shown to have little impact on policy. This paper analyses the distribution of state investment funds for national roads between counties in Norway, trying to find a rational choice explanation of the departure of road investment policy from cost-benefit considerations. Three models are proposed to explain the distribution of investment funds between counties: (1) the highway sufficiency rating model, (2) the net economic benefit model and (3) the vote trading model. Analyses for 1990–93 and 1994–97 investment planning terms support the highway sufficiency rating model and the vote trading model. The net economic benefit model is not supported. The highway sufficiency rating model and the vote trading model are highly correlated, making their relative explanatory contributions impossible to identify.

The Theory of Heroic Defeats: A Mixed Motivation Approach

The category of heroic action is important in both everyday life and the wider social context. This article argues that interest in the notion of heroic actions and heroic defeats also brings out an important set of sociological problems, such as disagreements on identity, norms, and rational choice explanations. Illustrations are provided from recent analyses of union militancy in Britain and Italy, and of the student movement in Beijing. Different versions of the critique of rational choice theory often take norm-guided action as a point of departure. Another version of this critique is represented by theories of new social movements and identity maintenance. The article suggests that rational choice theory is more useful than some of its opponents would have it; yet the general argument favors a mixed motivation approach. The discussion points out some of the strengths and limitations of different explanatory perspectives, and some of the links between them.

Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation

In recent elections, voters supported initiatives to limit the number of terms that their representatives may serve, yet at the same time, overwhelmingly re-elected their incumbents. We provide a theoretical explanation for this and other puzzles associated with voting on term limitations. The pattern of voting on term limits can be explained by the desire to redistribute power from one party to another, from one branch of government to another, and from districts with long-term incumbents to districts whose representatives have served only for a short time span. We test these hypotheses by looking at voting patters on California Proposition 140 and the vote on the 22nd Amendment with generally positive results.

Rational Choice Explanations of Individual Religious Behavior: Notes on the Problem of Social Embeddedness

L'A. s'interesse a la notion de choix rationnel a propos des attitudes religieuses de l'individu. S'il est globalement d'accord avec cette theorie, il lui reproche d'extraire l'attitude individuelle de son contexte culturel et social. Les perspectives de la theorie du choix personnel fonctionnent mieux lorsque les modeles economiques sont envisages avec des notions sociologiques. Les consequences des sanctions sociales et des contraintes normatives sur les choix religieux n'ont recu que peu d'attention. En outre, il apparait necessaire de se pencher sur les contextes culturels divers qui menent l'individu a des choix religieux