Weber connected intentionality to interpretation. The concept of attribution links his conception of cultural sciences to his definition of culture.' He conceived of means-end rationality as a possible of action (Weber 1922). Contemporary rational choice analysts in sociology have had less to say about meaning, or about methodological issues raised by the imputation of subjective (Boudon 1977, 1979; Corsi 1981; Elster 1978, 1979, 1982; Heckathorn 1988; Rusconi 1984; Szaniawsky 1979). The possibility of interpretation within a specifically sociological frame of reference, the traditional problem of sociological interpretation, is nevertheless raised anew by the program of rational choice analysis. The program is ultimately dependent on the factual assumptions about the intentions and meanings that rational agents attach to their actions and the actions of others (Burns 1990; Sciolla and Ricolfi 1989). The mutual relevance of the two programs, however, has not been assessed clearly. The aim of this paper is to clarify these relations. Put differently, it is to reassess the Weberian lesson from a contemporary perspective. Imputing intentions-attributing content to actions-has a traditional place in sociological explanation (Cicourel 1964, 1973; Harre and Secord 1972; Parsons and Shils 1951; C. Taylor 1964; R. Taylor 1966; von Wright 1971). For Weber and the interpretive sociologists, imputations of intentions or (more generally) the bestowal of on actions is a means to, or a part of, the explanation of a phenomenon constituted as an object of knowledge through the principle of value relevance. Verstehende sociology is characterized by the explicit theoretical linking of the phenomenon of interest to agents' bestowals of meaning. Meaning bestowal (or intention formation) is considered as one of the conditions for (the possibility of) the empirical occurrence of a particular course of action. For Weber, the theoretical construction of action was achieved through the ideal types of traditional, affectual, means-end rational, and value-rational action (1922). The kind of meaning relevant for the sociological interpreter is that which bears on the interpreter's sociological purposes as defined by his or her theoretical framework. No model of man (Simon 1957) is required, any more than access to true or objective is required. What is needed is an account of the context of social action, a theory of the conditions under which action becomes
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