Rational Certainty Research Articles

Kierkegaard and Descartes

Kierkegaard and Descartes RONALD GRIMSLEY KIERKEGAARD'SFIRST KNOWLEDGEof Descartes was probably not derived from a direct study of his work but from the lectures he attended as a student at the University of Copenhagen in the 1830's. The view of modern philosophy then current in Denmark was that of a continuous movement extending from Descartes to Hegel, although the enormous prestige enjoyed by the latter meant that Cartesian thought was interpreted mainly as the starting point for the investigation of problems upon which later philosophers were deemed to have shed much greater light. Later on, when he read Descartes himself, Kierkegaard regretted that he had not begun immediately with him instead of allowing himself to be influenced by Hegel's rather condescending attitude toward his French predecessor.1 Hegel certainly conceded to Descartes the great merit of having "extricated intellectual consciousness from that sophistry of thought which unsettles everything" and so of having comprehended the character of the "abstract idea," but he also implied that the Cartesian viewpoint was too naive, being "simple and as it were popular"--or as Kierkegaard expresses it "child-like"--in its approach to philosophical problems. Hegel speaks of Descartes, notes Kierkegaard, in a way that seems to mock at him, peremptorily closing his discussion with the remark that "mit ihm ist weiter nichts zu anzufangen." In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript of 1846, Kierkegaard recalled this judgement of Hegel's, for the latter is there described as a thinker who "with the help of the principle of identity of thought and being was emancipated from a more childlike manner of philosophizing, something which he himself calls attention to, for example in connection with Descartes." 2 During the years when he was supposed to be preparing for his theological examinations, Kierkegaard became increasingly interested in philosophy; he was for a time the pupil of a young teacher at the University of Copenhagen, H. L. Martensen, who later became a distinguished professor of theology and Primate of the Danish Church. In later life Kierkegaard was to see in Martensen an egregious example of "the Professor" who taught about Christianity instead of living it out: Martensen's academic attitude was, he believed, typical of the enervated values which were undermining the basis of contemporary spiritual life. Moreover, Martensen had come under the influence of Hegel, even claiming to be able to "go further" than the master himself. Yet in these student years Kierkegaard attended Martensen's lectures at the University and probably listened to him with respect. His papers contain notes on lectures which MartenCf . B~renKierkegaards Papirer, edited by P. A. Heiberg , V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting (20 vols.; Copenhagen: 1908-1948), IV B 13 (17). (Quoted hereafter as Papirer. The referenceis to volume,section,and entry-number.) Hegel's view of Descartes is to be found especiallyin Vorlesungen~ber die Geschichteder Philosophic (Werke, XV, 331-332). Concluding UnscientificPostscript, trans. D. E. Swensonand W. Lowrie (Princeton: 1941), p. 298, n,1. [31] 32 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY sen delivered in the winter of 1837-1838 and which were later published in book form under the title of Prolegomena to Speculative Dogmatics. On November 29, 1837, Martensen, who was primarily concerned with the impact of philosophy on theology, dealt with Descartes in the course of his review of the whole development of modern philosophy both in England and on the continent. (As well as discussing Spinoza and Kant, he dealt with Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.) 8 He followed Hegel in interpreting the Cartesian Cogito ergo sum as "the principle of the new Protestant subjectivity." The essential point about this was that it resulted from a method which did not cast doubt on particular things but upon everything. Ultimately, however, Descartes's intention was not to leave the issue in a "fluctuating condition," but to produce a rational certainty resting upon "the absolute identity of thought and being." More specifically still, this identity must first of all be associated with my own reality as a thinking being, because in every other case the "object" of thought remains outside me and so falls short of absolute certainty. The 'T' thus postulated by the cogito is no empirical self, but...

A Query About Assumptions on International Organization

In seeking a rational solution to policy problems, we select and approach the relevant facts in the light of underlying assumptions. Both knowledge of the object and rational certainty about the course to be taken can be attained only by proceeding from assumptions concerning values as well as causal relations. Our thinking is scientific (or, if one prefers another term, rationally disciplined rather than merely emotional) insofar as these indispensable assumptions are made deliberately, methodically, and critically. In applying thought to the problem of international organization, we have not done as well in this respect as we ought. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to call attention to the task of critically examining the assumptions on which the study of problems of international organization actually proceeds.

The Interdependence of Faith and Reason

So writes Sir Arthur Balfour. Is either of these statements sound? Or must each, in some sense, be absorbed in the other? It is the thesis of this paper that always and everywhere faith is the life blood of reason. Without faith, reason could do nothing. And that tenable faith ought always to be guided, so far as possible, by the light of reason. In short, that in all our sound believing faith and reason are interdependent. This thesis is important for at least one theoretical and one practical reason. It is important in theory because, if a sound thesis, it undermines the position of irrational extremists, like Barth, who spurn reason, and the rationalist, empiricist extremists who overlook or minimize reason's dependence on faith or affirm the possibility of rational certainty. It is important, practically, because it destroys the dangerous illusion that science, because (it is said) it trusts nothing but empirically verified conclusions, is the only trustworthy source of knowledge, free from the farce of faith. And it underlines the positive importance and possibility of knowledge not only in physical science but in the realms that matter most, in ethics, politics, religion and philosophy. For the truth is that science, philosophy and religion all rest solidly on faith. But what do we mean by faith and reason? In this paper the term faith means belief not in contradiction but in excess of the precise degree of assurance warranted by the measure of probability implied by the evidence and critical thought about it. This conception of faith, then, in spite of other legitimate usages to which the term is often put, deliberately includes the concepts of religious belief, of scientific theory, hypothesis, postulate, presupposition and assumption. The thesis of this paper is clearest when these are all subsumed, since they are here conceived as forms of it, under the general termfaith as just defined. There are two conceptions of reason relevant here. One is the ideal of rational necessity as in mathematics and logic. The other is the ideal of coherence or adequacy in explaining and interpreting the given data. This paper affirms that, concerning matters of fact, reason does not attain certainty-and that some of our basic beliefs, while lacking certainty, are nevertheless held, in practice and as presuppositions of extended structures of belief, as though they were absolutely certain. That measure of belief which is precisely warranted by coherent interpretation of the evidence is what is attributed to the work of reason. At most then, only necessary truth might be defined as certain and free from faith (though some-Trueblood, Peirce, etc.-would significantly question even this). Any belief in excess of the warrant of evidence interpreted in terms of the ideal of coherence or adequacy is faith. Since rational necessity is not attained with regard to matters of fact (and since the ideal of coherence does not give certainty), any ma* WILLIAM E. KERSTETTER is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio. As a chaplain, he served in the Army Air Forces in the Arizona desert, Japan, and the Philippines. Author of Locke's Capitalistic Economy and Human Freedom, in The Philosophical Forum, 1943; Church that Makes a Difference, The Christian Century, October 3, 1945; Steps Toward Winning G.I.'s, The Christian Century Pulpit, November, 1945, and other articles. A Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education.