Ratification Stage Research Articles

Quiet early bird or loud late riser? Parliamentary activities and types of European Parliament involvement during the negotiation of international agreements

ABSTRACT This paper inductively distinguishes six types of European Parliament (EP) involvement in the negotiation of international agreements. Since 2009, the EP has veto power on international agreements and has leveraged it through various activities such as resolutions. However, there exists no cross-case characterization of the EP’s involvement. Therefore, this paper asks: what are the types of EP involvement during the negotiation of international agreements? To systematically compare the nature, frequency and timing of EP activities, sequence analysis is applied to a dataset of EP activities relative to the 344 agreements concluded since 2009. For a majority of agreements, the EP acts as a ‘bystander’ and does not conduct any activities. When it does conduct activities, the EP most frequently acts as a ‘loud late riser’ and is active only during the ratification stage. For other agreements, EP involvement is very diverse regarding the timing and frequency of activities.

PELAKSANAAN PEMILIHAN KEPALA DESA KARTIASA KECAMATAN SAMBAS TAHUN 2019 PERSPEKTIF SIYASAH SYAR’IYAH

The Village Head Election in Sambas Regency was formed based on considerations of effectiveness, efficiency, and rationale in accordance with regional needs and capabilities as well as coordination, integration, synchronization and simplification as well as institutional communication between regional centers so that an election of a village head was carried out that truly reflected the will of the community village in determining the best leader. Based on the results of the research, the implementation of the Kartiasa Village Head Election refers to the legal basis for the Sambas Regency Regional Regulation Number 6 of 2015 concerning Village Head Election, and the Sambas Regent Regulation Number 27 of 2015 concerning Village Head Elections. The stages are: preparation, voter registration and nomination, voting, and determination / endorsement. Whereas the process and mechanism for the Village Head Election in Kartiasa Village, starting from the preparation stage whose activities include the formation of the Pilkades committee, up to the stipulation / ratification stage, in which the election results are submitted by the Election Committee to the BPD and from the BPD to the Regent through the District Head, in accordance with siyasah syar'iyyah (Islamic political system

Fast-track authority: A hold-up interpretation

Under Fast-Track Authority (FT), the US Congress commits to an up-or-down vote without amendments for any trade agreement presented for ratification. We interpret FT in terms of a hold-up problem. If the US negotiates an agreement with a smaller economy, businesses there may make sunk investments for the US market. At the ratification stage, the partner economy will be locked in to the US in a way it was not previously and Congress can make changes adverse to the partner, so to convince the partner to negotiate, it must first commit not to amend the agreement. FT is then Pareto-improving.

International Judicial Cooperation in Game Theory

Abstract This article utilizes the game theory to assess the feasibility and weaknesses of different methods to promote international judicial cooperation. It starts by justifying the game theory as a proper model to understand the pattern of interaction between states. It then applies typical games to analyse states’ decision-making process. It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems. The first-mover disadvantage at the ratification stage is not a fundamental barrier and may disappear over time. The battle-of-the-sexes game at the negotiation stage can be mitigated through the facilitation of a reputable institute, increasing cooperation interests and needs and reducing cooperation standards.

International Judicial Cooperation in Game Theory

This article utilizes the game theory to assess the feasibility and weaknesses of different methods to promote international judicial cooperation. It starts by justifying the game theory as a proper model to understand the pattern of interaction between states. It then applies typical games to analyse states’ decision-making process. It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems. The first-mover disadvantage at the ratification stage is not a fundamental barrier and may disappear over time. The battle-of-the-sexes game at the negotiation stage can be mitigated through the facilitation of a reputable institute, increasing cooperation interests and needs and reducing cooperation standards.

Penyusunan Rancangan Qanun Pengelolaan Satwa Liar di Aceh

Human conflict with wildlife is a complex problem because it isn’t only related to human safety but also with the safety of wildlife itself. Conflicts that have occurred have pushed the Government of Aceh, District/City Government and related parties to be more wise in understanding the lives of wild animals so that the handling and prevention measures can be optimized and based on the root of the problem. For this reason, a legal protection is needed in the form of a qanun which is expected to be able to integrate all available resources to protect wildlife in Aceh. The method of implementation in community service is to get involved with the expert team Commission II DPRA in drafting the Qanun of Wildlife Management until finally the qanun was ratified on 27 September 2019 and then promulgated to be Qanun on 29 October 2019. The participation of the authors in the drafting of the draft qanun of wildlife includes part of the process of forming the qanun, including starting from the stages of planning, drafting, and discussion. While the stages of ratification or stipulation, enactment and dissemination are carried out by the DPRA and the Government of Aceh itself in accordance with their respective duties, functions and authorities.

Consistency and uncertainty of UK measurements of mercury in precipitation

A novel method to assess the uncertainty of measurement of mercury in precipitation for the UK’s Heavy Metals Monitoring Network is presented. The method makes use of the fact that, because of the high risk of sample contamination, samples are taken in duplicate in order to ensure valid data is available for as many sampling periods as possible. Where both samples are valid a good opportunity is afforded to use the statistical differences in the rain volumes sampled and the mercury concentrations measured to assess the overall uncertainty of the measurement. This process has produced estimated uncertainties in good agreement with previous studies and well within the limits specified by European legislation. The work also highlighted an effective method to spot outliers in the paired samples at the data ratification stage.

The Ratification Premium

This article examines the effect of leaders’ foreign policy preferences on their ability to pursue and ratify arms control agreements. Does it take a “Nixon to go to China,” with hawks more effective than doves, when it comes to the domestic politics of treaty ratification? The authors observe that the theoretical logic correctly identifies an asymmetry between hawkish and dovish presidents, with the latter facing a credibility gap in advocating arms reductions. Although existing accounts assume leaders are captives of their type, the authors argue that dovish executives can overcome their credibility gap by obtaining the endorsement of informed legislators. These executives do so by paying a ratification premium, usually in the form of increased defense effort in areas not covered by the treaty. As a result, doves do not necessarily face a lower rate of success at the ratification stage; their disadvantage manifests itself primarily in the higher premium needed to obtain the same level of support as hawkish executives. The article demonstrates this argument through a formal model and tests the implications with paired comparisons of major arms control treaties in the Cold War and post–Cold War periods. The argument helps to resolve the Nixon-to-China theoretical debate. It shows that dovish leaders are not necessarily captives of their type because they can deploy side payments to achieve their policy goals. It also explains important puzzling features of the arms control record.

Europe's Jagged Little Pill: The Saga Surrounding the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty Finally Comes to a Close

“Most people have a fundamentally positive attitude to European integration. But at the same time, they have an ever-increasing feeling that something is going wrong, that an un-transparent, complex, intricate, mammoth institution has evolved, divorced from the factual problems and national traditions, grabbing ever greater competencies and areas of power; that the democratic control mechanisms are failing: in brief, that it cannot go on like this” On the 1st December 2009 last the Lisbon Treaty finally entered into force representing the end of the long and tortured adoption process. It was and will remain an important day in European history, but yet it passed relatively unnoticed; in stark contrast to the emotions raised throughout its ratification process. The polemic caused by the manner of the Treaty’s ratification is significant and has without question damaged the image of the European Union. This is true not only for those citizens who actually voted against its ratification but also more generally as citizens have been forced to accept that the European Union is moving towards “ever greater union” , whether they like it or not. Now that the Treaty is finally in place, it is perhaps interesting to briefly recall the process that has brought the European Union to this place and to ask if the end result has for once justified the means. It is proposed to first recall the circumstances leading to the adoption of the Treaty (A), before going on to consider its rejection at ratification stage by successive French, Dutch and Irish voters (B).

The Ratification Premium: Hawks, Doves, and Arms Control

This article examines the effect of leaders’ foreign policy preferences on their ability to pursue and ratify arms control agreements. Does it take a “Nixon to go to China,” with hawks more effective than doves when it comes to the domestic politics of treaty ratification? We observe that the theoretical logic correctly identifies an asymmetry between hawkish and dovish presidents, with the latter facing a credibility gap in advocating arms reductions. However, while existing accounts assume leaders are captives of their type, we argue that dovish executives can overcome their credibility gap by obtaining the endorsement of informed legislators. They do so by paying a “ratification premium,” usually in the form of increased defense effort in areas not covered by the treaty. As a result, doves do not necessarily face a lower rate of success at the ratification stage; their disadvantage manifests primarily in the higher premium needed to obtain the same level of support. We demonstrate this argument through a formal model and test the implications with paired comparisons of major arms control treaties in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Our argument offers a resolution to the Nixon-to-China debate; shows that dovish leaders are not necessarily captives of their type but can deploy side payments to achieve their policy goals; and explains puzzling features of the arms control record.

Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints

We analyze the impact of ratification constraints on the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). For this, we combine the literature on IEAs with the public choice literature on two-level games. By also incorporating uncertain preferences of the pivotal voter in the ratification stage, we make several important contributions: (i) we contribute to a more realistic modeling of the temporal structure of international agreements, (ii) we show a surprising, yet intuitive non-monotonic relationship between the optimal commitment level and the variance of ratification decisions, (iii) we identify reasons to expect a larger number of countries to join international negotiations than predicted by most of the coalition formation literature based on a representative agent model. Ratification constraints thereby can improve the welfare gains from stable international agreements.

Optimal Provision of Global Public Goods under Uncertainty: Strategic Transfers and Reservations in a Multilateral Treaty Obligation

This paper studies the formation and management of an international entity for promoting the provision of global public goods in a setup of international treaties on concessions and reservations. Based on the so-called Vienna Convention by which there can be a discrepancy between the original treaty obligation and the ratified one in the multi-lateral treaty implementation, we construct two-stage mechanisms for international treaties on global public goods; the concession stage and the ratification stage with reservations. We explicitly analyze the optimal reservation levels from the optimal mechanism when the countries face asymmetric information on the preference parameters to global public goods. Specifically, we characterize the environments where the optimal mechanism with dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility and ex-post participation- constraint in the literature of mechanism design exists. The result shows that the sophisticatedly calculated transfers in the principal of quid pro quo control the international concessions and reservations.

Optimal Provision of Global Public Goods under Uncertainty: Strategic Transfers and Reservations in a Multilateral Treaty Obligation

This paper studies the formation and management of an international entity for promoting the provision of global public goods in a setup of international treaties on concessions and reservations. Based on the so-called Vienna Convention by which there can be a discrepancy between the original treaty obligation and the ratified one in the multi-lateral treaty implementation, we construct two-stage mechanisms for international treaties on global public goods; the concession stage and the ratification stage with reservations. We explicitly analyze the optimal reservation levels from the optimal mechanism when the countries face asymmetric information on the preference parameters to global public goods. Specifically, we characterize the environments where the optimal mechanism with dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility and ex-post participationconstraint in the literature of mechanism design exists. The result shows that the sophisticatedly calculated transfers in the principal of quid pro quo control the international concessions and reservations.

Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties

AbstractSome treaties are signed and then ratified quickly while others languish in legal limbo, unratified by one or more parties. What explains this variation in the time between signature and ratification? The international relations literature has not taken the ratification stage seriously enough, despite its obvious importance from a legal and a political perspective. We offer a systematic study of this question in the context of bilateral investment treaties. We develop and test a set of theoretical propositions related to domestic-level constraints on the executive, the varying ability of governments to rationally anticipate ratification obstacles, and the bilateral relationship between treaty partners. We generally find support for these propositions but report some surprising findings as well. The article presents implications for investment agreements and treaty making more generally, and raises a number of issues for further study at the intersection of international politics and law.

External dimensions of European environmental policy: An analysis of environmental treaty ratification by third states

The European Union has become an important leader in international environmental affairs – particularly through the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with favourable terms. In this article, EU environmental leadership is studied from a new perspective, focusing on the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. Specifically, it investigates whether the EU is also capable of motivating third states to join its preferred MEAs. It is argued that third states join the EU's preferred MEAs to signal their compliance with EU environmental standards in an effort to become eligible for various rewards that the EU could potentially offer, including a credible membership perspective, access to its lucrative markets, and aid and assistance. The argument is tested by examining the ratification behaviour of 25 non-EU Member States with regard to all 21 MEAs negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The results provide robust support for the theory that EU rewards motivate third states to ratify these treaties. The results withstand a number of statistical tests, even when alternative explanatory factors such as trade intensities, transnational communication and geographic proximity are controlled for. The study is the first large-scale demonstration of the EU's external influence at the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. By identifying three different channels of EU influence, the research permits a more refined understanding of the EU's role as a promoter of environmental protection standards.

On the Path to Trade Liberalization: Political Regimes in International Trade Negotiations

The number of free trade agreements has increased substantially since 1980 despite efforts to promote multilateral trade liberalization. While there is evidence on the determinants of FTA formation, still little is known on the processing of trade agreements, particularly regarding the pre-implementation duration. This paper fills the research gap by using event data on the proposal, the negotiation, the signing, and the implementation of trade agreements. Duration analysis is employed to examine the connection between regime types and the lengths of the negotiation and the ratification stages. The results support the claim that higher levels of democratization and political constraints are associated with delays in the implementation of an agreement. This is primarily observable in the ratification stage. Moreover, I detect significantly prolonged negotiation talks and ratifications if the European Union participates.

Using completion to formulate a statement collectively

We describe how participants in an interaction use completions of each others' talk to bind themselves to a collective formulation of a matter in hand. In a corpus of problem-oriented discussions among groups of two or three people, we find speakers using sequences of completable utterance — putative completion — ratification to put their formulations of a problem-solution on a joint footing (a participant status that adds ‘collective author’ to Levinson's catalogue of producer footings). We describe the use of the completion sequence, and show how there are variations in its ratification stage (including explicit acceptance, repeating and reshaping).

Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement

In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players′ beliefs, then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints. We investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two-stage process, consisting of a ratification stage followed by the actual play of the chosen game. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C700, C780, D820.

Why Economic and Monetary Union Is an Important Objective for Europe

Many American-and some European-observers of the changing fortunes of the efforts to achieve an advanced degree of integration in the European Community (EC) are puzzled by the ambition to create an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the EC, extending all the way to the introduction of a common currency and a European Central Bank (ECB) to run a joint monetary policy. 1 Some focus on what they regard as questionable economic benefits of such a move, while others, e.g., Feldstein (1992), suggest that EMU can only be justified in political terms. But, in the latter case, the strategy is seen as very risky because monetary unification would then run well ahead of political union, reversing the order of integration in existing large federal states. Recently this type of criticism has become more widespread in Europe as well. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, with EMU as its central and most elaborately stated objective, ran into major difficulties at the ratification stage. Danish voters narrowly rejected the Treaty in a referendum in June 1992, though this result was reversed in a second referendum in May 1993. French voters only passed the Treaty very narrowly in September 1992, while ratification in the United Kingdom nearly brought down the government before it was finally completed in late July 1993. Germany, the largest EC country and traditionally a motor of integration, had visible misgivings about Maastricht, including the requirement to give up the deutsche mark (DM), a source and a symptom of Germany’s strength. Though voter misgivings about Maastricht were probably motivated more by other aspects of the Treaty than by EMU and the common currency, many Europeans clearly had grave doubts about the feasibility of achieving the objectives in this area within the tight time schedule foreseen in the Treaty.*

Mass Culture and Soviet Fine Arts

The question about mass culture in our society has not yet made it to the ratification stage but is in the discussion stage. If we compare the situation in our country with that in the West, we will see that we have essentially no division of culture into elite and mass culture. Nor will we find any of the notorious, popular, stereotypical depictions of "sex and violence," vamp-women, plush interiors and automobiles, banks, gangsters, and cowboys. We have none of that. Culture in our country is more homogeneous and uniform—although, to be sure, it also has its peaks, its valleys, and its lowlands.