Abstract
Abstract This article utilizes the game theory to assess the feasibility and weaknesses of different methods to promote international judicial cooperation. It starts by justifying the game theory as a proper model to understand the pattern of interaction between states. It then applies typical games to analyse states’ decision-making process. It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems. The first-mover disadvantage at the ratification stage is not a fundamental barrier and may disappear over time. The battle-of-the-sexes game at the negotiation stage can be mitigated through the facilitation of a reputable institute, increasing cooperation interests and needs and reducing cooperation standards.
Highlights
It applies typical games to analyse states’ decision-making process. It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate
The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems
International judicial cooperation refers to assistance and respect provided by the courts of one country to the judicial proceedings of another by staying or declining local proceedings in favour of a more appropriate foreign court, by assisting foreign courts to serve foreign proceedings on local residents or collect local evidence and by recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.[1]
Summary
International judicial cooperation refers to assistance and respect provided by the courts of one country to the judicial proceedings of another by staying or declining local proceedings in favour of a more appropriate foreign court, by assisting foreign courts to serve foreign proceedings on local residents or collect local evidence and by recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.[1]. It is arguable that the situation is changing as the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters was adopted on 2 July 2019 (‘Hague Judgment Convention 2019’) and as the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court 2005 (‘Hague Choice of Court Convention’) has been applied in 32 countries It may take time for these conventions to take full effects at the international level. This article argues that game theory is imperfect, it helps in understanding the current judicial cooperation situation from an angle different from traditional doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis.[9] This article applies the game theoretical analysis to assess the feasibility and weaknesses of different judicial cooperation methods It suggests that states should not update their domestic laws to unilaterally offer judicial cooperation to other countries even if reciprocity is adopted to urge other states to cooperate. The only effective means is through an international judicial cooperation treaty, which encounters relatively small compliance and enforcement problems
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