Russian Rates Research Articles

Demographic, Temporal, and Spatial Patterns of Homicide Rates in Russia

Interpersonal violence increased dramatically in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In this article, newly available arrest data from the Russian Ministry of the Interior and vital statistics data from the Russian State Committee for Statistics are employed in order to examine the demographic, temporal, and spatial patterns of homicide rates in the country. Among other findings, analyses reveal (1) homicide victimization rates in Russia are comparable to and/or greater than the high rates in the United States for at least the last 35 years; (2) a sudden decrease in homicide rates in the mid‐1980s, followed by a sharp increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulting in a Russian homicide victimization rate that is 15–20 times higher than in most European nations; (3) a strikingly different age pattern of homicide victimization rates as compared to the USA; and (4) a wide range of variation in homicide rates throughout the country, including a curious pattern of increasing rates from west to east.

Vodka and violence: alcohol consumption and homicide rates in Russia.

In Russia, rates of alcohol consumption and homicide are among the highest in the world, and already-high levels increased dramatically after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rates of both, however, vary greatly among Russia's 89 regions. We took advantage of newly available vital statistics and socioeconomic data to examine the regional covariation of drinking and lethal violence. Log-log models were employed to estimate the impact of alcohol consumption on regional homicide rates, controlling for structural factors thought to influence the spatial distribution of homicide rates. Results revealed a positive and significant relationship between alcohol consumption and homicide, with a 1% increase in regional consumption of alcohol associated with an approximately 0.25% increase in homicide rates. In Russia, higher regional rates of alcohol consumption are associated with higher rates of homicide.

The changing nature of murder in Russia

The death rate from homicide in Russia increased rapidly during the 1990s. It is now about 20 times higher than in western Europe and is among the highest recorded anywhere in the world. However, this issue has received little attention so far from public health researchers or policymakers. This paper describes the changing nature of homicide during the 1990s in Russia as a whole and, in more detail, in the Udmurt Republic. The study uses data from three sources: routine mortality data for Russia from 1970 to 1999; statistics on criminal investigations and convictions in Russia between 1990 and 1997; and an in-depth study of homicide trial records in the Udmurt Republic in 1989–1991 and 1998. Deaths from homicide increased between 1970 and 1985, falling slightly during the 1985 anti-alcohol campaign and then resuming their increase until 1994. Another fall in the late 1990s was arrested in 1998, with an increase in 1999. By 1999 the age standardised homicide death rate in Russia was 81% higher than in 1990, an increase almost twice that of all causes of death combined. Throughout the 1990s about 10% of those convicted of homicide were female. Of those homicides leading to convictions in the Udmurt Republic, 71% of those killed by males were male, as were 76% of those killed by females. Killings of women by men often involved sexual assaults. In Russia as a whole, about 80% of those convicted of homicide were reported to be under the influence of alcohol at the time. In the Udmurt Republic, where data on both offender and victim were available, victims were also commonly intoxicated. The nature of homicide in Russia has changed considerably in less than a decade, with many more now involving aggravating circumstances, such as murder to conceal another crime, in association with robbery or rape, or by a group of people. Although still a small proportion of the total convicted, the number of murders by hired killers is also on the rise. The characteristics of those convicted of homicide have also changed during the 1990s. They are now younger, less likely to have previous convictions, and to have a more diverse range of educational levels. The previous urban–rural gap, with higher levels in rural areas, has also narrowed.

Economic reform and mortality in the former Soviet Union: A study of the suicide epidemic in the 1990s

Male suicide rates in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic countries increased substantially in the early 1990s and are now the highest in the world. To what extent is this suicide epidemic explained by the macroeconomic instability experienced by these countries in that period? Fixed effects regressions across 22 transition economies indicate that male suicide rates are highly sensitive to the state of the macroeconomy, suggesting that the steep and prolonged declines in GDP in the western countries of the former Soviet Union may have been partly to blame for the suicide epidemic. Evidence also indicates that the general adult male mortality crisis in the region had a ‘feedback’ effect on suicide rates, with the loss of a spouse or friend – or declining life expectancy itself – contributing to rising suicide rates. Female suicide rates, in contrast, are insensitive to the state of the macroeconomy and are more strongly related to alcohol consumption.

Economic Reform and Mortality in the Former Soviet Union: A Study of the Suicide Epidemic in the 1990s

Male suicide rates in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic countries increased substantially in the early 1990s and are now the highest in the world. To what extent is this suicide epidemic explained by the macroeconomic instability experienced by these countries in that period? Fixed effects regressions across 22 transition economies indicate that male suicide rates are highly sensitive to the state of the macroeconomy, suggesting that the steep and prolonged declines in GDP in the western countries of the former Soviet Union may have been partly to blame for the suicide epidemic. Evidence also indicates that the general adult male mortality crisis in the region had a 'feedback' effect on suicide rates, with the loss of a spouse or friend ? or declining life expectancy itself ? contributing to rising suicide rates. Female suicide rates, in contrast, are insensitive to the state of the macroeconomy and are more strongly related to alcohol consumption.

Violent crime in Russia and the United States: 1990–19961

In spite of significant press attention to the dimensions of the crime problem in Russia during the 1990s, the scholarly literature on crime in Russia remains limited. In an attempt to address this limitation, this paper examines trends in violent crime in Russia during the period 1990–1996. To place the data in a comparative framework, we also examine data on reported violent crime in the United States during this period. Findings indicate the persistence of dramatically higher homicide rates in Russia, dramatic increases in reported robbery and aggravated assault rates, yet declines in rape rates. With the exception of homicide, violent crime rates remained below those in the U.S. We discuss implications of the findings and suggest additional research.

Comment: Controversies and Evidence in the Market Transition Debate

Despite repeated attempts to integrate competing perspectives (Szelenyi and Kostello 1996; Nee and Matthews 1996), the ongoing market transition debate has shown no signs of resolution. Instead, the 1996 AJS market transition symposium seems to have created more controversy than it settled (Nee 1996; Xie and Hannum 1996; Oberschall 1996; Parish and Michelson 1996; Walder 1996; Fligstein 1996; Szelenyi and Kostello 1996). And subsequent studies continue to reach nearly opposite conclusions (cf. Bian and Logan 1996; Gerber and Hout 1998; with Brainerd 1998; Nee and Cao, in press). When arguments become polarized, it often signals that divisions are falsely drawn (Bates 1997). Although originally made in another context, this observation is applicable here. As principals in this lively debate, we believe that clarification and reevaluation are essential for moving toward a reconciliation of competing viewpoints. In this comment we therefore identify the central issues in the controversy and provide an overall assessment of existing empirical evidence

Did the Economic Crisis Cause the Fertility Decline in Russia: Evidence from the 1994 Microcensus

Between 1989 and 1993, the total fertility rate inRussia dropped from 2.01 to 1.38, a fall ofunprecedented size in peacetime. The more commonexplanation asserts that the fertility decrease is thepopulation's response to the socio-economic crisisoccurring in the country. The alternative hypothesisstates that the fertility decrease is just acontinuation of the long-term trend, while the crisishas accelerated this process. On the basis ofindividual data obtained in the 1994 microcensus,which involved 5 per cent of Russia's population, thispaper attempts to find arguments for and against eachof the two hypotheses The analysis is based onquestionnaires of 798 thousand women born between 1959and 1975. Three indicators of fertility areinvestigated: frequency of birth in 1993, expectednumber of children, and desired number of children.These indicators are linked to 28 backgroundcharacteristics, including marital status, number ofchildren ever born, ethnicity, level of education,housing condition, and income level. The data do notreveal essential fertility differentiation by economicstatus, which would be present of the first hypothesiswere right. At the same time, a clear connection isfound between the frequency of births in 1993 and suchsocio-cultural markers as living in town orcountryside, ethnicity, and the desired number ofchildren. In addition, 1993 fertility actuallyconforms to women's opinions about the number ofchildren they intend to have. These results cast doubton the hypothesis that the economic crisis is the mainand only cause of the recent fertility decrease inRussia.

Asthma mortality in Russia between 1980 and 1989.

There is evidence that mortality due to asthma has increased in a number of nations over the last two decades. This study was conducted to assess asthma mortality rates in Russia from 1980 to 1989. Data obtained were compared with figures from other countries. National asthma deaths were obtained from the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation. Age- and sex-specific rates per 100,000 population per year were adjusted to the European population. Annual changes in mortality rates for the study period were estimated by linear regression analysis. Between 1980 and 1989, asthma mortality rates per 100,000 population per year increased from 3.7 to 5.3 in the total Russian population. Differences according to age and sex were observed. Asthma deaths increased with age and in most cases males showed higher death rates than females. There was a statistically significant annual increase in mortality rates for young males < 5 yrs of age and for adult males aged 35-64 yrs, as well as for females aged > or = 65 yrs. Asthma mortality rates in Russia between 1980 and 1989 may be considered moderate as compared with death rates reported for the same period in other countries.

Market reform and mortality in transition economies

The striking increase in mortality rates in Russia in the early 1990s occurred simultaneously with the government's erratic attempts to introduce market reforms. Other transition economies, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, avoided increases in death rates while they implemented rapid and deep reforms. Is there a link between mortality and the speed or depths of reforms, as suggested by other researchers [e.g. Sachs (1996) American Economic Review 86(2), 128–233]? This paper uses aggregate data on 22 transition economies for 1989–1994 to investigate this question. While the relationship between an index of reform progress and death rates is ambiguous, death rates in these countries are correlated with measures of reform success, such as GDP growth and the inflation rate. Higher crime rates and higher unemployment rates are also related to larger increases in death rates.

Macroeconomic consequences of the Russian mortality crisis

This paper examines macroeconomic consequences of the Russian mortality crisis. Life expectancy in Russia decreased from 70 to 65 years during the first half of the 1990s, which we estimate accounts for approximately 1.6 million excess deaths during 1990–1995. Coupled with its disproportionate impact on working age males, the large number of excess deaths suggests the crisis may have had a significant negative impact on the level and growth of Russia's per capita income. We estimate the economic cost of the crisis using two alternative approaches. First, we estimate the capitalized value of the income forgone due to the crisis, which represents between 1.8 and 2.7% of Russia's 1990 GDP. There are, however, both theoretical and empirical problems with this approach to estimating the cost of the crisis. Second, we estimate the parameters of a macroeconomic growth model and use it to calculate the effect of the crisis on Russia's rate of economic growth. Our calculations suggest that the net effect of the drop in life expectancy, the decline in the rate of total population growth, and the even larger decline in the rate of growth of the working age population have been to lower the annual rate of growth of income per capita in Russia by roughly one-third of one percentage point. Given that Russia's per capita income fell at an average annual rate of 9% during 1990–1995, we conclude that the mortality crisis — which has unquestionably been catastrophic in human terms — has been at most a small contributor to Russia's poor macroeconomic performance. The paper also discusses the effects of the crisis on other macroeconomic variables such as income inequality and the fiscal balance of the pension system. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible new approaches to modeling the two-way linkages between health status and economic growth.

Huge variation in Russian mortality rates 1984–94: artefact, alcohol, or what?

According to published data, between 1984 and 1994 mortality rates in Russia initially underwent a rapid decline followed by an even steeper increase. In 1994, male life expectancy at birth was 57.6 years, having fallen by 6.2 years since 1990. There has been concern that such striking fluctuations in mortality are an artefact, although, among other factors, alcohol consumption has been implicated. We analysed the age-specific and cause-specific patterns of mortality decrease and increase by use of data from a newly reconstructed mortality series for Russia so that we could examine the plausibility of various explanations for the mortality trends. All major causes of death, with the exception of neoplasms, showed declines in mortality between 1984 and 1987 and increases between 1987 and 1994. In relative terms, these tended to be largest for the age-group 40-50 years; surprisingly, they were of the same magnitude among women and men. The largest declines and subsequent increases in proportional terms were observed for alcohol-related deaths and accidents and violence. However, pronounced effects were also seen for deaths from infections, circulatory disease, and respiratory disease. No substantial variations were seen for neoplasms. The stability of mortality from neoplasms in contrast to other causes over the period 1984-94 largely precludes the possibility that the changes in life expectancy are mainly an artefact, particularly one due to underestimation of the population. Although factors such as nutrition and health services may be involved, the evidence is that substantial changes in alcohol consumption over the period could plausibly explain the main features of the mortality fluctuations observed. These results provide a major challenge to public health in Russia and to our understanding of the determinants of alcohol consumption and its role in explaining mortality patterns within and between many other countries.

Family planning in Russia

The data concerning the abortion rate in Russia for the past 5 years are presented. They demonstrate that abortion has been the main means of birth control. At present, the government, the Ministry of Public Health, obstetricians and gynecologists, and public organizations are making every effort to introduce medical and non-medical means of contraception.

Regional Trends in Crude Birth, Death, and Natural Increase Rates in Russia and the USSR: 1897-1989

"This paper establishes and discusses briefly regional patterns and trends in crude birth, death, and natural increase rates in Russia and the USSR from the turn of the century to 1989. The study is based on a comparable regional framework and placed in the context of the demographic transition theory. It discusses sources, collection, and quality of data, as well as necessary estimating procedures. An attempt also is made to examine briefly regional age-standardized rates."

Prevention of complications of pregnancy and childbirth in young women

Currently, despite the general trend towards a decrease in the birth rate in Russia among women of the main groups of childbearing age, there is an increase in the frequency of childbirth among young people. Teenage pregnancy, caused by early onset of sexual activity, poor awareness of contraceptive methods and their insufficient distribution, is a very serious problem in the field of gynecology [4].

The increase in death and disease under "katstroika".

The author describes recent trends in mortality and morbidity in the successor states to the former Soviet Union. Separate consideration is given to mortality under late perestroika (1987-1991) and subsequent mortality trends. The author concludes that "the collapse of the USSR and the problems of the successor states have had severe adverse affects not only on macroeconomic indices but also on the mortality and morbidity of the population.... Since the collapse of the USSR, the mortality situation in the successor states has rapidly and significantly worsened. Between 1991 and 1993 the crude death rate in Russia rose by 26%. As a result, by 1993 the life expectancy at birth of Russian men had fallen to about 59, which is about 6 years below the level of 1987.... By 1993, male life expectancy at birth in Russia had fallen below the level of the medium income countries and had probably fallen to a level about that of Indonesia in the second half of the 1980s. Ukraine has also experienced an increase in mortality since the collapse of the USSR. In other successor states, experiencing serious military conflicts, such as Tadjikstan and Armenia, the proportionate increase in mortality was even larger than in Russia."

The Individual's Health Is the Health of Society

Recently, a fact characterizing a fundamentally new phenomenon for Russia—net depopulation—has been repeated again and again in the mass media (and not only in the mass media). In the last quarter of the past year, our mortality rate was 11.3 per thousand, and the birth rate was only 11.2, i.e., there was a "negative growth." The phenomenon is serious enough in itself and has many aspects, from demographic to economic. It is natural that it should attract attention. However, the inclination to link it directly only with actions of the moment (or with the lack of action), to explain it by the liberalization of prices, etc., is annoying. The problem is much more long-term and complicated. The issue is not so much that the birth rate is declining (this is a worldwide tendency, and the birth rate in Russia is still much higher than in most European countries) as that the mortality rate is rising (this contradicts the same trends, forewarning us of trouble). The ultimate question is one of the stability of this negative process, of the potential, the reserve of health present in society as a whole and in each individual.

Family planning in Russia: Experience and attitudes of gynecologists

A survey was made of 375 Russian gynecologists. The questionnaire on family planning and contraceptives was distributed at the beginning of three local educational symposia. Almost all participants filled in the questionnaire on attitudes, knowledge and experience with family planning. The sample consisted of departmental specialists and heads of departments/clinics, working mainly at in- or out-patient women's health clinics. The mean age was 37 years; 83% were women, living in medium-sized or large cities (80%). Half of them had been working as a gynecologist for more than 10 years. Only 55% had been trained in family planning. The main reasons mentioned for the high abortion rate in Russia were the lack of education, non-involvement of male partner, and lack of modern contraceptives. Most of the gynecologists were in favor of special family planning clinics with special attention to services for the users. About half of the physicians knew how the pill works and estimated that 41% of women know that the pill contains estrogens. Sixty-two percent found that patients are badly informed about available contraception. Main sources of information on contraception were journals/books, colleagues and mass media. The majority reported having a directive style of patient counseling, and stated that parents should be informed of their teenagers' sexual experiences. The more experienced physicians with a training in family planning were better informed on contraception and showed a more patient-concerned attitude. It is concluded that health care providers should be the main target group of training and education in family planning, and need the support of Western European family planning organizations.

Radionuclide contamination and dose rates in Russia and Belarus after Chernobyl accident

The statistical characteristics of the contamination fields and the measured dose rates of gamma radiation in the air for the territories contaminated by the Chernobyi accident are of interest from the point of view of assessment of the absorbed dose for the population. The time dependence of the dose rate and the composition and characteristics of the contamination for individual territories of Belarus and Russia were considered earlier [1]. Examined here are the statistical characteristics of the contamination fields and dose rates in the Bryanskaya Oblast of Russia and the adjacent Gomel 'skaya and Mogilevskaya Oblasts of Belarus. Data on soil-sample 137Cs concentrations in the "Store" data base of the "Typhoon" Scient i f ic-Industr ia l Organization as well as data on the dose rate for the autumn of 1990 are analyzed. The 137Cs soil contamination and dose rate were determined simultaneously from samples or in a special manner for example, by going door-to-door in contaminated populated areas. The dose rates were estimated for individual parts of the farms (inside the house, on the street at the farm entrance, in the kitchen garden, the site at which the soil sample was taken). The soil samples were taken in the sodded regions using a standard sample cutter (a ring 140 mm in diameter and 50 mm high; the area of a unit sample was 0.0152 m 2) and in the gardens (plowed areas) by a soil auger to a depth of 200 mm. Mechanism of Formation of Statistical Characteristics of Soil-Contamination Distribution. Contamination can be formed by a small number of aerosol particles or rain drops that have landed on the area of the sample cutter. Modeling by the Monte Carlo method of the fallout of aerosol particles with a size of 0.1-5.5 mm (the spectrum of rain drops in this range has been described by Steiner and Waldvogel [2], for example) shows that the areal distribution of the mass of the particles is welldescribed by a log-normal distribution or a similar exponential distribution that has been truncated on the side of small particle size. The statistical density distributions are estimated by measurement of the activity of soil samples with a small area. Therefore, the distributions must be asymmetrical or sharply limited from the small-value side (Weibull or log-normal distributions). Statistical Data Processing. For statistical processing, the data on contamination density (P, Ci/km 2) and measured dose rate were grouped by various methods. Detailed data for individual populated areas were examined first (the distance between measurement and sampling points was several tens of meters). Then data averaged over the territory of populated points of a selected administrative region were used (the distance between sampling points was several kilometers). The distribution parameters for these groups of data were different, although the type of distribution was the same. For the grouped data, the type of statistical distribution was determined from an a priori set (gamma, Weibull, or log-normal distribution). The quality of the data description was verified by the Z 2 test. In addition, distribution-type-independent (robust) statistics the median and interquantile range were employed for a general description of contaminations different scales on the territory. Quartiles and decries, i.e., the values between which 50% and 80%, respectively, of all values were included, were used as quantiles. Contamination-Density Distributions for Individual Populated Points and Larger Territories. It follows from Fig. 1 that the contamination distributions over territories of populated points with high and relatively low contamination are similar. In all cases, the contamination distribution is nearly log-normal (as use of the g 2 test shows). As can be seen from Table 1, the characteristic of populated-point contamination used at the present time the mean 137Cs contamination differs considerably.

Women and Children First: Domestic Chaos and the Maternal Bond in the Drama of Liudmila Petrushevskaia

Liudmila Stefanovna Petrushevskaia is widely considered one of most powerful voices in Russian theatre today. Esteemed in her own country as the most prominent and complex figure in her generation of playwrights,1 Petrushevskaia enjoys critical acclaim abroad as well.2 Part of 1970s new wave of post-Vampilov dramatists that rose up to reclaim stuff of everyday as material stage, Petrushevskaia has already become a model in her own time for a new generation of young playwrights, who grew up distrusting ... established Soviet dramaturgical canon.* And as one of very few successful women dramatists living and working in Russia today, she brings a fresh perspective to bear on private problems of people their strained family relationships, their soured hopes and aspirations, their cramped living quarters. Where most modern playwrights pursue the image of 'magic land', visionary realm where self might find, if not fulfillment, at least shelter from assaults of existence,4 Petrushevskaia grounds this quest a haven from life's storms in grittier reality of communal housing. In effect, there is no such refuge; even family hearth is constantly divided and subdivided, continually engaged in a struggle existence (a condition described matter-offactly by one of her characters as life as a battlefield5). Home ceases to be a peaceful sanctuary due to overcrowding and bickering; whole generations grudgingly adapt to oppressive living conditions; and so begins disintegration of very institution of family, already manifest in statistics on rising divorce and declining birth rates in Russia. The reality of everyday