Rate Of Return Regulation Research Articles

Environmental externalities and regulation constrained cost productivity growth in the US electric utility industry

This paper examines whether having to comply with Phase 1 of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act, and rate of return regulation, each impacted the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth when accounting for the production of good and bad outputs. Phase 1, effective from 1995 to 1999, requires electric utilities to reduce their emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide (bad outputs). Actions undertaken to reduce the emissions (using less sulfur content coal, installing equipment), may have led to higher production costs, and impacted the rate of TFP growth. Rate regulation may impact how the firm produces its selected output level, which could lead to higher cost over time, and biased estimates of TFP growth. Following the work of Ball et al. (Struct Change Econ Dyn 16(3): 374–394, 2005), who developed the standard Malmquist cost productivity (MCP) index, we develop a MCP index for a rate regulated firm (RMCP index) then use the standard and regulated indices to determine whether having to comply with Phase 1 impacted TFP growth. Empirical results indicate that (i) the RMCP index underestimated the rate at which TFP growth occurred, (ii) Phase 1 utilities on average experienced positive TFP growth from 1996 to 2000 (Phase 1 firms experienced higher TFP growth rates than the rates experienced by firms not subject to Phase 1), and operated more allocatively inefficient in complying with the Phase 1 restrictions. Complying with Phase 1 did not affect the rate at which technical change occurred or the rates of change in scale efficiency.

Rate of return regulation and the Le Chatelier principle

This paper examines whether rate-of return regulation alters the input quantities firms use to produce their selected output level when the corresponding input prices change, in a manner similar to the Le Chatelier principle. More specifically, would the change in a rate regulated firm’s input quantity due to a change in its input price be less price elastic than the unregulated firm’s change in the input quantity due to a change in its input price. We follow Fare and Logan (1986), Nelson and Wohar (1983) in estimating a rate regulated cost function and capital input share system of equations. Using a 1992–2000 panel of 34 US major investor-owned electric utilities, empirical results indicate that the regulated own-input price elasticities of demand for labor and fuel are less price elastic than their corresponding unregulated own-input price elasticities of demand (a Le Chatelier principle type effect). Having a fuel clause (1) reduces the firm’s willingness to substitute from fuel to either non-fuel (capital, labor) input when the price of fuel rises, and (2) enhances the firm’s willingness to substitute from non-fuel inputs to fuel when the price of non-fuel inputs rises.

Em-Powering Economics: Some Thoughts on Policy and Financial Markets

This paper addresses the discussion between economic power and the power of politics with particular focus on financial markets. After general reflections about the economic basis of power, the paper discusses in a general equilibrium framework how financial innovations can lead to risk creation and an inflation of financial products. This creates a fundamental disorder in the financial system which from an aggregate point of view can be described in a standard portfolio framework, in which higher rates of return go hand in hand with higher private risks but also with increasing externalized (social) risk and insurance illusion. Rate of return regulation is proposed as an appropriate regulatory measure. Alternatively the deficiency could be cured by admission regulations for financial products which put the burden of proof for no external (systemic) damages of a financial instrument to the issuer.

The impact of incentive regulation on productivity in the US telecommunications industry: A stochastic frontier approach

This paper investigates whether the substitution of price cap regulation (PCR) and other forms of incentive regulation for traditional rate of return regulation (RRR) has had a measurable effect on productivity growth in the US telecommunications industry. A stochastic frontier approach is employed to compute the efficiency change, technological progress, and productivity growth for 25 LECs over the 1988–1998 time periods. By examining the relationship between the change in productivity growth and regulatory regime variables and other control variables, we find that PCR has a significant and positive effect, both in contemporaneous and lagged specifications.

Sub-Optimal Generation Portfolio Variance with Rate of Return Regulation

This paper demonstrates that continuation of traditional rate-of-return electric utility regulation of transmission and distribution assets will impede the ability of customers to optimize their generation portfolios. Under linear price regulation, with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale customers will choose a more (less) risky generation portfolio than they would with no transmission and distribution asset rate-of-return regulation. Similar problems arise under non-linear (two-part) pricing of transmission and distribution assets. When the per-unit price is set at marginal cost, with increasing (decreasing) marginal cost, customers will choose a more (less) risky generation portfolio than they would with no transmission and distribution asset regulation. With price caps the optimal generation portfolio is chosen.

Market failure in the municipal economy

The aim of this paper is, firstly, to assess the main factors of market failure in the municipal economy and, secondly, to show its practical consequences for the regulatory framework. The municipal market failure follows from market inefficiency connected mainly with natural monopoly and partially from imperfect information, uncertainty, externalities and instability. The nature of municipal markets is also influenced by a sui generis cost mechanism in network-dependent companies, high barriers of entry and their general profile of services (i.e. social goods, low demand elasticity). Noncompetitive (monopolistic) markets should and must be regulated and the main field of the municipal companies regulation is ratemaking as a rate of return regulation or price-caps regulation.

Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities

This paper investigates the relationship between investment and regulatory regimes (incentive vs. rate-of-return regulation) for a sample of EU energy utilities from 1997 to 2007. We control for the effect of firm ownership and for cross-country differences in the underlying energy demand and energy supply. To deal with potential endogeneity of the regulatory regime, we apply instrumental variable methods (2SLS and GMM). Our results show that investment rate is higher under incentive regulation than under rate of return regulation. Using original data on the regulatory tools (X factor and WACC), we find that investment of incentive regulated firms appears highly sensitive to the X factor, consistent with efficiency- and profit-seeking motivations. Electric utilities investment is also sensitive to the level and change in the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Finally, we find that the positive relationship between private control and investment is not robust to IV estimations, suggesting that in Europe regulation may have reduced the differences between private and public firms’ incentives to invest.

Regulatory effects on the market penetration and capacity of reliability differentiated service

This paper investigates the effects of alternative forms of regulation on the market penetration and capacity that are determined by a profit-maximizing monopolist providing reliability differentiated service to consumers. Both price cap and rate of return regulation lead to larger capacity and market penetration than in the absence of regulation. These forms of regulation also lead to larger consumer surplus than in the absence of regulation. A minimum reliability standard reduces market penetration, and this reduction may lead to a decrease in consumer surplus.

Regulatory risk in the utilities industry: An empirical study of the English-speaking countries

The economic theory on regulation suggests that firms subject to incentive regulation, such as price cap, bear more risk than firms subject to cost plus regulation, such as rate of return regulation. This hypothesis is tested empirically using a sample of 93 regulated companies operating in six English-speaking countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and USA, during the period 1995–2004. I replicate the methodology of the existing literature and also apply panel data techniques to my sample. The results obtained do not support the hypothesis that price cap regulation imposes more risk.

Rate of Return Regulation: The Case of Spanish Ports

An original model is put forward in this article to explain and consider the behavior of some of the most important public services in Spain. The cost function approach and the input distance function approach are used to estimate the existence of overcapitalization as a result of rate of return regulation. The results show that overcapitalization generated by this regulation is too significant not to be taken into account.

Regulating prices and profits in utility industries in low‐income economies

PurposeThe aim of the paper is to examine alternative methods of regulating prices and/or profits of privatised utilities in low‐income countries with a view to identifying their strengths and weaknesses.Design/methodology/approachThe economics of regulation literature has favoured the use of a price cap over rate of return or cost of service regulation because of its greater incentive effects. A third alternative, sliding‐scale regulation, has been put forward as a compromise between the price cap and a controlled rate of return, which is said to combine the merits of both methods. This paper considers the operation of a price cap, rate of return regulation and sliding‐scale regulation in the context of low‐income economies by reviewing the theory in relation to the conditions likely to be found in low‐income economies.FindingsIt is concluded that the case for the use of a price cap is much reduced in low‐income economies. This is because of its information requirements, need for regulatory expertise and, more broadly, the institutional endowment found in many low‐income countries.Research limitations/implicationsIt is recognised that this conclusion is tentative and deserves further research, comparing theory and practice.Practical implicationsCountries need to consider carefully which method of regulation will work best in the context of the institutions of the country, rather than simply copy a method from the developed world.Originality/valueThis is one of the first papers to challenge the prevailing belief that price cap regulation is superior to rate of return regulation in the context of economic development.

Price and Profit Regulation in Developing and Transition Economies: A Survey of the Regulators

Rate of return or cost of service regulation was the traditional means by which governments, especially in the USA, regulated profitability and prices in privately-owned public utility businesses. However, rate of return regulation was associated with efficiency disincentives. Hence, in 1983 a price cap was proposed to regulate British Telecom when it was privatized. Price caps were later introduced for other privatized utilities in the UK. Similarly, other countries that privatized their utility sectors in the 1980s and 1990s often introduced price cap regimes. This article reports the results of a questionnaire survey of the methods used to regulate profits and prices in privatized utility sectors in a sample of developing and transition economies. In addition to providing an insight into the different methods used in these economies, the article explains the difficulties that their regulators have in operating profit and price regulation regimes.

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.

The deregulation of Japan's electricity industry

Japan's electricity industry is now in the process of regulatory reform. This industry consists of three sectors: generation, transmission, and distribution. The reform phases out the entry barrier in the first sector, while keeping the latter two as they were with a rate-of-return (ROR) regulation. To simulate this regulatory reform, we employ a computable general equilibrium model, which distinguishes these three sectors and is equipped with the ROR regulation and substitution among various energy sources. Our numerical simulations show a potential for significant welfare improvements and substitution among energy inputs even if the reform scope is limited.

Cost of Equity Uncertainty and Rate of Return Regulation: Implications of New Developments in Financial Economics

Estimation of a corporation's cost of equity is crucial for various financial analyses. One area in which it is necessary is in rate of return regulation. In order for the regulator to set an appropriate rate of return, the corporation's cost of equity must be estimated accurately. This article examines the two most common methods used to estimate the cost of equity: the discounted dividend model and the capital asset pricing model. Recent developments in financial economics make traditional applications of these methods suspect. These developments are the use of share repurchases, and a prospective equity risk premium much lower than historic values suggest. The uncertainty described here, in combination with previously known sources of uncertainty, suggest that increased scrutiny of cost of equity estimates is warranted. Also, the ongoing search for improved models of the cost of equity should continue.

Incentive Regulation in Network Industries: Experience and Prospects in the U.S. Telecommunications, Electricity, and Natural Gas Industries

We trace the development of incentive regulation in the U.S. telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas industries. Telecom has moved much more in the direction of pure price cap regulation. Incentive regulation in electricity and gas has generally not strayed far from rate-ofreturn regulation. Reasons for these differences include differences in regulatory commitment, industry concentration, technological change and productivity growth, service quality concerns, and externalities. We conclude that electricity and gas can evolve to purer forms of price caps as they gain more experience with incentive regulation, and if the unique features of these industries are considered in plan design.

A model for regulated product innovation and introduction with application to telecommunications

This empirical examination compares product innovation under price caps and Rate of return regulation (RoRR) in US telecommunications. The econometric model comprises a count process (for product innovation) followed by a duration process (for regulatory delay). More services were created under price caps than under RoRR. The model may also be useful for other regulatory settings and issues.

The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry

We examine the impact of state incentive regulation on network modernization, aggregate investment, revenue, cost, profit, and local service rates in the U.S. telecommunications industry between 1986 and 1999. We find evidence of greater network modernization under price cap regulation (PCR), earnings sharing regulation (ESR), and rate case moratoria (RCM) than under rate of return regulation (RORR). Costs are generally lower under RCM. Costs are also lower under ESR and PCR when local competition is sufficiently intense. Some local service rates for business customers are lower under PCR. Revenue, profit, aggregate investment, and residential local service rates do not vary systematically under incentive regulation relative to RORR.

Price Caps, Rate of Return Constraints and Universal Service Obligations

This paper evaluates the effects of modifying price cap regulation when firms are allowed to use non-linear tariffs. We consider a stylized network industry and analyze price cap regulation combined with rate of return regulation and with a universal service obligation. While both modifications can increase aggregate welfare by reducing the pricing distortions under price cap regulation, a universal service obligation is welfare superior if the firm’s profits and the size of its network are held constant.

Transforming the energy sector: towards new governance structures

Governance issues related to the energy sector are complex and are assuming increasing importance with respect to sustainability of natural resources. This paper discusses the birth of the concept of independent regulation in the US, the two streams of regulation – rate of return regulation and price cap regulation – in the developed world, and the differences in their approach. It then covers independent regulation and governance of the energy sector in developing countries, focusing on India.