Ralph Wedgwood Research Articles

Contemporary debates in cognitive science

Notes on Contributors. Preface. Just How Modular Is The Mind?. 1. The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind Peter Carruthers. 2. Is the Mind Really Modular? Jesse Prinz. 3. Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? Richard Samuels. How Much Knowledge Of Language Is Innate?. 4. Irrational Nativist Exhuberance Geoff Pullum and Barbara Scholz. 5. The Case for Linguistic Nativism Robert Matthews. 6. On the Innateness of Language James A. McGilvray. Has cognitive science shown that human beings are cognitively bounded, or irrational?. 7. Bounded and Rational Gerd Gigerenzer. 8. Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue David Matheson. Are rules and representations necessary to explain systematicity?. 9. Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules Terrence Horgan and John Tienson. 10. Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective Bill Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen. Can consciousness and qualia be reduced?. 11. Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced William Lycan. 12. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced Brie Gertler. Does cognitive science need external content at all?. 13. Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) Ray Jackendoff. 14. The Intentional Inexistence of Language Georges Rey. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations?. 15. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? Kirk Ludwig. 16. Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the 'No' Side Chris Viger. Can mental states, knowledge in particular, be divided into a narrow component and a broad component?. 17. Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components? Tim Williamson. 18. The Internal and External Components of Cognition Ralph Wedgwood. Index...

Reply to Ralph Wedgwood

Reply to Ralph Wedgwood

Prime Causation

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 70, Issue 2 p. 459-467 Prime Causation1 STEPHEN YABLO, STEPHEN YABLO Massachusetts Institute of TechnologySearch for more papers by this author STEPHEN YABLO, STEPHEN YABLO Massachusetts Institute of TechnologySearch for more papers by this author First published: 29 May 2007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00541.xCitations: 5 1 These comments are extremely limited in scope and ambition. They focus on pp. 75-92 of Knowledge and its Limits, and about these I complain essentially that Tim is right for more reasons than he gives. Thanks to Louise Antony, Alex Byrne, Tim Crane, Elizabeth Fricker, Paul Horwich, Michael Martin, David Papineau, Christopher Peacocke, Ralph Wedgwood, and Tim Williamson. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume70, Issue2March 2005Pages 459-467 RelatedInformation

The Metaethicists’ Mistake1

Philosophical PerspectivesVolume 18, Issue 1 p. 405-426 The Metaethicists’ Mistake† Ralph Wedgwood, Ralph Wedgwood Merton College, OxfordSearch for more papers by this author Ralph Wedgwood, Ralph Wedgwood Merton College, OxfordSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 November 2004 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00035.xCitations: 10Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume18, Issue1December 2004Pages 405-426 RelatedInformation

A Slim Semantics for Thin Moral Terms?

This paper is a critique of Ralph Wedgwood's recent attempt to use the framework of conceptual role semantics in metaethics. Wedgwood's central idea is that the action-guiding role of moral terms suffices to determine genuine properties as their semantic values. We argue that Wedgwood cannot get so much for so little. We explore two interpretations of Wedgwood's account of what it takes to be competent with a thin moral term. On the first interpretation, the account does not warrant the assignment of a normative property as the semantic value of the target expression. On the second interpretation, the account presupposes that the subject has a prior understanding of normative notions.

Review of Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed. Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgwood

Review of Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed. Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgwood

The Aim Of Belief

NoûsVolume 36, Issue s16 p. 267-297 The Aim Of Belief Ralph Wedgwood, Ralph Wedgwood Merton College, OxfordSearch for more papers by this author Ralph Wedgwood, Ralph Wedgwood Merton College, OxfordSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 January 2003 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10Citations: 37AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume36, Issues16October 2002Pages 267-297 RelatedInformation

Sensing Values?

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 63, Issue 1 p. 215-223 Sensing Values? RALPH WEDGWOOD, RALPH WEDGWOOD Massachusetts Institute of TechnologySearch for more papers by this author RALPH WEDGWOOD, RALPH WEDGWOOD Massachusetts Institute of TechnologySearch for more papers by this author First published: 29 May 2007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00098.xCitations: 12AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume63, Issue1July 2001Pages 215-223 RelatedInformation

The Price of Non‐Reductive Physicalism

NoûsVolume 34, Issue 3 p. 400-421 The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism Ralph Wedgwood, Ralph Wedgwood Massachusetts Institute of TechnologySearch for more papers by this author Ralph Wedgwood, Ralph Wedgwood Massachusetts Institute of TechnologySearch for more papers by this author First published: 17 December 2002 https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00217Citations: 7AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume34, Issue3September 2000Pages 400-421 RelatedInformation

Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?

This paper began life as part of a longer paper, versions of which were read at MIT (May, 1997), Stanford (October, 1997), the University of Michigan (December, 1997), and the Classical Seminar in Corpus Christi College, Oxford (June, 1998). A version of the present paper was presented at Cornell's Society for the Humanities (March, 1999), and at the Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, held at University College, London (November, 1999). I thank the audiences on these occasions for helpful comments, especially Jean-Marie Beyssade, Chris Bobonich, Justin Broackes, Lesley Brown, David Charles, Ed Curley, Stephen Everson, Dan Garber, Louis Loeb, Gisela Striker, and Ralph Wedgwood. Thanks are also due to Carl Ginet, who saved me from a mistake and suggested a way to repair it; to Michael Ayers, Al-Quassim Cassam, and Zoltdn Szab6 for stimulating discussion; to Julia Annas, both for stimulating discussion and for showing me her as yet unpublished paper Hume and Ancient Scepticism, which has influenced my paper a lot; to Charles Brittain for stimulating discussion and helpful written comments; to an anonymous referee for, and the then editors of, the Philosophical Revieur, and to Christopher Taylor, my commentator at the Keeling Colloquium. Marjorie Grene's paper, Descartes and Ancient Skepticism, Review of Metaphysics 52 (1999): 553-71, reached me only after my paper had been completed; I regret that I was not able to take account of it. 1See (to take only a few of many examples) M. F. Burnyeat, Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism? in Skeptical Tradition, ed. M. F. Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 117-48, at 118-19 (originally published in Doubt and Dogmatism, ed. M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1980), 2053);J. Annas andJ. Barnes, Modes of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 7-8; B. Mates, Pyrrhonism and Modern Scepticism: Similarities and Differences, in Philosophie, Psycholoanalyse, Emigration, ed. P. Muhr, P. Feyeraband, C. Wegeler (Vienna: WUV-Universitatsverlag, 1992), 210-28, at 219-21; R. Hankinson, Sceptics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1995), 21-23; S. Gaukroger, The Ten Modes of Aenesidemus and the Myth of Ancient Scepticism, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995): 371-87, and his Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1995), 310ff. However, the claim is often qualified. Annas and Barnes, for example, say