Railway Package Research Articles

Railway Freight Corridors in the European Union

With the approval of four regulatory railway packages of the European Union, the development of railway traffic, the opening of the goods and passenger transport market, the expansion of liberalisation, the removal of barriers, and the gradual establishment of a single European railway area have been achieved. The competitiveness and efficiency of freight railways in Europe have been accomplished by establishing international freight corridors. The Alpine–Balkan rail freight corridor was established for more accessible and better-quality goods transport services between Central and Southeast Europe with a connection to Turkey.

The liberalisation of high-speed rail services in Spain: Ticket price in the Madrid–Barcelona corridor

Current EU regulations and initiatives aim to promote a series of structural changes within the rail sector to improve its efficiency and environmental sustainability. Thus, a liberalisation process has been implemented through the so-called "railway packages". In the case of Spain, in 2021 the Spanish state-owned railway infrastructure manager (ADIF) culminated a long and complex process, initiated in 2016, to replace the existing public monopoly with free market models. As a result, three different companies have signed a ten-year agreement on the provision of high-speed services on the Madrid-Barcelona route, Madrid-East and Madrid-South.By facilitating the entry of new competitors, a reduction of transport costs is expected, which will in turn reduce the charges paid by operating companies. This will benefit rail passengers. In fact, the Spanish high-speed rail network presents, in general terms, excess capacity and low levels of congestion, which makes it easier for new operators to access the infrastructure. Therefore, new rail services will increase by 65% the network's capacity, compared to pre-liberalisation scenario.Given the new highly competitive scenario, the prices and types of tickets are much more complex as they are highly influenced by numerous factors, including internal factors, external factors, competition among rail operators and strategic customers. However, an appropriate ticket-pricing strategy can not only attract more passengers but also improve revenue. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to analyse the pricing strategy for High Speed Rail (HSR) services in the Madrid-Barcelona corridor, considering the competition among different rail operators.

유럽연합 철도법제 현황에 관한 연구

The European Union has implemented policies focusing on the principle of separation of infrastructure and operation and market opening(open access) for 30 years to revitalize railway transportation. The EU's rail policy is starting from the Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community's railways. In 1995, two guidelines (Council Directive 95/18/EC of 19 June 1995 on the licensing of railway undertakings and Council Directive 95/19/EC of 19 June 1995 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the charging of infrastructure fees) were issued, and in 2001 the so-called First Railway Package reiterated open access and competition in the international railway cargo market to further develop their guidelines. The second railway package in 2004 stipulated the harmonization of different certification and safety regulations, and the creation of the European union agency for railways to promote safety and mutual operation. In 2007, the third railway package has consistently promoted the development of the railway industry through competition, such as declaring the introduction of competition in international passenger services. The European Commission analyzed the performance and problems between 2011 and 2012, and announced the fourth railway package containing the results and supplementary measures. The Fourth Railway Package is a set of six legislation designed to complete a single market for railway services, with an important goal being to revitalize the railway sector and to increase competitiveness over other means of transport.

The liberalisation of the European Union passenger rail market: New challenges for future public service contracts

The process of European Union(EU) rail market liberalisation is now at a tipping point, with the fourth railway package approved by the European Parliament and Commission and the Member States that have to embed its mandates and provisions into their national legislation. To a large extent, this has already been achieved. The railway package is structured in two main pillars – market pillar and technical pillar – with specific objectives. My paper will focus on the market pillar, particularly on the new challenges that the liberalisation of the EU passenger rail market will generate on public service contracts in effect as of 2023. The establishment of the single European railway area requires common rules on the award of public service contracts in this sector, while taking into account the specific circumstances of each Member State. Public service contracts for public passenger transport services by rail should be awarded on the basis of a competitive tendering procedure. Procedures for competitive tendering of public service contracts should be open to all operators, should be fair and should respect the principles of transparency and non-discrimination. This paper will analyse the new legal challenges that public service contracts in railway transport will encounter and what their impact will be on the process of liberalisation or the EU passenger rail market.

FULL STEAM AHEAD OR DOWN? AN EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN RAILWAYS AFTER THE “YEAR OF RAIL”

The year 2021 was a critical juncture for European Railways. Not just the deadline for full implementation of the Fourth Railway Package, but the EU also advertised the whole year as "the year of Rail" to accelerate mobility on rail and aid member states to speed up their compliance with the norms of highly anticipated “Single European Railways”. Nevertheless, both goals seemed pretty ambitious to achieve when member states were still coping with the pernicious effects of the pandemic and the war. This research evaluates EU nations’ current performance towards the EU’s railway regulations. Through a machine-learning model, the analysis suggests three classes of states. It assumes a significant differentiation in member state performance, which causes the EU to fall behind the assumed schedule immensely.

Qualitative and Quantitative Indicators of Railway Stations

Abstract The liberalization of the rail freight market has been booming in recent years. On a pan-European scale, new freight carriers are increasing year after year. Support for the liberalization of the railway sector is mainly implemented through the so-called railway packages and one of the tools is the quantitative and qualitative indicators of the individual railway stations. The relevance of the article is mainly to propose measures for railway stations, where freight transport is declining despite the liberalized market. These are main railway stations located on regional lines and railway stations with a smaller scope of transport work. The aim of this paper will be to propose measures to support freight transport in the Slovak Republic by setting minimum requirements (standards) for railway stations depending on their performance, respecting their current technical level of railway operation.

He who controls the process controls the outcome? A reappraisal of the relais actor thesis

ABSTRACT In the early years of co-decision, scholars posited that informal trilogues would empower individual negotiators vis-à-vis their respective institutions because of their privileged position in the process of EU legislative decision-making. Now that the procedural framework governing trilogues has been tightened significantly in recent years particularly with the aim of controlling the negotiators, this article investigates if individual negotiators can still exercise control over the process of decision-making, biasing end results towards their own preferences. Based on a case study of the EU’s fourth Railway Package, we conclude that this is indeed the case. Applying a new conceptual frame for analysing informal negotiations, we present first conclusion as to how chief negotiators can manipulate negotiations processes to achieve preferred results in this specific but influential forum of negotiations.

Requirements of the 4th Railway Package Towards Safety Management Systems

Abstract In accordance with the new requirements of rail law, from June 2020, a railway undertaking or rail infrastructure manager applying for a single safety certificate/ authorization should demonstrate compliance with the relevant requirements of the Safety Management System (SMS) set out in the Commission delegated regulation (UE) 2018/762. To this end, he should provide proof to the national safety authority or, where applicable, to the European Union Agency for Railway Safety, of the establishment of a safety management system in accordance with Art. 9 of Directive (EU) 2016/798. According to Regulation, the organization should describe the scope of the safety management system, indicating which parts of the business are covered by it, considering legal requirements. The publication attempts to identify necessary changes and additions to hitherto functioning SMS.

Research Methodology: Application of Railway Luggage and Package Transportation Scheme Formulation Based on a Dynamic Time–Space Service Network

In the current market environment, the formulation of a railway luggage and package transport scheme (RLPTS) is often affected by the specific requirements of the transport organization, the complex composition of the transport service network, and the dynamic changes of transport demands, which make it very difficult. In this paper, a two-stage RLPTS formulation method is proposed that can meet not only transport demands with dynamic changes, but also the requirements of transport timeliness. It is used to solve the problem of current RLPTS formulation. First, a dynamic service network for railway luggage and package transport (RLPT) is constructed based on passenger train schedules, and based on this network, an improved A* algorithm is designed to generate feasible path sets for RLPT demand. Then, based on feasible path sets, a flow distribution model aiming at maximizing the total profit of transportation is established to solve the model in order to enable the flow allocated on the path. Finally, an example calculation shows that the method can implement the RLPTS formulation rapidly.

Competition in the railway passenger market: The challenge of liberalization

European country members have been opening up to competition railway passenger services in recent years, whereas others still remain on the way to liberalization. The recent Commission’s fourth European Union (EU) Railway Package has updated the European legislation to ensure an effective liberalization within the EU country members by 2020. It is intended to enhance firms’ efficiency and also consumers’ benefits. In this article, we study different paths towards liberalization from the traditional state-owned monopoly configuration. First, the monopoly outcome is presented, as it is the current situation in a number of EU country members. Second, the oligopoly models are introduced to study different paths towards an effective competition as a result of different market configurations. It is found that liberalization may enhance consumer surplus keeping operators’ profitability only when variable costs and access charge to the network are low. Finally, some regulatory measures are discussed.

How to liberalise rail passenger services? Lessons from european experience

This paper studies the experience of Europe's three most liberalised railways - Sweden, Germany and Britain - in opening-up rail passenger services to competition by means of competitive tendering, and seeks to draw lessons for countries that are just starting the process, such as France. It also comments on experience of competition in the market in these and other countries (this form of competition has been taken furthest in other countries - notably Italy and the Czech Republic, as well as on a single route in Austria). The paper fills an important gap in the literature - that has so far focused on econometric modelling of the impact of rail reforms - by considering how competition can best be introduced in practice. This investigation is important and timely given the requirements of EU legislation (4th Railway Package) which will require competition to be introduced into passenger rail services (by 2020 for commercial services, and 2023 for public transport contracts) across the whole of the EU. It finds evidence that competitive tendering has helped increase demand for and reduce subsidies to the rail passenger sector, but that there are many decisions that have to be taken as to how it is to be implemented. Short gross cost contracts may work well for regional services where the tendering authority takes the lead in planning and marketing such services. If services where ticket revenue recovers a larger share of costs – “more commercial services” – are to be tendered, long net cost contracts may make more sense. An alternative is to leave them operated by the incumbent but with open access for competitors to enter the market. Two particular issues face countries starting on the liberalisation process. Firstly, if existing rolling stock is owned by the incumbent rather than the franchising authority or an independent company; that remains a major barrier to entry. The second is the position of existing staff. If new operators are required to take them on at existing wages and conditions; that is a barrier to improved efficiency, but for new operators to recruit their own staff may also be problematic, particularly where the pace of change is fast.

The strategic dimension of logistics in the Fourth Railway Package

The importance of the Fourth Railway Package for the development of rail transport is discussed in this article. Attention is drawn to the role of logistics in the aspect of interoperability and nodal infrastructure development. The importance of the technical pillar from the Fourth Railway Package for the rail freight logistics is indicated.

Calculation of access charges for rail infrastructure in the light of European Union’s regulations

The article presents evolution of EU’s regulations referring to the rules of calculation of access charges for rail infrastructure. In the opposite to payable utilization of road, harbor or airport infrastructure, payable access to the rail infrastructure for transport operators (rail carriers) is a relatively new issue in the European railways, because it emerged just in 1991 in relation with taken up system reforms of EU’s rail sector. In the introductory part of the article, the Directive 91/440 has been indicated as a historically first law act that referred to the issue of calculation of access charges for rail infrastructure. Next, there were presented regulations of the Directive 2001/14 adopted within so called first railway package and vagueness in their interpretation, which led to the trials before the European Court of Justice, whereas the most important was the one against Poland, ended with the sentence on the 30th of May 2013. The final part of the article presents references to this sentence and to the new regulations referring to the charges for the access to rail infrastructure, included in the Directive 2014/34 and executive ordinance 2015/909 issued on its basis.

Methodology for Tendering the Performances in Long Distance Rail Passenger Transport

A fundamental step in the liberalisation of the rail market has been the separation of the railway infrastructure from the railway operating. The partial liberalisation of the rail market in the European Union (EU) was already underway in 2010. Opening up the market to new private railway operators means that operators can compete for the performance of selected lines. The opening up process of domestic rail passenger transport markets according to the fourth railway package has a variety of levels in Member States. This process is requested to be performed not later than 2019, while making public tenders for transport service contracts compulsory in the public interest. The paper is focused on tender implementation steps for long-distance rail passenger transport and shows the legislation requirements for the tendering process. There is a need to analyse the technical and other obstacles and threats to the operation of long-distance rail services entering competition. The idea is to meet the objectives of the EU White Paper on transport and The Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No. 1191/69 and 1107/70.

Theoretical basis for calculation of charges for access to railway infrastructure in the light of European Union law

This article discusses the rules for calculation of charges levied for access to railway infrastructure under the European Union directives and based on economic categories such as “marginal costs”, “direct costs”, “fixed costs”, and “variable costs”. The introductory part of the article refers to Directive 91/440, historically the first legal act that referred to the issue of calculation of charges levied for access to railway infrastructure. Subsequently, the provisions of Directive 2001/14, adopted in the so-called “first railway package”, and interpretative ambiguities in this regard were indicated. As a result, the European Commission had for several years promoted the idea that charges levied for access to railway infrastructure should be calculated on the basis of the theoretical category of “marginal cost”, although no provision of the applicable directive indicated such category. Since the Member States did not accept this idea and used their own calculation systems, the European Commission gave rise to infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union, accusing several Member States of infringing the provisions of Directive 2001/14, regarding the calculation of charges levied for access to railway infrastructure. Undoubtedly, the most important proceeding was the one against Poland, which concluded with the judgment delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union of 30 May 2013. The final part of this article includes references to this judgment, as well as new provisions on the calculation of charges levied for access to railway infrastructure set forth in Directive 2012/34, and the implementing regulation 2015/909 issued on its basis.

La liberalización del sector ferroviario: ¿una política congruente con el derecho comunitario de la competencia?

The Forth Railway Package approved in 2016 in order to remove remaining obstacles to complete the Single European Rail Area aims, inter alia, to boost competition by adapting the system of governance between railway infrastructure managers and service operators. However, in this respect, reality shows us a scenario away from those objectives and dominated by a few operators. This paper aims to analyze the causes of this situation and to propose ways of improvement. To this end, it focuses on a key aspect of the liberalization process of the sector, such as the area of market relations between railway infrastructure managers and transport service operators. The study is approached from the perspective of EC Competition law, with particular reference to rules applicable to merger control.

The Application of EU Competition Rules in the Transport Sector

In 2016 the centre of attention in the transport industry was the upheavals in the shipping industry and the dramatic changes in its landscape. The collapse of the South Korean giant Hanjin sent shock waves through the industry and caused significant disturbances in logistical chains around the world. The alignment of alliances in the industry has changed with the rearrangement of the three mega-alliances G5, Ocean 3 and CKYHE into Ocean Alliance and THE Alliance. EU regulators focused on the clearance procedures of new significant mergers (CMA CGM/NOL and Hapag-Llyod/UASC; UASC, United Arab Shipping Company) and the adoption of the commitments decision in the Container Shipping case. In rail, the Council and European Parliament finally adopted the fourth railway package, a significant and much debated legislative effort that aims at enhancing the single market for rail transport service. Antitrust enforcement effort continued with raids and initiation of proceedings against companies in the rail passenger sector but also the first Commission decision relieving ahead of schedule a company (Deutsche Bahn) of its commitments following their successful implementation.

Open Access for Rail Passenger Services in Europe: Lesson Learnt from Forerunner Countries

Abstract The fourth railway package –still discussed today by the European institutions - plans to open the whole rail transport market to competition in 2022. Currently, only freight transportation and international passenger services are open to competition. According to the fourth package, the market for regional transportation should be organized around franchises and therefore competition “for” the market. On the contrary, competition for long distance services - at least for profitable services – should be “open access”. This paper evaluates the potential consequences of this open access competition at the European level based on the consequences of open access competition in the seven forerunner countries that have already allowed for some form of open access competition. These experiences may give us some clues regarding the impact of open access in Europe. It inventories all the open access services that exist/have existed across Europe. Based on this database, we construct standard profiles and strategies of new entrants. We found that it takes several years for open access competition to settle after legal opening of passenger transportation market. For most of the new entrants, the financial strategy is to minimize risk. Wide-scale entries with brand new rolling stock are extremely uncommon. Bankruptcy (or service interruption) are common. Therefore, it is unlikely that the fourth package implementation leads to a dramatic change in the functioning of the rail passenger transportation market.

The Fourth Railway Package:

After four years of lively debates, the fourth railway package has eventually been adopted in 2016. It contains a 'technical pillar' recasting the Interoperability and Safety Directives and amending the Regulation on the European Railway Agency's powers. These new provisions should cut red-tape and progressively lift technical barriers for the development of European railway services. The package also includes the much more controversial 'market pillar', amending the Public Service Obligation Regulation and the Directive establishing a Single European Railway Area. These new provisions introduce competition both in and for domestic passenger transport services, as well as detailed governance rules for infrastructure managers. This paper argues that the long standing legislative process focused more on reducing the European Commission's rather rigid proposals than on identifying and addressing the cause for the relatively poor modal share retained by the railways. As a result, the fourth railway package may well be only the next stop on the journey to liberalisation.

Competition Law and the Rail Market: The Future Liberalization of the EU Rail

How the examples from the liberalization of the UK rail markets and the case law from the ECJ can benefit us to tackle possible inefficiencies, vertical and horizontal restraints, barriers to access and cross-subsidies by States in the implementation of the Railway Packages of the EC, from the competition law perspective.