Populist Radical Right Parties Research Articles

Between opportunities and constraints: right-wing populists as designers of migrant integration policy

ABSTRACT Anti-immigrant claims are seen as key to the success of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in parliamentary opposition. Yet migrant integration policies adopted by PRRPs in executive power are still a blind spot in research. Some scholars assess their policy impact as weak and attribute this to a lack of robust policy suggestions, others point to their taming by mainstream coalition partners and by government responsibility. Recently though, PRRPs have found more favourable political opportunities in the increased salience of migration and a rightward shift of centre-right parties. Drawing on policy documents from the Austrian coalition government of the radical right Austrian Freedom Party and the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (2017-2019), this paper investigates policy designs and constraints in the area of migrant integration. Our study points out the impact of PRRPs in government on integration policy through strengthening regulatory instruments, weakening distributive instruments and using organizational instruments to centralize policy implementation at the expense of NGOs. Yet this approach not only alters the substance of policy designs, the radical right also imprints a populist mode of confrontational and accelerated policy-making. Against these changes, taming is left to political and especially institutional constraints at national and international levels.

From Cohesion to Contagion? Populist Radical Right Contestation of EU Enlargement

AbstractThe rise of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in a growing number of European Union (EU) member states and inside the European Parliament (EP) has triggered concern over their ability to drive further contestation of European integration. Using EU enlargement as a test case, we analyse an original dataset of over 2′700 hand‐coded statements from the last three EP mandates (2004–19) to trace the emergence of an increasingly coherent, oppositional discourse by PRRPs towards a further widening of the EU. We show that PRRPs contribute to a generalized hardening of opposition towards enlargement, but fail to impose their identity‐focused framing upon other parliamentary actors. Instead, we suggest that mainstream party groups accommodate PRRPs' essentialist discourse by shifting from technical, conditionality‐based reasoning towards more political arguments articulated around human rights and democracy. Our findings feed into debates about the transnational cooperation of PRRPs and the political impact of Euroscepticism.

No Strong Leaders Needed? AfD Party Organisation Between Collective Leadership, Internal Democracy, and “Movement-Party” Strategy

This article analyses the formal and lived organisation of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany). We show that the party is exceptional among what is usually understood as the populist radical right (PRR) party family, at least from an organisational perspective: The AfD sharply contradicts the “standard model” of PRR party organisation, which emphasises “charismatic” leadership and the centralisation of power as key features. Instead, studying the AfD’s efforts to adopt some elements of a mass-party organisation and its relatively decentralised decision-making underlines the importance of “movement-party” strategy, collective leadership, and internal democracy—concepts that are usually associated with Green and left-wing parties. Our analysis shows how the party’s organisation is essential for understanding its development more broadly as it reflects and reinforces sharp intra-party conflict. From this perspective, the case of the AfD sheds new light on the relationship between PRR party organisation and electoral success, indicating the importance of strong ties to parts of society over effective internal management as long as demand for anti-immigration parties is high. We conclude that even though AfD quickly built up a relatively inclusive organisational structure, the role of both its leadership and its rank-and-file is still a matter of controversy.

Party Organisation of PiS in Poland: Between Electoral Rhetoric and Absolutist Practice

The article analyses the organisation of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [PiS]) in Poland. The case of PiS does not only allow us to explore the organisational features of a strongly institutionalized, incumbent party which uses populist radical right (PRR) politics. PiS, we argue, is also an ideal case to contrast what such parties might rhetorically declare and substantively do about their organisational features. Using party documents, press reports, quantitative data, and insights from the secondary literature based on interviews with activists, we evaluate the extent to which PiS has developed a mass-party-related organisation, and centralized its intra-party decision-making procedures. We find that while PiS made overtures to some aspects of mass-party-like organisation for electoral mobilization, the party remained reluctant to actively expand its membership numbers and put little effort into fostering the integration and social rootedness of its members through everyday intra-party activities. Furthermore, despite attempts to enact organisational reinvigoration, in practice PiS continued to revolve around strongly centralized structures and, in particular, the absolutist leadership style of the party’s long-time Chair Jarosław Kaczyński. The analysis contributes to assessing the variety and functions of organisational features and appeals within the comparative study of PRR parties. Most particularly, it invites further research into the still relatively under-researched interactions between PRR party organisation and active party communication.

Hijack or release? On the heuristic limits of the frame of instrumentalization of religion for discussing the entanglements of populism, religion, and gender

ABSTRACT In the Manichaean discourse of the radical-right populist parties, both religion and gender play a role in the discursive process of ‘othering’. At the same time, on some occasions, populist discourse also mobilises Christianity and gender equality against immigrants, which has been interpreted through the frames of hijacking or instrumentalization. In this paper, I advance two arguments: first, I illustrate the relevance of the literature on secularisation to finetune the analysis of the entanglements of populism, religion and gender, to overcome the ‘hijacking’ frame; second, I make a plea for a socio-constructivist perspective, which pays attention to how the actors make sense of their religious-political engagement and try to avoid paternalistic interpretations. Empirical analysis focuses on the discourse of the supporters of Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Italian radical-right populist party Lega Nord, on Instagram, showing the intersections of religion and gender.

Affective Polarization and the Populist Radical Right: Creating the Hating?

AbstractDo populist radical right (PRR) parties fuel affective polarization? If so, how and under which circumstances? Based on a comparative cross-country analysis covering 103 elections in 28 European countries and an examination of longitudinal data from the Netherlands, we show that PRR parties occupy a particular position in the affective political landscape because they both radiate and receive high levels of dislike. In other words, supporters of PRR parties are uniquely (and homogeneously) negative about (supporters of) mainstream parties and vice versa. Our analyses suggest that these high levels of antipathy are most likely due to the combination of these parties' nativism and populism – two different forms of ingroup–outgroup thinking. Our findings also suggest that greater electoral success by PRR parties reduces dislike towards them, while government participation appears threatening to all voters except coalition partners.

Residential Constraints and the Political Geography of the Populist Radical Right: Evidence from France

What explains variation in populist radical right (PRR) support within Western democracies? Specifically, why is contemporary PRR support often and increasingly stronger in areas seemingly detached from the effects of globalization, transnationalism, or immigration, the key issues these parties emphasize? This study articulates a theory of residential constraints to deepen understanding of these spatial patterns. I hypothesize that when citizens are residentially constrained—that is, when their means of reacting to local conditions and “voting with their feet” are limited—they are more likely to support PRR parties. To test this claim, I use a multimethod research design and exploit both quantitative and qualitative evidence from France, an important case of long-standing and geographically divided PRR support. I demonstrate that the PRR performs well in areas where locals’ access to services and opportunities is compromised and where opportunities and incentives to relocate are blocked by residential constraints. Residential constraints thus generate a set of relative economic grievances and render them highly salient in localities that may otherwise appear unaffected by more objective hardships and structural decay.

The Covid-19 Crisis: Opportunity or Threat for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe?

Starting as a public health problem, the Covid-19 pandemic has become a multi-dimensional crisis that involves various policy areas. Crises have the potential to change priorities and trigger various reflexes in any given society, including a realignment on the political spectrum. In Europe, Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) were on the rise due to the previous crises in Europe. In this context, have these parties appealed more or less to voters during the pandemic? This study aims to investigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the discourse and popular support of European PRRPs in its first year. The responses of the PRRPs of Austria, France, Germany and Italy to the pandemic and its governance are explored through leaders’ Twitter posts. Changes in popular support for the political mainstream and the PRRPs are examined through recent opinion polls. The trend of the rise of European PRRPs before the pandemic is revisited and discussed in light of the findings.

Does ethno-territorial identity matter in populist party support? Evidence on the demand-side from 19 populist radical right and populist radical left national and regionalist parties

ABSTRACT This article investigates to what extent citizens’ conceptions of nation-state identity and European identity contribute to the support for populist radical parties along the left-right and the national level and sub-state divide. Drawing on data European Social Survey data, it employs multinomial and logistical regression models to examine the connection between territorial identity and support for majority nationalist Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) (9 cases), national-level Populist Radical Left Parties (PRLP) (4 cases), sub-national PRRP (3 cases), and sub-national PRLP (3 cases). The overall findings confirm that nation-state identity and European identity have independent and significant effects. In several of the cases, a strong nation-state identity is positively related to support for (a) majority nationalist PRRP. A (negative) European identity is a central characteristic throughout the sample of majority nationalist PRRP and present in every single case. Sub-state PRRP supporters reject nation-state identity and, interestingly, in one case also European identity more than do other partisans. Identity effects, especially a negative nation-state identity, were present among PRLP supporters too. However, the evidence points to significantly less coherence.

The Role of Short-Term and Longer Term Immigration Trends on Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

The success of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Europe has, in part, been attributed to growing immigration, but previous findings have found an inconsistent relationship between immigration and voting for PRRPs. We address previous inconsistencies by suggesting a time-focused perspective on intergroup relations. We disentangle short-term from longer term immigration trends and argue that a recent increase in immigration should predict PRRP support. With time, however, citizens will adapt to these demographic changes and voting for PRRPs could decline. We drew on official immigration records and representative data from the European Social Survey, capturing the voting behavior of 75,874 individuals from 15 European countries between 2002 and 2014. We found that a recent increase in immigration predicted more PRRP voting, and this relationship was strengthened under conditions of higher economic strain and inequality. In contrast, sustained immigration in the longer term was not related with PRRP votes.

Angry Reactionary Narcissists? Anger Activates the Link Between Narcissism and Right-Populist Party Support

Even though previous research connected personality traits and support for radical-right populist parties (RRP), the question of which mechanisms connect these concepts is still underexplored. In particular, we focus on narcissistic rivalry, a maladaptive path of grandiose narcissism. Drawing on the affective intelligence framework and the narcissistic admiration and rivalry concept, we propose that the effect of rival narcissism on vote choice for the German Alternative für Deutschland is mediated by reactionary political orientations and activated by anger. Drawing on 2017 data from the mixed-mode representative GESIS panel (N = 2,552 & 1,901), we employ moderated mediation analyses. We show that reactionary political orientations mediate the relationship between narcissistic rivalry and RRP support. However, high levels of generalised anger are needed to activate the relationship between personality, reactionary values, and RRP support, whereas the mediating role of anti-immigrant sentiment is not affected by anger. Our study emphasises the role of anger in RRP support, thus showing that anger might explain why only some people with a specific predisposition support RRPs. The study also stresses the complexity of the relationship between personality, value orientations, and political behaviour.

Reputation versus office: Why populist radical right governmental participation has differed between Sweden and Denmark

Sweden and Denmark have presented contrasting relationships between centre-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties. In Sweden, the centre-right has refused cooperation with the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD), even when this cost the centre-right office. However, in Denmark, coalitions led by centre-right parties have cooperated with the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) (DF) on multiple occasions. Through a controlled comparison, we examine what explains these different outcomes. Using Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and public opinion data, we firstly look at the policy congruence between parties and the social acceptability of cooperation. We then examine interview material with representatives from centre-right and PRR parties in Sweden and Denmark to see their explanations of cooperation and non-cooperation. We conclude that, while the office goals of Danish centre-right parties, along with the policy focus and uncontroversial past of DF, explain that case, the reputation and past of SD has precluded a similar outcome.

‘Enough’ of What? An Analysis of Chega’s Populist Radical Right Agenda

ABSTRACT In 2019, for the first time in Portugal, a populist radical right party (PRR) made it to parliament. Since then voting intentions for Chega (Enough) have grown with the party leader finishing third in the 2021 presidential race. This article provides an empirical-based account of the party’s agenda and ideological profile. It asks to what extent Chega shares the core ideological characteristics of the PRR family, i.e. nativism, populism and authoritarianism. Relying on a battery of primary data (party documents, legislative proposals, official party posts on Facebook), the article combines qualitative and quantitative text analysis. It shows that Chega’s agenda falls well into the radical right profile, not only in positional terms but also in terms of issue salience.

Electoral support for FPÖ in regional and national arenas: Different levels of government, same causality?

ABSTRACT Which factors contribute to the electoral success of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs)? We empirically investigate the relationship between the Austrian Freedom Party/FP (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich/FPÖ)'s electoral shares and the degree of population's socioeconomic polarization based on data for six regional and national elections and 118 municipalities in the state of Salzburg. Regional elections offer an excellent setting for conducting a thorough test of the argument that relative deprivation provides fertile ground for PRRPs. Our longitudinal study provides clear evidence that the more polarized the socio-economic structure in Salzburg's municipalities, the higher the share of FP supporters. This relationship holds over time and across types of elections: regional elections (‘Landtagswahlen’) and national elections (‘Nationalratswahlen’).

Is Alt-Europe possible? Populist radical right counternarratives of European integration

ABSTRACT After the 2016 Brexit referendum, European populist radical right (PRR) parties shifted towards what I call an alt-European policy programme. Alt-Europe is a conservative, xenophobic intergovernmental vision of a European ‘community of sovereign states’, ‘strong nations’ or ‘fatherlands’, that abhors the EU’s ‘centralised’ United States of Europe. Whereas most work on the PRR examines its national impact and plots party programmes on a spectrum from soft to hard Euroscepticism, this article instead contributes to cutting edge transnational research on PRR narratives. I use qualitative content analysis to identify narratives that support or undermine alt-Europe, and tropes that refer to them, in the thirteen parliamentary, presidential and European election manifestoes since 2012 of four major PRR parties, AfD (Germany), PiS (Poland), Lega (Italy) and FN (France). Contesting the hard-soft dichotomy in Euroscepticism studies, the article identifies enduring alt-European master narratives across Europe. These stories of geopolitics, democracy, money and especially ethnic understandings of Christian civilisational identity offer important shared narrative resources for programmes of both reforming and replacing the EU. Common narratives also support the PRR unity needed to implement an alt-European programme. However, PRR parties’ extreme nationalism and different interpretations of these narratives strongly impede this cooperation.

Protagonists or consenters: radical right parties and attacks on trade unions

ABSTRACT Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) not only seek to influence public policies with (re-)distributive implications to attract voters; they also try to reshape economic governance to weaken their opponents. We develop a theoretical model suggesting that the institutional reform strategies of PRRPs depend in large part on the degree of Social democratic party–union ties. When organizational ties between centre-left parties and trade unions are strong, PRRPs are protagonists of attacks on institutional union power and unite with centre-right parties in alternating long-term power relationships. By contrast, when Social democratic party–union ties are weak, PRRPs turn into consenters to the centre-right’s institutional reform proposals and act in accordance with short-term electoral and coalitional concerns. We research our argument in two primary case studies of Austria and Denmark, and control for alternative explanations with reviews of the institutional reform agendas pursued by radical right parties in Sweden and Germany.

Back to the familialist future: the rise of social policy for ruling populist radical right parties in Italy and Poland

This article contributes to the emerging studies of populist radical right parties’ social policies by looking at two cases, Italy and Poland, where such parties have been in office without the constraint of mainstream pro-market coalition partners. The comparison of two cases with different historical/institutional paths and economic conditions shows how important high-visibility, high-expenditure social policies can be for populist radical right parties (PRRPs) once in government. More specifically, the analysis of pension and family policies reveals important parallels in the revamping of familialistic aspects of the welfare state, despite demographic and economic pressures. The findings demonstrate that social policy is more important and less focussed on welfare chauvinism than assumed by the literature on PRRPs. This is explained by PRRPs’ electoral expansion strategy towards more deprived groups, which in countries with a strong conservative Catholic presence is achieved through ideological repertoire expansion towards familialism, which can address both the material and cultural interests of the new electorate.

Exit or Voice: Abstention and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT Despite the growing literature on populist radical-right parties (PRRP), the relationship between turnout and populist voting remains understudied, especially for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In this article, we analyze the individual-level factors that differentiate between those choosing voice (voting for PRRP) and exit (abstention) in the 2019 European Parliament elections. We estimate pooled logistic regression models for twelve PRRP from six CEE countries. Our findings show that anti-immigration and Euroskeptic attitudes—but also, unlike in Western Europe, trust in the national elites and satisfaction with democracy—increase the odds of PRRP voting instead of abstaining.

Longing for the “good old days” of our country: National nostalgia as a new master‐frame of populist radical right parties

Scholars and commentators have argued that national nostalgia forms a germane element of the rhetoric of populist radical right parties (PRRP). We addressed the national nostalgia component of PRRP ideology with respect to voters. Relying on political science theorizing and social psychological evidence, we proposed that national nostalgia forms a new emotion-based explanation for PRRP support within the cultural grievance framework. National nostalgia reflects grievances over perceived loss of the ethnically and culturally homogeneous moral community. Such grievances are subsequently mobilized by PRRP to justify and increase the persuasiveness of their nativist ideology. We hypothesized that voters who experience higher national nostalgia would evince stronger support for PRRP, due to national nostalgia's association with endorsement of PRRP's nativist ideology (i.e., ethnic nationhood and anti-Muslim attitudes). We tested this hypothesis by surveying a representative sample of native majority members in The Netherlands (N = 1,934). The results were consistent with the hypothesis, highlighting the relevance of national nostalgia for understanding PRRP success.

Embedded liberalism or embedded nationalism? How welfare states affect anti-globalisation nationalism in party platforms

In industrialised democracies, welfare state provisions have offsetting implications for anti-globalisation nationalism, central to the position taking of populist radical-right parties. On the one hand, social protection has an ‘embedded liberalism’ effect, mitigating economic insecurities associated with globalisation and thereby dampening anti-globalisation nationalism. On the other hand, social protection has an ‘embedded nationalism’ effect, awakening worries that globalisation may undermine hard-won provisions, thereby deepening anti-globalisation. This paper argues and finds evidence that which of these dynamics predominates depends on the particular kind of anti-globalisation debated and on the particular party family doing the debating. Welfare effort does generally dampen anti-globalisation nationalism, but it can deepen more than dampen anti-globalisation with respect to immigration and EU-integration that more directly impact existing national welfare provisions. Welfare effort can also deepen more than dampen anti-globalisation among radical-right and radical-left parties taking issue-ownership of anti-globalisation and of protecting national welfare-state competencies from global pressure.