Radical Left Parties Research Articles

Contesting Western support for Ukraine. The radical left in the European Parliament

ABSTRACT The 2022 full-scale Russian invasion into Ukraine challenged the political parties of the radical left and right that have traditionally been sympathetic to Russia. This paper examines the positions on the Russian war against Ukraine of radical left members of the 9th European Parliament (2019–2024), based on their voting behavior in the first year since the start of the full-scale invasion. The data show that the radical left is most divided over sanctions. In contrast, MEPs from the 18 radical left parties under study are highly united in their support of international law. The divisions among radical left MEPs correlate weakly with the geographical distance to Russia and with their parties’ position on the left/right-axis, but more strongly with parties’ position on socio-cultural questions: Socio-culturally progressive parties are more inclined to support an assertive stance towards Putin’s authoritarian and traditionalist Russia than socio-culturally conservative ones.

Peculiarities of the social structure of the electorate of left-wing parties in the EU countries

The article is devoted to the analysis of the political situation in the European Union, focusing on changes in support for left-wing parties in the context of global challenges. Transformations in the electoral preferences of EU citizens caused by economic and political turmoil and international conflicts are considered. The main focus is on the growing popularity of radical left populist parties. The analysis shows that traditional left-wing parties are losing support due to insufficiently radical proposals, which leads to fragmentation of their electorate. Radicalization of political sentiment is seen as a serious challenge, as radical movements are less predictable and can create political instability in the region. In this regard, analysts are faced with the question of possible changes in the political landscape, which is especially important in the context of tense international relations and sanctions pressure on Russia. The author emphasizes the need to understand political changes and forecast their consequences in order to develop effective electoral forecasts. The article considers the main results of the 2024 European Parliament elections, their impact on electoral preferences and changes in the EU political landscape. The theoretical approaches and empirical studies of leading domestic and foreign scholars in the field of studying party systems are analyzed, which allows us to assess current and future trends in European politics. The work also touches upon the issues of uniting left-wing forces in opposition to right-wing parties, as well as possible scenarios for the development of the political situation in the European Parliament and its impact on international relations and interstate interaction.

‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’? European radical left parties’ response to Russia’s war in Ukraine

The 2022 Russian (re)invasion of Ukraine highlights the need to understand better how European parties react towards aggressions by anti-liberal authoritarian states. In this article, we focus on the still relatively understudied yet crucial case of the radical left. Since our initial quantitative overview shows that there is no united front on positions of radical left parties towards Russia’s actions, we argue for the necessity of a deeper analysis of radical left strategies. A similar empirical analysis, however, is lacking. To fill this gap, we provide a qualitative content analysis of the reactions to Russia’s 2022 aggression on Ukraine from different ideological sub-types of radical left parties from the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Poland and Portugal. We conclude that there is a clear heterogeneity in the way the radical left approaches the invasion of Ukraine, which, albeit not perfectly, corresponds with ideological and strategic sub-types within the party family. Therefore, it makes little sense to regard the party family as a whole as ‘pro-Russian’. The findings invite further comparative studies on varying reactions to Russia’s aggressions within and across particular party families.

Are there populist parties in Brazil? An analysis of Election manifestos (2010-2022)

Are there populist parties in Brazil? Despite the common perception of personalistic electoral connections, the literature suggests that parties play a crucial role in legislation and voting choice. However, Brazilian parties are overlooked in populism studies. This article adds to the literature by analyzing populism in Brazilian election manifestos between 2010 and 2022. Through a man-machine content analysis application, it finds that populism is used by only a few parties, predominantly among radical left parties. The article also explores populism within mainstream parties during the 2018 elections. Despite not representing a threat to democracy due to limited influence, the existence of populist parties challenges the misconception that populism in Brazil is solely about leadership.

Job insecurity and vote for radical parties: A four-country study

Job insecurity is a pervasive phenomenon whose effects on support for different parties have attracted increasing attention in the literature. A growing body of research has assessed the relationship between job insecurity and the success of radical parties in Western democracies, but results are still inconclusive due to the complex nature of this independent variable. This article contributes new evidence to the current debates on this topic by analyzing how both objective labour market status and perceived job insecurity are associated with the vote for radical right and radical left parties. Our findings, based on four original surveys conducted in France, Germany, Greece and Spain, suggest that perceived job insecurity is generally associated with greater support for the radical left, but not for the radical right. In contrast, we find the relationship between objective labour market status and support for radical parties to be more ambiguous (and, in most cases, statistically non-significant).

What’s left of the populist radical left? SYRIZA and Die Linke compared

ABSTRACT This paper examines the discursive articulations of populism with egalitarianism in the parties of the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the German The Left Party (Die Linke). I draw on tools of political discourse analysis and use a discursive-analytical perspective to develop an analytical framework for examining egalitarianism and populism as separate yet interconnected concepts in the examined cases. My data is drawn from speeches and interviews of each party’s leadership during the national and European Parliament elections from 2009 to 2019. The aim is to make an argument for the analytical utility of ‘the elite’ term and its importance within each party’s socio-political context to separate egalitarian from populist elements in each party’s discourse and offer a renewed understanding of the distinction between egalitarianism and populism as two concepts that are often conflated in radical left parties. The analysis showed that there was a distinction between egalitarian and populist discursive elements in both parties’ discourses, with each party employing them on different levels depending on their respective contexts.

European radical left foreign policy after the invasion of Ukraine: shifts in assertiveness towards Russia

ABSTRACT The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a closer examination of parties’ attitudes towards the Putin regime. While research has examined the connections of the EU's far-right with Russia, less attention has been given to the stances of Radical Left Parties (RLPs). We close this gap by analysing Roll Call Votes (RCVs) in the European Parliament. Our findings indicate that RLPs displayed the lowest levels of assertiveness towards Russia before 2022, being even less assertive than other Eurosceptic groups. RLPs significantly increased their assertiveness after the invasion, bringing them closer to the EP mainstream. However, some divergence in assertiveness towards Russia existed within the RLPs before 2022 and remains relevant after the invasion, with the Traditional/Communist parties standing closer to Russia than radical New Left/Democratic Socialist parties.

Birds of a feather flock together: influence of ideology in the implementation of participation

ABSTRACT The global spread of participatory budgeting (PB) has facilitated its adoption by ideologically diverse political parties. Nowadays, we can easily find conservative, social democratic and leftist parties as promoters of PB. Hence the question arises: how does party ideology influence the implementation of citizen participation mechanisms? In this article, we study PB processes in nine different Spanish municipalities. Our aim is to analyse three dimensions that can be influenced by ideology: PB’s participatory design, the reasons different parties have to launch and maintain PB, and the possible instrumental reasons politicians refer to when speaking in favour of or against PB. According to our findings PB initiatives implemented by conservative, social democratic and radical left parties are quite different from one another: from a managerial way of understanding participation (conservative), which views participants as consumers to understanding PB as an educational process aimed to empower citizens (radical left). Nevertheless, arguments vary depending on whether politicians are in office or in the opposition, the former being more inclined to support citizen participation.

The radical left in the European Parliament

The article presents a feature of the communist movement in Europe following the collapse of the Soviet model of socialism at the end of the 20th century. The primary focus is given to the radical left parties represented in the European Parliament. In this context, the historical genesis of the establishment and functioning of the European parliamentary political group, the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), is analyzed and characterized. Within the European Parliament, this political group serves as an important unifying element for political parties with socialist and communist orientations. The scope of activity of this political group determines the main values of the European radical left, which can be considered as one of the alternatives to neoliberalism and social democracy.

What has become of Podemos? The elites of a radical left party and their evolving dynamics of recruitment

What has become of Podemos? The elites of a radical left party and their evolving dynamics of recruitment

The radical left and its political communication. An examination of the campaign activities of radical left candidates in sixteen Europe countries

In this paper we focus on the political communication activities of the candidates of the radical left parties (RLPs), emphasizing their campaign activities during electioneering. We aim to address three key questions. First, we seek to understand what type of political communication activities RLP candidates use. Second, we undertake a comparative analysis, contrasting these activities with those employed by candidates and MPs from other party families in order to identify any notable distinctions. Third, we explore the thematic emphasis of their campaign activities and whether it aligns with the commonly held perception of RLPs as less individualistic, particularly in light of the prevailing trend towards increased personalization in politics. Our data come from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) and cover 16 European countries over the years spanning from 2005 to 2017. In sum, the findings present a nuanced perspective and do not conclusively demonstrate a distinctly unique type of candidate of the radical left.

The angry voter? The role of emotions in voting for the radical left and right at the 2019 Belgian elections

This study examines the role of negative (anger, fear) and positive emotions in addition to political attitudes (political trust, populist attitudes, external political efficacy) as key determinants of voting behaviour. We rely on the RepResent voter survey conducted in 2019 in Belgium ( n = 3236) allowing us to assess the relationship between emotions, political attitudes, and the vote for radical right (VB, PP) and radical left parties (PTB-PVDA). Findings indicate that anger is significantly and positively related to voting for radical left and right parties, while controlling for key political attitudes and issue positions. Fear and positive emotions are not significantly more related to voting for radical parties than for other parties. The results suggest that anger should be more systematically integrated in electoral research. These findings call for further analysis on the causal mechanism linking emotions and voting behaviour, and the (in)direct effects of emotions on voting.

All roads lead to Rome? Analysing the electoral performance of populist radical left parties in Europe (2008-2018): a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis

ABSTRACT In the last decade, there have been numerous studies on the rise, characteristics, and consequences of the emergence of populist parties in Western liberal democracies. However, most analyses of European populist parties have focused on the right-wing populist parties. Although some scholars have made valuable efforts to understand left-wing populism in Europe, these studies have paid attention to their ideological-organizational idiosyncrasies or the characteristics of their electoral bases. This paper aims to fill the gap in the economic and political contexts in which Radical Left Populist Parties have achieved significant electoral results putting into practice a fsQCA analysis and examining their uneven electoral performance in Europe. Following some previous work applying QCA techniques, this paper tests the theory on the importance of economic and political factors. Findings indicate that the electoral performance of radical left populism cannot be explained in a univocal way, highlighting the crucial role of equifinality in understanding this political phenomenon.

Past the saturation point: Why voters switch from mainstream to niche parties and vice‐versa

AbstractWhen do voters switch from mainstream to niche parties and vice‐versa? To understand these switches, we focus on the saturation of the party system. We theorize that when a party system is oversaturated – i.e. when a higher effective number of parties contests elections than predicted based on socio‐political contextual characteristics (the system's ‘carrying capacity’) – it becomes increasingly likely that: (1) mainstream party voters defect to niche parties; and (2) niche party voters refrain from switching to mainstream parties. Based on vote‐switching patterns in 15 countries and 53 elections, we find that oversaturation increases shifts from mainstream to niche parties. Further analyses show that this holds for shifts from mainstream to radical left and right parties, but not for shifts to green parties. This has important consequences for research on vote switching, the electoral consequences of policy differentiation and the competition between niche and mainstream parties.

Take the Streets or Take the Parliament? Political Participation Choices of Radical Left Individuals

Voters across Europe have become increasingly polarised on both ends of the political spectrum in the last decade. While radical right parties were able to mobilise voters on their salient topics, radical left parties were only sporadically successful. In this article, we analyse why radical left parties fail to benefit from increasing polarisation by examining their potential voter base. Radical left individuals should have a lower incentive to participate in elections to change the status quo because of their suspicion towards authorities in general and the government more specifically. Instead, they should engage in status quo -busting grassroots activities to enforce revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, change. Our hypotheses are put to an empirical test by relying on data from the European Social Survey. We include respondents from 17 Western European countries from five rounds of the European Social Survey. The results have important implications for our understanding of the demand side of the political extremism wave.

Post-industrial alignment and class support for radical left parties in Southern Europe

ABSTRACT Focusing on Southern Europe during the sharp electoral rise of radical left parties (RLPs) (2008–2020), this article identifies a post-industrial pattern of class support for the radical left. Leveraging survey data, it shows class support for the radical left is linked to a horizontal distinction in the labour market based on work logic. RLPs attract mostly those working in face-to-face service jobs, lower-grade associate professionals voting based on cultural and economic preferences, and unskilled routine workers voting out of economic preferences. Radical left support in post-industrial Southern Europe is thus stronger among service workers and segments of the professional middle classes than among production workers.

‘Void’ democrats? The populist notion of ‘democracy’ in action

Populism is often seen as a threat to liberal democracy because of its rejection of constitutional constraints and emphasis on popular sovereignty. Others argue that populism is a corrective to mainstream politics and not necessarily anti-democratic. While the relationship between populism and democracy is widely debated in theory and empirically assessed by estimating the effect of populist rule, we analyse discursive references to democracy in election manifestos and tweets of populist radical right (PRRP) and populist radical left (PRLP) parties in seven Western European countries. By mapping populists’ discourses on democracy across electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian dimensions, we find that PRLP elaborate a more coherent understanding of democracy (especially its participatory and egalitarian dimensions) and do not reject any dimension. PRRP hardly elaborate on any dimension except participation. PRRP appear as ‘void’ democrats with ambivalent and incoherent credentials, which at times reject and instrumentalise democracy.

What is to be Done? How Radical Leftists Help to Solve the Problem of Personalist Party-Building in Latin America

Political leaders around the world increasingly rely on personalist parties to win elections and govern. While existing scholarship assumes that personalist parties do not build territorial organization, in fact they vary substantially in terms of organizational strength. In this paper, we move beyond existing structural explanations of party-building and focus on the role of party elites’ preferences to explain the source of this variation. Through a mixed-method approach combining process-tracing of the case studies of Venezuela’s MVR/PSUV and Ecuador’s Alianza PAIS and statistical analysis of Latin American parties, we find that party elites’ past political experiences shape whether personalist parties successfully invest in party organization. Party officials who were socialized in radical-left parties are more likely to advocate for party-building and their presence within party cadres is associated with stronger party organization.

Voting across borders? The electoral consequences of individual transnationalism

ABSTRACT This article investigates the association between individual-level transnationalism, interactions and cultural skills cutting across European Union (EU) member states, and voting behaviour in the 2019 European elections. The process of EU integration has expanded significantly virtual and physical forms of cross-border mobility in the last decades. Previous works have shown that transnational social exchange furthers Europhile attitudes and dilutes fears for immigrants. Against this backdrop, it is argued that people with high levels of transnationalism have the incentive to vote for parties with pro-EU integration and pro-immigration platforms. Empirical analyses conducted on original public opinion data show that transnational traits significantly affected vote choices in the 2019 European elections. Individual transnationalism is relevant per se in increasing the probability of voting for green and radical-left parties, instead, its negative association with voting for radical right parties runs through EU and immigration attitudes.

A Reconceptualization of the Party Family: SYRIZA, Podemos, and the Emergence of the Neo-Reformist Left

Over the past decade we have witnessed the rise of radical left parties (RLPs) in several European countries. According to the prevalent definition in the literature, the key feature of this party family is the goal to overcome capitalism. However, based on content analysis of party and governmental documents, this paper argues that the two most prominent RLPs today, SYRIZA (Greece) and Podemos (Spain), fall short in their socio-economic policies of that definition. Why are they still classified as radical left then? In addressing this puzzle, the paper critically revisits the established notion of the “party family” coined by Mair and Mudde, arguing instead that parties are what they choose to do and should therefore be classified according to their policy. Based on this, it is argued that parties such as SYRIZA and Podemos would be more accurately described as “neo-reformist left,” as a sub-type of the social democratic party family. Clarifying the character of these parties is not only important for conceptual consistency. By labelling “radical” parties that are not so, political scientists risk reinforcing the legitimacy of the neoliberal status quo, not the least by excluding from the conversation the actual radical alternatives. This is particularly relevant today, with the resurgence of anti-capitalist ideas among younger generations.