Radical Embodied Research Articles

A Radical Embodied Characterization of German Modal Constructions

Abstract This paper starts out from a radical embodied analysis of German modals. The merit of this proposal is that it provides a framework for the conceptualization of these constructions as part of a broader continuity between perception, memory and consciousness. According to the interpretation and defense of this view offered here, I will argue that modal events in German are constructed as instances of the embodied information encoded by specific constructional attachment patterns. The results of the corpus study in the latter part of the paper reveal that syntactic content (rather than lexical information alone) is crucial for the reduction of both surprise and entropy, as it reflects cognitive processes associated with affordance mapping and the speakers’ need to increase epistemic capital. This shows that humans make use of stored perceptual maps, the combination of which allows us to construct and manipulate complex event representations.

Constraint-evading surrogacy: the missing piece in Radical Embodied Cognition’s non-representationalist account of intentionality?

Radical Embodied Cognition (REC) is an anti-representationalist approach to the nature of basic cognition proposed by Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin. While endorsing REC’s arguments against a role for contentful representations in basic cognition we suggest that REC’s ‘teleosemiotic’ approach to intentional targeting results in a ‘grey area’ in which it is not clear what kind of causal-explanatory concept is involved. We propose the concept of constraint-evading surrogacy as a conceptual basis for REC’s account of intentional targeting. The argument is developed via a reconsideration of Peter Godfrey-Smith’s ‘environmental complexity thesis’. We show how constraint-evading surrogacy clarifies REC’s account of intentionality by specifying the role of external natural signs and certain internal states (REC’s ‘Local Indexical Guides’). We argue that the resulting view of intentionality can be extended to proto-biotic autocatalytic systems, offering support for the life-mind continuity thesis. We leave open the question of whether it is helpful to consider constraint-evading surrogacy to be a form of (non-contentful) representation, but we suggest that there is a prima facie case for such a view.

Gurwitsch’s Field of Consciousness and Radical Embodied Cognitive Science: A Case of Mutual Enlightenment

ABSTRACT This article tests the waters concerning a possible integration of Gurwitsch’s theory of consciousness into 4E research. More specifically, it is suggested that radical embodied approaches can benefit from Gurwitsch’s distinction between theme, thematic field and margin in order to methodically grasp how contextual and attentional factors can modulate affordance perception. On the other hand, Gurwitsch’s choice to locate the awareness of embodiment (most of the time) in the domain of the margin can generate important theoretical problems in light of empirical evidence often brought up by situated cognition researchers. Following Gallagher’s suggestion that phenomenology and cognitive science can enlighten each other, I argue that Gurwitsch’s notion of a field of consciousness can be an invaluable tool for research on affordances. Nonetheless, at the same time, the results of embodied cognitive science should lead us to revisit some of his intuitions regarding the role of bodily awareness.

Street Dance Activism Global Dance Meditation for Black Liberation Radical Embodied Dialogue August 19, 2020 Recorded over Zoom

AbstractGlobal Dance Meditation for Black Liberation began with Dr. Shamell Bell's dream, a clear vision of people around the world heeding a call, at the same time, to the same rhythm, in a collective resonance. It has grown into a conversation, a community, a journey, and a call to action. This Radical Embodied Dialogue was created to honor Black dance artists and their legacies. As part of the Street Dance Activism Global Dance Meditation for Black Liberation twenty-eight-day collective healing project, we invited Marlies Yearby and Dianne McIntyre to share their stories and their shared histories. The pandemic, coupled with use of technology, opened up and provided alternative methods to host a gathering and listen to their experiences that have too often been excluded from dance history texts. This resulting documentation of some of the work of these artists restores the significance of their work to American dance history.

Editorial: Radical Embodied Cognitive Science of Human Behavior: Skill Acquisition, Expertise and Talent Development

Editorial: Radical Embodied Cognitive Science of Human Behavior: Skill Acquisition, Expertise and Talent Development

Agency From a Radical Embodied Standpoint: An Ecological-Enactive Proposal.

Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency.

On the Education About/of Radical Embodied Cognition.

In mainstream or strong university education, the teacher selects and transmits knowledge and skills that students are to acquire and reproduce. Many researchers of radical embodied cognitive science still adhere to this way of teaching, even though this prescriptive pedagogy deeply contrasts with the theoretical underpinnings of their science. In this paper, we search for alternative ways of teaching that are more aligned with the central non-prescriptive and non-representational tenets of radical embodied cognitive science. To this end, we discuss recent views on education by Tim Ingold and Gert Biesta, which are based on Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism and Gibsons’ ecological approach. The paper starts by introducing radical embodied cognitive science, particularly as it relates to motor skill learning, one of our prime interests in research and teaching. Next, we provide a synopsis and critique of the still dominant prescriptive and explicating pedagogy of strong education. Following Ingold and Biesta, we search for a weak alternative through a careful consideration of the education of attention and the participating teacher. To illustrate our arguments, we use examples of the first author’s teaching about/of motor skill learning. The paper is concluded by briefly considering the implications of weak education for a radical embodied science of motor skill learning.

Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience

A radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) based on ecological psychology requires the understanding of the brain, its structure, and its functions to be compatible with the main tenets of the Gibsonian theory. In this paper, we propose neural reuse as a promising candidate to achieve such understanding. We base our proposal on two fundamental ideas. In section two, we review what we take to be the two central requirements for a RECN based on ecological psychology: compatibility with the explanation of perception and action at the ecological scale and the rejection of computation as a paradigm for the explanation of the activity of the brain. In section three, we show how neural reuse meets the two requirements and, furthermore, we evaluate its theoretical parallelism with ecological psychology. Finally, after developing these ideas, in the conclusion we put forward further aspects and research possibilities that follow from the coalition of neural reuse and ecological psychology for a Gibsonian neuroscience.

Radical embodiment in two directions

Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psychologists pursue an ontological strategy. They begin by describing the habitat of the species, and use this to explain how action possibilities are constrained for individual actors. Enactivists, meanwhile, pursue an epistemic strategy: start by characterizing the exploratory, self-regulating behavior of the individual organism, and use this to understand how that organism brings forth its animal-specific umwelt. Both types of explanation are necessary: the ontological strategy explains how structure in the environment constrains how the world can appear to an individual, while the epistemic strategy explains how the world can appear differently to different members of the same species, relative to their skills, abilities, and histories. Making the distinction between species habitat and animal-specific umwelt allows us to understand the environment in realist terms while acknowledging that individual living organisms are phenomenal beings.

Brazilian Serialities: Personhood and Radical Embodied Cognition

This paper investigates the relationship between personhood and family in light of the impact that radical embodied cognition has had in anthropological theory over the past years. The paper is based on a study of onomastic seriality among siblings and cohabiting cousins in Brazil, where it became clear that interruption of the series is more common than full compliance. Since name attribution is a central aspect of launching early personal ontogeny, the paper argues that this kind of interrupted seriality amounts to a narrative strategy of triangulation that fosters the creative imagining of familial persons. The paper attempts to deepen our understanding of the modes of operation of personhood by diverging from the established representationist theories of cognition that remain dominant in anthropological circles.

Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, edited by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo.Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, by Anthony Chemero.The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, by Mark Rowlands.

<i>Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science</i>, edited by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo.<i>Radical Embodied Cognitive Science</i>, by Anthony Chemero.<i>The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology</i>, by Mark Rowlands.

Commentary: The Embodied Brain: Towards a Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience

Commentary: The Embodied Brain: Towards a Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience

Toward a radically embodied neuroscience of attachment and relationships.

Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982) posits the existence of internal working models as a foundational feature of human bonds. Radical embodied approaches instead suggest that cognition requires no computation or representation, favoring a cognition situated in a body in an environmental context with affordances for action (Chemero, 2009; Barrett, 2011; Wilson and Golonka, 2013; Casasanto and Lupyan, 2015). We explore whether embodied approaches to social soothing, interpersonal warmth, separation distress, and support seeking could replace representational constructs such as internal working models with a view of relationship cognition anchored in the resources afforded to the individual by their brain, body, and environment in interaction. We review the neurobiological bases for social attachments and relationships and attempt to delineate how these systems overlap or don’t with more basic physiological systems in ways that support or contradict a radical embodied explanation. We suggest that many effects might be the result of the fact that relationship cognition depends on and emerges out of the action of neural systems that regulate several clearly physically grounded systems. For example, the neuropeptide oxytocin appears to be central to attachment and pair-bond behavior (Carter and Keverne, 2002) and is implicated in social thermoregulation more broadly, being necessary for maintaining a warm body temperature (for a review, see IJzerman et al., 2015b). Finally, we discuss the most challenging issues around taking a radically embodied perspective on social relationships. We find the most crucial challenge in individual differences in support seeking and responses to social contact, which have long been thought to be a function of representational structures in the mind (e.g., Baldwin, 1995). Together we entertain the thought to explain such individual differences without mediating representations or computations, but in the end propose a hybrid model of radical embodiment and internal representations.

Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

From naturalistic neuroscience to modeling radical embodiment with narrative enactive systems.

Mainstream cognitive neuroscience has begun to accept the idea of embodied mind, which assumes that the human mind is fundamentally constituted by the dynamical interactions of the brain, body, and the environment. In today’s paradigm of naturalistic neurosciences, subjects are exposed to rich contexts, such as video sequences or entire films, under relatively controlled conditions, against which researchers can interpret changes in neural responses within a time window. However, from the point of view of radical embodied cognitive neuroscience, the increasing complexity alone will not suffice as the explanatory apparatus for dynamical embodiment and situatedness of the mind. We suggest that narrative enactive systems with dynamically adaptive content as stimuli, may serve better to account for the embodied mind engaged with the surrounding world. Among the ensuing challenges for neuroimaging studies is how to interpret brain data against broad temporal contexts of previous experiences that condition the unfolding experience of nowness. We propose means to tackle this issue, as well as ways to limit the exponentially growing combinatoria of narrative paths to a controllable number.

Linguistic embodiment and verbal constraints: human cognition and the scales of time.

Using radical embodied cognitive science, the paper offers the hypothesis that language is symbiotic: its agent-environment dynamics arise as linguistic embodiment is managed under verbal constraints. As a result, co-action grants human agents the ability to use a unique form of phenomenal experience. In defense of the hypothesis, I stress how linguistic embodiment enacts thinking: accordingly, I present auditory and acoustic evidence from 750 ms of mother-daughter talk, first, in fine detail and, then, in narrative mode. As the parties attune, they use a dynamic field to co-embody speech with experience of wordings. The latter arise in making and tracking phonetic gestures that, crucially, mesh use of artifice, cultural products and impersonal experience. As observers, living human beings gain dispositions to display and use social subjectivity. Far from using brains to “process” verbal content, linguistic symbiosis grants access to diachronic resources. On this distributed-ecological view, language can thus be redefined as: “activity in which wordings play a part.”

Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances.

In this paper, we set out to develop a theoretical and conceptual framework for the new field of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience. This framework should be able to integrate insights from several relevant disciplines: theory on embodied cognition, ecological psychology, phenomenology, dynamical systems theory, and neurodynamics. We suggest that the main task of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience is to investigate the phenomenon of skilled intentionality from the perspective of the self-organization of the brain-body-environment system, while doing justice to the phenomenology of skilled action. In previous work, we have characterized skilled intentionality as the organism's tendency toward an optimal grip on multiple relevant affordances simultaneously. Affordances are possibilities for action provided by the environment. In the first part of this paper, we introduce the notion of skilled intentionality and the phenomenon of responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances. Second, we use Friston's work on neurodynamics, but embed a very minimal version of his Free Energy Principle in the ecological niche of the animal. Thus amended, this principle is helpful for understanding the embeddedness of neurodynamics within the dynamics of the system “brain-body-landscape of affordances.” Next, we show how we can use this adjusted principle to understand the neurodynamics of selective openness to the environment: interacting action-readiness patterns at multiple timescales contribute to the organism's selective openness to relevant affordances. In the final part of the paper, we emphasize the important role of metastable dynamics in both the brain and the brain-body-environment system for adequate affordance-responsiveness. We exemplify our integrative approach by presenting research on the impact of Deep Brain Stimulation on affordance responsiveness of OCD patients.

Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

This paper briefly introduces radical embodied cognitive science (RECS) and places it in historical perspective. Radical embodied cognitive science is an interdisciplinary approach to psychology that combines ideas from the phenomenological tradition with ecological psychology and dynamical systems modeling. It is argued that radical embodied cognitive science has a long history; it is as a direct descendent of the Jamesian functionalist approach to psychology. This approach to psychology is contrasted with the current trend of supplementing standard cognitive psychology with occasional references to the body. In contrast with these trends, radical embodied cognitive science is skeptical of the explanatory usefulness of mental representations. The future prospects of radical embodied cognitive science and the broader functionalist framework are discussed.

How We Model Educational Embodiment: Practical Considerations and a Theoretical Proposal

In his essay, “Neuroscience, Education, and a Radical Embodiment Model of Mind and Cognition,” Clarence Joldersma aims to “develop a model that more adequately situates the conversation about neuroscience’s possible contribution to educational practice, including the idea of interventions.” The radical embodiment model Joldersma develops here is a speculative yet well-balanced account, substantially informed by the broader theoretical project of embodiment in recent cognitive science. Radical embodied cognition’s avowedly non-representational stance — that perception is fundamentally goal-directed action and learning occurs outside of the head, in the space between brains, bodies, and lifeworld — unfolds educational possibilities in a way that previous computationalist theories never did. As a result, constructive dialogue between neuroscientists and educators seems much more plausible.

Anthony Chemero: Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

Anthony Chemero: Radical Embodied Cognitive Science