Quebec Sovereignty Research Articles

The issue of international recognition in the Supreme Court of Canada's Reference on Quebec Sovereignty

The issue of international recognition in the Supreme Court of Canada's Reference on Quebec Sovereignty

The Politics of the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal

The Societe Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montreal (SSJBM) is a Quebecois nationalist organization. For more than 160 years its members have been promoting interests of Francophone Canadians. Today voice of this two thousand-member organization is in forefront of those who advocate Quebec sovereignty and protection of French language in Quebec. This article, based on documents and published materials, as well as participant observation and interviews with twenty-six key members, presents a history of society, highlights its political agenda, and notes its relationship with political parties. Patriotic Beginnings The Societe Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montreal traces its origin to a banquet organized by Ludger Duvernay that was held in Montreal in 1834 (Paulette 1980; Rumilly 1975). In 1827 Duvernay had become publisher of Montreal newspaper, La Minerve. By 1832 subscriptions to La Minerve had grown from 240 to more than thirteen hundred. This was due mainly to fact that La Minerve publicized and supported claims of Parti Patriote, which was trying to reform government of Lower Canada so that it would adhere to liberal democratic principles (SSJBM 1994). At that time elite of English-speaking merchants and military officers, men who were opposed to democratic ideas of Patriotes, had established a Freemason's Lodge in Montreal. Each 24 June they held a banquet to celebrate foundation of their lodge, or perhaps more trenchantly, their business success, which was result of a series of speculative partnerships. Their organization was not open to French Canadians (SSJBM 1994). In 1834 Duvernay showed his disdain for this English-speaking oligarchy by organizing a banquet on 24 June to celebrate Canadian nation. On 26 June 1834 La Minerve reported that twenty-five toasts were made by sixty guests. The first of these was Duvernay's salute to the people, source of all legitimate authority (SSJBM 1994, 14). Other toasts praised Louis-Joseph Papineau, leader of Patriotes, and Elzear Bedard, who had presented ninety-two resolutions calling for reform of Legislative Council (the powerful unelected upper chamber). Also saluted were (elected) Assembly of Lower Canada and United States government. The banquet was indeed a political event. Furthermore, participants decided to make their national celebration an annual activity to be held each 24 June (Rumilly 1975). In calendar of Roman Catholic Church this is Feast of St. John Baptist. Because of date's proximity to summer solstice, it had been celebrated in Europe and New France with a ritual of lighting bonfires, which dated from pagan times. In Montreal long, warm days of this season were an ideal time for celebration of fete nationale (Rumilly 1975). The following year more than 100 diners participated in banquet at Hotel Rasco. The hall was decorated with maple leaves and green, white, and red horizontally striped flag of Patriotes (Moniere 1987). The violence of an unsuccessful attempt to throw off British rule in 1837-38 interrupted celebration of holiday. Duvernay was sought by British troops. He and other leaders of Patriotes who were not killed or imprisoned fled to exile in New England (SSJBM 1994). Concern for People's Welfare Duvernay returned to Montreal in 1842, after Upper Canada had been united with Lower Canada. The 1840 Act of Union ensured that French Canadians would have a numerical minority in legislative assembly, even though they constituted a majority of population. However, it did eventually result in responsible government; that is, government in accord with wishes of elected representatives of people. Indeed, Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine, who had been present at first banquet became co-prime minister of United Canada (Rumilly 1975). …

Communauté nationale et définition du sujet politique: analyse de deux grandes consultations populaires au Québec 1967-1995

Through a comparative analysis of two great collective discussions on the evolution of the French-Canadian and Quebecois community, we will attempt to identify the mutations that have occurred in representations of the national community and the effects these mutations have had upon the definition of the political subject. First, we will examine th discourse of the Etats generaux du Canada francais, held on two occasions in 1967 and 1969; then, we will look at the discourse of the Comissions sur l'avenir du Quebec which sat in 1995 in the context of the Parti Quebecois government's preparations for introducing a bill on Quebec sovereignty to the National Assembly. The analysis consists of comparing two discourses of self-definition of the national community, elaborated thirty years apart, in order to circumscribe possible transformations in the representation of the Quebecois political subject. Contrary to analyses that assert a loss of legitimacy and a degradation of politics as the prinicpal site for th...

Attitude Towards Risk-Taking and Individual Choice in the Quebec Referendum on Sovereignty

How do people make decisions when they have to choose between unknown futures? Do they simply rely on anticipated costs and benefits or do they use some other criteria to assess their options? And what determines the criteria they use to make such decisions? This article explores the way voters take sides when they are faced with a fundamental political choice. Using data from a survey of voting intentions conducted prior to the 1995 referendum on sovereignty in Quebec, we find that attitude towards risk-taking influences political choice indirectly, as it affects the relative weights given to different decision criteria. Individuals who usually accept risk more readily tend to choose entirely on the basis of anticipated costs and benefits, but individuals who are more reluctant to take risks give almost as much weight to the perceived possibility of a ‘worst outcome’. Our analysis suggests that attitude towards risk-taking had a modest but significant impact on individual choice, and thus was a contributing factor in the outcome of the Quebec referendum.

Nationalism and the Pathology of Legal Systems: Considering the Quebec Secession Reference and its Lessons for the United Kingdom

Questions relating to the disintegration and destruction of legal systems or what H.L.A. Hart called the 'pathology of legal systems' are extremely difficult to confront as questions of law. When political allegiance to one legal system begins to erode, the natural tendency of judges may be to struggle to save the system from collapse, thereby putting at risk the chance of orderly transition to succeeding nascent legal systems. However, just as it is best for a natural person to order his or her affairs and write a will while of sound mind, perhaps a legal system even one with promise and potential remaining should likewise plan for its orderly, and lawful, demise. Indeed, by confronting the unthinkable, perhaps it can (unlike a natural person contemplating eventual death) achieve partial survival, so that in the aftermath of its dismemberment a remnant of the system remains worthy of allegiance from at least some of its citizens. This was, in essence, the task that the Supreme Court of Canada accepted in Reference re the Secession of Quebec from Canada.2 In what the Chief Justice of Canada, Antonio Lamer, described as the most important judgment in the Court's history,3 the nine Supreme Court justices ruled unanimously that the Dominion of Canada is divisible and (by implication) destructible, and that there are legal rules governing such division and destruction. The case arose when the federal government of Canada invoked the advisory jurisdiction of the Court by referring to it three questions, namely: (1) Can the government or legislature of the province of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally under Canadian law? (2) Can the government or legislature of Quebec effect secession unilaterally under international law? (3) If Canadian and international law conflict on this point, which prevails?4 Thus, the Court confronted the same basic legal issue as did the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the famous case of Madzimbamuto v LardnerBurke5 with the critical difference that, in that case, the Rhodesian government had

The Quebec sovereignty referendum of 1995: how not to manage a multinational polity

The first part of the article uses a bare tactic‐strategy model to explain the passivity of the Canadian government in the face of Quebec's near approval of the sovereignty option of the 1995 referendum. The second part considers some of the cultural and sociological obstacles to Canada changing its political system to adapt it to the needs of a multinational society. The analysis is restricted to the relations between Quebec and Canada to the exclusion of the problems posed by Indians and Inuit.

A Constitutional Duty to Negotiate Amendments:Reference Re Secession of Quebec

In the aftermath of the 1995 referendum on Quebec unilateral secession,1the then Minister of Justice, Allan Rock, proposed that the legality of a province's attempting to secede unilaterally be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a judicial opinion, pursuant to that Court's special advisory jurisdiction.2Accordingly, on 30 September 1996, the Governor General in Council submitted three questions of law, discussed in detail below, concerning the legal authority of Quebec, under both Canadian and international law, to secede from the Canadian federation. In addition to the government of Canada, two provinces, the two territories, and a number of special interest groups and individuals (all given leave to intervene) submitted written arguments and rejoinders over the course of 1997.3The government of Quebec did not participate in the hearing and submitted no argument. Accordingly, the Court appointed an (from Quebec) to represent the secessionist interest. The Court heard argument from 16 to 19 February 1998. On 20 August 1998 the Court released its unanimous opinion, rather earlier than expected.4The Court rejected the legal right of Quebec to separate unilaterally under Canadian constitutional law, and the right to do so under international law as recognised in Canada. Given the latter holding, the Court did not consider further the third question relating to reconciling a possible conflict between the two legal orders. The following extended case comment proposes to outline and discuss briefly the reasoning of the Court, in what is a significant exercise of judicial power in the service of constitutional affairs. The structure of this comment will follow that of the Court's resaoning, dealing first with a preliminary objection, then turninh to question 1(introduction and discussion) and then to Question 2 and 3.5

Self-determination—Canada—Quebec—right to secede under constitutional law and public international law—role of international law in Canadian courts

Re Reference by Governor in Council Concerning Certain Questions Relating to Secession of Quebec from Canada.Supreme Court of Canada, August 20, 1998.In an attempt to clarify the legal context in which continuing Canadian constitutional conundrums arise, the federal executive referred three questions to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the legality under both Canadian constitutional law and international law of a potential unilateral declaration of independence by the Province of Quebec. The Court declared that unilateral secession is not permitted under either Canadian constitutional law or international law. The “underlying principles that animate” the Canadian Constitution preclude secession, even though there is no specific text prohibiting the dismantling of the Canadian state. However, if Quebecers were to vote yes to secession by “a clear majority on a clear question,” democratic legitimacy would be conferred on the secessionist project and a constitutional obligation to negotiate would arise binding the other provinces and the federal authority.

Quebec's sovereignty project and aboriginal rights

Quebec's sovereignty project and aboriginal rights

Canada's Two Solitudes: Constitutional and International Law in Reference re Secession of Quebec

AbstractThis article begins by examining two different perspectives on the accommodation of Quebec and the French fact in Canada. The first, exemplified by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, emphasised equality of the French and English languages across Canada. The second approach, adopted by Trudeau's contemporary René Lévesque, Prime Minister of Quebec, focused on the province of Quebec, and the state of the French language there. The second part of the article recounts the history of Quebec in Canada, emphasising throughout the varied range of legal and political accommodation that has occurred over the years. This section concludes with a brief description of the constitutional falling out between Quebec and Canada which has occurred over the past twenty or so years. The article concludes with a detailed analysis of the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Reference re Secession of Quebec. This case is especially important for the way in which it mixes cons iderations of international law and domestic constitutional law. The author concludes by asserting that the survival and strength of the French fact in Canada is dependent upon a strong Quebec; and that a strong Quebec must show corresponding respect and recognition for its own minorities: aboriginal, anglophone and other.

Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec

Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec

Sovereignties Old and New: Canada, Quebec, and Aboriginal Peoples

In the age of nation-states, it has been a fundamental concept in international relations and international law. Sovereignty has also acted as a powerful reinforcement of the internal authority of the nation-state and the hegemony of its dominant social forces. In the present era of globalization and transnational corporations, sovereignty as a concept is being increasingly called into question, as is the legitimacy of the nation-state. Ironically, just as sovereignty is revealed as theoretically problematic, it has emerged as the rallying-cry and philosophical justification of the most effective political challenge to the integrity of the existing state structure in Canada: the Quebec sovereignty movement. This is a paradox. A challenge to old state structures is formulated in language that, even as it inverts, also mirrors the very concept that underpins the structures that are challenged. The political stalemate that results is a confrontation of two sovereignties, Canadian and Quebecois, each claiming exclusivity, while contesting the same ground. It is this paradox I wish to address. I will first examine the limitations of classical sovereignty as applied to Canada, where it has always been a misleading guide. Quebec sovereignty shares with its Canadian antagonist a common contradiction, the abandonment of the economic dimension of sovereignty while insisting on a political definition alone. Quebec's sovereignty project is not one of economic nationalism but neither is it one of ethnic nationalism. It is, instead,

Re Reference by the Governor in Council Concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada

536Human rights — Self-determination — Scope and extent — Right to self-determination in the context of an existing State — Whether part of the population of an existing State capable of constituting a “people” for the purpose of the right of self-determination — Internal and external self-determination — Whether international law recognizes a right of unilateral secession for part of the population of an existing State — Quebec — Whether population of Quebec or part thereof a “people” — Whether population of Quebec enjoying internal self-determination — Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations between States 1970Recognition — Of States — Of right of people to self-determination — Recognition as condonation of unlawful act — Whether likelihood of recognition of breakaway State means that there is a right to create such a StateRelationship of international law and municipal law — In general — Whether Supreme Court of Canada entitled to answer question regarding application of international law — International law as part of the law of Canada — Right of self-determination under Canadian law and international lawStates — Creation and dissolution — Self-determination of groups within State — Whether conferring a right of unilateral secession — Relationship between right of self-determination and respect for territorial integrity of State — The law of Canada

Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec

The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1998 that neither the Canadian constitution nor international law allows Quebec to secede from Canada unilaterally. Secession would require amending the constitution. However, if a clear majority of Quebecers unambiguously opts for secession, the federal government and the other provinces would have a constitutional duty to negotiate. This is an obligation that the court declared to be implicit in four principles that inform and sustain the constitutional text-federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. The same set of principles would govern the negotiations themselves. Accordingly, Quebec could not dictate the terms of secession, and one cannot assume that agreement would be reached. If negotiations fail, and Quebec declares independence unilaterally, the international community would have to decide whether Quebec's action was legitimate.

The Polls and the 1995 Quebec Referendum

Abstract: We perform a meta-analysis of 23 voter polls reported in the news media during the two-month period preceding the 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum. Contrary to common interpretations of the course of the referendum campaign, we find that there was a smooth and general increase in support for the sovereignty option during this period, and that Lucien Bouchard's dramatic intervention on behalf of the yes campaign on October 9 apparently had little effect on voters' stated intentions. The same was true of other putatively consequential events that transpired during the referendum We conclude that the pre-referendum polls slightly, but systematically, exaggerated the level of support for sovereignty. Resume: Nous executons une analyse meta de vingt-trois sondages qui sont annonce dans les journaux devant une periode de deux mois avant la 1995 referendum sur la souverainte du Quebec. En contraste des interpretations conventionelle pendant le cours de la referendum, on trouve un tendance positive pour la souverainte dans tout la periode et que l'intervention de Lucien Bouchard au commencement de 9 d'octobre sera pas de consequence. Ni les interventions des autres evenements touche la direction. On conclus que les sondages avant le referendum, exagere, un peut, le support pour la souverainte du Quebec. The October 30, 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum is surely the most dramatic electoral event in recent Canadian political history. Substantial attention has been paid to the referendum in the popular press and, to a lesser extent, in the scholarly literature, both during and after the event. Nevertheless, while there is substantial commentary on pre-referendum polls, we are aware of careful statistical analysis of the dynamics of the campaign as revealed in the polls -- a task that we carry out in this paper. The period leading up to the 1995 Quebec referendum was notable for the intensity of political polling -- 23 general polls of voters were reported in the news media in the two-month period preceding the referendum, and by all accounts many more private polls were commissioned by interested parties.(1) Characterisations of the Referendum Campaign In an analysis of the 1992 Canadian constitutional referendum, LeDuc and Pammett (1995: 5) argue that while referenda in parliamentary democracies can be understood in much the same terms as elections, their outcome is even more dependent on the short-term elements of the campaign. At the start of the 1995 Quebec referendum campaign, the yes forces were under the formal leadership of the then-premier of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau. The no forces were captained by the leader of the Quebec Liberal Party, Daniel Johnson. Parizeau's leadership was widely regarded as ineffective. On October 9, in a dramatic gesture, Parizeau ceded direction of the yes campaign to Lucien Bouchard, then the leader of the Quebecois. Just as Parizeau's leadership was considered ineffective, Lucien Bouchard's takeover of the campaign was widely interpreted as giving the yes forces an important boost -- an interpretation that persists to this day. For example, on the day after the referendum, the Toronto Globe and Mail ran an article with the headline, Bloc Quebecois Leader Lucien Bouchard brought big gains when he took over the reigns of the Yes committee (Picard, 1995).(2) It would not be difficult to produce literally dozens of similar statements. While the dominant interpretation, the efficacy of Bouchard's intervention on the referendum campaign is not universally accepted. Writing in the Montreal newspaper La Presse, Quebec sociologist Pierre Drouilly (1995b) pointed to a generally rising trend of support for the yes option in polls conducted during the pre-referendum period. Likewise, in a paper published shortly after the referendum, Universite de Montreal political scientist Edouard Cloutier identified four potential turning points in the referendum campaign (Cloutier, 1995: 37): On September 24, Claude Garcia, Chief Executive Officer of the Standard Life Insurance Co. …

Effects of Foreign Ownership on Media Content: Thomson Papers' Coverage of Quebec Independence Vote

Critics and scholars have long worried about the power that media owners have to shape the content and ideas that reach the public. In the past four decades, as concentration of media ownership has increased, considerable effort has been focused on studying the impact of ownership structures on the quality, nature and diversity of media content. In the late 1980s, the aggressive expansion of media corporations into overseas markets began raising questions about the impact foreign ownership may have on the content and performance of domestic media.(1) Concern about foreign ownership of media is not new. Since the early part of this century, most nations have specifically prohibited or strictly limited the foreign ownership of core domestic media and communication companies at least partly out of fear that foreign owners would use those outlets to manipulate public opinion in times of national crisis. As a result of such restrictions, transnational media ownership was not widespread outside of the consumer magazine industry prior to the late 1980s. Not surprisingly, then, research on the international aspects of media performance has been focused largely on the effects imported media may have on domestic audiences, and on issues of international coverage, news flow and framing. Little attention has been paid to the effects foreign ownership may have on media content. After the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the ownership of large segments of Eastern Europe's print media passed into the hands of foreign, largely Western companies.(2) Simultaneously, the move towards privatization and liberalization of communication industries throughout the industrialized world opened the doors to greater international ownership of media companies. Contributing to the rapid transnationalization of media companies since the late 1980s has been the global push for free trade in international markets. Industrialized nations, in particular, have recognized that information is a valuable trade good in world markets and,(3) as a result, media and cultural industries are increasingly being included in free trade agreements. The European Union has worked to reduce national barriers to transnational media ownership and investment, while both the Canadian Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement include specific provisions designed to pressure Canada and Mexico to open their cultural industries to American investment.(4) Simultaneous with this increased emphasis on free trade has been the development of technologies that facilitate the management of global media operations, such as high-speed computer networks and satellite communications. Additionally, the movement by some media companies to take advantage of these new opportunities by transnationalizing has pressured others in the industry to do the same in order to avoid being placed a competitive disadvantage. These factors suggest that the transnationalization of media will continue in the foreseeable future and lend some impetus to studying the question of the impact of foreign ownership on media content. Literature review Although there is little published research that directly addresses the question of the impact of foreign ownership on media content, and particularly print media content, there has been considerable examination of the effects of other types of ownership structures on newspaper content. Media scholars have long been concerned about the rapid consolidation of media ownership that has taken place over the past few decades, with critics arguing that control of large numbers of media outlets allows a handful of corporate owners to obtain dominant influence over public opinion.(5) This concern is, of course, based on the assumptions that owners influence media content and that chain ownership will tend to homogenize the content of the multiple media outlets held by the chain, leading to a reduction of the vigor and diversity of the editorial content and opinion available to the public. …

Supreme Court of Canada: Reference Re Secession of Quebec

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If Quebec Goes … The ‘Exodus' Impact?

In this paper, we explore migration aspects of the 1995 Quebec Sovereignty Referendum with data from a survey administered to non-francophones in Montreal two weeks prior to the Referendum. While the Quebec sovereignty issue has been around for some time and earlier exodus from the province, particularly among anglophones, is largely regarded as “forced” in some way, this study neither confirms the 1995 Sovereignty Referendum as a paramount factor in explaining outmigration from Quebec nor points to a real reluctance to leave Montreal. The decision to move is influenced by the interplay of a multitude of factors. The political influence is only an added factor to longstanding economic decline and cultural clash. Moreover, if there is any impulsion, the degree varies among different cultural and socioeconomic groups.

Vandals at the Garden's Gates? Political Reaction to the Maritime Union Proposal on Prince Edward Island

The concept of Maritime union--that is, political amalgamation of the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island--has, in recent years, again appeared on the Canadian political agenda. As in the past, two main forces drive it: First, there remains the looming threat of Quebec secession, which might result in the dismemberment of the country, leaving its easternmost provinces isolated and adrift. Second, there is the fiscal crisis that now informs politics in Canada, and which has caused great concern in region so dependent on Ottawa. Many are the voices in the rest of that now insist that the Maritime provinces unite, even if only as cost-saving device. Their endorsement of Maritime union is part of wider agenda that has gained currency in the 1990s: the downsizing of government and public-sector bureaucracies in the quest for efficiency and economies of scale. Proponents of amalgamation claim that larger units would facilitate regional economic planning, save administrative costs by eliminating the duplication that comes with competing layers of government, streamline and combine departments, provide less costly delivery of services, and lessen competition for jobs and investment. Amalgamation, they contend, will help solve the dilemma faced by every level of government in the 1990s: how provide decent public services with ever-shrinking budgets while avoiding an increase in taxes. The Globe and Mail, Canada's National Newspaper, has extolled the virtues of political and economic union and warned Maritimers that patience with keeping the region afloat is running short; Canadians can no longer afford support impoverished provinces, no matter what the historical and romantic reasons for their existence. Having distinct law-making bodies alone costs one-third of billion dollars year; and what of the more than forty overlapping public-sector institutions? The costs of provincehood, concluded the paper, are themselves an impediment growth.(1) David Yager, Calgary Herald columnist, has called surely the most over-governed country in the world and cited PEI in particular as a microcosm of structural bureaucratic overlap that diverts billions of dollars from the creation of real private sector jobs government for government's sake.... Without federal transfers and subsidies from wealthier regions, it's likely none of the smaller provinces would exist at all. Taxpayers wouldn't stand for it. is now faced with the consequences of its profligate spending over the past decades, and the only solution, he suggests, is to get rid of smaller provinces entirely by merging them into larger and more cost-effective units. (2) Gordon Gibson, former leader of the British Columbia Liberal party, and now journalist and author affiliated with the Fraser Institute, has advocated the wringing out of such inefficiencies in the political system as small provinces, whose politicians and bureaucracies duplicate services. (3) And University of Toronto historian Michael Bliss, who owns summer home on the island, in his more gentle and humorous Toronto Star columns, has pondered aloud whether such an anomalous entity as PEI will survive, especially now that the Confederation Bridge links it the mainland. Derided by some as little more than cute little theme park, he wrote, PEI might end up as three counties of New Brunswick. He even questioned the viability of its only university. (4) These are few of the many examples of this type of discourse, one which can nowadays be found in books, newspapers, and on television throughout Canada. Little wonder that former premier Joe Ghiz in 1992 brooded about the possibility that, in its increasing lack of concern for the special economic, political, and social needs of small societies, Canada may not be able in the future accommodate Prince Edward Island as separate and viable entity. …

NAFTA and the Fragmentation of Canada

Introduction: Free Trade in Canadian History a deeply disturbing article about Canada's future, Charles Doran (1996, 108) cast the problem of Quebec separatism in larger terms and asked, In the aftermath of the Cold War, is the system of world politics evolving toward larger and more stable polities? Or is the system devolving toward smaller, more fragmented states, cast adrift by the loss of ideology at the top of the system and rising nationalism at the bottom? He answered his own questions by concluding that: At the turn of the 21st century, the real tension is caused by the struggle, on the one hand, of the huge multicultural state to survive, and on the other, by the thousands of populist, ethnic, and linguistic regional culture centers to carve out their own identities. Not limited to the poor Third World states, this new challenge to institutional authority is common to all multicultural states, regardless of political makeup or wealth. this essay, I want to take the questions he poses here even farther by relating them to NAFTA. Canada's future is affected by its place in NAFTA in much the same way as are the relations between Canada and Quebec even though, on the surface, NAFTA is not an issue of identity politics. But that is only on the surface. Canada, trade is not just a matter of buying and selling, of markets and profits. Rather, it speaks to the broadest definition of national well-being. From pre-Confederation times, the issue of free trade with the United States has evoked passionate reactions over how it would affect national independence (Brown 1966). Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy, in which protective tariffs were to be a means fostering industrial development, is now recognized as much for its symbolic contribution to nationalism and independence as its contribution to Canada's economic development (Jackson et al. 1986, 62). Since then, the attractiveness of free trade has always been offset by its vulnerability to nationalist attack (Granatstein 1985). Although his commitment to reciprocal trade relations with the United States was only one source of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's defeat in the 1911 election (Graham 1968, 176), the issue that sticks in our minds today is the opposition's slogan of No truck nor trade with the Yankees. From such reactions we can recognize that free trade is as much about identity politics as it is about economic relations between sovereign states. Free trade brings into question the meaning of Canada in highly complex ways. As a result, it is too simplistic to conceive of the issue simply causing a bipolar division between nationalists and continentalists, as though the latter had no claim to nationalism (Merrett 1996, 19-60). Was Laurier, with his message that the twentieth century would belong to Canada, any less a nationalist than Macdonald? There were, to be sure, those whom support of free trade was a step toward political union and, no doubt, there are still advocates of this view in Canada. But it is both more realistic and more inclusive to admit that there are others, committed to Canada's continuity as an independent state and an autonomous society, who remain divided over the optimum ways in which Canada should relate to the United States. At the same time, the general commitment to Canadian independence is not sufficient to dampen the cleavages created or reinforced by debate over free trade. other words, even if we disregard the extreme of political union with the United States, we are still left with deep societal fissures associated with competing definitions about the nature of Canada. post-Confederation Canada, free trade (or reciprocity) was a major issue in the election of 1891. Goldwin Smith, then a recent immigrant from England who came to embrace full union with the United States (Berger 1971), pointed out that the major cleavages were between industrialists and farmers, with farmers' organizations advocating commercial union (Smith 1971, 222). …