Since the pre-Socratics, philosophers have been intrigued by the nature of attraction, both in nature and in the human sphere. What makes a piece of iron irresistible to a magnet? What draws Ariadne to Theseus? Similarly, aestheticians question the source of our attraction to or interest in certain artworks or things in our environment. As for human relationships, people are attracted by various qualities in others, for example, intellectual agility, ethical integrity, sexual magnetism, beauty, charisma, and glamour. Some types of attraction involve a more inclusive appreciation of the individual as a complex, unique being, especially when the attractive quality is more than superficial, that is, when the human exterior--behavior and appearance-seems to manifest a complex subjective state. In such cases, our attraction may have an aesthetic component. Glamour, I argue here, is this sort of personal quality. This article has two aims. First, it offers a philosophical analysis of glamour, an aspect of human experience largely ignored or, at best, disparaged, by philosophers. Second, it explores some uncharted terrain of how we apply aesthetic qualities to persons.' Generally, we attribute aesthetic properties to artworks, nature, and various artifacts (including bodily embellishments, such as tattoos or decorative fingernails). But aesthetic properties, I argue, can also be instantiated by persons, not only by their physical selves qua perceptual entities. One might hesitate to call a feature like glamour an aesthetic property of a person, let alone a potentially positive one, for glamour seems to exist only on the surface of the bodily self. If, as some believe, glamour is merely a masquerade, then glamour could not add value to a person qua person. If anything, glamour, on this construal, would devalue a person, for it would seem to stem from excessive attention to one's own appearance, a morally bankrupt pursuit, especially if done for the sake of deception. But to level such a criticism would be to ignore the real, widely overlooked, first-person component of glamour. Most people, though, associate glamour with the third-person aspects of it. In this article, I argue that these impressions of glamour are misleading. Glamour has a crucial first person, subjective aspect. Moreover, it is neither ethically negative nor perverse, nor is it pragmatically maladaptive. In fact, the appreciation of glamour may add aesthetic interest to the human experience, both for those who observe it and the self that possesses it.