Issuer Quality Research Articles

Companies' behavior in measuring the quality of financial reports: Pre- and post-pandemic research.

Since information is the foundation for decision-making by its users, it and the quality associated with it must be given particular importance in order to reduce uncertainties about how it is reported and interpreted and to increase its usefulness. Financial reporting is of relatively great significance to both those who provide it and those who use it, with accounting providing a wide range of sources of financial information, ensuring a high degree of credibility compared to other sources of information. The objective of the research is to highlight the behavior of companies in measuring the quality of issuers' financial reporting to identify solutions for harmonizing the way financial information is presented with the needs of users. Two hypotheses were defined and tested for this purpose, with the research being segmented over three successive stages. The first stage consists in identifying the appropriate index to measure the quality of financial reporting. The second stage consists in gathering the data and obtaining the quality measurements, for testing the defined hypotheses. The third stage concerns in concluding the results obtained highlight the existing divergences between the period before the health crisis, but also the period immediately after the COVID-19, on the two markets of the Bucharest Stock Exchange (regulated market and AeRO market).

Emerging market debt and the COVID‐19 pandemic: A time–frequency analysis of spreads and total returns dynamics

AbstractWe apply wavelet analyses to study the impact of COVID‐19 pandemic on the performance of emerging market bonds, in both investment grade and high yield ranges of creditworthiness. Our results show varying level of coherence ranging from low, medium and high between the Coronavirus Media Coverage index and the price moves of the emerging market USD‐denominated debt. We attribute the intervals of low coherence levels to the diversification potential during a systemic pandemic such as COVID‐19 of investments in bonds issued by developing economies. We document differences in patterns exhibited by various indices describing behaviour of option‐adjusted spreads and total returns as a function of credit quality of issuers form emerging market economies. We report well‐defined zones of the regime switching between the lead and lag roles of the emerging market bonds vis‐à‐vis the media coverage.

Underpricing on the Selected European Alternative Investment Markets

Abstract The phenomenon of underpricing is the subject of many studies on the stock markets, but there is still a research gap referring to the European Alternative Investment Markets, markets for small and medium companies. They are a source of capital and such an anomaly as underpricing could be a barrier for development of young companies. It means so-called money left on the table, which constrain the effectiveness of the market. The purpose of the paper is to analyze whether lower entry regulations on the European Alternative Investment Markets are correlated with the higher value of underpricing as the demonstration of higher investing risk. We calculate raw initial returns with different equilibrium prices for three European Alternative Investment Markets and confirm that NewConnect, the market with the lighter legal environment, has the highest initial returns for the first day of trading, however after one month returns turn out to be significantly lower than on the other two markets and differs for aftermarket rate of returns. Our results suggest that there is a premium for higher risk on NewConnect, but only after one month rate of returns turn out to be negative, which can suggest that market participants verify very quickly the quality of issuers.

Valuation Implications of Market Incompleteness: A Robust Empirical Characterization of Stock Market Incompleteness

This study shows listings of new issues that occur in order of increasing, or decreasing average quality are general equilibrium listing paths, equivalently necessary conditions for maintenance of best valuations within stock markets. This finding demonstrates robustness of an existing price equilibrium never is independent of entire listing sequence of new innovations within stock markets. Introduction of pragmatism of nigh impossibility of satisfaction of the general equilibrium necessary conditions induces either of systemic undervaluation, or overvaluation of new issues. Given either of undervaluations or overvaluations are robust to presence of certifying financial intermediaries, credible signals of issuer quality, presence of rational investors, and efficiency of aggregation of information, stock markets inherently are imperfect mechanisms for allocation of capital. Consistent with relevance of stock markets only in context of management of market imperfections, presence of information asymmetries within populations of investors is associated with better equilibriums than homogeneity of investors' information. Study findings yield an empirically tractable, yet formal theoretical characterization for severity of stock market incompleteness, which is, severity of deviations from, or perturbations to general equilibrium listing paths. An important side outcome of the formal theoretical modeling is arrival at the first fully rational formal theoretical rationalizations for stock return momentum, stock return reversals, and intermittency of arrival of price correction events within stock markets.

Does financial advisor quality improve liquidity and issuer benefits in segmented markets? Evidence from the municipal bond market

PurposeUsing a unique sample of about 563,000 competitively bid municipal revenue bonds with financial advisors issued during the period 1998–2012, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role and influence of financial advisor quality in the municipal bond market.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use a sample of about 563,000 competitively bid municipal revenue bonds with financial advisors issued during the period 1998–2012. The authors estimate a selection model where the authors identify the factors leading to the selection of a high-quality financial advisor. The authors then, using the inverse mills ratio from the first regression, estimate the association of high-quality advisor (and other factors) with the cost of borrowing.FindingsThe results suggest that high-quality financial advisors provide a credible signal to market participants about issue and issuer quality. This signal translates to a greater number of bids for issues that use high-quality financial advisors, resulting in improved liquidity and lower borrowing costs for these issues. The results also show that the beneficial effects obtained by using higher quality financial advisors are prevalent across all categories of issues such as for refunding and non-refunding issues, and for both insured and non-insured issues. The benefits are also generally observed for issues of most size categories. The results also suggest that the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act requiring mandatory registration of financial advisors and enhanced scrutiny has only increased the benefits to issuers from using higher quality financial advisors.Originality/valueThis paper differs from previous research in several important ways. First, the study is, to the authors’ knowledge, the first study that explores the relationship between financial advisor quality and liquidity in the municipal sector. The authors show using higher quality financial advisors enhances liquidity for the issues by attracting a significantly large number of bids. Second, the sample is exclusively comprised of competitively bid revenue issues all of which rely on financial advisors. This enables us to examine more unambiguously the influence of financial advisor quality, without the confounding effects of issues without financial advisors. Third, time coverage (1998–2012) and size of the sample (roughly 563,000 bond issues) enables us to conduct varied sub-sample analyses with greater power since the resulting sub-sample partitions themselves are of very large size. This provides better and additional insights into the role of financial advisor quality. The more current data when compared to prior research enables us to examine the impact of financial advisor quality inter-temporally with special attention devoted to the period after passage of the Dodd–Frank Act.

Information Content of Offer Date Revelations: A Fresh Look at Seasoned Equity Offerings

AbstractBesides the offer price discount, investment bankers use revisions in offer size from the amount originally filed to signal the issuer's quality to their buy‐side clients. Unlike the offer price discount, offer size revision not only relates to the offer date price reaction, it also predicts post‐SEO (seasoned equity offering) performance. Improved SEOs, whose offer size exceeds the amount originally registered, experience significantly positive returns during the registration period and on the offer date. More importantly, they do not underperform post‐issuance. Their complement, regular SEOs, exhibit significantly negative returns during the registration period, on the offer date, and underperform their benchmark following issuance.

Soft and Hard Information and Signal Extraction in Securities Crowdfunding

We examine the impact of information flows on financing and the relative roles of hard information, soft information, and certification of issuer quality by third parties, using novel evidence from the US securities-based crowdfunding market. While hard information about the issuer’s financial condition and experience has only marginal relevance for offering outcomes, third-party certification of issuer quality as well as soft information about the issuer proxied by social media following plays a significant role in crowdfunding offerings. The relative roles of hard information and certification are greatest in offerings of more information-sensitive securities and when investors are less likely to derive nonpecuniary returns from participating in an offering. Further, there is evidence of partial substitution between different signals of issuer quality. Both third-party certification and issuer social media following are positively related to the valuation obtained by the issuer. Issuers tailor deal features, specifically, the choice of funding target flexibility and offering duration, to the level of information asymmetry about issuer quality. Finally, there is some evidence of geographic matching, with issuer characteristics and local availability of platforms affecting distance between issuers and platforms.

Underwriter reputation and the quality of certification: Evidence from high-yield bonds

This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market in which certification of issuer quality is most valuable to investors owing to low liquidity and issuing firms’ high opacity and default risk. We find bonds underwritten by the most reputable underwriters to be associated with significantly higher downgrade and default risk. Investors seem to be aware of this relation, as we further find the private information conveyed via the issuer-reputable underwriter match to have a significantly positive effect on at-issue yield spreads. Our results are consistent with the market-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism.

Issuer Quality and Corporate Bond Returns

We show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms and that this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders. The key insight is that changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low-quality firms, so debt issuance of low-quality firms is particularly useful for forecasting bond returns. We show that a significant decline in issuer quality is a more reliable signal of credit market overheating than rapid aggregate credit growth. We use these findings to investigate the forces driving time variation in expected corporate bond returns.

The issuance of callable bonds under information asymmetry

We reconsider the role of asymmetric information in motivating the issuance of callable bonds. The previous literature has emphasized a possibility that a call feature serves as a signal of issuer quality. We demonstrate that asymmetric information can motivate use of a call even when this action does not signal quality in equilibrium. We construct a matched sample of callable and non-callable bonds that permits us to control for non-informational effects on the call issuance decision. Empirical evidence from speculative grade bond markets is consistent with the hypotheses that asymmetric information motivates use of the call feature, but there is no evidence that inclusion of the call functions as a signal to the market. ► We reconsider the role of asymmetric information in the issue of callable bonds. ► The previous literature has emphasized a call feature as a signal of issuer quality. ► We demonstrate that asymmetric information can motivate the call without signaling. ► Empirical evidence from speculative grade bonds is consistent with our hypothesis.

No Guaranties: The Decline of Municipal Bond Insurance

The credit crisis that roiled the financial and housing markets in late 2007 and early 2008 resulted in well‐publicized budget challenges for state and local governments. Less visible has been a dramatic change in the bond insurance market, which alters how governments issue long‐term debt. Debt issuance data from Texas are used to model bond insurance premiums and examine utilization following the crisis. The results provide evidence that insurance premiums rose dramatically following the fiscal crisis, even when controlling for widening credit spreads and changes in the underlying credit quality of issuers.

Underwriter Reputation and the Quality of Certification: Evidence from High-Yield Bonds

This paper provides primary evidence of whether certification via reputable underwriters is beneficial to investors in the corporate bond market. We focus on the high-yield bond market, in which certification of issuer quality is most valuable to investors owing to low liquidity and issuing firms’ high opacity and default risk. We find bonds underwritten by the most reputable underwriters to be associated with significantly higher downgrade and default risk. Investors seem to be aware of this relation, as we further find the private information conveyed via the issuer-reputable underwriter match to have a significantly positive effect on at-issue yield spreads. Our results are consistent with the market-power hypothesis, and contradict the traditional certification hypothesis and underlying reputation mechanism.

Issuer Quality and the Credit Cycle

We show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms, and that this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders. The key insight is that changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low quality firms, so the debt issuance of low quality firms is particularly useful for forecasting bond returns. We show that a significant decline in issuer quality is a more reliable signal of credit market overheating than rapid aggregate credit growth. We use these findings to investigate the forces driving time-variation in expected corporate bond returns.

Breaking down the barriers: Competition, syndicate structure, and underwriting incentives

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.

Duration of IPOs between offering and listing: Cox proportional hazard models—Evidence for Chinese A-share IPOs

This paper estimates the duration from offering to listing of Chinese A-share IPOs issued from 1994 to 2005. We firstly compare the effects of the two issuing systems on the length of this duration and find that the waiting time to listing has been shortened greatly after the Approval System is adopted. Secondly, this study emphasizes on exploring endogenous factors related to an issuer itself, including the issuer's quality, market sentiment, allocation mechanism, and underwriter, etc. Then a Cox proportional hazard model is employed to examine these factors' influences on this issuer's final listing. Further, this paper extends the analysis to explore the role of the issuing system and issuing year respectively. Most endogenous factors are found to still be functioning when we take into account the effect of the issuing system, but the effects of underwriter, allocation mechanism, offering price and floatation size diminish in favour of the effect of issuing year.

How Do Venture Investments by Different Classes of Financial Institutions Affect the Equity Underwriting Process?

Over the 1993-2000 period, a majority of U.S. venture-backed IPOs have venture backing by financial institutions. Each class of financial institutions has its own asset expertise, investment criteria and access to proprietary information on private firms, which we exploit evaluating whether venture investments by commercial banks, investment banks and insurance companies have independent effects on the equity underwriting process. We also examine whether these effects are a function of investment size and whether the effects differ for debt (loans) and equity investments. We find that each class of financial institutions making venture investments in a firm going public is associated with evidence of lower adverse selection risk; namely reduced underpricing and absolute offer price revisions and stronger long-term operating performance. The impacts of debt or equity investments by separate classes of financial institutions are largely additive. Moreover, the size of financial institution ownership in an issuer is more informative than the presence of financial institution investors. This body of evidence is consistent with equity holdings and loans by each class of financial institutions providing independent certification of issuer quality.

Business and Financial Indicators: What are the Determinants of Default Probability Changes?

This paper investigates some common determinants of default probability changes of individual firms using Standard & Poor's ratings database. We analyze and quantify the responses of hazard rates to changes in various economic variables, namely financial markets, business cycle and credit indicators, and examine their persistency. First, we show that including non-financial information largely improves the poor explanatory power of financial-based factor models. More importantly, in comparison with market factors, business and credit factors become dominant as the issuer quality decreases. Second, we highlight the benefits of past information. Our results prove that both past shocks and subsequent economic trends are of prime importance in explaining probability changes. To draw these conclusions, we introduce a semi-parametric framework accommodating the continuous nature of probability changes and ageing effects. It allows us to recover default probabilities over any desired time horizon.

Evidence on What CFOs Think About the IPO Process: Practice, Theory, and Managerial Implications

Many privately held companies aspire to go public through an initial public offering. But the IPO process is time-consuming, expensive, and fraught with uncertainty. With the aim of shedding light on the process and reducing at least some of the uncertainty, the authors asked several hundred CFOs to share their experiences and perceptions with regard to six specific aspects of the IPO process: (1) motives for going public; (2) the timing of IPOs; (3) criteria for choosing an underwriter; (4) cause of IPO underpricing; (5) IPO signaling; and (6) reasons to stay private. The main findings from the survey are summarized below: •The primary motive for going public is to create a currency-publicly traded shares-that can be used to fund acquisitions. •CFOs strongly base the timing of their IPOs on overall stock market conditions, while paying relatively little attention to IPO market conditions. •CFOs choose underwriters based on their overall reputation and industry expertise. Somewhat surprisingly, issuers did not express much concern about the underwriter fee structure. •CFOs view underpricing mainly as a means of compensating investors for taking on the risk of IPOs in the after-market. •The two strongest perceived positive signals for issuer quality are a history of strong earnings and the use of a reputable investment bank. The strongest negative signal is the sale of insider shares in the IPO. •The primary reason for staying private cited by the CFOs of private companies is the desire to maintain decision-making control.

Evidence on private equity offering announcements: Strong and weak firms’ pooling versus separation

This study finds private equity firms classified as higher quality at the announcement date outperform lower quality issues right after the announcement. Yet, higher and lower quality announcers have similar positive announcement period abnormal returns. Since correct post-announcement re-pricing is related to announcement and prior historical information on quality differences, investors unsoundly respond to this available information prior to and at the announcement. The announcement likely serves as the catalyst initiating a re-determination of issuer quality and revaluation. Consistent with expected better relative future performance, higher quality issuers have higher pre-announcement asset turnovers, more liquidity and less management turnover.

Wanna Dance? How Firms and Underwriters Choose Each Other

ABSTRACTWe develop and test a theory explaining the equilibrium matching of issuers and underwriters. We assume that issuers and underwriters associate by mutual choice, and that underwriter ability and issuer quality are complementary. Our model implies that matching is positive assortative, and that matches are based on firms' and underwriters' relative characteristics at the time of issuance. The model predicts that the market share of top underwriters and their average issue quality varies inversely with issuance volume. Various cross‐sectional patterns in underwriting spreads are consistent with equilibrium matching. We find strong empirical confirmation of our theory.