Quadrennial Defense Review Research Articles

Capabilities-Based “Confusion”: Why Capabilities-Based Planning Systems Struggle

In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Department of Defense would henceforth use capabilitiesbased planning to guide the development of the armed forces. The popularity of the idea spread to many allied countries that also embraced the concept. However, the successful implementation of the method has been hindered by a number of factors: lack of an agreed lexicon, confusion in many defense organizations to the degree to which “threats” are used, inattention to policy priorities, heavy institutional analytical requirements, and a lack of acknowledgement of the importance money must play in any planning system. The paper concludes that whilst elements of the method are well-suited to providing objective data in support of senior leadership’s decision-making; alone, it is insufficient to drive planning, which is inherently a political process.

TRUMAN dOCTRINE (1946); Defense Planning Guidance (1991) & The National Security Strategy (2002): The Mackinder & Spyman Dialetics Revisited

The aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman’s geopolitical theories, which sustained the grand strategy of the United States with the implementation of 1946 Truman Doctrine, are still relevant today after their termination. The results indicate that the intellectual matrixes were found in documents of the grand strategy of the United States in two moments. First, in 1992, in the George Herbert Walker Bush’s government’s Defense Planning Guidance document, formulated by the Pentagon, in February 1992. Second, they were found replicated 10 years after in the first term of President George Walker Bush, inaugurated in 2001. In the latter, the theoretical formulations repercussions were depicted in the official documents Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) and the National Security Strategy (2002). The article concluded that the authors’ ideas remain valid to explain and interpret the actions of the United States’ grand strategy in the international scenario.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE (1946); DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (1991) & THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2002): THE MACKINDER & SPYKMAN DIALECTICS REVISITED

The aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman’s geopolitical theories, which sustained the grand strategy of the United States with the implementation of 1946 Truman Doctrine, are still relevant today after their termination. The results indicate that the intellectual matrixes were found in documents of the grand strategy of the United States in two moments. First, in 1992, in the George Herbert Walker Bush’s government’s Defense Planning Guidance document, formulated by the Pentagon, in February 1992. Second, they were found replicated 10 years after in the first term of President George Walker Bush, inaugurated in 2001. In the latter, the theoretical formulations repercussions were depicted in the official documents Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) and the National Security Strategy (2002). The article concluded that the authors’ ideas remain valid to explain and interpret the actions of the United States’ grand strategy in the international scenario.

Truman Doctrine (1946); Defense Planning Guidance (1991) & The National Security Strategy (2002) the Mackinder & Spykman Dialects revisited

The aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman’s geopolitical theories, which sustained the grand strategy of the United States with the implementation of 1946 Truman Doctrine, are still relevant today after their termination. The results indicate that the intellectual matrixes were found in documents of the grand strategy of the United States in two moments. First, in 1992, in the George Herbert Walker Bush’s government’s Defense Planning Guidance document, formulated by the Pentagon, in February 1992. Second, they were found replicated 10 years after in the first term of President George Walker Bush, inaugurated in 2001. In the latter, the theoretical formulations repercussions were depicted in the official documents Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) and the National Security Strategy (2002). The article concluded that the authors’ ideas remain valid to explain and interpret the actions of the United States’ grand strategy in the international scenario.

Future Tasks: Threats and Missions for SOF

Forecasting is an inexact art at best. This article outlines a framework for forecasting SOF futures based on one originally used in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review to map capabilities against threats. It also employs intersecting lines of inquiry, beginning with the American SOF “corporate view” of the future. The forecast distills a number of public and private sector futures assessments into three “mega-trends,” derived from analysis of over a dozen public and private sector futures assessments, and then produces a SOF “market forecast” based on the implications of current and emerging technologies. The market forecast suggests decision makers may be forced into reconsidering the nature of SOF organizations as well as the SOF Truths in order for SOF to retain a unique or “special” value in the future. This forecast concludes by outlining four future possible vectors, or alternative futures scenarios, in which emerging technologies might impact future missions to inform and spur additional thought and discussion among SOF force developers and employers.

Tradeoffs in defense strategic planning: lessons from the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review

ABSTRACT Defense ministries conduct strategic planning in various ways. In this article I outline tradeoffs in the design of strategic planning processes, and consider the implications of these tradeoffs for choices about the conduct of defense planning in different circumstances. Whereas an inclusive and transparent planning process is well-suited to building internal and external buy-in for a defense strategy, a more exclusive and opaque process is more likely to generate a defense strategy that departs from the status quo and speaks candidly about key challenges. The design of a defense planning process should therefore be informed by certain features of its context, such as whether the international security environment is stable or in flux and whether the defense ministry enjoys or lacks strong political support. I base the article’s findings on an in-depth analysis of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, which served for nearly two decades as the major strategy process of the U.S. Department of Defense. This analysis draws on interviews I conducted of 23 defense officials and experts, as well as primary and secondary sources. More generally, my findings highlight for scholars and practitioners the importance of understanding how planning processes can shape defense and national security policies.

Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times

ABSTRACT: Force reductions resulting from the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review significantly compromise the US Army's ability to maintain the global commitments and positioning necessary for managing strategic risks arising from multiple, unforeseen sources. In this article, the authors discuss how active duty Army capacity affects America's strategic risk. ********** During the upcoming decade, the United States will be challenged by a new strategic threat or worse, multiple strategic threats. How will the US Army respond if sequestration cuts continue? The near-future Army--for better or worse--will originate in this decade. The size and readiness of the near-future Army will offer one of two options, either reducing America's strategic or increasing it. So what would be the right size of the Army if we want to reduce America's strategic risk? The results of 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) led to reducing the size of the Army to levels unseen since before World War II. Unfortunately, the current force reduction can only produce one result, the weakening of the joint force's ability to deter conflict, which accordingly increases America's strategic risk. Since the publication of the 2014 QDR, numerous new threats have emerged to challenge the Army's reductions. Daesh captured large parts of Iraq and Syria. The Syrian Civil War escalated, causing a Middle East and European refugee crisis. Russia annexed Crimea, invaded Ukraine, and intervened alongside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain the Assad regime in Syria. North Korea remained bellicose, testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. China continued its territorial expansion in the South China Sea, and the Taliban continued to intensify offensive operations in Afghanistan. All of these events occurred in just the last several years; what might the next few years bring? While acknowledging the indispensable roles of both the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as strategic reserves, their roles, missions, and sizing are beyond the scope and length of this article, which focuses on the size of the active duty Army. This discussion considers what the Army brings to the fight in relation to forward presence and deployable capabilities, the current and future demand on land forces, and examines two options for rightsizing the Army to reduce strategic risk. To set the stage for Army force sizing, we discuss the definition of strategic and five troubling assumptions about future war. Strategic Risk How does strategic relate to the size of the current and future US Army? Strategic is the probability of failure to achieve a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The smaller the army, the higher the of failure to obtain a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. (1) Senior US Army leaders view today's Army at high risk in regards to the emerging threats and potential for future great-power conflict. High is the rating in which the Army would not be able to accomplish all its assigned tasks in the allotted time and level of casualties. (2) Five Faulty Assumptions While assessments of strategic risk, acceptable cost, and the size of the Army are complex, several false assumptions about future war and landpower have gained currency in defense circles. These assumptions increase national strategic by failing to appreciate Army capacity-capability with sufficient scale and endurance--as an essential element of national security. The is troubling because it threatens to consign the US military to a repetition of the mistakes of recent wars and the development of joint forces ill-prepared for future threats. Forward-positioned land forces do not prevent conflict. Deterrence depends on the demonstrated ability to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its objectives, and deterrence theory states deterring aggression is most likely to succeed when the potential aggressor believes the threats will be enacted. …

Disenchanting Secularization

Disenchanting Secularization

Meeting the American Standard but Falling Short

Writing official strategy documents is hard. The United States produces a National Security Strategy and a Quadrennial Defense Review every four years, not to mention several other similar efforts....

GEOPOLITICS OF THE 2015 BRITISH DEFENSE WHITE PAPER AND ITS HISTORICAL PREDECESSORS

IntroductionDefense white papers, sometimes called national security strategy documents, are important expressions of countries national security policy goals. They describe the international security environment facing individual countries at given moments in time and how they expect to counter and defeat national enemies if r esort t o military force is requir ed. The U.S. Gover nment and military r egularly issue national security policy documents such as the National Security Strategy of the United States issued by presidential admin- istrations every four to five years, the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) issued by t he Department of Defense, and the National Military Strategy of the United States. Such documents are important assessments by governments of the day on their national and international security priorities and the financial measures they are willing to take to meet their national interests. These documents also cover economic, diplomatic, environmental, financial, and geopolitical factors influencing their ability or inability to achieve these objectives.1This work examines recent the defense white paper released by the United Kingdom in November 2015. It will analyze the contents of historic defense white papers produced by the UK, the geopolitical factors influencing historical and contemporary British defense white papers, and the UK's willingness and ability to carry out objectives described in these white papers given historical and current economic and security environments facing London. Such documents receive both praise and criticism from interested observers depending on their political perspectives. Research on these documents can revea l significa nt ins ights on how their gover nments addr essed nat iona l secur ity a nd economic priorities they confr onted. These documents a nd research also demonstrate the degree of security coordination Britain has or does not have with its superpower ally the U.S.2The UK has issued a number of defense white papers since World War II. Annual government parliamentary commissions called Statement on Defence and Statement on the Defense Estimates were issued from 1946-1996.3 The 1957 Sandys Review issued by Minister of Defense Duncan Sandys (1908- 1987) during the Macmillan Government (1957-1963) was the first major post-war British defense white paper. Issued in the aftermath of the Suez debacle, this document stressed nuclear deterrence as the keystone of British defense policy recommending the abolition of compulsory military service, greater allied burden sharing with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conventional forces, reducing overseas military forces and the number of Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters, and changing the Navy's role to emphasize relying on aircraft carriers to project power in peacetime emergencies and limited hostilities.4The next British defense white papers were issued between 1965-1968 by Harold Wilson's Labour Government (1964-1970) under Minister of Defence Denis Healy (1917-2015). These documents and subsequently implemented policies involved withdrawing British military forces from east of the Suez, reducing the size of the territorial army, cancelling further construction of aircraft carriers and domestic aircraft construction, and r educing military forces deployed in C yprus, Germany, and Malta due to fina ncia l cris es forcing the pound's devaluation.5 A decade later, another Wils on Labour Government under Minister of Defence Roy Mason (1924-2015) issued a defense review (1974-1975) stating that defense spending would be reduced from 5% to 4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over ten years, that British defense spending should be harmonized with the NATO avera ge which included 3.8% of GDP for France and 4.1% for Germany, and that London's defense spending should be focused on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.6T he next ma jor Br it is h defense review was initiated during Margar et Thatcher's Conservative government (1979-1990) under the stewardship of Defence Minister John Nott. …

Does Strategic Planning Matter? The Outcomes of U.S. National Security Reviews

IN RECENT YEARS, ALL OF THE MAJOR U.S. NATIONAL security agencies have conducted quadrennial strategy reviews.1 In 1996, the U.S. Congress mandated the conduct by the Defense Department of a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that entails a “comprehensive examination” of U.S. defense strategy and policies, “with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.”2 Since then, U.S. policymakers have also launched quadrennial reviews in the U.S. intelligence community and at the Departments of Homeland Security and State. As of this writing, U.S. agencies have completed five QDRs, three Quadrennial Intelligence Community Reviews (QICRs), two Quadrennial Homeland Security Reviews (QHSRs), and two Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Reviews (QDDRs).3 In addition, the Barack Obama administration has begun the first Quadrennial Energy Review, which is being led by the White House and Department of Energy. These quadrennial reviews require a major investment of time and energy on the part of many government officials. The reviews therefore raise several questions: What have been the outcomes of quadrennial reviews by government agencies? What factors have shaped their outcomes? More generally, are formal strategic reviews worth doing?

The Role of the Intelligence Community in Identifying Cooperative Opportunities

While a lot has been written about the Department of Defense's (DoD) ongoing Strategic Choices and Management Review and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, 1 far less attention has been paid to t...

What the QDR Ought to Say about Landpower

ABSTRACT: The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have been completed as of this writing, but will not yet have been published. Facing new strategic priorities and mounting fiscal pressures, it is anticipated that capacity or size of American landpower will be substantially reduced: Army's end strength could be decremented to a post-World War II low of just 420,000 to 450,000 soldiers. This article considers implications of such reductions. ********** The US Department of Defense (DOD) faces numerous challenges today as it updates US defense strategy in light of a dynamic security environment and significant resource constraints. The QDR affords landpower strategists an excellent opportunity to step back and think about future. As former Pentagon strategist Shawn Brimley wrote, With wars ending, budgets declining, technology proliferating, and other powers rising, a real of opportunity to reshape US defense strategy has opened for first time since end of Cold War. (1) However, that window also brings with it great risk. Documents like National Intelligence Council's 2030 report or Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Operating Environment suggest United States must have balanced and versatile forces able to accomplish a wide variety of missions. Urgency is needed to create greater Joint adaptability and versatility to cope with uncertainty and complexity. Although niche capabilities will still be needed, a balanced force design is basis for adaptation and operational flexibility. Landpower and Joint Force 2020 Landpower's role in 21st century was studied by a task force commissioned by US Army, US Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command. This effort produced a concept paper delineating what landpower brings to fight, and emphasizes achieving influence in human domain and winning clash of wills inherent in human conflict. (2) It argues, persuasively, that the importance of conflict prevention and ability to shape conditions in regions to maintain stability through actions highly focused on human factors is also rising in significance. (3) The interplay of human and moral factors in war is something Clausewitz stressed, but which modern strategists might deemphasize or inadvertently overlook. (4) The role of landpower is questioned in some quarters: it is equated to protracted counterinsurgency tasks and portrayed as expensive. Some critics think of Arm), and Marines solely in terms of current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and hope to opt out of such messianic missions and nation-building tasks. But after a decade of irregular war, contributions made by Army, Marines, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) should not be narrowly defined by last decade or exaggerated concerns about endless wars. American landpower capabilities have been broadened and deepened by a decade of sacrifice and adaptation. The tremendous learning curve and combat experience of last decade has produced a very flexible force, and United States must retain best of that leadership, experience, and lessons. We should not seek to refight last war, nor should we recoil from a ruthlessly realistic appreciation for world as it is rather than what we hope it may become. As noted by Major General H. R. McMaster: ... in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning did not account for adaptability and initiatives by enemy. American forces, deployed initially in insufficient numbers to keep pace with evolution of those conflicts, struggled to maintain security. The lesson: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, like all wars, were contests of will that unleashed dynamics that made future events impossible to predict. Fortunately, American forces adapted. (5) The US military has not yet studied or drawn adequate lessons about factors that facilitated this adaptation. …

Creating a model to measure relationships: U.S. Army strategic communication

Strategic Communication is receiving much credence for public relations planning in the U.S. Army, (Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2010. The Office of the Chief of Public Affairs for the U.S. Army, has a Strategic Communication Division and it is home to the last vestiges of former Secretary of, Defense Donald Rumsfeld's ill-fated attempt to create such an office at the Department of Defense, (DoD) level. In 2009, Major General Mari K. Eder, deputy director of the U.S. Army Reserve, wrote of, the tragic lack of a comprehensive strategic communication focus across DoD levels, let alone at the, Army level. A “Deep Dive” Conference sponsored by the Army during the summer of 2006 focused on, measuring outcomes of its public affairs programs. In spite of the conference objectives, the Army was, not able to define strategic communication completely nor was it able to come up with adequate, operational measurement tools for measuring relationships with key publics or stakeholders within, strategic communication. It was able to produce some measurable and motivational objectives as well, as measurable process tools for media relations, but it still lacked the ability to measure quantitative or, qualitative relationships with key stakeholders.

Integrating behavioral health services within military health system: a model for opportunities and challenges

Background–The 2010 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review report was the impetus for a review of strategies, programs and resources including healthcare. A section of this report focused on lowering military health systems cost, while striking a balance with the “Quadruple Aim” (1) maximizing readiness, (2) improving the health of the population, (3) enhancing the patient experience of care, and (4) responsibly managing per capita cost of care. The Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) was a primary target to reach the goals of the Quadruple Aim. What is the basis for integration of behavioral health services into Department of Defense Military Health System (MHS)?–The PCMH is an initiative to reorganize primary care to improve health outcomes. The implementation and evaluation of transformed primary care systems into PCMHs across the USA is also taking place in the Department of Defense MHS. Unlike most PCMHs, the MHS effort considered the integration of behavioral health services essential to PCMH implementation. Although the Navy, Air Force, and Army all have integrated some aspects of behavioral health into their models, there was a need for an overall MHS systemwide vision and implementation. A 2007 Taskforce on Mental Health recommended the integration of mental health professionals into primary care settings to improve the access and outcomes of behavioral healthcare within MHS. In response to this recommendation, A Mental Health Integrated Working Group (MHIWG) established recommendations for integrating behavioral health providers and care facilitators into primary care that included staffing, evidence-based assessment and treatment, and workforce development. How was the policy for integrating behavioral health services developed?–Once funding was secured, the recommendations from the MHIWG were transformed into a Department of Defense policy. This policy ensures minimum standards, competencies, and evaluation of impact within and across the services. Although currently in draft form, it is estimated that after a 12-month coordination process, it will be formally published. How will the workforce be developed to facilitate this implementation?–Behavioral health professionals are often trained for assessment and intervention in specialty clinics where appointment length and reporting are longer and more detailed than in other health care settings, particularly PCMH. The difference in culture, clinical setting, and the unique delivery system warrants minimum training criteria and core competencies for behavioral health providers consistent with Air Force, Navy, and Army publications. Training will include didactic and experiential training prior to seeing patients. How will the integration of behavioral health services be evaluated?–Evaluation of this initiative is imperative for long-term sustainability and effectiveness. Because behavioral health providers and care facilitators were not part of overall PCMH evaluation outcomes, separate evaluation variables are being planned. These include patient, provider, and clinic, and system level, process, measures that align with the Quadruple Aim. Research questions, methods, data collection, and statistical analysis are being proactively determined and they will correspond with measures collected. Bottom line: The development, implementation, and evaluation a policy to integrate behavioral health services into Military Health Service is complex but has the potential to improve care while lowering military health systems cost and striking a balance with the goals included in the Quadruple Aim. This initiative can be used as a model of behavioral health services integration in other PCMHs. Policy implications: It is necessary to involve many different groups in policy development and implementation strategies. These stakeholders should be engaged at all levels and leaders and champions identified and utilized. Specific rationale for the policy needs to be clear and evidence-based. Evaluation needs to be considered in the planning stages of a policy to integrate behavioral health services to gain robust measures that demonstrate policy effectiveness. Research implications: It is necessary to identify expected impact from integration and develop a set of quality metrics and effective evaluation design that will allow scientifically robust conclusions to be drawn. Developing these measures and using them consistently across care systems can help build the evidence of the importance of behavioral health services integration.

Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy

In the past few years, the Indian Ocean has emerged as a major center of geostrategic interest. The Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) set the tone by calling for a more “integrated a...

The New Imperialism: Stabilization and Reconstruction or the Responsibility to Fix?

As a result of the wars undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan by the George W. Bush administration, the United States has taken on a responsibility to reconstruct the political and economic institutions of these countries. This responsibility has been carried out through provincial reconstruction teams that operate at the local level to rebuild the societies shattered by war. In conceptual terms, the responsibility increasingly reflects the new emphasis on reconstruction and stabilization operations laid out in the State Department’s 2011 Quadrennial Defense and Development Review, which sets the groundwork for future interventions both to prevent states from failing and to rebuild states devastated by war or natural disaster. The ambitious nature of this strategy suggests a new age of American imperialism under which the “responsibility to protect” of the 1990s may become the “responsibility to fix” of the twenty-first century.

The Myth of “Securing the Commons”

Not since President George W. Bush uttered the words ‘‘axis of evil’’ has a strategic phrase generated as much Beltway buzz as ‘‘securing the commons.’’ One of the few points of agreement between President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the neoconservative Project for the New America’s Century’s ‘‘Rebuilding American Defense’’ report, various NATO research papers, and numerous think tank publications is that they all emphasize the importance of ‘‘safeguarding the global commons.’’ 1 And yet, what does that mean? Herein lies the problem: the term has multiple and often contradictory meanings. For the extreme left, it connotes imperialist designs; while to liberal institutionalists it means good world citizenry. To many realists, it is synonymous with overreach; while to conservatives it signals proper hegemonic activity. To the World Bank, it means protecting the world from global environmental challenges, 2 while to others it refers to sustaining American hard power in the post-Cold War era. 3 Even the term ‘‘commons’’ is

Defense community perspectives on uncertainty and confidence judgments

In 2007, the CNA Military Advisory Board (MAB), an expert panel composed of 11 retired admirals and generals from the United States, identified climate change as a “threat multiplier” for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world. (CNA MAB National security and the threat of climate change2007)The Department of Defense reached a similar conclusion in last year’s Quadrennial Defense Review–a legislatively mandated analysis of the Defense Department’s strategy and priorities. This document frames the long-term course for policy decision-making at the highest levels. The reports demonstrate that climate change and energy are now mainstream elements of national security planning, and can be assessed within the frameworks used to evaluate other threats, risks, and responses. However, the exact magnitude of the threat posed by climate change is difficult to calibrate in part because the language used by scientists to predict uncertainty and the confidence levels of judgments is not sufficiently clear. The defense community has a vast amount of experience exploring and dealing with uncertainty. Scientists trying to better describe the effects of climate change may be able to draw lessons from the defense community’s approach to uncertainty including how to better communicate findings to wide audiences including policy-makers.

ADAPT AND OVERCOME: REVISING US NAVAL DOCTRINE AND POLICY IN AN ERA OF UNCONVENTIONAL CONFLICT

When the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was released in Februaryof 2006, the United States was in the middle of a multi-front Global War on Terror(GWOT) that had been underway for more than four years. Beginning with theinitial response to the 9/11 attacks in October of 2001, the US Navy began to play asignificant part in the unconventional operations that characterised the early days ofOPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. While the Navy carried out its missionadmirably supporting Special Operations Forces (SOF) by providing the USS KittyHawk (CV 63) as a “lily pad”, which enabled Rangers, Delta operators, GreenBerets, and SEALs to move in and out of Afghanistan from a maritime staging area,it was a role well outside the norm of American naval operations and one the Navyis yet to fully embrace.