Does Strategic Planning Matter? The Outcomes of U.S. National Security Reviews

Abstract

IN RECENT YEARS, ALL OF THE MAJOR U.S. NATIONAL security agencies have conducted quadrennial strategy reviews.1 In 1996, the U.S. Congress mandated the conduct by the Defense Department of a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that entails a “comprehensive examination” of U.S. defense strategy and policies, “with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.”2 Since then, U.S. policymakers have also launched quadrennial reviews in the U.S. intelligence community and at the Departments of Homeland Security and State. As of this writing, U.S. agencies have completed five QDRs, three Quadrennial Intelligence Community Reviews (QICRs), two Quadrennial Homeland Security Reviews (QHSRs), and two Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Reviews (QDDRs).3 In addition, the Barack Obama administration has begun the first Quadrennial Energy Review, which is being led by the White House and Department of Energy. These quadrennial reviews require a major investment of time and energy on the part of many government officials. The reviews therefore raise several questions: What have been the outcomes of quadrennial reviews by government agencies? What factors have shaped their outcomes? More generally, are formal strategic reviews worth doing?