It is well known to those interested in Neoplatonism that Plotinus speaks regularly of two 'intellects'. There is a psychic intellect whose activity he often calls btavota and later philosophers discursive thought; and there is a 'pure' intellect which has not descended into the soul and whose activity later philosophers often call intuitive or non-discursive thought. For the first to be replaced by, or to become the second, which is of course a higher level for the soul, is a necessary step towards contact with the One. Discursive thought means thought that involves transition, an expression often applied to thought by Plotinus. But this can be a temporal transition from one element of a thought to another or a logical transition from a premiss to a conclusion. Singular judgments belong to discursive thought.' No one doubts that temporal transition and inference are both excluded from the activity of pure intellect. But Plotinus regularly describes the object, or better, content, of this activity as 'everything together' (6goiv 3avrTa). And in a paper of 1970 I suggested that, extrapolating from Aristotle's notion of a judgment, he supposed that there is a form of consciousness which is the exercise of a single thought or concept that in discursive thinking would have been subject or predicate of a composite thought called a judgment.2 This form of consciousness is what I described as non-propositional and identified with the activity of pure intellect. Without quarrelling with this notion of 'non-propositional' R. Sorabji has disputed that pure intellect's activity is non-propositional according to Plotinus. Sorabji claimed first in Language and Logos and then in his own Time, Creation and the Continuum that the transition which is absent from