The paper applies the concepts of the horizon problem, agency costs, monitoring, and special interest incentives to trustee management of public schools and higher education. We examine whether South Carolina's 1984 Education Improvement Act, a major restructuring of educational organization and spending in South Carolina, is related to the ratio of pupils in private versus public schools. We employ 30 years of county level data in South Carolina, and we uncover several things. There is no statistically credible relation between public school expenditures per pupil and the private school/public school enrollment ratio. However, we do find that the directed changes in rules, organizational structure, and incentives mandated by the 1984 Educational Improvement Act are associated with a reduction in the relative number of children attending private school. We interpret this to mean that the features of the law requiring better accountability and the like were perceived by parents to make for better education while the increased money spent was only a transfer to teachers or some other groups; we find that organization matters more than money.