Punishment Strategies Research Articles

Environmental therapy for cognitive and sensory impairment in a mouse model of Down syndrome

We analyze conditions under which it is possible to achieve efficient mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions with a self-enforcing international agreement in which all countries find it in their self-interest to abide by the agreement. We model the choice of emissions by countries as a dynamic game. We use a two-part punishment scheme for deviations from an agreement that is renegotiation-proof and show when this scheme supports the efficient outcome as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Using numerical examples, we show that an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium exists for a range of reasonable parameter values. The existence of such equilibrium may be non-monotonic in the discount rate and the ratio of slope of marginal abatement cost and marginal damages.

How should commodities be taxed? A supergame-theoretic analysis

This paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets. We consider both a Cournot and a Bertrand supergame with discounting, with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick-and-carrot optimal punishments. We show that, irrespective of firms' choice variable, and under both punishment schemes, increased reliance on ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain a collusive agreement. Contrary to the conventional wisdom according to which ad valorem taxation should be preferred on welfare grounds, we find that welfare under specific taxation might be higher than welfare under ad valorem taxation. The main conclusion of our analysis is that traditional welfare results on the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation based on static models do not necessarily survive in a dynamic setting where the possibility of collusion among firms is taken into account. In response to an increase in the ad valorem tax rate, sufficiently patient firms might find it rational to form an implicit cartel, which would not have existed otherwise.

Evolutionary snowdrift game incorporating costly punishment in structured populations

The role of punishment and the effects of a structured population in promoting cooperation are important issues. Within a recent model of snowdrift game (SG) incorporating a costly punishing strategy (P), we study the effects of a population connected through a square lattice. The punishers, who carry basically a cooperative (C) character, are willing to pay a cost α so as to punish a non-cooperative (D) opponent by β. Depending on α, β, the cost-to-benefit ratio r in SG, and the initial conditions, the system evolves into different phases that could be homogeneous or inhomogeneous. The spatial structure imposes geometrical constraint on how one agent is affected by neighboring agents. Results of extensive numerical simulations, both for the steady state and the dynamics, are presented. Possible phases are identified and discussed, and isolated phases in the r–β space are identified as special local structures of strategies that are stable due to the lattice structure. In contrast to a well-mixed population where punishers are suppressed due to the cost of punishment, the altruistic punishing strategy can flourish and prevail for appropriate values of the parameters, implying an enhancement in cooperation by imposing punishments in a structured population. The system could evolve to a phase corresponding to the coexistence of C, D, and P strategies at some particular payoff parameters, and such a phase is absent in a well-mixed population. The pair approximation, a commonly used analytic approach, is extended from a two-strategy system to a three-strategy system. We show that the pair approximation can, at best, capture the numerical results only qualitatively. Due to the improper way of including spatial correlation imposed by the lattice structure, the approximation does not give the frequencies of C, D, and P accurately and fails to give the homogeneous AllD and AllP phases.

Mechanisms driving pre- and post-stressor repetitive negative thinking: Metacognitions, cognitive avoidance, and thought control

Background and objectivesRepetitive negative thinking (RNT) is common to multiple emotional disorders and occurs before, during, and following a stressor. One replicated difference between common forms of RNT such as worry and rumination is temporal orientation towards a stressor, with worry being more future-oriented and rumination more past-oriented. Different mechanisms may drive RNT at these different time points. The aim of Study 1 was to examine whether previously demonstrated relationships between post-stressor RNT and mechanisms theorized to drive engagement in RNT, including metacognitive beliefs, cognitive avoidance strategies, and thought control strategies, would be replicated with anticipatory (pre-stressor) RNT. The aim of Study 2 was to replicate these associations in a new sample that completed measures of both pre- and post-stressor RNT. MethodParticipants in Study 1 (N = 175) completed the RNT-L in anticipation of a stressor, along with measures of metacognitive beliefs, cognitive avoidance strategies, and thought control strategies. Participants in Study 2 (N = 91) completed the measures both before and after a stressor. Results: Pre- and post-stressor RNT were significantly correlated with all three mechanism measures. Metacognitive beliefs that RNT is uncontrollable and dangerous, and the thought control strategy of punishment, were most consistently and uniquely associated with RNT at both time-points. LimitationsReplication with clinical samples and with reference to a broader array of stressors is required. The correlational design precluded causal conclusions. ConclusionsCommon and possibly some distinct mechanisms drive RNT before and after a stressor.

Thought Control: Is It Ability, Strategies, or Both That Predicts Posttraumatic Symptomatology in Victims of Interpersonal Trauma?

Cognitive models of PTSD have implicated thought control in the development, maintenance, and recovery from PTSD. The present study extends previous research on thought control (ability and strategies) and it’s relation to posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) in a sample of interpersonal trauma (IPT) survivors. Results revealed that weak thought control ability mediated the relationship between accumulated discrete IPT experiences and PTSS severity. Weak thought control ability was associated with greater use of thought control strategies, and thought control strategies of punishment and suppression added significant variance over and above the effects of accumulated IPT experiences and thought control ability in predicting PTSS severity. Furthermore, weak thought control ability was related to greater PTSS severity through the use of punishment and suppression thought control strategies. The present findings extend previous research and provide further support for theoretical assumptions of current treatment approaches for PTSD.

Development and Preliminary Validation of the Thought Control Questionnaire for Adolescents (TCQ-A)

The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ, Wells and Davies in Behav Res Therapy, 32, pp 871–878, 1994) measures individual differences in thought suppression strategies. This study describes the development and psychometric properties of an adolescent version of the questionnaire. Pilot studies were conducted to make some of the items more accessible to young people while still retaining the meaning of the original items. The adolescent version of the questionnaire and measures of emotional disorder were then administered to 589 school pupils aged 13–17 years. Confirmatory factor analysis yielded mixed results with only partial support for a five factor solution. Subsequently exploratory factor analysis did suggest a five factor structure that was the same as the original TCQ with the only difference being two fewer items. The five factors were distraction, social control, worry, punishment and reappraisal. The TCQ-A showed good internal consistency and evidence of stability over time. Scores on the worry and punishment subscales were positively correlated with measures of emotional symptoms. These data provided initial support for the psychometric properties of the TCQ-A and extend findings suggesting worry and punishment strategies are associated with psychological vulnerability.

TACIT COLLUSION WITH QUANTITY‐MATCHING PUNISHMENTS IN A HOMOGENEOUS MARKET*

Tacit collusion with quantity‐matching punishments in a homogeneous market is investigated. The findings are the following: (i) tacit collusion can arise with quantity‐matching punishments in a homogeneous market, (ii) the monopoly quantity cannot be supported by quantity‐matching punishment strategy, and (iii) compared with Nash‐reversion punishments, collusion is no easier to sustain, but not necessarily harder. The results are compared with those in Lu and Wright (International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 28 (2010), pp. 298–306) with price‐matching punishments. A linear demand example is provided to illustrate the theory.

Relational Political Contribution Under Common Agency

Motivated by commitment problems of contracts in lobbying, this paper studies a model of a repeated common agency where monetary transfers must be voluntary. First, we show that the optimal punishment strategy for a principal takes a two-phase scheme, which is similar to the punishment characterized by Goldlucke and Kranz (2012). Second, we investigate whether an outcome of standard menu auctions with binding contracts can be supported by implicit contracts. We define the environment to be more preference-diverse if an efficient decision is less attractive to each principal. We show that the discount factor must be high to support the outcome of the standard menu auction if the environment is preference-diversified.

Collusive price rigidity under price-matching punishments

By analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price-matching punishment strategy, we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close. This provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve. In contrast to the kinked demand curve, it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price, which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits. The relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high-cost phase, the degree of product differentiation, and the number of firms in the market are also investigated.

Thought Control Strategies in Adolescents: Links with OCD Symptoms and Meta-Cognitive Beliefs

The perceived control of intrusive thoughts is important in our understanding of a variety of psychological disorders, but particularly in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Little research has explored thought control strategies in younger populations, despite the frequent onset of OCD in childhood. This study examined thought control strategies and meta-cognitive beliefs in relation to Obsessive Compulsive (OC) interference scores in an adolescent sample. A non-referred sample of 151 adolescents aged 13-16 completed the Thought Control Questionnaire, the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire - Adolescent version, and the Leyton Obsessional Inventory - Child Version. Adolescents reported using distraction and worry as thought control strategies as much as adults, but social control and reappraisal less frequently, with adolescent males also reporting less use of punishment as a strategy. The strategies of worry and punishment, and positive beliefs about worry, uncontrollability and danger beliefs (UCD) and superstition punishment and responsibility beliefs (SPR) predicted OC interference scores. Furthermore, these meta-cognitive beliefs mediated the relationships between punishment and worry and OC interference scores. Given the similarities between our results and those from research exploring these variables in adults, it is proposed that cognitive behavioural models of OCD that have been developed in adult populations may be relevant to adolescents, but that meta-cognitive beliefs about superstition, punishment and responsibility may be important in adolescence.

Peer-to-Peer multimedia sharing based on social norms

Designing incentive schemes for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) multimedia sharing applications, where the participating peers find it in their self-interest to contribute resources rather than to “free-ride”, is challenging due to the unique features exhibited by such networks: large populations of anonymous peers interacting infrequently, asymmetric interests of peers, network errors, multiple concurrent transactions, low-cost implementation requirements, etc. In this paper, to address these challenges, we design and rigorously analyze a new family of incentive protocols that utilizes social norms. In the proposed protocols, each peer maintains a reputation reflecting its past behaviors in the P2P system (i.e. whether the peers have followed or not the social strategy prescribed by the social norm), and the social norm rewards and punishes peers depending on their reputations. We first define the concept of a sustainable social norm, under which no peer has an incentive to deviate from the social strategy prescribed by the protocol. We then formulate the problem of designing optimal social norms, which selects the social norm that maximizes the network performance among all sustainable social norms. In particular, we prove that, given the P2P network and peers' characteristics, social norms can be designed such that it becomes in the self-interest of peers to contribute their contents to the network rather than to free-ride. We also investigate the impact of various punishment schemes on the social welfare as well as how should the optimal social norms be designed if altruistic and malicious peers are active in the network. Our results show that optimal social norms are capable of deterring free-riding behaviors and providing significant improvements in the sharing efficiency of multimedia P2P networks.

Forfeiture of Illegal Gains and Implied Risk Preferences

In the law enforcement literature there is a presumption – supported by some experimental and econometric evidence – that criminals are more responsive to increases in the certainty than the severity of punishment. Under a general set of assumptions, this implies that criminals are risk seeking. We show that this implication is no longer valid when forfeiture of illegal gains and the possibility of unsuccessful attempts are considered. Therefore, when drawing inferences concerning offenders’ risk attitudes based on their responses to various punishment schemes, special attention must be paid to whether and to what extent offenders’ illegal gains can be forfeited and whether increases in the probability of punishment affect the probability of attempts being successful. We discuss policy implications related to our observations.

How many lives can bloody and shocking road safety advertising save? The case of Spain

Abstract At the beginning of the 21st century, the punishment strategies used by the Spanish administration were considerably hardened to achieve a reduction in road accidents. This hardening could also be seen in the mass-media public advertising campaigns, with a marked shift from gentle messages to threat-based advertisements. The goal of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of this radical change in terms of main road accident indicators and the time that the effects last using multivariate unobserved component models set up in a state space framework applied to monthly series for the 1980–2008 period. The main conclusion is that the effect on reducing road accidents is no greater when citizens are subjected to a greater level of threats in advertising campaigns than would on average be achieved using campaigns with a low level of threats. Secondly, the impact of bloody advertising in Spain is limited to the most serious accidents, those that cause deaths, either on highways or in built-up areas. Moreover, the positive effects progressively decrease as the average lifespan for significant effects of medium and high level campaigns on deaths on highways or in built-up areas was 8 months and almost 12 days. The results show that a reduction in numbers of deaths and injuries is always achieved when the level of harshness in the messages is increased after a period of several years of mild advertising.

Repeated rational secret sharing, revisited

Rational Secret Sharing Scheme (RSSS) disposes the dilemma that several selfish players come together and willingly pool their shares to reconstruct a secret without a compulsory execution measure, while cooperation is not a strict optimisation. This paper introduces four punishment strategies and expands the perfect conclusions in infinitely repeated RSSS to show that cooperation will recur by means of some strategies. For finitely repeated RSSS, this paper verifies that there is no way for players to cooperate under perfect and complete information for backward induction. To overcome this difficulty, this paper relaxes conditions such as the types of players and the randomised strategies. It is proved that, given the different types and incomplete information, players will insist on cooperation in finitely repeated RSSS. In addition, we discuss repeated games in an extensive form and propose a 2-out-of-2 RSSS.

Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment Among Students and Clerical Workers

We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available.

What’s Love Got to Do with It?

What’s Love Got to Do with It?

Strategies of Cooperation and Punishment Among Students and Clerical Workers

We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.

EFL teachers’ classroom discipline strategies: the students’ perspective

This study investigated Iranian EFL teachers’ classroom discipline strategies from their students’ perspective. One thousand and four-hundred ninety-seven students filled in the classroom discipline strategy questionnaire that assessed their perceptions of the strategies their English teachers used to discipline the classroom. The results showed that Iranian EFL teachers appeared to use recognition/rewarding strategies more often to discipline their classes, while using aggression and punishment were the least common classroom discipline strategies. Female teachers used punishment, discussion, and aggression strategies more in comparison to male teachers. Also, public school teachers used aggression strategy more than those who worked in private schools.

A Behavioral Justification for Escalating Punishment Schemes

The standard two-period law enforcement model is considered in a setting where individuals rarely lose self-control or commit crime without first comparing expected costs and benefits. Where escalating punishment schemes are present, there is an inherent value in keeping a clean criminal record; a person with a record may unintentionally become a repeat offender if he fails to exert self-control, and be punished more severely. If the punishment for repeat offenders is sufficiently high, one may rationally forgo the opportunity of committing a profitable crime today to avoid being sanctioned as a repeat offender in the future. Therefore, partial deterrence can be achieved at a very low cost through the use of escalating penalties, providing a behavioral justification for punishing repeat offenders more severely.

Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations

Terrorist groups repeatedly include operatives of varying commitment and often rely on a common set of security-reducing bureaucratic tools to manage these individuals. This is puzzling in that covert organizations are commonly thought to screen their operatives very carefully and pay a particularly heavy price for record keeping. The authors use terrorist memoirs and the internal correspondence of one particularly prominent group to highlight the organizational challenges terrorist groups face and use a game-theoretic model of moral hazard in a finitely sized organization to explain why record keeping and bureaucracy emerge in these groups. The model provides two novel results. First, in small heterogeneous organizations longer institutional memory can enhance organizational efficiency. Second, such organizations will use worse agents in equilibrium under certain conditions. The core logic is that in small organizations the punishment strategies that allow leaders to extract greater effort are credible only when operatives can identify and react to deviations from the leaders' equilibrium strategy. This dynamic creates incentives for record keeping and means that small organizations will periodically use problematic agents in equilibrium as part of a strategy that optimally motivates their best operatives.