Punishment Rules Research Articles

Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply

A number of articles and studies over the past decade, most by Paul Robinson and co-authors, suggest relationship between the criminal law’s reputation for being just — its — and its ability to gain society’s deference and compliance through variety of mechanisms that enhance its crime-control effectiveness. This has led to proposals to have criminal liability and punishment rules reflect lay intuitions of justice — empirical — as means of enhancing the system's moral credibility. In recent article, Christopher Slobogin and Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein (SBR) report seven sets of studies that, they argue, undermine these claims about desert and moral credibility and instead support their own proposed distributive principle of As this article shows, however, SBR have it essentially backwards: not only do their studies actually confirm the crime-control power of desert, but they provide no support for their own principle of individual prevention. Moreover, that principle, which focuses on an offender’s dangerousness rather than his perceived desert, is erroneously described by SBR as a sort of limiting retributivism. In reality, what SBR propose is system based on dangerousness, where detention decisions are made at the back-end by experts. Such an approach promotes the worst of the failed policies of the 1960s, and conflicts with the modern trend of encouraging more community involvement in criminal punishment, not less.

Criminal Sanctions against Non-state Functionaries Who Accept Bribes and Abuse Public Power

为了惩处非公职人员利用公共权力受贿的行为, 中国刑法反腐败体系先后经历了 以共同犯罪模式处罚到以单独犯罪模式处罚, 以及由司法解释探索处罚规则到由刑法 典直接规定罪刑规范的转变。司法解释格外关注对与公职人员有共同利益关系的非公 职人员的处罚, 利用影响力受贿罪是为解决司法解释产生的刑法真空而设, 但是又出 现了新的法律障碍。利用影响力受贿罪主体的一般化应是今后的完善方向。 关键词: 非公职人员 特定关系人 关系密切人 补漏规则 In order to penalize the acceptance of bribes by non-state functionaries who abuse public power, the anti-corruption system of China’s criminal law has undergone successive transformations: from punishing non-state functionaries who accept bribes in accordance with the joint crime model to punishing them in accordance with the model for a single crime, and from seeking the rules of punishment in judicial interpretations to having the criminal code directly prescribe the criteria for determining a charge. Judicial interpretations have been particularly concerned with the punishment of non-state functionaries who have a relationship of common interests with a state functionary. The crime of accepting bribes given in return for trading in influence was established to solve the problem of the judicial vacuum created by judicial interpretations, but new legal obstacles have emerged. To generalize the class of offenders who accept bribes in return for using their influence is the route future improvement should take.

Brain regions involved in the learning and application of reward rules in a two-deck gambling task

Decision-making involves the ability to choose between competing actions that are associated with uncertain benefits and penalties. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), which mimics real-life decision-making, involves learning a reward–punishment rule over multiple trials. Patients with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) show deficits learning these rules, although this performance deficit is not exclusively associated with VMPFC damage. In this study, we used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to study the roles of prefrontal cortex regions involved in rule learning and rule application in healthy adults using an adapted version of the Iowa Gambling Task. Participants (N=20) were asked to infer rules over series of 16 trials in a two-deck card game. Rewards were given on each trial and punishment was unpredictable. For half of the series, those decks that gave high rewards were also better decks in the long run. For the other half of the series, the decks that gave low rewards were better decks in the long run. Behaviorally, participants started to differentiate between advantageous and disadvantageous decks after approximately four/six trials, and learning occurred faster for high-reward decks. Lateral PFC (lat-PFC) and Anterior Cingulate Coretex (ACC)/pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) were most active for early decisions, whereas medial orbital frontal cortex (med-OFC) was most active for decisions made later in the series. These results suggest that lat-PFC and ACC/pre-SMA are important for directing behavior towards long-term goals, whereas med-OFC represents reward values towards which behavior should be directed.

Consumer Protection - Problems and Prospects

Consumer Protection - Problems and Prospects

대학 운동선수들의 체벌에 관한 연구

The purpose of this study was to construct better satisfactory field culture of elite sports, through reconsider unreasonableness and reasonableness of the athlete`s corporal punishment in the university. For the shake of this study, it was exemplified type & method of actual the athlete`s corporal punishment after make a search for concept & category of corporal punishment. And each opinion of ex-athlete·present athlete & present coach about the athlete`s corporal punishment was reclassified in details topics. Such on the basis of each opinion, necessity`s existence or nonexistence of the athlete`s corporal punishment was diagnosed. As a result, students are need not the corporal punishment because adult; unreasonableness was equaled with the corporal punishment is suitable because partial method of a purified punishment, neutrality opinion that is a necessary evil in the athlete`s life. But it was focused on necessary a means of reinforcement is the corporal punishment that present coaches to achieve purpose of education actually. Therefore, it was discussed fundamental cause and reason of each opinion about the athlete`s corporal punishment synthetically. In conclusion, it was suggested that prepare & publication of rational the corporal punishment rule of coaches, rational the corporal punishment, active concern in relationship of colleagues, insurance of position stability about coaches in the university, etc.

Tacit Collusion with Price Matching Punishments

We re-examine tacit collusion under a simple punishment rule in which firms match any lower price by their rivals, but otherwise leave their prices unchanged. We provide conditions under which this simple rule sustains collusion and is credible. Provided competition is imperfect, collusion can always be sustained, but never to the point of monopoly. Interestingly, the standard ambiguous relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion is unambiguous under this new setting. The relationship to existing theories of price matching guarantees, kinked demand curves, and continuous reaction-function equilibria are explained.

A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games

One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

Rational probation decisions for juvenile delinquents

Assuming a risk of innocent conviction and fully rational individuals, the current study addresses the effects of immediate punishment and probation rules. Strict dominance of a probation rule requires that the judicial system is highly unreliable and, at the same time, learning over criminal careers is strong. Else, an optimal punishment scheme can always be based on either regularly offering probation or appropriate immediate punishments.

Wilfrid Prest. Albion Ascendant: English History, 1660-1815. (The Short Oxford History of the Modem World.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xx, 363. $27.95. ISBN 0-19-820418-3.

Wilfrid Prest. Albion Ascendant: English History, 1660-1815. (The Short Oxford History of the Modem World.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1998. Pp. xx, 363. $27.95. ISBN 0-19-820418-3. - Volume 32 Issue 1

Equilibrium Inflation as Determined by a Policy Committee

Building upon the work of Kydland and Prescott [1977], Barro and Gordon [1983b] developed a model explaining excess, socially suboptimal inflation as the result of a policy game between the monetary authority and wage setters in an economy. In a follow-up paper Barro and Gordon [1983a] modified their original model to achieve a lower inflation rate by allowing the monetary authority to acquire a reputation for good behavior. In essence, this extension models monetary policy as the outcome of an infinitely repeated game between a monetary authority and wage setters. In this game wage setters adopt punishment rules for monetary authority behavior, where bad behavior is an inflation rate higher than expected. This extended model of Barro and Gordon, and hence the conclusions derived from it, is open to several criticisms (see, for example, Canzoneri [1985] and Rogoff [1987]). First, the results hinge on the theory of infinitely repeated games and thus would appear to be of questionable relevance in any economy with finitely lived policy makers. Second, and more fundamentally, it is difficult to accept the description of policy as a game between the monetary authority and wage setters. One can accept that under certain circumstances an individual wage setter would adopt punishment rules of the type Barro and Gordon discussed, if the individual thought all wage setters were doing so. What is left unexplained in the Barro and Gordon analysis is how or why each individual wage setter, when left alone, would think and act in such a manner. It would seem that some formal coordination among wage setters would be needed to establish punishment rules, which suggests a limited applicability of the model to countries with a dominant union or with an aggregate wage-setting authority. (Of course, this criticism is relevant to other papers in this literature: for example, Backus and Driffill [1985] and aspects of Canzoneri [1985].) The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how these criticisms can be voided and how the Barro and Gordon [1983a] results can be rehabilitated by modeling monetary policy more realistically

Distribution of the cost of maintaining common resources

In an experiment simulating management of a common forest, members of four-person groups planted seedlings and harvested trees as they grew. Half of the 36 groups was assigned the equality rule according to which costs for planting seedlings were equally assigned to all members, and the other half was assigned the punishment rule according to which costs were assigned only to the member who harvested the largest number of trees. This rule factor was crossed with the voting factor (voting vs. no-voting). In the voting condition, group members could vote during the latter half of the experiment for one of the above two rules. It was predicted that equality-assigned groups would experience the devastating consequences of defective actions so that they would vote for the punishment rule more than would punishment-assigned groups which would not experience such devastating consequences. Results for the experiment supported this prediction. Results also indicated that adoption of the punishment rule improved post-voting profits of equality-assigned groups.

An Introduction to Hindu Jurisprudence

This article intends to be introductory to other more specific studies and, to that end, briefly surveys Hindu jurisprudential theory. It seeks an orientation, recalls the development of Hindu legal institutions, and examines schools of jurisprudence in ancient India. It turns to an analysis of ancient Hindu thought on common jurisprudential issues (the state, law and the rule of law, punishment and procedure) and finally attempts to reveal something of modern Hindu jurisprudence's growth, richness, and diversity and its similarity to our own. (1) An Orientation. The practice has become prevalent in American academic writing to set off East and West as opposites. It is said that the West places its reliance on reason and the scientific method; the East, on supersensory experience and intuition.' This tends to emphasize, to borrow F. S. C. Northrop's phrase, ideological differences.2 Even if a writer concludes that natural law is at the foundation of both Eastern and Western legal orders he still treats them as different-one known by immediate apprehension, and the other known postulationally.3 This leads to the conclusion that attempts to combine Oriental and Occidental economic, political, aesthetic, and religious values end in failure.4

Tibetan Folk-law

Tibetans inhabit three major regions, Tibet proper, Khams, and A-mdo. Tibet is the region so marked on the maps; Khams is the province marked as Sikang; A-mdo does not exist as a political entity, but is divided into a number of Hsien (counties) in the north-western part of Szechwan, the south-western part of Kansu, and the area inhabited by Tibetans in Ts'inghai or Kokonor. My four years' field experience of Tibetan culture was in A-mdo on the Kansu-Ts'inghai border. My study of Tibetan folk-law, therefore, is based on conditions in A-mdo. The appended translation of “Rules of Punishment for Tibetans” (promulgated by the Manchu Imperial Court in 1733) applies mainly to Tibetans in A-mdo and secondarily to those in Tibet and Khams.