Public Service Agreements Research Articles

Union recognition and union security

PurposeUnion membership has declined in many countries reducing union capacity to bargain and contribute to economic equality. This paper aims to explore a more hopeful case in an Australian state, where the dramatic anti-union strategies of conservative governments have been reversed by Labor governments.Design/methodology/approachThe research frames union recognition and union security in an international context, highlighting differences between US, Canadian, UK and Australian approaches. The research focuses on the Australian state of Queensland, providing an historical account of changes to union recognition and union preference provisions, drawing on legislation, major public service agreements, newspapers and parliamentary transcripts.FindingsConservative governments in Australia have implemented anti-union strategies, and Labor governments have often failed to restore union-friendly provisions when re-elected. In contrast, the Queensland study demonstrates a substantial restoration of union security provisions when Labor governments are re-elected, rebuilding political capital with unions and potentially supporting union membership. This difference is due to unique political and institutional factors that provide governments with unfettered powers to legislate their industrial relations agenda, whether in support or otherwise of unions, and has led to the more distinctive pendulum swings to the right and left than occurred elsewhere in Australia.Originality/valueThe research contributes to debates about the factors related to declining union membership and highlights a case where unions have achieved restoration of many provisions that increase their influence and potentially their membership.

Budgeting and governing for deficit reduction in the UK public sector: act three ‘accountability and audit arrangements’

This paper explains how the UK central government has changed accountability and audit arrangements for local government in England, while retaining its approach to setting annual budgets within the context of multi-year spending reviews. It highlights how dismantling the institutions and processes that monitored outputs and outcomes for spending, such as public service agreements and comprehensive area assessment, meant that top-down accountability became focused overwhelmingly on financial conformance rather than organizational performance for local government. Supplementary reforms to increase the transparency or ‘visibility’ of public administration, and thereby enable greater bottom-up accountability, have resulted in a performance assessment system that is neither rigorous nor standardized. The overall result is a weakening of local accountability arrangements.

Reducing emergency bed-days for older people? Network governance lessons from the ‘Improving the Future for Older People’ programme

In 2007, the UK government set performance targets and public service agreements to control the escalation of emergency bed-days. Some years earlier, nine English local authorities had each created local networks with their health and third sector partners to tackle this increase. These networks formed the ‘Improving the Future for Older People' initiative (IFOP), one strand of the national ‘Innovation Forum’ programme, set up in 2003. The nine sites set themselves one headline target to be achieved jointly over three years; a 20 per cent reduction in the number of emergency bed-days used by people aged 75 and over. Three ancillary targets were also monitored: emergency admissions, delayed discharges and project sustainability. Collectively the sites exceeded their headline target.Using a realistic evaluation approach, we explored which aspects of network governance appeared to have contributed to these emergency bed-day reductions. We found no simple link between network governance type and outcomes. The governance features associated with an effective IFOP network appeared to suggest that the selection and implementation of a small number of evidence-based services was central to networks' effectiveness. Each service needed to be coordinated by a network-based strategic group and hierarchically implemented at operational level by the responsible network member. Having a network-based implementation group with a ‘joined-at-the-top’ governance structure also appeared to promote network effectiveness. External factors, including NHS incentives, health reorganisations and financial targets similarly contributed to differences in performance.Targets and financial incentives could focus action but undermine horizontal networking. Local networks should specify which interventions network structures are intended to deliver. Effective projects are those likely to be evidence based, unique to the network and difficult to implement through vertical structures alone.

‘Building the Global Network?’ The Reform of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under New Labour

From 1997 onwards the FCO was reshaped by New Labour. The removal of responsibility for overseas aid to a new Department of International Development (DFID) was perhaps the most dramatic change. Successive cuts to the FCO budget and the progressive centralization of foreign-policy decision-making in Number 10 also had their effects, as did a series of government-directed reforms to recruitment practices. In an effort to make it more accountable to the public, the FCO was also bound by Public Service Agreements specifying targets for service delivery, publish Strategy Reports and mission statements, and Annual Departmental Reports setting benchmarks for performance. Together these reforms were designed to transform the FCO's culture, replacing inherited traditions of thought and practice with new ones believed better suited to contemporary world politics. This paper examines these inherited and new traditions, as well as the dilemmas they addressed.

Alcohol Misuse Y91 Coding in ICD-11: Rational Terminology and Logical Coding Specifically to Encourage Early Identification and Advice

Alcohol misuse is a common presentation to the Emergency Department (ED). The International Classification of Diseases ICD-10 for alcohol misuse, both under F10 and Y90/Y91, is not straightforward. The practicalities of coding ED attendances reveal an increasing detachment from ICD-10 (currently under review). Early identification [sometimes using blood alcohol concentrations (BACs)] and brief advice (IBA) can reduce unscheduled alcohol-related ED re-attendance. The UK Government Department of Health has implemented use of the terms 'Hazardous Drinking', 'Harmful Drinking' and 'Dependent Drinking' in its Public Service Agreements aimed at reducing harm by alcohol. Simplifying coding might increase IBA usage. We suggest that coding improvements in ICD-11 should update Y91 (currently 'clinical assessment')-with ICD-10 Y90 remaining for BAC to classify a patient's 'alcohol status'. Y90 and Y91 together would indicate the urgency for early IBA and/or speciality referral, aiming to reduce the prevalence of 'Dependent Drinking'.

Performance Measurement in the Public Sector in England: Searching for the Golden Thread

Despite the significant volume of studies on public sector performance measurement, a paucity of empirical research describes in detail the systems and processes used at different levels of government to measure and manage performance. This study focuses on the experience of Public Service Agreements in the public sector in England. In particular, the impact of a centralized, performance measurement-driven approach on public service delivery is analyzed using case studies in a health care and a police organization. Despite efforts to introduce a “golden thread” to link different levels of the public sector hierarchy, in both cases, there was relatively low consistency in terms of performance indicators, targets, and priorities. Significant implications are evident for the design and role of performance targets and indicators, for the possibility to align frameworks at different levels of the public sector, and for the importance of feedback loops in measurement systems.

The State of UK Governance

This article has two elements. The first relates a real current experience in civil service life and discusses the `way it was' on a certain date — 11 June 2008 — with reflections on the structure of departmental Whitehall and Cabinet Government under Gordon Brown's premiership; and on the key role of Public Service Agreements in the way the civil service works now. The second considers what this perceived reality tells us about some current theorizing about `networks' and governance while insisting on the centrality of the observable fact and the parliamentary context as one such `fact'.

Performance budgeting in the United Kingdom

This article discusses the United Kingdom framework for performance budgeting and management and its evolution from 1998 onwards, primarily focused on the period 1998-2007. Public service agreements (PSAs) have moved away from inputs and processes to a focus on the outcomes that matter to public service users.

The unpredictability of favourability: condition assessment and protected areas in England

The probability that protected areas will deliver their potential for maintaining or enhancing biodiversity is likely to be maximised if they are appropriately and effectively managed. As a result, governments and conservation agencies are devoting much attention to the management of protected areas. In the U.K., the demand for performance accountability has resulted in Public Service Agreements (PSA) that set out targets for government departments to deliver results in return for investments being made. One such target for England is to ensure that all nationally important wildlife sites are in favourable condition by 2010. Here, we tested the hypothesis, of potential strategic importance, that the ecological condition of these sites is predictable from relationships with a range of physical, environmental and demographic variables. We used binary logistic regression to investigate these relationships, using the results of English Nature’s 1997–2003 condition assessment exercise. Generally, sites in unfavourable condition tend to be larger in area, located at higher elevations, but with higher human population density and are more spatially isolated from units of the same habitat. However, despite the range of different parameters included in our models, the extent to which the condition of any given site could be predicted was low. Our results have implications for the delivery of PSA targets, funding allocation, and the location of new protected areas.

WHO OR WHAT SETS THE AGENDA?

Based on a case study of the implementation of England's Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) – a funding stream which allowed local authorities to target approximately £1.5 billion at pressing social problems – this article considers the relative importance of internal and external forces on the agenda setting process. Our data suggests that despite the coincidence of events which put rural issues firmly on the media and public agendas in 2000–2003, in the low profile and arcane world of LPSAs, agenda setting was heavily influenced by the technical criteria negotiated between central and local government officials.

The spaces of modernisation: Outcomes, indicators and the local government modernisation agenda

The modernisation of local government has attempted to reinvent central–local government relations by offering freedoms and flexibilities to facilitate the governance of local issues. At the same time, a shift to outcome focussed targets as a new form of governmental rationality allows central government to delimit these opportunities. Drawing on aspects of governmentality and actor-network theory, the paper explores the tensions between these modes of government. It argues that outcome focussed targets circumscribe the limits of local governance by offering a despatialised technology of government. Using a case study of Local Public Service Agreements, the paper highlights the problems 10 English rural local authorities have experienced in their attempts to construct and negotiate a series of local policy targets with central government. The paper shows how the spatial limitations of statistical governance conspire against the construction of targets which reflect local policy priorities. In conclusion we consider the extent to which these limitations are a deliberate act of control and consider the implications for agency within networks of governmentality.

The UK Parliament and performance

Many governments across OECD countries now produce substantial amounts of performance information. This movement has increasingly become known variously as output- or outcome-based budgeting or governance. This article focuses on the important question of how legislatures are responding to this development. Using the case of the UK's public performance measurement systems — especially since 1997 and the introduction of Public Service Agreements — it examines the UK Parliament's response to this change. It poses the question: to what extent has Parliament used this new resource to challenge the executive arm of government or has been challenged itself to adapt its own role and activities to this new regime? From a detailed analysis of the conduct of parliamentary Select Committees and a survey of Select Committee members we find that Parliament itself has been more challenged by performance reporting than challenging of the executive, despite attempts by Parliament itself to institutionalize performance scrutiny. The article concludes with a discussion of how far legislative scrutiny, and even perhaps co-steering, of performance is feasible or desirable.

Improving service delivery performance in the United Kingdom: Organization theory perspectives on central intervention strategies

A noteworthy example of public sector performance management was launched by the UK's Labour government in 1997. Starting in 1998, departments established a central capacity to deal with “public service agreements” negotiated with Treasury and the performance of frontline units in its domain. In 2001 the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU) was established to work on prime ministerial priorities involving 21 targets in four departments. This paper examines the role of central government in contributing to performance improvement where actual performance is delivered by dispersed subunits. It seeks to identify techniques the central government uses for performance management, and asks whether these techniques appear likely to have positive effects on performance. It develops a framework using concepts from organization theory and uses it to evaluate the activities and effectiveness of the PMDU in influencing frontline service delivery.

Organization Design and Frontline Service Improvement in Government: The Case of Performance Targets in the United Kingdom

Over the last decade there has been a dramatic expansion in use of performance measurement and performance management in government - using measures as a tool to improve performance along dimensions measured. Using this potentially powerful tool to try to remedy underperformance in government, the Labour government in the United Kingdom has since 1997 engaged in a particularly ambitious example of public-sector performance management. Departments negotiate public service agreements with the Treasury (the budget ministry) in conjunction with budget settlements. These are quasi-contracts where departments agree to produce a level of performance in exchange for resources. Performance levels, called targets, are a combination of a quantitative indicator of performance combined with a specified level of required attainment. Examples have included improvements in surgical wait times, student test scores, and commuter rail punctuality. The subject of this paper is the role of central government (headquarters) in contributing to performance improvement where actual performance is delivered by these dispersed subunits. This study examines the role of central institutions in (for example) improving police performance, delivered by frontline police forces, but not in their role in improving agency environmental regulations, which is delivered by central government itself.

Stretched to the limit? The impact of Local Public Service Agreements on service improvement and central – local relations

Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) are one of a number of policy instruments introduced by New Labour to facilitate service improvement in local government. Situating LPSAs in debates about central – local relationships, this paper examines their impact to date. It compares the expectations of LPSAs amongst central and local stakeholders, delineates the experiences of each in attempting to work in a new way, identifies those aspects of the LPSA process which ‘worked’ and those which did not, considers evidence of impact and identifies implications for future policy and practice. The paper concludes that LPSAs have led to improvements in the systems and processes of local government, contributed to local partnership working and stimulated limited changes in central – local government relations. Early data indicate that LPSAs have had some impact on service improvement but there remain important questions about sustainability.

Setting Public Service Outcome Targets: Lessons from Local Public Service Agreements

Public agencies in the UK and elsewhere are increasingly required to set outcome targets as a strategy for improving their services. A crucial element of this ‘results orientation’ is a clear definition of the desired outcomes and a specification of appropriate performance indicators. A recent example of this policy in the UK—Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs)—is examined in this article. The authors’ analysis of the first generation of LPSAs shows that just under half of the indicators used were measures of outcome. The authors explain the ‘wicked’ issues in outcome measurement that emerged from the research.

Setting Public Service Outcome Targets: Lessons from Local Public Service Agreements

Public agencies in the UK and elsewhere are increasingly required to set outcome targets as a strategy for improving their services. A crucial element of this 'results orientation' is a clear definition of the desired outcomes and a specification of appropriate performance indicators. A recent example of this policy in the UK - Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) - is examined in this article. The authors' analysis of the first generation of LPSAs shows that just under half of the indicators used were measures of outcome. The authors explain the 'wicked' issues in outcome measurement that emerged from the research.

Local Public Service Agreements and Performance Incentives for Local Government

This paper provides an overview of Local Public Service Agreements (LPSAs) as they have developed in the UK. The LPSA is a scheme in which a local authority commits itself to achieving a range of demanding targets, agreed with central government, that reflect national and local priorities. An important purpose is to force improvement by ‘stretching’ performance beyond the norm, with additional financial rewards and additional freedoms being made available to successful authorities. The background, context and policy objectives associated with the introduction of LPSAs are reviewed, and the basis of LPSA agreements and the freedoms and flexibilities that accompany them described. Piloting and the wider rolling out of LPSAs in both the first and second generations are considered in the light of the experiences of two very different authorities: Kent County Council and the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. Reactions to the LPSA process at the local and national levels are assessed in relation to the high expectations placed upon this new programme.

Competency, Bureaucracy, and Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis

Competency can be considered a central theme in contemporary public service reforms. This article analyzes the development of competency frameworks for senior public servants at the national–government level in three countries (the U.S., the U.K., and Germany). By tracing the development of competency as an idea, it is shown that competency reforms drew selectively on management ideas, and by tracing the nature and time‐patterns of competency reform developments in the three countries, it is shown that competency came onto the reform agenda at different times and by various routes rather than by a simple pattern of international policy transfer or business‐to‐government transfer. It is argued that the adoption of competency frameworks took place at critical junctures for preexisting public service bargains or agreements in each case and that they were shaped by the particularities of institutional context. However, although competency is arguably central to public service reform, it is far from clear that the competency frameworks in these three cases contributed to the declared aims of many contemporary public service reformers.

The UK Core Executive's Use of Public Service Agreements as a Tool of Governance

The contemporary literature on governance notes the difficulties that core executives, central points for steering and co‐ordinating public activity, have in undertaking this strategic function. The UK core executive, particularly the Treasury, has developed a regime of Public Service Agreements (PSAs) as a novel and ambitious tool of governance, particularly for public services. The tool incorporates improved priority setting, information about performance, and incentive effects for ministers and officials through a system of performance targets. However, systems for setting priorities are fragmented and include those focused on the Prime Minister's Office and Cabinet Office. Monitoring has been improved, although measures often provide a limited, or sometimes even potentially misleading, impression of progress towards valued goals. The direct incentive effects of PSAs appear to be weak. While the link between the system and the allocation of expenditure has engaged the interest of departments in discussing priorities, ministerial and other officials’ responsibility for performance has been limited. Targets have increasingly been seen as by ministers as minimum pledges of performance rather than tools for stretching and improving performance. Various forms of blame avoidance and blame shifting have occurred and the credibility of the PSA system is in danger of being undermined by frequent changes to targets and misrepresentation of performance in some areas.