The UK Parliament and performance

Abstract

Many governments across OECD countries now produce substantial amounts of performance information. This movement has increasingly become known variously as output- or outcome-based budgeting or governance. This article focuses on the important question of how legislatures are responding to this development. Using the case of the UK's public performance measurement systems — especially since 1997 and the introduction of Public Service Agreements — it examines the UK Parliament's response to this change. It poses the question: to what extent has Parliament used this new resource to challenge the executive arm of government or has been challenged itself to adapt its own role and activities to this new regime? From a detailed analysis of the conduct of parliamentary Select Committees and a survey of Select Committee members we find that Parliament itself has been more challenged by performance reporting than challenging of the executive, despite attempts by Parliament itself to institutionalize performance scrutiny. The article concludes with a discussion of how far legislative scrutiny, and even perhaps co-steering, of performance is feasible or desirable.