Public Opinion Scholars Research Articles

Black Opinion on the Legitimacy of Racial Redistricting and Minority-Majority Districts

Minority–majority districts are highly controversial. To assess the degree to which black positions on this controversial matter were well-thought-out and fixed, questions based on Sniderman and Piazza's (1993) “counterargument” technique were included in the 1996 National Black Election Study. Black opinion instability on the issue of race and redistricting reveals the complexity of mass attitudes and the reasoning process and reflects the manner in which a set of clashing interests and core values is balanced and prioritized. Although a large majority of blacks voiced initial opposition to creating districts where blacks and Hispanics are the voting majority, most blacks changed their position in response to the counterargument. This asymmetry suggests that blacks more strongly favor the goal of increasing minority representation than the principle of color blindness in Congressional redistricting. Education and racial identification are key predictors of black opinion on racial redistricting. Less educated blacks and weak racial identifiers were less supportive of minority-majority districts and racial redistricting practices. These results support the revisionist perspective among public opinion scholars that rational, thinking individuals can hold wavering opinions upon questioning because they generally encapsulate a set of contradictory values and interests.The research reported in this paper was funded by grants to the author from the National Science Foundation POWRE Program (SBR-9743928) and from the National Science Foundation's Political Science Division (SBR-9796212). An earlier version was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, August 31–September 3, 2000. The author thanks Luis Fraga at Stanford University for his comments as the panel's discussant, as well as the APSR Editor, Lee Sigelman, and reviewers for their contributions to this paper. I also thank Bruce Boyd at Computing Services at UCI and Gary King at Harvard University for their technical assistance.

The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon

Despite the massive attention heaped on the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon by public opinion scholars, relatively little attention has been paid to its constituent elements. Yet, recent research has found that different groups of Americans respond differently to presidents’ activities according to their interests and attentiveness. In this study, I disaggregate public opinion along two dimensions: political party and political sophistication. I argue that in responding to high-profile presidential activities abroad, different groups of Americans weigh various individual, contextual, and situational factors differently. I investigate all major U.S. uses of force between 1953 and 1998 and find that the propensity of different groups to rally does indeed vary according to individual and environmental circumstances. To explain these differences, I employ two models of public opinion. The first emphasizes the importance of threshold effects in explaining opinion change. That is, individuals who are closest to the point of ambivalence between approval and disapproval are most likely to change their opinion in response to external circumstances. The second emphasizes both the propensities of different types of individuals to be exposed to a given piece of information, and their susceptibility to having their opinion influenced by any additional information. My results offer a more nuanced picture of the nature and extent of the rally phenomenon than has been available in previous studies. My findings also hold important implications for other related scholarly debates, such as whether, and under what circumstances, the use of force can successfully divert public attention from a president’s domestic political difficulties.

A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies By Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 398p. $59.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.

Scholars of media and public opinion in Western Europe and the United States will find plenty of useful information and much to argue about in A Virtuous Circle. The data are rich and broad, and the conclusions drawn are provocative and relevant to some of the major debates in the field. The central question addressed is whether the news media discourages political engagement.

International Crises and Public Support for President Clinton United Nations’ Arms Inspection in Iraq

Since the publication of John Mueller’s Wars, Presidents and Public Opinion (1973) scholars have been alert to the possibility that international crises, irrespective of the wisdom of the policies from which they arise, can increase public support for the president of the United States.Mueller based his explanation, of the so-called “rally” phenomenon, on a patriotic public reaction to threats to a nation’s safety. In Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion and Public Support (1991) Brody and Shapiro challenge Mueller’s patriotism hypothesis. Their data suggest that rallies appear if (and only if) opposition elites do not openly and actively criticise the policies, which gave rise to the crisis. Three ingredients are necessary and sufficient to produce a rally: (1) A presidential monopoly of the interpretation of the meaning of the events and the actions required to end the crisis; (2) A silent or supportive political elite; (3) News media that abjure independent policy criticism which, instead, depend entirely upon political elites to provide policy opposition. The second and third ingredients produce the president’s interpretive monopoly. Faced with but one interpretation of the events and the actions, to which they give rise, the public has no basis for withholding its support. Foreign affairs are inherently ambiguous to most of the American public and without good reason to question the wisdom of foreign policy, the benefit of the doubt goes to the president.This paper will examine the usefulness of the Brody-Shapiro hypotheses in helping us understand the media, elite and public responses to the crisis that followed Iraq’s attempt to limit the United Nations. inspection of its arms production facilities in February 1998.

Congress, the press, and the public

This work aims to explore how the media presents Congress to the American public and how, in turn, the public perceives Congress. The book examines how the growing public hostility towards Congress may be caused by the way Congress is presented to and interpreted for the public via the press. Public opinion scholars analyze historical data to discern trends in and sources of public hostility towards Congress. Media specialists examine patterns of congressional coverage in national print and television news and attitudes towards Congress among producers, editors and reporters. And students of Congress explore the tools and techniques leaders and rank-and-file members use in presenting themselves and their institution to the public. The book concludes by assessing the role the media plays in presenting Congress to the public and what the media and Congress might do to improve public understanding.

Why voters fail information tests: Can the hurdles be overcome?

Renowned public opinion scholars have provided solid evidence that average voters generally make rational political choices. If this is correct, why have most recent studies that measured voter knowledge and learning of current information yielded appallingly low scores? The essay sheds light on this intriguing puzzle by showing that current tests of voter knowledge, which focus on rote memorization of names and factual details, underrate voters' election IQ. Moreover, knowledge scores could rise sharply if the mass media information supply were better tailored to the average voter's information needs. Major problems in the election information supply are an overemphasis on isolated facts and inappropriate message framing when it comes to the substance and format of news stories. Furthermore, many election stories are repetitive and uninteresting to voters. The general public's response to the “new” media presentations, which became popular during the 1992 presidential campaign, shows that it is possible to make election news more attractive and informative for today's audiences.

Reading Between the Lines of Consumer Confidence Measures

Public opinion data about consumer buying intentions have proven to be reliable indicators of future economic trends. This demonstrates the advisability of including well-informed public opinion data in public policy planning. This introduction and the three essays that follow are based on a panel on Taking the Pulse of the Economy: A Fresh Look at Economic Indicators, which was presented at the 1981 Annual AAPOR Conference. Doris A. Graber is Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 46:336-339 ? 1982 by the Trustees of Columbia University Published by Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 0033-362Xl8210046-336l$2.50 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.129 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 06:20:30 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 337 CONSUMER CONFIDENCE MEASURES people's willingness and ability to formulate sound opinions about difficult economic issues when they have been unwilling to give much thought to other areas. Above all, most people feel that they have no choice in the matter: they must form opinions about the state and prospects of the economy because they need to make important economic decisions. They believe that these decisions involve their personal economic security very immediately and directly because major economic investments must be financed through depleting savings or by borrowing against future earnings. A decision to buy a house, a car, or major appliances and furniture is risky and must be carefully considered. It requires complex calculations about personal income trends, job security, and the prospects for inflation and interest rates. It involves appraising the current state of the economy, comparing it to past conditions, and projecting future trends for several years ahead. These are difficult calculations, yet many people learn to do them well because they have had repeated experience with financial decision making. By contrast, the pressure to make political decisions is less compelling and their direct impact on personal life is less clear. Many people are therefore unwilling to make the effort that well-informed decision making requires. Nonetheless, the fact that people do make well-reasoned financial decisions permits a guarded optimism about their capacity for other complex appraisals if there is sufficient motivation and frequent occasion to practice the decision-making art. A look at the impact of opinions about the economy also provides rare gratification for scholars of public opinion, who frequently find it difficult to demonstrate linkages between opinion and behavior. Judging from the evidence presented below, large numbers of people do act in accordance with their appraisals of economic conditions. Economists agree, for instance, that consumer behavior was strongly affected during the 1970s by attitudes of mistrust. Consumers lost confidence in the ability of the government to solve economic problems; they came to believe that inflation and unemployment are permanent afflictions which vary only in degree of severity; and they lost the long-standing belief that living standards could always be expected to rise. The actions taken in conformance with these beliefs had a major impact on the American economy. In fact, in the past 30 years, whenever consumers feared a recession and therefore refused to buy cars and other durables, the economy has gone into a tailspin. When the times seemed propitious for buying and investing, an economic upturn has followed. Consumer expectations have been advance indicators of future happenings because they have foreshadowed by three This content downloaded from 207.46.13.129 on Mon, 27 Jun 2016 06:20:30 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms