Public Debt Contracts Research Articles

Price Uncertainty and Debt Covenants: Evidence from U.S. Oil Producers

Abstract We use an exogenous, forward-looking measure of price uncertainty to examine the effect of uncertainty on the use of covenants in private and public debt contracts. The effect of uncertainty differs significantly in loans versus bonds, suggesting that private and public lenders face different incentives when contracting under high uncertainty. In loans, uncertainty increases the use of performance-based covenants. In contrast, covenant usage decreases in bonds, but firms with low agency conflicts mainly drive this effect. However, bondholders require higher spreads to offset the lack of protection with fewer covenants. Hedging does not affect the covenant-uncertainty relationship for debt contracts. (JEL: G21, G23, G32, D82, D81)

Corporate Bankruptcy and Directors’ Reputation: An Empirical Analysis of the Effects on Public Debt Contracts

This article investigates the link between board members’ past professional experiences and the terms and conditions of the debt contracts of their current firms. In particular, we examine whether directors’ past bankruptcy experience affects the pricing and nonpricing terms of public debt contracts. Using a sample of 8,142 bond issues in the United States in the period 1995 to 2015, we document higher credit spreads and smaller bond sizes for firms with such directors, suggesting that bondholders are concerned about past bankruptcy experience. Our results remain robust to different model specifications. This effect is moderated for bankruptcies that are likely driven by macroeconomic shocks such as the dotcom bubble and the global financial crisis. We also show that our findings are not explained by bond issuers with an elevated risk of default and seem instead to be driven by directors serving on key monitoring committees, indicating that prior bankruptcy experience raises concerns about the company’s corporate governance. Finally, mediation analysis offers some evidence of a limited negative indirect effect of prior bankruptcy experience on the terms of debt contracts through the firm’s financial and investment policies. Overall, our findings suggest that lenders incorporate information about past professional experiences of directors into public debt contracting.

The Rise of Covenant-Lite Bond Contracting

We investigate the trading and yield effects of covenant-lite (cov-lite) high-yield bond contracts, which have a restricted (lite) set of covenants. The excluded covenants often are those that use accounting performance measures. Although much research has focused on the potential benefits of accounting as a basis for debt contracting, little is known about settings where it may be optimal to exclude accounting performance statistics from public debt contracts. We find that cov-lite high-yield bonds have a higher trading turnover and lower yield spreads. Our findings provide empirical support for theory, which predicts, for optimal bond covenant design, that a trade-off between improving trading ease versus enhanced investor protection needs to be managed. These results enhance our understanding of the limits of accounting’s role in (bond) contracting design.

Customer concentration types and public debt contracts

PurposeThis paper aims to examine how a firm’s customer concentration, which is the amount of sales between a supplier firm and the major customers, affects corporate bond contracts. This study also investigates how the types of customer concentration have a significant impact on bond contracts.Design/methodology/approachThe research uses the Compustat’s segment customer database and the Mergent fixed income securities database, which provides details about publicly offered US bond issues and issuers. The sample also includes the US Congressional committees’ data from the 96th to 115th congresses. To control any endogenous concerns, the author uses changes in the seniority of US senators on powerful committees and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) as exogenous shocks. For a robustness test, the author also uses the propensity score-matched pairs.FindingsWhile higher customer concentration, on average, leads to higher yield spreads and strict covenants, firms that have the US Government as a major customer pay lower yield spreads and have higher issue ratings. However, as a firm’s sales depend too heavily on the US Government customer channel, the bond issuance is likely to have lower issue ratings. The main findings also show that firms with government concentrations take advantage of political links, leading to lower yield spreads after two exogenous events.Originality/valueThe findings in this paper show the importance of a firm’s customer types in bond markets by emphasizing the positive impact of the US Government as the sales channel. Exogenous event studies based on the propensity-matched sample alleviate the endogenous concerns.

The effect of timely loss recognition and accrual quality on corporate bond spread: The influence of legal and financial institutions

We use a unique dataset of 11,497 corporate bonds issued by firms operating in 56 countries. The objective of the paper is to study the effect of timely loss recognition and accrual discretion on the design of public debt contracts in international bond markets, especially that previous research had more focus on bank loans rather than bonds. The paper provides an alternative explanation to prior literature for the relevance of timely loss recognition to the bond market, and clarifies more the role of accrual quality in debt contracting. We utilize our international sample to capture variations in the main analysis with respect to the legal enforcement in which the issuer firm operates, or the financial development of the market of issue. We find evidence that timely loss recognition is counterproductive with bond issuances, whereas accrual quality has a strong favorable impact on bond spread. The relevance of accounting choices to bond markets changes with the level of a country’s law enforcement and a market’s financial development. The paper encourages researchers to come up with different explanations for the influence of accounting choice on different types of debt contracts. It also highlights the role played by institutions to mitigate the effects.

Price Uncertainty and Debt Covenants

I use a forward-looking and exogenous measure of price uncertainty to examine the causative effect of uncertainty on the choice and use of financial covenants in private and public debt contracts, as well as the role that risk management and financial frictions play in that relationship. In private loans, high uncertainty leads to more and tighter financial covenants linked to performance. Risk management attenuates the effect of uncertainty on the inclusion of financial covenants while firms characteristics especially related to default risk intensify the effect. In bond contracts, uncertainty decreases the use of financial covenants for firms that have financial covenants in an existing private loan at the time the bond is issued. These results are consistent with the theory that financial covenants help lenders economize on monitoring costs and suggest that bondholders economize on monitoring costs by free-riding on the monitoring efforts of private lenders.

Conditional conservatism and the yield spread of corporate bond issues

Building upon recent research which indicates that debt markets rather than equity markets shape financial reporting, this study examines how conditionally conservative financial reporting relates to the yield spread of corporate bond issues. Our findings suggest that the debt contract efficiency/information costs view of conditional conservatism, documented in private debt contracts, does not generalize to public debt contracts. Instead, a debt contract renegotiation costs perspective seems to better capture the dynamics of the public debt markets, with conditionally conservative reporting being associated with higher yield spread of corporate bond issues. Additional subsample test results indicate that the association between conditional conservatism and bond yield spreads is more pronounced in non-investment grade bonds, for bond issuers with more financial distress, and for bonds that are issued before the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. This study fills a gap in the conservatism literature, which focuses primarily on equity or private bank loan markets with traditional debt contract efficiency/information costs view.

Evidence on the determinants and economic consequences of delegated monitoring

We investigate delegated monitoring by examining the determinants and effects of including cross-acceleration provisions in public debt contracts. We find that cross-acceleration provision use depends on borrowers' going concern relative to liquidation values, debt repayment structures, credit quality, and financial reporting quality. This suggests that the use of cross-acceleration provisions increases when the costs of cascading defaults are lower, the conflicts between creditor classes are higher, and the benefits of delegating monitoring to banks are higher. We also find a lower interest rate on public debt contracts with cross-acceleration provisions, but the rate reduction depends on borrowers' financial reporting quality.

Evidence on the Determinants and Economic Consequences of Delegated Monitoring

We investigate delegated monitoring by examining the determinants and effects of including cross-acceleration provisions in public debt contracts. We find that cross-acceleration provision use depends on borrowers’ going concern relative to liquidation values, debt repayment structures, credit quality, and financial reporting quality. This suggests that the use of cross-acceleration provisions increases when the costs of cascading defaults are lower, the conflicts between creditor classes are higher, and the benefits of delegating monitoring to banks are higher. We also find a lower interest rate on public debt contracts with cross-acceleration provisions, but the rate reduction depends on borrowers’ financial reporting quality.

Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism

ABSTRACTUsing a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings. Covenants govern the transfer of decision‐making and control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a company approaches financial distress and thereby limit managers’ abilities to expropriate bondholder wealth. Covenants are expected to constrain managerial opportunism, however, only if the accounting system recognizes economic losses in earnings in a timely fashion. Thus, the demand for timely loss recognition should increase with a contract's reliance on covenants. Consistent with this conjecture, I find evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss recognition. I also find evidence that the presence of prior private debt mitigates this relationship.

Financial Reporting Quality and Corporate Bond Issue

Building upon recent research which indicates that debt markets rather than equity markets shape financial reporting, this study examines how conditionally conservative financial reporting relates to the yield spread of corporate bond issues. Our findings suggest that the debt contract efficiency/information costs view of conditional conservatism, documented in private debt contracts, does not generalize to public debt contracts. Instead, a debt contract renegotiation costs perspective seems to better capture the dynamics of the public debt markets, with conditionally conservative reporting being associated with higher yield spread of corporate bond issues. Additional subsample test results indicate that the association between conditional conservatism and bond yield spreads is more pronounced in non-investment grade bonds, for bond issuers with more financial distress, and for bonds that are issued before the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. This study fills a gap in the conservatism literature, which focuses primarily on equity or private bank loan markets with traditional debt contract efficiency/information costs view.

Financial covenants in the markets for public and private debt

AbstractThe public debt contracts surveyed in Whittred and Zimmer (1986) and Stokes and Tay (1988) were issued between 1962 and 1985, and there has been significant macroeconomic, institutional and regulatory change since that time. We analyse a sample of 36 recently issued Australian public debt contracts and document a considerable change in the ‘package’ of financial covenants used in public debt contracts. The covenant package is now less restrictive and the types of covenants used are more heterogenous. We also survey a sample of 41 recent Australian private debt contracts. These contracts contain a greater number, variety and, collectively, more restrictive set of financial covenants than those public debt contracts we survey, supporting theory which suggests that covenant restrictive and renegotiation–flexible contracts are more suited to borrowers contracting with financial intermediaries in private debt markets. We also note differences in accounting rules associated with financial covenants used in these private debt contracts.

The Changing Role of Accounting Numbers in Public Lending Agreements

The use of accounting number in loan agreement is an important part of the demand for accounting information. We examine new public debt contrast from three time periods to investigate the changing role of accounting number of public lending agreements, nothing a dramatic decline in the use of accounting numbers over the last quarter century. Accounting-based covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing appear in less than 10 percent of the most recent sample of debt contracts examined. Moreover, accounting-based covenants included in public debt contracts tend to focus more one cash flow numbers and less on balance sheet measures of leverage than in the past. The evidence presented here suggests that recently executed public covenants provide little incentive for managers to manipulate accounting numbers. We also find a declining correlation between leverage and use of accounting-based debt covenants in public debt This finding suggests that leveragema not be a good proxy for public debt covenant slack in accounting policy choice studies.

Accounting and non‐accounting based information in the market for debt: Evidence from Australian private debt contracts

This paper examines accounting and non‐accounting based restrictive covenants in Australian private debt agreements. With respect to the former, our findings differ from previous research on public debt. We find more varied definitions of constraints and their specified tightness in private debt contracts than in public debt contracts. Further, limits on interest cover are found to be continuing constraints and not ‘once‐off’ limits. The paper reports frequent use of more specific or ‘tailored’ accounting based constraints and the frequent inclusion of off‐balance sheet numbers in the measurement rules specified.The paper also provides the first Australian evidence on the use of non‐accounting based constraints. These are pervasive and cover a wide range of corporate activity. While largely consistent with previous research the paper also reports evidence of restrictions previously argued to be sub‐optimal and hence, unlikely to be observed. Specifically, there are frequent restrictions on firms’ production and investment policies.

The Incidence of Accounting-based Covenants in UK Public Debt Contracts: An Empirical Analysis

Abstract Accounting-based covenants are of particular interest to accounting researchers in view of their potential to influence management's accounting policy choices and their attitudes to new accounting standards. This exploratory paper provides evidence on the incidence of accounting-based covenants in 108 UK public debt contracts for the period 1987-1990. Thirty percent of the agreements contain such covenants, the majority of which are affirmative gearing covenants. Focusing on the institutional differences between the UK and the US, the paper examines relationships between the presence of accounting-based covenants and (a) characteristics of the issuing firm, and (b) other control mechanisms included in the debt agreement. UK firms raising public debt are of good credit quality and UK insolvency procedures afford unambiguous protection to secured creditors. As a result, accounting-based covenants are associated with long-term unsecured debt and with firms having high values for assets-in-place but,...