Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Inspection Reports Research Articles

The Association between PCAOB Inspection Reports and Seasoned Equity Offering Discounting

SUMMARY We examine the association between Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports and a firm’s cost of equity capital, measured using seasoned equity offering (SEO) discounting. SEO discounting occurs when the offer price is lower than the prior day’s market price of the firm’s shares and represents “money left on the table” for issuing firms. We document an economically significant, positive association between SEO discounting and the use of an auditor found to be deficient by the PCAOB for clients of triennially inspected auditors. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that this relation is stronger for clients with lower analyst following and disclosed material weaknesses in financial reporting controls, and weaker if the auditor issues a going concern modification. Our evidence is consistent with PCAOB inspections providing meaningful information about audit quality to market participants, particularly for clients of smaller, triennially inspected auditors. Data Availability: All data are from publicly available sources. JEL Classifications: M42.

Audit firm political connections and PCAOB inspection reports

We examine the effect of audit firm political connections on the harshness of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports. Relying on Regulatory Capture Theory and Motivated Reasoning Theory, we show audit firm political connections, as measured through PAC contributions, are negatively associated with the harshness of Part I reports. Our results are robust to instrumentation and are not due to movements of personnel between the PCAOB and audit firms or improvements in a firm's audit quality. In supplementary tests, we show the negative relation is stronger when we consider the directed nature of PAC contributions to members of Congress who exercise SEC oversight and robust to alternative measures. Finally, we consider the harshness of Part II inspection reports and find no association with political connections. Collectively, our results suggest audit firm political connections induce favorable influence over Part I findings of PCAOB inspection reports.

Do PCAOB Inspections Improve Working Capital Accrual Reliability? Evidence from the PCAOB Annual versus Triennial Inspection Exposure

SYNOPSISIn this study, we examine whether the ability of working capital (WC) accruals to predict future earnings and cash flows differs between registrants whose auditors are subject to annual Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections and those whose auditors are subject to triennial PCAOB inspections. We find that WC accruals of clients audited by auditors subject to annual PCAOB inspections enhance earnings persistence more and map into future cash flow realizations better than those audited by auditors subject to triennial PCAOB inspections. These findings are stronger for operating asset accruals than for operating liability accruals. Furthermore, after PCAOB inspection reports are released, improvements in WC accrual reliability are more evident for clients audited by annually inspected auditors than for clients audited by triennially inspected auditors. Overall, our findings suggest that more frequent PCAOB inspections help to improve WC accrual reliability.JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48.Data Availability: The data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

PCAOB inspections: An analysis of entity-level and application-level control audit deficiencies

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection process identifies deficiencies related to how firms conduct audits. Our work extends prior research by examining the type of internal control audit deficiencies (entity-level or application-level). Internal control audit deficiencies of both types may increase the risk of material misstatement, so the PCAOB is concerned with whether audit firms are performing appropriate procedures to identify entity-level and application-level internal control audit deficiencies, including those involving information technology general controls (ITGCs). Using text analysis to examine audit deficiencies by internal control type and firm size, we find that PCAOB inspection reports identify significantly more application-level than entity-level control audit deficiencies. Application-level control deficiencies generally involve revenue, inventory, and accounts receivable accounts whereas entity-level deficiencies often involve lack of centralized controls or controls over period end financial reporting. The number of application-level deficiencies identified for both Big 4 and second-tier firms varied between inspection years 2010 and 2015. However, the number of entity-level deficiencies, including ITGCs for both Big 4 and second-tier firms, held nearly steady during the period. Our findings should be of interest to practicing accountants, regulators, and other users of PCAOB inspection reports.

PCAOB Inspections: An Analysis of Entity-Level and Application-Level Control Audit Deficiencies

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection process identifies deficiencies related to how firms conduct audits. Our work extends prior research by examining the type of internal control audit deficiencies (entity-level or application-level). Internal control audit deficiencies of both types may increase the risk of material misstatement, so the PCAOB is concerned with whether audit firms are performing appropriate procedures to identify entity-level and application-level internal control audit deficiencies, including those involving information technology general controls (ITGCs). Using text analysis to examine audit deficiencies by internal control type and firm size, we find that PCAOB inspection reports identify significantly more application-level than entity-level control audit deficiencies. Application-level control deficiencies generally involve revenue, inventory, and accounts receivable accounts whereas entity-level deficiencies often involve lack of centralized controls or controls over period end financial reporting. The number of application-level deficiencies identified for both Big 4 and second-tier firms varied between inspection years 2010 and 2015. However, the number of entity-level deficiencies, including ITGCs for both Big 4 and second-tier firms, held nearly steady during the period. Our findings should be of interest to practicing accountants, regulators, and other users of PCAOB inspection reports.

Audit deficiency and auditor workload: evidence from PCAOB triennially inspected firms

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the impact of workloads at public accounting firms on the likelihood of an audit deficiency being identified during a triennial inspection by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).Design/methodology/approachUsing the human resource information disclosed in PCAOB inspection reports, this study constructs two firm-specific workload measures: the ratio of issuer clients to audit partners; and the ratio of issuer clients to professional staff. Firm-level audit deficiency is measured at three levels of severity: Do any of the audit engagements inspected by the PCAOB reveal an audit deficiency? Are any of the identified audit deficiencies directly related to the auditors’ failure to identify a departure from GAAP in the client’s financial statement? Are any of the identified audit deficiencies associated with a significant adjustment or restatement in the client’s subsequent period financial statements? This study uses logistic regression to examine the association between audit deficiency and the workload of public accounting firms.FindingsThe empirical evidence suggests that the workload of public accounting firms is positively associated with the likelihood of a deficient audit, auditor’s failure to identify client’s GAAP departure and/or an audit deficiency resulting in a significant adjustment or even a restatement of the client’s financial statements in the subsequent period.Originality/valueThis study is among the first to investigate the impact of firm workload on deficient audits.

SEO Underpricing and PCAOB Inspection Reports: Do Investors Use PCAOB Inspection Information?

We examine the association between Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports and a firm’s cost of equity capital, measured using seasoned equity offering (SEO) discounting. SEO discounting occurs when the offer price is lower than the prior day’s market price of the firm’s shares and represents ‘money left on the table’ for issuing firms. SEO discounting is a non-trivial cost to an issuing firm, and its occurrence is increasing in both frequency and magnitude. We document an economically significant, positive association between SEO discounting and the use of an auditor found to be deficient by the PCAOB, and this association is most pronounced for clients of smaller, triennially inspected auditors for which few other signals of quality exist. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that, for clients of triennially inspected auditors, this relation is stronger for timelier inspection reports and smaller auditing firms. In conclusion, our evidence is consistent with PCAOB inspections providing meaningful information about audit quality to market participants, particularly for clients of smaller, triennially inspected auditors.

Do PCAOB Inspections Improve the Quality of Internal Control Audits?

We investigate whether Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections affect the quality of internal control audits. Our research design improves on prior studies by exploiting both cross-sectional and time-series variation in the content of PCAOB inspection reports, while also controlling for audit firm and year fixed effects, effectively achieving a difference-in-differences research design. We find that when PCAOB inspectors report higher rates of deficiencies in internal control audits, auditors respond by increasing the issuance of adverse internal control opinions. We also find that auditors issue more adverse internal control opinions to clients with concurrent misstatements, who thus genuinely warrant adverse opinions. We further find that higher inspection deficiency rates lead to higher audit fees, consistent with PCAOB inspections prompting auditors to undertake costly remediation efforts. Taken together, our results are consistent with the PCAOB inspections improving the quality of internal control audits by prompting auditors to remediate deficiencies in their audits of internal controls.

The Effects of Manager-Auditor Affiliation and PCAOB Inspection Reports on Audit Committee Members' Auditor Selection

SUMMARY This article summarizes the “The Effects of Prior Manager-Auditor Affiliation and PCAOB Inspection Reports on Audit Committee Members' Auditor Recommendations” (Abbott, Brown, and Higgs 2016), who investigate the extent to which audit committee members (ACM) of small public companies consider auditors' Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports and/or the auditors' prior affiliation with management in their auditor hiring decisions. The authors find participants (the study's proxy for ACM) incorporate the inspection report, as well as the auditor's prior affiliation with management into their selection decision. Specifically, an auditor's prior affiliation with management negatively impacts his/her chances of being selected by the audit committee. To the extent inspection results measure auditors' competence and prior affiliation with management measures auditor independence, the authors find auditor independence influences auditor selection decisions only when an auditor is deemed competent. In this paper, I discuss the implications of Abbott et al.'s (2016) findings for auditors, public companies, audit committees, and regulators/policymakers interested in understanding whether and how major aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are being implemented within corporate governance.

The Effects of Prior Manager-Auditor Affiliation and PCAOB Inspection Reports on Audit Committee Members' Auditor Recommendations

ABSTRACTThis study investigates (1) the extent to which audit committee members (ACM) of small publicly traded companies utilize Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports in their auditor selection recommendations when management recommends hiring the auditor, and (2) whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's mandated one-year cooling-off period mitigates independence concerns of ACM resulting from a prior management-auditor affiliation in the same auditor selection context. We use financially literate professional participants as proxies for ACM who make a Likert-scale based recommendation for hiring the auditor. Our study manipulates a hypothetical, triennially inspected auditor's inspection results (favorable/unfavorable) as an auditor competence indicator and a prior management-auditor affiliation (present/absent) as an auditor independence indicator. We document that participants incorporate the inspection results into their selection recommendations, that prior affiliation negatively impacts ACMs' selection recommendations, and that auditor independence effects are contingent upon auditor competence. More specifically, auditor independence impacts auditor selection decisions only when auditor competence is favorable.

The association between PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies and small audit firms’ characteristics

Purpose– The purpose of this study is to examine the association between certain audit firm characteristics and the number of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)-identified audit deficiencies.Design/methodology/approach– Using a hand-collected sample of PCAOB inspection reports for small audit firms with 100 or less issuer clients from 2007 through 2010, an ordinary least squares model is applied by regressing the number of deficiencies on a set of audit firm characteristics.Findings– Results show that the number of PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies is positively associated with the number of issuer clients and negatively associated with the number of branch offices, the human capital leverage and the organization structure as Limited Liability Partnership firms. Additional analysis also shows that the PCAOB inspection length is positively associated with the number of deficiencies, the number of branch offices and the number of issuer clients, but negatively associated with the organization structure as limited liability company firms. Moreover, the PCAOB inspection lag is positively associated with the number of deficiencies and the number of issuer clients.Research limitations/implications– Results of this study cannot be generalized beyond public accounting firms with 100 or fewer issuer clients. In addition, there is a possibility that other measurements of firm-level characteristics that impact the number of PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies were not captured in the study.Practical implications– This study explains the association between audit firm characteristics and PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies. Our results caution small audit firms about not having enough professional staff, low human capital leverage and serving too many issuer clients, as those factors may potentially impair audit quality.Originality/value– This study helps to explain the relationship between audit deficiencies and controllable, measurable firm-level characteristics. It is, therefore, differentiated from previous studies, most of which were focused on PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies as measures of audit quality and stakeholder reactions to PCAOB reports.

The Impact of PCAOB Reports Containing Audit Deficiencies on Non-U.S. Audit Firms: Initial Evidence

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) regularly conducts inspections of non-U.S. audit firms. Based on 243 PCAOB inspection reports of non-U.S. audit firms, published by the PCAOB between January 2006 and December 2011, we examine involuntary dismissals, voluntary resignations, and voluntary deregistration of inspected non-U.S. audit firms following PCAOB reports containing audit deficiencies. Our results show that 24 out of 1,604 clients of non-U.S. audit firms have dismissed their auditors within one year following the disclosure of audit deficiencies in PCAOB reports, and that only four of these 24 clients appointed successor auditors with clean PCAOB reports. Also, we find only four auditor resignation cases from the 1,604 clients of non-U.S. audit firms within one year after they received a PCAOB report containing audit deficiencies. Finally, 22 non-U.S. audit firms voluntarily ceased to be registered with the PCAOB either during the inspection process or after they received PCAOB reports containing audit deficiencies. Compared to registered non-U.S. audit firms, these deregistered non-U.S. audit firms have relatively fewer resources (e.g., fewer partners and professional staff, smaller offices) and, thus, may not be able to bear compliance costs (e.g., costs associated with preparation for inspections) associated with PCAOB inspections. This study provides insights regarding the impact of PCAOB international inspections.

PCAOB Quality Control Inspection Reports and Auditor Reputation

SUMMARY: In 2002, the peer review auditor program was replaced with independent inspections of audit firms by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB inspections differ from the peer reviews in several key areas including the independence level of the reviewers, the nature and timing of the reviews, and the content and timing of the findings' disclosures. This study focuses on the informational value of the quality control criticisms disclosure included in Part II of the PCAOB inspection reports. After each inspection, the PCAOB issues inspection reports that include a public portion (Part I) of identified audit deficiencies, and most include a nonpublic portion (Part II) of identified quality control weaknesses. Part II of the report only becomes public if the firm fails to satisfactorily remediate the quality control deficiencies in a 12-month period. This study examines the change in audit firms' market share following the public disclosure of Part II of the inspection report. The results find that audit firms lose a significant amount of market share following the public disclosure of quality control criticisms, and suggest that such a disclosure provides a credible signal of auditor quality to audit clients.

PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality

With the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), audit firm oversight shifted away from self-regulation to independent regulation. The inspections program is the central feature of the PCAOB. We examine whether PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish actual audit quality (as opposed to perceived) during the period inspected to better understand this important regulatory tool. We use three measures that proxy for actual audit quality: abnormal accruals, restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected auditors, we find that PCAOB inspections are associated with lower audit quality when the reports are seriously deficient (weaker results for deficient reports). More specifically, we find clients of triennially inspected auditors that receive a deficient or seriously deficient report are associated with significantly higher abnormal current accruals and clients of auditors that receive a seriously deficient report are associated with a greater propensity to restate. Our evidence is subject to the caveat that PCAOB reports for triennially inspected auditors do not capture the going concern aspect of audit quality. For annually inspected auditors, the results are conflicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality during the period inspected for annually inspected auditors.

When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Stakeholder Reaction to GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports of Small Auditors

SUMMARY:Section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts inspections of registered public accounting firms that provide audits for publicly traded companies. The results of the inspection process are summarized in publicly available reports at the PCAOB website. Using these reports, we categorize the inspection reports into three levels of increasing severity: clean, GAAS-deficient, and GAAP-deficient. We examine the potential use of GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports as perceived audit quality signals for the clients of GAAP-deficient auditors that are inspected on a triennial basis by the PCAOB. Our investigation is predicated on the notion that audit quality is generally not directly observable. Thus, the clients of these auditors may seek to signal their desire for audit quality by dismissing their GAAP-deficient auditors. Our results suggest that the clients of GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are more likely to dismiss these auditors in favor of triennially inspected auditors that are not GAAP-deficient. In addition, we find that greater agency conflicts, the presence of an independent and expert audit committee, and outside blockholdings magnify this effect. Interestingly, we find no evidence that the clients use GAAP-deficient reports to procure a subsequent-year audit fee discount or more favorable going-concern auditor reporting treatment. Our evidence indicates that PCAOB inspection reports created heterogeneity in auditor brand name among a group of non-Big N/non-national auditors that did not previously exist and are universally treated by prior research as “other auditors.”

An Account Analysis Of PCAOB Inspection Reports For Triennially-Inspected Audit Firms

Since 2005, the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) has been issuing inspection reports for triennially-inspected audit firms as part of its overall mission to improve audit quality. This study analyzes the findings in the PCAOB inspection reports by classifying the audit deficiencies cited in the reports by area of deficiency and type of audit failure. CPA firms can utilize these findings in their efforts to reduce client engagement audit risk. The results indicate that the overall number of cited deficiencies is declining each year, revenue and asset accounts are the most frequently cited accounts, business combinations and equity transactions are the most cited transactions, and insufficient testing or documentation is the primary type of audit failure. We also document that most departures from GAAP occur in the accounting for business transactions or in liability accounts.

Increasing Transparency: A Prototype of the Nonpublic Portions of PCAOB Large-Firm Inspection Reports

SUMMARY:The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and requires it to conduct annual inspections of accounting firms that regularly provide audit reports for more than 100 public companies (issuers). Certain information in these reports is, by law, nonpublic—in particular, findings of “quality control” (QC) deficiencies. Having access to nonpublic portions of PCAOB inspection reports, the authors create an illustrative example of a nonpublic portion of a large-firm inspection report, albeit with specific firms and issuers de-identified.

Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting in the Context of Offshore Outsourcing: A Theory-Based Research Agenda

Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS-5) of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) suggests, for organizations (user) that are outsourcing their processes to service organizations, that user management should evaluate controls at the service organization, as well as related controls at the user company, when making its assessment about internal controls over financial reporting. In spite of this directive, a number of PCAOB inspection reports find user auditors making judgment errors related to internal control reports generated by service organizations. Thus, it seems third-party internal controls seem to be a neglected area in terms of practice as well as research. Though, outsource offshoring has become a strategic business model, related internal controls issues have not been explored by academicians. This paper is an attempt to develop a research agenda that is grounded in theory, and supported by prior literature, and interviews with practitioners. The paper has implications for academicians as well as practitioners.

Investors’ Expectations of the Improvement in the Credibility of Audit Opinions following PCAOB Inspection Reports with Identified Deficiencies

ABSTRACT: Following high-profile accounting scandals (e.g., Enron), Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts regular inspections of audit firms and issues inspection reports that describe audit deficiencies identified during the inspections. One purpose of these reports is to improve public confidence in auditor credibility. We conduct a between-subjects experiment to provide initial evidence concerning investors’ perceptions of audit opinion credibility following PCAOB inspections. While we find an overall increase in perceptions of the credibility of future audit opinions, the degree to which perceptions increase is a function of three salient characteristics of PCAOB reports. Specifically, we find that investors anticipate more (less) improvement in the credibility of future opinions when: (1) inspections contain high (low) severity deficiencies; (2) firms respond to the reports with concessions (denials); and (3) for small (large) firms. Further, investors’ assessment of the credibility of the firm’s response to the PCAOB report is higher for concessions than denials; response credibility fully mediates the effect of response type (concession or denial) on the perceived improvement in the credibility of future opinions. Therefore, the inspections may be a useful tool for improving the perceived credibility of audit opinions under certain conditions. Implications include the possibility that firms should consider carefully the nature of their responses and the PCAOB should consider establishing outreach programs to investors to educate them about its regulatory role.

Auditing the auditors: Evidence on the recent reforms to the external monitoring of audit firms

This paper analyzes audit firm supervision since the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) began conducting inspections. First, we find that audit clients do not perceive that the PCAOB's inspection reports are valuable for signaling audit quality. Second, we document that the information content of peer review reports fell after they became narrower in scope with the initiation of PCAOB inspections. Third, we isolate that the signaling role of peer review reports mainly stems from information that PCAOB inspectors do not publicly disclose. Collectively, our evidence implies that less is known about audit firm quality under the new regulatory regime.