Psychological Facts Research Articles

The Use and Incorporation of Extralegal Insights in Legal Reasoning

Following the US example, European scholarship has seen more and more interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary academic work being carried out over the last few decades, not only in criminal law but also relating to private law and civil procedure. In such studies ‘extralegal’ knowledge from, for example, psychology, sociology and economics, is combined with existing legal insights and transformed into ‘novel’ legal knowledge. This has often led to new thoughts on how to organize our legal landscape and to new public policy issues and solutions. An intriguing question underlying these studies is whether it is in fact possible – and if so, how, why and when – to leap from such ‘extralegal’ insights to normative legal conclusions. How and when can any researcher step over from, for example, empirical psychological facts to legal normative value judgments (as one is required to do from a legal end, for instance as a judge ruling on a case)? What, if anything, allows anyone to do so? What are the conditions under which it would be safe to say that one could cross over from one side to the other? By reviewing the existing methodological literature on this topic and by linking up with ideas about the (analogous) use of comparative law materials, this paper – methodological in nature – tries to come up with a workable ‘method’ for crossing the border between social science disciplines and the law. As it turns out, a due process approach is the best available option. This approach asks of judges, practitioners and scholars to become familiar with the methodology of the social sciences. That hurdle might be overcome by using court-appointed experts to evaluate the usefulness of the extralegal materials. The judge would thus resort to an expert to advise him on how to be a decent gatekeeper when it comes to the possible use of insights from social sciences.

ALÂEDDÎN ALİ ÇELEBİ'NİN MÜNÂZARA TÜRÜNDE BİR ESERİ: DÂSİTÂN-I TÛTÎ VÜ KARGA-İ 'ALÂEDDÎN

Although the date is unknown, the speech of animals, and we imagine them to share their thoughts with human subjects is based on very old. Some animals were loaded mythic meanings and each animal's importance in human life under the guidance of these mythical beliefs, took place in cultural life. Sometimes animals are used as a symbol to describe and comprehend the subject of religious. The philosophy behind this fact, examining the sociological and psychological facts is the subject of another study, was the subject of a philosophical story between two animals in this article. It has been mentioned before in our article what kind of munazara. It has been mentioned the manuscript copy of mathnawi, conformational features and content. The owner of the mathnawi, were informed about the life of poets Filibeli Alaeddin, his literary figures and his works. After that, the transcribed text was presented.Through analyzing the mystical meaning of terms has been demonstrated the value of the work

Future Generations and Deliberative Democracy: What and How to Represent?

This essay discusses the representation of future people’s rights and interests in present political deliberation. Future persons, it will be argued, cannot be regarded as holders of actual rights or interests, which poses a serious obstacle to their being represented in the present. Nevertheless, future generations do matter for members of the present generation, and it is this psychological fact that can be relied upon when looking for a suitable institutionalised way of avoiding generational egoism in public deliberation. What can, and should, be represented is, therefore, present people’s rights and interest with regard to their posterity. The second part of the essay focuses on the form of this representation. After an examination of recent proposals made by A. Dobson and K. S. Ekeli, it will be argued that there need not be several representatives of the future who participate in legislation in more or less the same way as 'ordinary' representatives do. What is important, instead, is that concerns regarding posterity be directly formulated in most public discourses possible.

Covariation of psychological and inflammatory variables in patients with chronic lymphocytic leukemia receiving ibrutinib.

7057 Background: Ibrutinib has been shown to induce durable responses in patients with high risk relapsed/refractory (r/r) chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) (Byrd et al., 2013). Psychological fact...

Constructivism in Practical Philosophy

Constructivism in Practical Philosophy

“British Asignats”: Debt, Caricature and Romantic Subjectivity in 1797

AMANDA LAHIKAINEN “British Asignats”: Debt, Caricature and Romantic Subjectivity in 1797 It would be ofgreat theoretical interest to establish the conceptual link between this genesis of self-consciousness and the modern notion of paper money. —Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative, 1993 I N LIGHT OF ITS PARADOXICAL DEFINITION AS BOTH A MATERIAL AND AN immaterial thing, debt is continually subject to a crisis of definition and representation.1 This made for an interesting visual problem in the eight­ eenth century for graphic satirists who, in search of a suitable visual lan­ guage, often thought about debt in terms of credit or belief, trust, and faith in either a person or an institution. In 1797 Isaac Cruikshank, following a print designed by Gillray two months prior, etched “British Asignats [sic]” into the print Billy a cock-horse or the Modern Colossus amusing himself(fig. 1). In so doing, he envisioned that William Pitt, tasked with funding the war against Revolutionary France, replaced Britain’s material wealth with spu­ rious immaterial wealth. That is, Pitt had usurped the remains ofreal physi­ cal money in Britain and replaced it with paper money. Perhaps some viewers might have been reminded of the forged assignats produced by Britain between 1793 and 1795 as a furtive means of further debasing France’s economy, but in this print Cruikshank reveals the fear that British I wish to thank the Paul Mellon Centre for a travel grant to the UK. While at the British Museum I was able to work with the rich collection of imitation bank notes in the depart­ ment ofcoins and medals. Catherine Eagleton’s support ofthe project proved essential, as did several discussions with Jack Mockford. Further, I am indebted to K. Dian Kriz, Douglas Fordham, Amelia Rauser and Eitan Sayag for helpful comments. Funding from the Kluge Center at the Library of Congress enabled me to complete the article. 1. “debt, n. ia. a sum ofmoney or a material thing lb. a thing immaterial,” OED Online, June 2013, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/47935?rskey=bcxEK3&result= 1, accessed 11 July 2013. SiR, 53 (Winter 2014) 509 510 AMANDA LAHIKAINEN Figure i: Isaac Cruikshank, Billy a cock-horse or the Modern Colossus amusing himself (8 March 1797). Hand-colored etching. © Trustees of the British Museum. DEBT, CARICATURE, ROMANTIC SUBJECTIVITY, 1797 511 bank notes might meet with the same desperate fate as French paper money.2 The public’s faith in Pitt to repay this paper debt in specie remains doubtful. Tied to his lack of creditworthiness lurks the fear offinancial col­ lapse. Much like our current debates about financial crises, fiscal cliffs, and quantitative easing, debt was frequently the subject of heated debate throughout the eighteenth century, notably during the South Sea crisis in 1720 and the Bank Restriction Act of 1797.3 The fact that money and pub­ lic credit were based on both faith in government institutions and individu­ als created a deep sense ofanxiety that graphic satirists, Gillray in particular, exploited in representation. This anxiety stemmed from the fact that money in all its variants maintains its value due purely to human agree­ ment. Money is an “institutional fact” (existing within human institutions) and not a “brute fact” (existing independently ofhuman institutions).4 That is, money carries what Georg Simmel called “the psychological fact of ob­ jective value” and not objective value itself.5 In late eighteenth-century Europe paper currency made this structure of belief ever more apparent because the difference between coin and paper remained a crucial distinc­ tion (even though this very structure also maintained the value of coin). Britons were particularly fixated on the negative example set by Revolu­ tionary France since the failure of assignats had recently laid bare the fragil­ ity of a system based on trust and agreement.6 The groundwork for this trust and agreement, or the culture of paper money, much like the topic offinancial forgery, has been overlooked in re­ cent scholarship and deserves further attention in relation to the graphic arts as well as Romanticism (despite Kevin Barry’s pronouncement that on “February 26, 1797, a run on the Bank of England precipitated English 2. Peter Isaac, “Sir...

The Use and Incorporation of Extralegal Insights in Private Law Reasoning

Following the US example, European scholarship has seen more and more inter- or multi-disciplinary academic work being carried out relating to private law and civil procedure over the last few decades. In such studies ‘extralegal’ knowledge stemming from, for example, psychology, sociology and economics is combined with existing legal insights and arguments and transformed into ‘novel’ legal knowledge. This has often led to new thoughts on how to organize our legal landscape and to possible new public policy issues and solutions. An intriguing question underlying these kinds of studies is whether it is in fact possible – and if so, how, why and when – to leap from such ‘extralegal’ insights to normative legal conclusions. How and when can any researcher step over from, for example, empirical psychological facts to legal normative value judgments (as one is required to do from a legal end, for instance as a judge ruling on a case)? What, if anything, allows anyone to do so? What is, in other words, the yardstick, or what are the conditions under which it would be safe to say that one could cross over from one side to the other? What kind of justification could there be? By reviewing the existing methodological literature on this topic and by linking up with ideas about the (analogous) use of comparative law materials in other jurisdictions, this paper – methodological in nature – tries to come up with a workable ‘method’ for crossing the border between social science disciplines and the law. As it turns out, a due process approach is the best available option. This approach asks of judges, legislators and scholars to be or become familiar with the methodology of the social science at stake. That hurdle might be gigantic but might be overcome by using court-appointed experts to collect or at least evaluate the usefulness of the extralegal materials available. The judge would thus resort to an expert to advise him on how to be a decent gatekeeper when it comes to the possible use of (insights from) social sciences.

A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos

We intend to put into question two fundamental principles adopted by critical rationalism. One of them, explicitly proposed by Popper, argues that what is valid in logic is also in psychology. And the other, tacitly espoused, implies that epistemological verdicts have metascientific authority and validity. Regarding the second, we hold the view that to the conclusions arrived at by epistemology should not automatically be conferred metascientific authority and validity. To acquire metascientific import such conclusions also need to be derived from the observation of the actual ways of producing scientific knowledge. The Hume-dependent manner with which Popper rejects induction exemplifies with emblematic strength the tendency to extend the conclusions of epistemology to philosophy of science. On one hand Popper endorses Hume’s argument about the lack of epistemic justification for induction, on the other, disagrees with the humean view that induction is routinely employed and should, therefore, be seen as a human or animal fact. Popper departs from Hume to argue that induction is not even a way of thinking; therefore, it can be employed neither by the layman nor by the scientist. Also in defense of the thesis that induction does not exist, Popper gives primacy to epistemology. More than an epistemological thesis, the theory that decrees that induction is not even a psychological fact requires empirical confirmation. For Popper being right, it is necessary to verify the theory that our minds always operate according to the model from the top down. And psychology not even provides the corroboration of Popper’s thesis.

Complexity is in the Brain of the Beholder: A Psychological Perspective on Software Engineering’s Ultimate Challenge

Complexity of software has been largely studied as a property of the code. We argue instead that complexity is a psychological phenomenon and should be studied from this perspective. The psychological literature however is structured in a way making of little practical usefulness. We propose a model based on isolated psychological facts connected by intuitive reasoning to fight complexity in a practical way. In this model, complexity corresponds to occurrences of cognitive overload in the working memory (WM), the bottleneck of cognition. Reducing complexity can be achieved by relieving the WM of some load by explicitly representing the internal mental constructs using external media such as software tools. We present a case study in which we used this model to produce a tool to reduce the complexity in program comprehension for large software systems. The tool was used in an industrial setting. We present here the mental constructs targeted and the details of the tool.

Влияние биологических и психосоциальных фактороВ на психический онтогенез недоношенного ребенка

Влияние биологических и психосоциальных фактороВ на психический онтогенез недоношенного ребенка

FOUR FRIENDLY CRITICS: A RESPONSE

In this reply, I seek to summarize fairly the criticisms advanced by each of my four critics, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Yaffe, John Gardner, and Carolina Sartorio. That there is so little overlap either in the aspects of the book on which they focus or in the arguments they advance about those issues has forced me to reply to each of them separately. Schaffer focuses much of his criticisms on my view that absences cannot serve as causal relata and argues that this commits me to the view that double preventions (such as beheadings) cannot be causal of events such as deaths. I deny that double preventions such as beheadings are not causal, while admitting that other double preventions are not causal but denying that this latter conclusion is unwelcome in its implications. Yaffe criticizes my view that a person substantially causing some harm H is sufficient for that person having performed the activity of H-ing, whereas I affirm that causing H is sufficient for doing the action of H-ing even if it is not sufficient for intentionally H-ing (Yaffe's definition of “activity”). Gardner takes issue with my “experiential argument” for the relevance of causation to moral blame; he urges that we cannot infer that we are more guilty (when we cause a harm than when we don't) from either the psychological fact that we feel more guilty or from the moral fact that it is virtuous to feel such heightened guilt, because it is viciously circular: we feel such guilt only because we have already judged that we are more guilty, and it is virtuous to feel such guilt only because we in fact are more guilty. I deny such circularity exists. Sartorio takes issue with my thesis that in omissive overdetermination cases (where each omission is sufficient to fail to prevent some harm, meaning neither is necessary) neither omitter is morally responsible for the harm. I trade intuitions with Sartorio about a range of related cases that we each think bears on the issue.

‘The Thorny and Arduous Path of Moral Progress’: Moral Psychology and Moral Enhancement

The moral enhancement of humans by biological or genetic means has recently been urged as a response to the pressing concerns facing human civilization. In this paper, I argue that proponents of biological moral enhancement have misrepresented the facts of human moral psychology. As a result, the likely effectiveness of traditional methods of moral enhancement has been underestimated, relative to biological or genetic means. I review arguments in favor of biological moral enhancement and argue that the complexity of moral psychology raises serious problems for such interventions. I offer a programmatic sketch of the ways in which our improved understanding of moral psychology can help facilitate more traditional methods of moral enhancement. I conclude that the best response to the dangers faced by human civilization is the continued use of traditional methods of moral enhancement and the use of our improved understanding of moral psychology to further refine and develop these methods.

Compelling Fictions: Spinoza and George Eliot on Imagination and Belief

AbstractSpinoza took it to be an important psychological fact that belief cannot be compelled. At the same time, he was well aware of the compelling power that religious and political fictions can have on the formation of our beliefs. I argue that Spinoza allows that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fictions. His complex account of the imagination and fiction, and their disabling or enabling roles in gaining knowledge of Nature, is a site of disagreement among commentators. The novels of George Eliot (who translated Spinoza's works) represent a significant development for those who aim to resolve such disagreement in favour of the epistemic value of the imagination and fiction. Although Eliot agreed with Spinoza that belief cannot be compelled, she nevertheless affirmed the potential of certain kinds of fiction to be not only compelling but also edifying. The parallel reading of Eliot and Spinoza offered here raises the question of whether his philosophy can accommodate a theory of art in which the artist is seen to be capable of attaining and imparting dependable knowledge.

Life-Based Design Against Loneliness Among Older People

Developing successful service concepts has to rely on the efficient exploitation of knowledge about everyday life. This design thinking is called life-based design (LBD) and it is based on examining different aspects of forms of life as a starting point for technology design. Here, we consider LBD in the context of reducing the feeling of loneliness. Via the implementation of focus groups, we studied how different age groups experienced loneliness, and examined whether generational formation could give insight into analysing different life situations and forms of life in the context of social relationships. Exploring forms of life is a focal tool of LBD, stressing the importance of understanding the cultural, social and psychological facts and values that would explain people’s actions in a particular life situation. Finally, we suggest an integrated service system to decrease the feeling of loneliness.

Hearing How Smooth It Looks: Selective Attention and Crossmodal Perception in the Arts

Hearing How Smooth It Looks: Selective Attention and Crossmodal Perception in the Arts

The Visual Extent of an Object

The visual extent of an object reaches beyond the object itself. This is a long standing fact in psychology and is reflected in image retrieval techniques which aggregate statistics from the whole image in order to identify the object within. However, it is unclear to what degree and how the visual extent of an object affects classification performance. In this paper we investigate the visual extent of an object on the Pascal VOC dataset using a Bag-of-Words implementation with (colour) SIFT descriptors. Our analysis is performed from two angles. (a) Not knowing the object location, we determine where in the image the support for object classification resides. We call this the normal situation. (b) Assuming that the object location is known, we evaluate the relative potential of the object and its surround, and of the object border and object interior. We call this the ideal situation. Our most important discoveries are: (i) Surroundings can adequately distinguish between groups of classes: furniture, animals, and land-vehicles. For distinguishing categories within one group the surroundings become a source of confusion. (ii) The physically rigid plane, bike, bus, car, and train classes are recognised by interior boundaries and shape, not by texture. The non-rigid animals dog, cat, cow, and sheep are recognised primarily by texture, i.e. fur, as their projected shape varies greatly. (iii) We confirm an early observation from human psychology (Biederman in Perceptual Organization, pp. 213–263, 1981): in the ideal situation with known object locations, recognition is no longer improved by considering surroundings. In contrast, in the normal situation with unknown object locations, the surroundings significantly contribute to the recognition of most classes.

Predictor of E-Learning Development and Use Practices in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) of NWFP, Pakistan

One cannot predict the details of future but one can surely prepare for it. Researchers in eLearning are capitalizing on the user-perceptions as possible predictor of the user-attitudes towards the development, use, problems and prospects of eLearning in their institutions. This application is founded on the psychological fact that a human’s attitude depends on his/her ‘belief’ or ‘perceptions: meaning given by the individual’ about the thing used. That is, if eLearning users perceive educational technologies favorably, they are more likely to speedily adopt digital tools than those who misperceive or under-perceive them. This research reveals that perceptions about educational technologies are very significantly related with and predict the criterion variable of ‘Problems of eLearning’ but surprisingly, the ‘prospects of eLearning’ are very nominally associated with and predicted by the predictor.

Spiritual Well-Being

1. Values that regulate social behaviourThe United Nations Millennium adopted by the General Assembly Summit which was held on September 6-8, 2000 (Session 55, paragraph 60b of the agenda) includes the list of basic objectives that the UN gives special importance. The Declaration starts with the statement of those values and principles that are followed by the heads of state and government at the dawn of the new millennium. Why are these values given so much significance?It is a well-known psychological fact that activity of a biological creature or a social institution is triggered by its needs. However, behaviour of both human individuals and social communities is regulated not only by a set of patterns, but also by human values and attitudes. These values and attitudes may be unconscious and hiding behind habits and rules, behavioural patterns and a way of thinking, but they can be realized by both individual and social community who have an opportunity to make them manageable. The choice of values is the manifestation of both freedom and responsibility. Making a conscious choice about values which regulate his/her social behaviour a human individual becomes a true citizen with all the personal, social (e.g. economic, legal, etc.) attributes (Ball, 1997).The system of values accepted in society gives rise to beliefs, principles, social attitudes and norms, personal and social behavioural goals, and also regulates the decision making process at all stages of social activity. Any change in the system of values leads to significant changes in social behaviour projects as a way of behaviour modification.Throughout human history, there have been dreams about building a society regulated by human values that could promote not only its economic, but also its intellectual and ethical development. Such dreams about the people, state, professional communities managed by true noble people, aristocrats of the spirit would remain an empty dream even today, but for scientific research data of the recent decades which indicate that cultural values do influence successful functioning of human communities and their economy.Why do some ethnic groups and nations live better off than other ones of the kind? The determining factors include the climate, the geographical location, the size of the country, natural resources, the choice of policies, and good management, etc.However, according to Daniel P. Moynihan (The New Republic, June 7, 1986) it is culture but not politics that determines the success of society. The author believes that some cultural values may hinder economic development while the others may be really beneficial for it. In 1985, Lawrence E. Harrison published his book Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind - The Latin American Case, in which the notion of culture is defined as a coherent system of values, attitudes and institutions that influence individual and social behaviour.2. Spirituality and developmentPsychologists and physicians have lately become closer to peer into the aspect of a human being.Nowadays basic approaches to studying spirituality are as follows: (1) spirituality as a principle of self-development and self-actualization; (2) the roots of spirituality, which do not go deeply into a human individual (especially in his/her personal traits or tendency to reflection), but also in his/her creative activity and in the products of life; (3) study of the factors of human states; (4) religious studies.Self-reflection (What is my true essence? Who am I?) is accompanied by the search for the meaning of life, while specific life events are given a specific value. This spiritual work contributes to personal growth. Each person has to make an individual choice among a wide range of values and assign them to regulating personal behaviour, the daily exercise of this choice being a test of his/her personality. …

What We Look For is What We Find

The purpose of this paper is to examine epistemological connections between the words used by psychologists, the way words influence what methodology we use, and how methods influence our beliefs about causality and construct phenomena regarded as psychological facts. These processes are considered in terms of a personal and historical perspective gained from nearly forty years of studying the psychology of women and gender. This paper focuses the history of the distinction between sex and and the continued attention of researchers to the question of whether sex/gender differences exist. It argues that the issue continues to be researched because of the relative absence of socio-structural variables such as status and power from most psychological discourse and the current empirical focus of many feminist psychologists in the United States. I also argue that lack of attention to epistemology and to the connection between politics and scholarship has led to a definition of the psychology of women and/or gender that no longer attends to feminist theory and to a decline in socially activist scholarship. Women and men cannot be studied in isolation from other social constructions such as race/ethnicity, social class, sexual diversity, and cultural difference. Such synthesis will be difficult without a return to concerns about epistemology and question generation that are rarely addressed in U. S. feminist psychology today.

What We Look For is What We Find

The purpose of this paper is to examine epistemological connections between the words used by psychologists, the way words influence what methodology we use, and how methods influence our beliefs about causality and construct phenomena regarded as psychological facts. These processes are considered in terms of a personal and historical perspective gained from nearly forty years of studying the psychology of women and gender. This paper focuses the history of the distinction between sex and and the continued attention of researchers to the question of whether sex/gender differences exist. It argues that the issue continues to be researched because of the relative absence of socio-structural variables such as status and power from most psychological discourse and the current empirical focus of many feminist psychologists in the United States. I also argue that lack of attention to epistemology and to the connection between politics and scholarship has led to a definition of the psychology of women and/or gender that no longer attends to feminist theory and to a decline in socially activist scholarship. Women and men cannot be studied in isolation from other social constructions such as race/ethnicity, social class, sexual diversity, and cultural difference. Such synthesis will be difficult without a return to concerns about epistemology and question generation that are rarely addressed in U. S. feminist psychology today.