Prototypical Exemplars Research Articles

Korean Speakers' Acquisition of the English Ditransitive Construction: The Role of Verb Prototype, Input Distribution, and Frequency

Recent studies in usage‐based linguistics have found that construction learning is more effective when input is skewed toward a prototypical exemplar of the construction, thereby reflecting the frequency distribution in natural language. This study investigates the extent to which a prototypical ditransitive verb with high frequency (give) facilitates the acquisition of the English ditransitive construction in Korean children learning English in a community in which exposure to English is rare outside of the formal classroom setting. Six classes were randomly assigned to either a skewed frequency group, where the input was skewed toward give, or a balanced frequency group, where the input was evenly distributed among the training ditransitive verbs. This experiment found little evidence for the facilitative effects of skewed input on construction learning. Instead, the results suggest that construction learning in this situation is superior with a more balanced set of verbs rather than a focus on a single prototype.

Learning argument structure generalizations

General correlations between form and meaning at the level of argument structure patterns have often been assumed to be innate. Claims of innateness typically rest on the idea that the input is not rich enough for general learning strategies to yield the required representations. The present work demonstrates that the semantics associated with argument structure generalizations can indeed be learned, given the nature of the input and an understanding of general categorization strategies. Examination of an extensive corpus study of children’s and mothers’ speech shows that tokens of one particular verb are found to account for the lion’s share of instances of each argument frame considered. Experimental results are reported that demonstrate that high token frequency of a single prototypical exemplar facilitates the learning of constructional meaning.

Critical analysis of the neural systems organizing innate fear responses

Unconditioned emotional responses elicited by exposure to a predator have served as the prototypical exemplar for analyses of the behavioral biology of fear-related emotionality. However, the primary research model for the study of fear has involved shock-based cue and context conditioning. While these shock-based models have provided a good understanding of neural systems regulating specific conditioned fear-related behaviors (typically freezing), it is not known if the neural systems underlying an array of defensive responses to innate, unconditioned, painless threat stimuli, and conditioning to these stimuli, are the same as those involved in foot shock and its conditioning sequellae. Recent work involving lesions and c-Fos activation in conjunction with predator or predator odor exposure suggest specific neural systems for response to these, potentially different from the systems outlined in Pavlovian fear conditioning studies. As outlined in the present review, these systems include the medial hypothalamic defensive circuit; specific amygdalar and septo-hippocampal territories, involved in processing, respectively, cues related to the predator presence and environmental contextual analysis; and the periaqueductal gray, known to be critically involved in the expression of predator-induced responses. This information may be potentially important in analysis of defense-related psychopathologies and in the design of therapeutic interventions for them.

The attractiveness of nonface averages: implications for an evolutionary explanation of the attractiveness of average faces.

Researchers have argued that humans' attraction to average faces reflects an evolved psychological mechanism to identify high-quality mates. If this direct-selection account is correct, there is no reason to expect a similar averageness bias for stimuli that are irrelevant to reproductive fitness. The current study, however, found a strong relationship between averageness and attractiveness for dogs, wristwatches, and birds. The most parsimonious explanation is that humans have a general attraction to prototypical exemplars, and that their attraction to average faces is a reflection of this more general attraction. We tested whether a general preference for familiar stimuli can account for the attractiveness of averageness. This account was not supported for dogs or birds, but could not be ruled out for watches.

Influence of feature training on the formation of exemplar-specific representations in children with mental retardation.

Whether exemplar-specific or prototype representations were primarily used by children with mild mental retardation in a categorization task consisting of two groups of make-believe animals whose features were ill-defined was examined. Categorization performance of familiar, prototypic, and novel test phase exemplars indicated that these children were able to acquire and use both types of representations. A feature-labeling training procedure, expected to promote the formation of exemplar-specific representations prior to exemplar classification, was also incorporated within the current study's design. It was unclear whether such training had any impact on the formation of exemplar-specific representations.

Comparing exemplar and prototype models of categorization.

Abstract Five experiments contrasted the prototype and exemplar theories of categorization. The stimuli for the experiments were simple perceptual figures that varied along two multi-valued dimensions. During the learning phase of each experiment, participants assigned each of a series of stimuli to one of two categories and received feedback concerning their assignments. During the generalization phase, participants made category judgments with respect to novel stimuli, including some crucial test stimuli that were (a) more similar to the prototype of one of the two categories, and at the same time, (b) more similar, on average, to the exemplars of the other category. Participants assigned the test stimuli to the latter category. This was taken as evidence favoring the exemplar over the prototype theory. To cope with an incessant flow of information, humans and other organisms must group their experiences into meaningful categories (Anderson, 1991; Shepard, 1987; Smith & Medin, 1981). How do they do this? The traditional view, dating from the time of Aristotle, is that categories are mentally represented as sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. According to this view, an exemplar is assigned to a category if it satisfies the category's membership conditions (Ashby, 1992). Recently, problems have been raised with this view. For example, the exemplars of categories do not always seem to share the same properties (Wittgenstein, 1953). In some cases (e.g., game), there are apparently no properties that are shared by all members of the category. In addition, some exemplars of some categories seem better than others. For example, a robin seems a better bird than a chicken does (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; Wittgenstein, 1953). Several theories have been proposed in response to these problems. According to the prototype theory, a category's mental representation is based on a prototypical exemplar or prototype. For example, the representation for the BIRD category might be based on ROBIN. To decide whether an entity is a member of a category, one compares it to the category's prototype (Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970; Reed, 1972). This theory can account for the phenomena that are problematic for the traditional theory. Because category membership no longer depends on necessary and sufficient conditions, all exemplars need not share the same properties. Stimuli will be better exemplars of a category the more closely related they are to the category's prototype. According to the exemplar theory, a category's mental representation encodes the exemplars that compose the category. To decide whether an entity is a member of a category, one compares it to the category's exemplars (Brooks, 1978; Estes, 1986; Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986). Again, this theory can account for the problematic phenomena. If all of the exemplars of a category are encoded, all exemplars need not share the same properties. Stimuli will be better exemplars of a category the more closely related they are to the category's exemplars. A considerable literature exists contrasting the prototype and exemplar theories. The research has typically used tasks in which novel categories are learned in the laboratory. The primary focus has been on the process by which a test stimulus is assigned to one of several contending categories after differences among these categories have been learned. A distinction has generally been made between stimuli that vary in terms of bi-valued (e.g., small, large) and multi-valued (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 cm) dimensions. Medin and his colleagues have repeatedly compared the prototype and exemplar theories using bi-valued stimuli (Medin, Altom, Edelson, & Freko, 1982; Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Medin, Dewey, & Murphy, 1983; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981; Nosofsky, Kruschke, & McKinley, 1992). These comparisons have supported the exemplar theory. …

A Schema Model for Examining the Integrity of Psychotherapy: A Theoretical Contribution

Basic principles of a schema model of psychotherapy are developed. According to this model, therapist competence is expressed in the extent to which the therapist's behavior reflects the overall therapy schema (schema influence) and in how well the behavior is adapted to the state of the patient (empathy). A procedure for performing adherence and competence ratings is inferred from the model. The schema model leads to at least four guidelines for achieving reliable and valid integrity ratings that differ from those of traditional approaches. First, it implies that the provision of prototypic exemplars, connected to stated principles on all levels of abstraction (technique, strategy, overall strategy) is the most precise way to exhibit competent use of a therapy model. Second, the evaluation of competence involves a series of hermeneutic part-whole-part circles moving across the abstraction levels. Third, because context is inextricably related to the application of schemas, a schema approach focuses the concrete course of therapy as it unfolds over time. Fourth, adherence to a model and rating of this adherence is viewed as a question of adopting the set of the model in a mindful way: let the events organize spontaneously without use of prescriptions.In diesem Beitrag werden die Grundprinzipien eines Schemamodells der Psychotherapie entwickelt. Diesem Modell zufolge drückt sich die Kompetenz des Therapeuten in dem Ausmass aus, in dem sein Verhalten das gesamte Therapieschema widerspiegelt (Einfluss des Schemas) und in dem Masse, wie gut dieses Verhalten mit dem Zustand des Patienten korrespondiert (Empathie). Von diesem Modell wird eine Methode zur Beurteilung der Konformität des Therapeuten mit dem Therapieschema und dessen Kompetenz abgeleitet. Dieses Schemamodell beinhaltet mindestens vier Richtlinien für die Erlangung reliabler und valider Integritätsbeurteilung, die sich von traditionellen Ansätzen unterscheiden. Es impliziert erstens, dass die Bereitstellung von Prototypen, die mit den wesentlichen Therapieprinzipien auf allen Abstraktionsebenen verbunden sind (Technik, Strategie, Gesamtstrategie) der exakteste Weg ist, die Evaluation der Kompetenz nach einer Reihe von hermeneutischen Schlussbildungen, die alle Abstraktionsebenen durschziehen müssen. Da der Kontext unausweichlich mit der Anwendung von Schemata verbunden ist, konzentriert sich ein Schemaansatz drittens auf den konkreten Therapieverlauf über der Zeit. Viertens wird die „Modelltreue” und deren Beurteilung als die Frage danach erachtet, wie eine Reihe von Modellen kreativ genutzt. werden: Die Ereignisse müssen sich ohne konkrete Vorschriften spontan organisieren.Les principes de base d'un modèle schématique de la psychothérapie sont développés ici. Selon ce modèle, la compétence du thérapeute est exprimée dans la mesure avec laquelle le comportement du thérapeutic reflète le schéma thérapeutique d'ensemble (influence du schéme) et de quelle manière le comportement est adapté à l'état du patient (empathie). Un procédé pour effectuer des évaluations d'adhérence et de compétence est déduit du modèle. Le modèle schématique conduit à au moins quatre lignes directrices pour atteindre des évaluations d'intégrité fidèle et valide qui diffèrent de celles des approches traditionnelles. Premièrement, cela implique que la provision d'exemplaires prototypiques, connectés aux principes statués à tous les niveaux d'abstraction (technique, stratégie, stratégie d'ensemble) est la manière la plus précise pour faire preuve d'une utilisation compétente d'un modèle thérapeutique. Deuxièmement, I'évaluation de compétence implique une série de cercles herméneutiques partie-tour-partie se déplaçant à travers les niveaux d'abstraction. Troisièment, parce que le contexte est inextricablement lié à I'application de schémas, une approche schématique se concentre sur le déroulement concret d'une thérapie dans son déploiement dans le temps. Quatrièment, l'adhérence à un modèle et l'évaluation de cette adhérence est vue comme une question d'adoption de l'ensemble du modèle de manièle de manière attentive: il faut laisser les événements s'organizer spontanément sans l'utilisation de préceptes.

Prototypicality of responses of autistic, language disordered, and normal children in a word fluency task

Abstract High-functioning autistic, specifically language-impaired, and normal children were administered word fluency tasks in which they were required to provide the names of animals and the names of vehicles. The exemplars provided by each subject for each category were assigned prototypicality ratings according to the norms of Uyeda and Mandler (1980). The autistic children provided less prototypic exemplars than did the language-impaired children or language-matched normals. The results support the notion that autistic children have a semantic processing impairment and that part of the basis for this impairment may lie at the level of organization within lexical categories.

Effects of prototypicality on categorization in 1- to 2-year-olds: Getting down to basic

Increasing evidence suggests that basic-level categories are a developmentally later achievement, resulting from differentiation of earlier global-level ones. Both within-category similarity and between-category contrast have been shown to be major determinants of categorization, and thus they are likely to affect differentiation as well. By varying exemplar prototypicality we examined the joint influence on differentiation of manipulations of within-category similarity and between-category contrast. Using object manipulation, we tested 13-, 16-, and 20-month-olds' (Experiment 1); and 24-and 28-month-olds (Experiment 2) categorization of global- and basic-level object sets composed entirely of prototypical exemplars and of nonprototypical exemplars. Effects of prototypicality were parallel at the global and basic levels: Categorization of prototypical exemplars was superior to that of nonprototypical exemplars. Children behaved systematically toward categories of prototypical exemplars at an earlier age than toward categories of nonprototypical exemplars. The gap between categorization of prototypical and nonprototypical exemplars narrowed first at the global level of contrast (i.e., at 24 months) and later at the basic level of contrast (i.e., at 28 months). The research provides new information on the effects of prototypicality and on the process of differentiation of early global categories into more specific basic-level ones.

Relative Group Size and Cognitive Representations of Ingroup and Outgroup

Two studies examined cognitive representations of ingroups and outgroups of varying relative group size. These cognitive representations were examined in the context of the category verification paradigm, wherein subjects have to decide the category membership for prototypic and nonprototypic exemplars of (ingroup and outgroup) social categories. The results of both studies confirm the prediction that the smaller group is subject to greater prototype cognitive representation, whereas the larger group is subject to greater exemplar cognitive representation. Discussion considers the implications of these results for some paradoxes of intergroup behavior, andfor stereotyping in general.

Links Between Personality Judgments and Contextualized Behavior Patterns: Situation-Behavior Profiles of Personality Prototypes

Research on personality judgment traditionally has assumed that the perceiver is guided intuitively by an implicit theory of global situation-free dispositions. In contrast, the cognitive social model of personality hypothesizes more contextualized person variables (e.g., how the individual encodes the situation, and the relevant expectancies it activates) that underlie the structure of social behavior. These person variables are expected to be expressed as stable profiles of if … then …, situation-behavior contingent relations: she does A when X but she does B when Y. This model predicts that prototypic exemplars of different personality types are characterized by meaningful profiles of behavior variability, patterned distinctively across situations. To examine the ecological validity of this hypothesis, children in a summer residential camp setting were observed for an average of 167 hours to track their on-going behavior across situations for 6 weeks. Each child also was rated for goodness of fit to th...

Beyond Literal Meanings: The Psychology of Allusion

When people understand expressions that are intended nonliterally, two kinds of meaning are simultaneously apprehended: the literal meanings of the words themselves and the speaker's intended figurative meaning. Standard models of language comprehension assume that the literal meanings of figurative expressions are rejected in favor of a nonliteral meaning. I propose an alternative approach in which literal meanings are systematically used to convey figurative meanings through the process of allusion: The use of an expression to refer to entities or situations that are prototypical exemplars of culturally shared concepts and symbols. This approach provides an account of how people use and understand figurative language in general, and metaphor and idioms in particular.

プロトタイプ事例の再認に及ぼす記銘事例とプロトタイプ事例の類似性の影響

To test whether the similarity between the prototypical and the study exemplars affects the recognition of prototypical exemplars, 60 undergraduates were presented two, four, or six sample exemplars simultaneously and then asked to judge whether average prototypical (Pa) or the modal prototypical (Pm) exemplars, was more similar to, or went together with them. In the narrow category structure which are composed of exemplars with less variable values, the Pa exemplars were selected as frequently as the Pm ones. In the wide category structure which are composed of the exemplars with more variable values, however, the Pm exemplars were selected more frequently than the Pa ones. Previous finding that Pm exemplars were more abstracted than Pa exemplars in the wide structure might be due to the similarity between prototypical exemplars and sample exemplars.

Understanding metaphorical comparisons: Beyond similarity.

Traditionally, metaphors such as job is a jail have been treated as implicit similes (i.e., this metaphor would be treated as if it were a comparison statement, job is like a jail). Tversky's account of similarity is applied to such nonliteral similarity expressions, and is shown to apply as readily to nonliteral comparisons as to literal comparisons. But treating metaphors as comparison statements fails to account for certain important phenomena, including metaphoricity itself (the judgment that a comparison statement is nonliteral). We argue that metaphors are exactly what they appear to be: class-inclusion assertions, in which the topic of the metaphor (e.g., job) is assigned to a diagnostic category (e.g., entities that confine one against one's will, are unpleasant, are difficult to escape from). In such assertions, the metaphor vehicle (e.g., jail) refers to that category, and at the same time is a prototypical exemplar of that category. This account of metaphor provides a basis for a theory of metaphor comprehension, and also clarifies why people use metaphors instead of similes. How do people understand nonliteral expressions such as my grandfather is a baby? Taken literally, this sentence seems false. A grandfather must be an adult, and an adult cannot be of an age to be included in the category baby. According to traditional theories of metaphor comprehension (see Ortony, 1979a), the listener must reject this false literal interpretation and somehow find a nonliteral interpretation that is appropriate to the context of the conversation. In terms of speech act theory, where an utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance that differs from sentence meaning (Searle, 1979, p. 114, italics added). A comprehension model based on this assumption postulates three stages:

反復記銘‐再認課題におけるプロトタイプの抽象

Two experiments were performed with 96 undergraduates to examine recognition memory of average prototypical exemplars, modal prototypical exemplars and original exemplars in a repeated study-recognition paradigm. In Experiment 1, the amount of within-category variability and the instruction for memorizing were varied. In the narrow category-structure which had less-variable exemplars, the confidence scores were higher for the average prototypical exemplars than for the modal ones, whereas the reverse was true in the wide category-structure which had morevariable exemplars. The confidence scores of modal prototypical exemplars were higher under the abstraction instruction than under the exemplar one. With repeated study-recognition trials, the confidence scores increased for the original exemplars but decreased for the average and modal prototypical exemplars. In Experiment 2, the amount of within-category variability and the presentation procedure of original exemplars were varied. Although the results were about the same as in Exp. 1, the confidence scores of modal prototypical exemplars were higher when the original exemplars were presented successively than when they were simultaneously. The findings were interpreted with reference to distinctiveness of dimensional values of the original exemplars and discriminability between the original exemplars and the prototypical exemplars.

Basic level categorization in seven- and nine-month-old infants.

ABSTRACTThe current reliance on linguistic data for inferences about the concept–word relationship has led to serious questions being raised regarding the existence and facilitative role of prelinguistic categories in early word learning. In three experiments a multiple habituation paradigm was used to examine the ability of 7- and 9-month-old prelinguistic infants to form a natural, basic-level object category. In Experiment 1, 9-month-old infants appeared to form a category of bird, but only when habituated to prototypical exemplars as opposed to poor exemplars. Discriminability between prototypical habituation exemplars and test stimuli was demonstrated in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, 7-month-olds did not form a category of bird when habituated to prototypes. These findings constitute independent evidence for the existence of a linguistically relevant nonlinguistic category prior to the onset of word comprehension. Moreover, formation of prelinguistic categories appears to be facilitated by exposure to prototypes. Such goodness-of-exemplar effects suggest a structural similarity between infants' prelinguistic categories and early semantic categories. Finally, nonlinguistic categorization of natural basic-level objects, as represented in line drawings, appears to emerge between 0;7 and 0;9.

What some concepts might not be

A discussion of the difficulties of prototype theories for describing compositional meaning motivates three experiments that inquire how well-defined concepts fare under paradigms that are commonly interpreted to support the prototype view. The stimulus materials include exemplars of prototype categories (sport, vehicle, fruit, vegetable) previously studied by others, and also exemplars of supposedly well-defined categories ( odd number, even number, female, and plane geometry figure). Experiment I, using these materials, replicated the exemplar rating experiment of Rosch (1973). It showed that both the well-defined and prototypic categories yield graded responses, the supposed hall-mark of a family resemblance structure. Experiment II, using the same sorts of stimulus materials, replicated a verification-time paradigm, also from Rosch (1973). Again, the finding was that both well-defined and prototypic categories yielded results previously interpreted to support a family-resemblance description of those categories, with faster verification times for prototypical exemplars of each category. In Experiment III, new subjects were asked outright whether membership in the category of fruit, odd number, etc., is a matter of degree, or is not, and then these subjects were rerun in the Experiment I paradigm. Though subjects judged odd number, etc., to be well-defined, they provided graded responses to all categories once again. These findings highlight interpretive difficulties for the experimental literature on this topic. Part I of the discussion first outlines a dual theory of concepts and their identification procedures that seems to organize these outcomes. But Part II of the discussion argues that feature theories are too impoverished to describe mental categories, in general.

Prototypicality norms for 28 semantic categories

The extent to which an item is a prototypical exemplar of a category has been found to predict several experimental results (e.g., reaction times in category classification, free and cued recall of lists, release from proactive inhibition in recall). We present prototypicality ratings for 840 words, equally distributed over 28categories. Thecategories were taken from Battig and Montague’s (1969) normative tables; only those categories that contained “concrete” items in common usage were employed in the study. Intragroup reliability correlations were high for all categories tested, as were the correlations for prototypicality ratings between the present study and that of Rosch (1975). In addition, correlations between prototypicality ratings, production frequencies, and word frequencies of the items are given.