Auction Protocol Research Articles

ETradeChain: Blockchain-Based Energy Trading in Local Energy Market (LEM) Using Modified Double Auction Protocol

ETradeChain: Blockchain-Based Energy Trading in Local Energy Market (LEM) Using Modified Double Auction Protocol

Secure blockchain bidding auction protocol against malicious adversaries

In recent years, with the development of blockchain, electronic bidding auction has received more and more attention. Aiming at the possible problems of privacy leakage in the current electronic bidding and auction, this paper proposes an electronic bidding auction system based on blockchain against malicious adversaries, which uses the secure multi-party computation to realize secure bidding auction protocol without any trusted third party. The protocol proposed in this paper is an electronic bidding auction scheme based on the threshold elliptic curve cryptography. It can be implemented without any third party to complete the bidding auction for some malicious behaviors of the participants, which can solve the problem of resisting malicious adversary attacks. The security of the protocol is proved by the real/ideal model paradigm, and the efficiency of the protocol is analyzed. The efficiency of the protocol is verified by simulating experiments, and the protocol has practical value.

A New Quantum Sealed-Bid Auction Protocol with a Set of Local Indistinguishable Orthogonal Product States

Quantum sealed-bid auction (QSA) is a special form of transaction with significant applications in the economic and financial fields. Using a unique set of locally indistinguishable orthogonal product (LIOP) states, we propose a new QSA protocol in this paper. In the protocol, the bid message is encoded as a quantum sequence of LIOP states, and the different particles of LIOP states are transmitted separately. Even though an attacker obtains a portion of the particles, they cannot recover the entire bid message because of the local indistinguishability of LIOP states. Once the auctioneer announces the winner’s bid, all bidders are able to confirm the authenticity of their bid. With the help of a semi-honest third party, collusion between the auctioneer and a malicious bidder can be discovered. Finally, our protocol is capable of meeting all requirements for secure sealed-bid auctions through security and completeness analysis. Additionally, the proposed protocol does not require any entangled resources and complicated operations, so it can be easily implemented in practice.

Trustworthy sealed-bid auction with low communication cost atop blockchain

Auction, widely used by firms and governments, has facilitated trillions of dollars in the world economy. However, when price is the only factor determining the winner, how to guarantee the trustworthiness of the auction outcomes, and at the same time preserve the privacy of losing bidders is a challenging issue. In this paper, to address this issue, we present a sealed-bid auction protocol with privacy preserving and public verifiability atop blockchain. No bidder is able to repudiate or change any bidding to outbid others and all public information comes with proof that even observers are able to validate the auction. Proofs post along the way to validate biddings and identify the winner are in the form of group elements with communication complexity O(log⁡(nm)), n,m denoting the upper bound bit length of the bidding price and the number of bidders respectively. The logarithmic complexity significantly reduces the communication cost and makes it practical for large-scale auction. Moreover, our protocol can be easily extended to any type of ordinal-price sealed-bid auction such as second-price with privacy preserving. We provide detailed security proofs or analysis of the required security goals. The evaluation of time cost in off-chain operations and gas cost in on-chain functions demonstrate the practicality of our protocol in real-world applications.

The cost of privacy on blockchain: A study on sealed-bid auctions

In order to preserve privacy in a blockchain ecosystem, the main objective is to keep a transaction's data private, such as the sender, the receiver, and the amount transferred. The current work studies the cryptographic tools commonly used to achieve this type of privacy, primarily focusing on the Ethereum blockchain. Such tools usually require many computational and storage resources, leading to additional fees. An anonymous auction protocol was developed as a case study to explore these costs, where hiding the identity and the amount of the bids utilizes a variety of cryptographic primitives. The proposed implementation was compared against three sealed-bid auction protocols, which utilize similar cryptographic tools for preserving privacy throughout the auction process. The results show that providing an additional level of anonymity, such as hiding someone's identity, can increase the gas cost significantly, up to 2.5 times, depending on the choice of the cryptographic tools, which determine the usage of the blockchain's storage and computational resources. By adjusting the level of decentralization on the application level by moving some operations off-chain and maintaining the role of the auctioneer, we show that we can maintain anonymity while reducing the gas cost by 40%.

SEAL: A Strategy-Proof and Privacy-Preserving UAV Computation Offloading Framework

Due to the limited battery and computing resource, offloading unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)’ computation tasks to ground infrastructure, e.g., vehicles, is a fundamental framework. Under such an open and untrusted environment, vehicles are reluctant to share their computing resource unless provisioning strong incentives, privacy protection, and fairness guarantee. Precisely, without strategy-proofness guarantee, the strategic vehicles can overclaim participation costs so as to conduct market manipulation. Without the fairness provision, vehicles can deliberately abort the assigned tasks without any punishments, and UAVs can refuse to pay by the end, causing an exchange dilemma. Lastly, the strategy-proofness and fairness provision typically require transparent payment/task results exchange under public audit, which may disclose sensitive information of vehicles and make the privacy preservation a foremost issue. To achieve the three design goals, we propose SEAL, an integrated framework to address Strategy-proof, fair, and privacy-prEserving UAV computation offLoading. SEAL deploys a strategy-proof reverse combinatorial auction mechanism to optimize UAVs’ task offloading under practical constraints while ensuring economic-robustness and polynomial-time efficiency. Based on smart contracts and hashchain micropayment, SEAL implements a fair on-chain exchange protocol to realize the atomic completion of batch payments and computing results in multi-round auctions. In addition, a privacy-preserving off-chain auction protocol is devised with the assistance of the trusted processor to efficiently protect vehicles’ bid privacy. Using rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we validate that SEAL can effectively prevent vehicles from manipulating, ensure privacy protection and fairness, improve the offloading efficiency, and reduce UAV’s energy costs and expenses with low overheads.

Agent-based Negotiation for Cooperative Transports within Aircraft Production

Multi-agent systems have been used for many decades to solve problems within complex industrial systems. The most common means of coordination is the Contract Net Protocol, a simple yet powerful auction protocol, which has been enhanced by many authors and addressed by different standardization efforts. Autonomous transportation for aircraft production is a particularly challenging area of automation. It necessitates flexible and reliable approaches, including reliable communication and execution of processes for which existing agent frameworks are insufficient. This contribution outlines current efforts within the community to build a ROS2-based agent framework and proposes an applicable capability-modeling approach as well as a suitable negotiation protocol for cooperative transport processes.

Reverse auction protocol based on quantum teleportation

Reverse auction is a revolutionary procurement technology, widely used in enterprises and governments, which can increase purchasing transparency and reduce purchasing costs. In this paper, we combine reverse auction with quantum theory and propose a novel protocol that guarantees security by adopting quantum teleportation, quantum key distribution and so on. This protocol also has the properties of anonymity of supplier, verifiability, disavowal impossibility and traceability, properties that ensure the fairness of transactions. The analysis results show that the protocol is simple, high performing and reliable. We hope that it will be applied in real life.

Quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on quantum secret sharing

Quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on quantum secret sharing

Quantum and semi-quantum sealed-bid auction: vulnerabilities and advantages

A family of existing protocols for quantum sealed-bid auction is critically analyzed, and it is shown that they are vulnerable under several attacks (e.g., the participant's and non-participant's attacks as well as the collusion attack of participants) and some of the claims made in these works are not correct. We obtained the bounds on the success probability of an eavesdropper in accessing the sealed-bids. Further, realizing the role of secure sealed-bid auction in the reduction of corruption, a new protocol for sealed-bid auction is proposed which is semi-quantum in nature, where the bidders do not have quantum resources but they can perform classical operations on the quantum states. The security of the proposed protocol is established against a set of attacks, and thus it is established that the proposed protocol is free from the vulnerabilities reported here in the context of the existing protocols.

Anonymous Quantum Sealed-Bid Auction

In this brief, we present a novel quantum protocol for sealed-bid auction and design the corresponding quantum circuits. In the proposed protocol, we introduce two auctioneers to ensure that they can supervise each other, where one is a classical auctioneer, and the other is a quantum auctioneer. Furthermore, we turn sealed-bid auction into secure multiparty summation by employing the Chinese Remainder Theorem to achieve the anonymity. Compared with the related protocols, the proposed protocol can meet more security properties, e.g., anonymity, fairness, verifiability, secrecy and non-repudiation.

A secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on quantum public key encryption

A secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on quantum public key encryption

Financing land acquisition for infrastructure projects

Land acquisition for infrastructure projects that require a large amount of funding can be financed with an equity-like protocol. The auction protocol does not require knowledge of the reservation value of the land acquired, nor does it require determination of the post-development value of the land in the surrounding area. Competition among private players transfers the value of pecuniary externalities, manifested in land price appreciation, to the government, which it can use to partially finance the project.

A second-hand shipwreck market: Salvage auctions in mid-eighteenth-century Helsinki

When a merchant ship was wrecked in the Gulf of Finland in the eighteenth century it was salvaged (mainly its running rigging), together with its cargo. In eighteenth-century Sweden, salvage was the monopoly of the Northern Diving and Salvage Company (1729–1802). In Helsinki, several salvage auctions were held each year. Salvage documents are useful sources not only for investigating the demand for ship parts, but also for identifying ships and explaining past marine accidents. The detailed technical knowledge provided by auction protocols offers insight into ships and their equipment in the early modern Baltic. Many ships were on their way to St Petersburg (established in 1703), the home port of European naval stores, but many of them were wrecked on the rocky coasts of Helsinki. This gave rise to a strange kind of shipping based on random imports and the use of recycled cordage, sails and anchors from the shores blessed by unfortunate ships.

BA2P : Bidirectional and Anonymous Auction Protocol with Dispute-Freeness

Electronic auction is a popular platform to sell goods, task assignment, and resources’ allocation due to reductions of transaction costs and has attracted a huge number of potential buyers. However, it is challenging to address the disputes between the buyer and the auctioneer. The main reason is, on the one hand, solving such problem leverages to the broad domain of research aspects, such as economic theory, engineering, and cryptography, and, on the other hand, it is difficult to arbitrate in a decentralized and anonymous setting. In this work, we consider a more general framework to solve the potential disputes by enforcing bidirectional confirmation and public verification. Hence, the bidding procedure is clear to inspect and potential disputes can be erased. To achieve this goal, we propose policy-driven chameleon hash and revised linkable-and-redactable ring signature as building blocks. We used these two tools to build a bidirectional and anonymous auction protocol called BA 2 P. In our BA 2 P protocol, the bidders can competitively and anonymously place their bids to outbid others. At the end of the auction protocol, everyone can verify the validity of the bidding proof and decide the winner. Thus, dispute-freeness feature is achieved. The analysis suggests that our proposal is provably secure and practically efficient, and it trades some efficiencies with dispute-freeness feature.

Quantum sealed-bid auction protocol for simultaneous ascending auction with GHZ states

Quantum sealed-bid auction protocol for simultaneous ascending auction with GHZ states

Anonymous Auction Protocol Based on Timed-Release Encryption Atop Consortium Blockchain

Anonymous Auction Protocol Based on Timed-Release Encryption Atop Consortium Blockchain

Quantum-based privacy-preserving sealed-bid auction on the blockchain

Sealed-bid auction is one of the major protocols used in the electronic commerce industry. Recently, many schemes have been proposed to implement sealed-bid auction protocols based on quantum computing, while other schemes have adopted the blockchain. However, each of the previous proposals has focused on a few sealed-bid auction features while simply ignoring others. A robust sealed-bid auction protocol should comprise all important features and satisfy all requirements. We design a sealed-bid auction protocol using quantum-based blockchain, in which the transactions of the sealed-bid auction are stored using the blockchain and supported by quantum computation and communication to enhance security and protect privacy. Our proposed protocol takes advantage of both quantum computing and blockchain technology to ensure essential features and requirements. Security analysis, evaluation, and comparisons are presented to demonstrate the advantages of our protocol.

FIPA İngiliz Açık Artırma Protokolünün Rol Tabanlı Bir Çoklu Etmen Çerçevesi ile Gerçekleştirilmesi

Agents are autonomous and complex software units. One of the major characteristics of agents is sociality. In general, agents do not work single to achieve their objectives. They try to achieve own objectives by working collaboratively with other agents situated in same multi agent system(s). Collaboration among agents situated in same or different agent platform(s) is realizable if and only if correspondence among agents is based on specific communication and interaction standards. Definition of standards increase acceptability of agent technology by industry. In this study, the interaction protocol named as “English Auction” which has been specified by FIPA was implemented by using the role-based development environment provided by SEAGENT framework. As a conclusion of the study, the agent roles and the agent plans that achieve the goals of these roles in the FIPA English Auction Protocol were obtained. These generic plans can be simply reused in other multi agent system applications developed using SEAGENT framework.

A Blockchain-based Iterative Double Auction Protocol Using Multiparty State Channels

Although the iterative double auction has been widely used in many different applications, one of the major problems in its current implementations is that they rely on a trusted third party to handle the auction process. This imposes the risk of single point of failures, monopoly, and bribery. In this article, we aim to tackle this problem by proposing a novel decentralized and trustless framework for iterative double auction based on blockchain. Our design adopts the smart contract and state channel technologies to enable a double auction process among parties that do not need to trust each other, while minimizing the blockchain transactions. In specific, we propose an extension to the original concept of state channels that can support multiparty computation. Then, we provide a formal development of the proposed framework and prove the security of our design against adversaries. Finally, we develop a proof-of-concept implementation of our framework using Elixir and Solidity, on which we conduct various experiments to demonstrate its feasibility and practicality.