Abstract Physical protection systems (PPSs) are designed to counter and neutralize any theft or sabotage attempts carried out against a given site. PPS designs are crucial, requiring rigorous analysis and evaluation to ensure their reliability, sustainability and optimal security. This paper assumes a Hypothetical Nuclear Research Center (HNRC) for PPS analysis and evaluation. This work will determine the PPS’s most vulnerable path elements, by demonstrating expected intrusion attack scenarios by taking advantage of the HNRC’s design weaknesses. Also, this work determines the threats resulting from adversary intrusion through the weakness path elements located at the nuclear site. Additionally, this paper develops an analytical methodology for this evaluation and risk assessment, by using the Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion (SAVI) computer program. Through constructing adversary sequence diagrams (ASDs), SAVI can easily identify the HNRC’s most vulnerable paths, pinpointing the areas which require the most attention. Alongside SAVI is the quantitative risk analysis method - the Dai et al. Model – which can calculate the effectiveness and risk of the PPS itself by measuring its degree of uncertainty using effectiveness entropy. To comply with effectiveness and risk standards, this work also introduces security system upgrade processes and determines the optimal security solution for the HNRC.
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