Client Protection Research Articles

Diversion in the Canadian Juvenile Justice System: A Tale of Two Cities

AbstractThe present study attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of diversion in the juvenile justice system by comparing two different communities. One community has a formalized, well‐established diversion program whereas the other community utilizes the Family Court to a much greater extent. Preliminary data suggests no difference in recidivism for a matched sample of young offenders. The implications of the study are discussed in terms of future research on diversion and the need for appropriate comparison groups.In the past two decades, diversion programs have been one of the major innovations within the juvenile justice system. These programs have attempted to divert juveniles from the formal process involving court hearings by creating alternative interventions at the policy and community level. The basic premises underlying these programs is that the formal court system may do more harm than good by labeling youngsters as “delinquent” and rendering them more vulnerable by involvement in an adversary process (Reference numbers 4, 12, 14). Diversion programs that provide youngsters with an opportunity to make restitution or perform community services are compensation for their misbehavior are seen as more immediate and meaningful consequences than awaiting a formal adversarial court hearing (5, 13).However, diversion programs have not met with universal acceptance. Critics have pointed out that programs, in fact, “widen the justice net” by processing children who never would have gone to court anyway (3, 7). As well, concerns have been raised as to the protection of clients' legal rights in the diversion program and the dangers of “double jeopardy” in the event that failure in a program could lead to an even more severe disposition by the court (8, 9).The debate over the effectiveness of diversion programs has been fueled by the lack of research. Although there are many studies that suggest the success of this approach (1, 6, 10), the research has suffered in its credibility due to the absence of appropriate control groups.The present study attempted to fill this significant void in previous evaluations of diversion, by comparing two communities in southwestern Ontario with different approaches to juvenile justice. The cities of Windsor and London are approximately 200 km apart, with comparative populations (200,000 vs 250,000). Windsor has well established diversion programs with substantial support of community agencies, the police force and Crown Attorney's office. This program is described in detail elsewhere (2, 11) so will not be outlined here. London has no such program and consequently has an obviously greater number of youngsters handled through the formalized juvenile court. The authors hoped to capitalize on this “naturally occurring difference” in approach between the two cities by examining the rate of recidivism of young offenders as well as determine their attitudes (and that of their parents) toward the interventions they received.The hypotheses in the pilot studies outlined were that the diversion program youth in Windsor would have a more positive attitude about their intervention and would be less likely to recidivate than a matched sample of youth in London, based on the theoretical underpinning of diversion as well as the results of previous outcome studies.

Medical vs Legal Fee Splitting

To the Editor:— James H. Hutton, MD, compares medical fee splitting (proscribed) to fee splitting in the legal profession which is approved by the bar association. He suggests that medical fees be paid in lump sum and the doctors split them any way they see fit. A fallacy in the comparison is that fee splitting among lawyers is self-regulating, since most fees are contingent on the size of the settlement. Therefore it is to the advantage of the client to secure lawyer A in the hope that he will get a large award. It is also to the advantage of lawyer A to secure the services of lawyer B who may be able to get an even larger award. Lawyer A can't possibly choose a less talented lawyer or his fees would suffer. The system provides for referrals of increasing- competence, and an increasing degree of protection for the client.