In their paper “Assisted Suicide Is Not Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Watts and Howell1 engage the debate regarding physician assisted suicide. As the authors noted, we previously had written “Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Individual Case and Public Policy.“2 Our intent in writing that article was to focus on the more general issue of voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) and not specifically on assisted suicide, since our article was a companion to the American Geriatric Society position paper on VAE.3 We now take the opportunity to explain our views about policy regarding physician assisted suicide. A central premise of our argument against legalizing VAE is that policy must comprehensively assess the benefits and the risks, both to the individual and to society. In this framework, we argued that potential pitfalls from legalized VAE outweighed the perceived benefits. How should we judge physician assisted suicide in this framework? The authors justify assisted suicide by citing the compelling case of those with intractable pain. How many patients cannot get adequate symptom relief once enrolled in hospice programs? The limited research that has been done suggests that this number is small.4,5 Obviously, more research is needed regarding the degree to which adequate palliation is not achieved, especially if it is not achieved despite vigorous efforts. However, the debate is not decided if a small number have intractable pain. There may be a few tragic cases whose only relief is found in continuous near-anesthetic analgesia. Our society must grapple with seriously inequitable access to supportive health care services, including hospice. Many will not get even first-line efforts to relieve pain and suffering. Our grave concern is that patient requests for assisted suicide will largely be prompted by lack of access to supportive services for the dying. Those at greatest risk for lack of access are the impoverished and those at risk of impoverishment with survival. A policy that encourages patients to choose to end life because of a lack of adequate supportive services is “inhumane,” to use Watts and Howell's term. As we previously noted,2 the most difficult cases will not be those with intractable pain but those with a “weariness with life.” Van der Maas and colleagues' work6 suggests that patients give this reason in just over one-fifth of the cases. No one yet knows how often these requests are firm and thoughtful requests, not arising dominantly from depression or social isolation. We find these cases quite troubling. The care that Dr. Quill gave his patient before the patient's decision to implement suicide would seem to be exemplary.7 Will we be able to secure similar standards for medical practice as a whole? Certainly, we have far to go. In The Netherlands, where VAE is not prosecuted, evidence to date indicates that the regulatory process falls far short of protecting patient rights.8 Although “ultimately” the patient is responsible for physician-assisted suicide, manipulation and coercion can be subtle. Having no attractive alternatives because of shortcomings of the health care system is quite coercive. Policy changes must be informed by carefully conducted empirical research and public debate. Virtually no such research exists, and the public debate is therefore clouded. Educational efforts to train health care providers to palliate pain and psychological distress during dying are obviously justified. Likewise, those who are dying must have appropriate access to palliative care. When this society has secured these services for all and has engendered reliable research, then we should debate whether killing the remaining sufferers can sometimes be justified. The reverse order would be a serious error.