Propositional Modal Logic Research Articles

Liar-type Paradoxes and the Incompleteness Phenomena

We define a liar-type paradox as a consistent proposition in propositional modal logic which is obtained by attaching boxes to several subformulas of an inconsistent proposition in classical propositional logic, and show several famous paradoxes are liar-type. Then we show that we can generate a liar-type paradox from any inconsistent proposition in classical propositional logic and that undecidable sentences in arithmetic can be obtained from the existence of a liar-type paradox. We extend these results to predicate logic and discuss Yablo’s Paradox in this framework. Furthermore, we define explicit and implicit self-reference in paradoxes in the incompleteness phenomena.

Ockham’s Calculus of Strict Implication

In his main work Summa Logicae written around 1323, William of Ockham developed a system of propositional modal logic which contains almost all theorems of a modern calculus of strict implication. This calculus is formally reconstructed here with the help of modern symbols for the operators of conjunction, disjunction, implication, negation, possibility, and necessity.

Semantics of Propositional Fuzzy Modal Logic with Evaluated Syntax and its Application to Fuzzy Decision Implications

AbstractThis paper deals with propositional fuzzy modal logic with evaluated syntax based on MV-algebras. We focus on its semantical theory from the viewpoint of Pavelka's graded semantics of propositional fuzzy logic, investigate the L-tautologies based on different Kripke frames. We also define the notion of L-semantical consequence operation, its some basic properties are obtained. Finally, this paper considers the fuzzy decision implications in propositional fuzzy modal logic with evaluated syntax based on MV-algebras, and presents a kind of semantical characteristics of fuzzy decision implications. Moreover, we introduce the notions of possible and necessary fuzzy decision implication, and their semantical characteristics are presented as well.

Variants of multi-relational semantics for propositional non-normal modal logics

A number of significant contributions in the last four decades show that non-normal modal logics can be fruitfully employed in several applied fields. Well-known domains are epistemic logic, deontic logic, and systems capturing different aspects of action and agency such as the modal logic of agency, concurrent propositional dynamic logic, game logic, and coalition logic. Semantics for such logics are traditionally based on neighbourhood models. However, other model-theoretic semantics can be used for this purpose. Here, we systematically study multi-relational structures, whose investigation is still relatively underdeveloped. After a brief introduction to two different versions of multi-relational semantics – which we call strong and weak multi-relational semantics – we proceed to study several modal schemata. Special attention is paid to the schemata CON and D. Finally we offer completeness proofs for several systems using both strong and weak semantic tools: The proofs thus cover both classical systems and N-monotonic systems.

Second-order propositional modal logic and monadic alternation hierarchies

We establish that the quantifier alternation hierarchy of formulae of second-order propositional modal logic (SOPML) induces an infinite corresponding semantic hierarchy over the class of finite directed graphs. This solves an open problem of van Benthem (1985) [5] and ten Cate (2006) [11]. We also identify modal characterizations of the expressive power of second-order logic (SO) and monadic second-order logic (MSO) in terms of extensions of modal logic with second-order quantification.

The bounded proof property via step algebras and step frames

The paper introduces semantic and algorithmic methods for establishing a variant of the analytic subformula property (called ‘the bounded proof property’, bpp) for modal propositional logics. The bpp is much weaker property than full cut-elimination, but it is nevertheless sufficient for establishing decidability results. Our methodology originated from tools and techniques developed on one side within the algebraic/coalgebraic literature dealing with free algebra constructions and on the other side from classical correspondence theory in modal logic. As such, our approach is orthogonal to recent literature based on proof-theoretic methods and, in a way, complements it.We applied our method to simple logics such as K, T, K4, S4, etc., where establishing basic metatheoretical properties becomes a completely automatic task (the related proof obligations can be instantaneously discharged by current first-order provers). For more complicated logics, some ingenuity is still needed, however we were able to successfully apply our uniform method to the well-known cut-free system for GL, to Goré's cut-free system for S4.3, and to Ohnishi–Matsumoto's analytic system for S5.

UNIFORM INTERPOLATION IN SUBSTRUCTURAL LOGICS

AbstractUniform interpolation property of a given logic is a stronger form of Craig’s interpolation property where both pre-interpolant and post-interpolant always exist uniformly for any provable implication in the logic. It is known that there exist logics, e.g., modal propositional logic S4, which have Craig’s interpolation property but do not have uniform interpolation property. The situation is even worse for predicate logics, as classical predicate logic does not have uniform interpolation property as pointed out by L. Henkin.In this paper, uniform interpolation property of basic substructural logics is studied by applying the proof-theoretic method introduced by A. Pitts (Pitts, 1992). It is shown that uniform interpolation property holds even for their predicate extensions, as long as they can be formalized by sequent calculi without contraction rules. For instance, uniform interpolation property of full Lambek predicate calculus, i.e., the substructural logic without any structural rule, and of both linear and affine predicate logics without exponentials are proved.

WHAT IS THE CORRECT LOGIC OF NECESSITY, ACTUALITY AND APRIORITY?

AbstractThis paper is concerned with a propositional modal logic with operators for necessity, actuality and apriority. The logic is characterized by a class of relational structures defined according to ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics, and can therefore be seen as formalizing the relations between necessity, actuality and apriority according to epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We can ask whether this logic is correct, in the sense that its theorems are all and only the informally valid formulas. This paper gives outlines of two arguments that jointly show that this is the case. The first is intended to show that the logic is informally sound, in the sense that all of its theorems are informally valid. The second is intended to show that it is informally complete, in the sense that all informal validities are among its theorems. In order to give these arguments, a number of independently interesting results concerning the logic are proven. In particular, the soundness and completeness of two proof systems with respect to the semantics is proven (Theorems 2.11 and 2.15), as well as a normal form theorem (Theorem 3.2), an elimination theorem for the actuality operator (Corollary 3.6), and the decidability of the logic (Corollary 3.7). It turns out that the logic invalidates a plausible principle concerning the interaction of apriority and necessity; consequently, a variant semantics is briefly explored on which this principle is valid. The paper concludes by assessing the implications of these results for epistemic two-dimensional semantics.

QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC ON THE RATIONAL LINE

AbstractIn the topological semantics for propositional modal logic, S4 is known to be complete for the class of all topological spaces, for the rational line, for Cantor space, and for the real line. In the topological semantics for quantified modal logic, QS4 is known to be complete for the class of all topological spaces, and for the family of subspaces of the irrational line. The main result of the current paper is that QS4 is complete, indeed strongly complete, for the rational line.

Worlds and Propositions Set Free

The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worlds. Next the authors show that an object-theoretic analysis of the Kaplan paradox reveals that there is no genuine paradox at all, as the central premise of the paradox is simply a logical falsehood and hence can be rejected on the strongest possible grounds—not only in object theory but for the very framework of propositional modal logic in which Kaplan frames his argument. The authors close by fending off a possible objection that object theory avoids the Russell paradox only by refusing to incorporate set theory and, hence, that the object-theoretic solution is only a consequence of the theory’s weakness.

Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics 1.15

In Prior Analytics 1.15 Aristotle undertakes to establish certain modal syllogisms of the form XQM. Although these syllogisms are central to his modal system, the proofs he offers for them are problematic. The precise structure of these proofs is disputed, and it is often thought that they are invalid. We propose an interpretation which resolves the main difficulties with them: the proofs are valid given a small number of intrinsically plausible assumptions, although they are in tension with some claims found elsewhere in Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. The proofs make use of a rule of propositional modal logic which we call the possibility rule. We investigate how this rule interacts and coheres with the core elements of the modal syllogistic.

On predicate provability logics and binumerations of fragments of Peano arithmetic

Solovay proved (Israel J Math 25(3---4):287---304, 1976) that the propositional provability logic of any ?2-sound recursively enumerable extension of PA is characterized by the propositional modal logic GL. By contrast, Montagna proved in (Notre Dame J Form Log 25(2):179---189, 1984) that predicate provability logics of Peano arithmetic and Bernays---Godel set theory are different. Moreover, Artemov proved in (Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR 290(6):1289---1292, 1986) that the predicate provability logic of a theory essentially depends on the choice of a binumeration of the theory which is used to construct the provability predicate. In this paper, we compare predicate provability logics of I? n 's. For a binumeration ?(x) of a recursive theory T, let PL ?(T) be the predicate provability logic of T defined by ?(x). We prove that for any natural numbers i, j such that 0 < i < j, there exists a ?1 binumeration ?(x) of some recursive axiomatization of I? i such that $${{\sf PL}_\alpha({\rm I \Sigma}_i) \nsupseteq \bigcap_{\beta(x)}{\sf PL}_\beta({\rm I \Sigma}_j)}$$ PL ? ( I Σ i ) ? ? β ( x ) PL β ( I Σ j ) and $${{\sf PL}_\alpha({\rm I \Sigma}_i) \nsubseteq \bigcup_{\beta(x)}{\sf PL}_\beta({\rm I \Sigma}_j)}$$ PL ? ( I Σ i ) ? ? β ( x ) PL β ( I Σ j ) , where β(x) ranges over all ?1 binumerations of recursive axiomatizations of I? j .

Preservation of Craig interpolation by the product of matrix logics

The product of matrix logics, possibly with additional interaction axioms, is shown to preserve a slightly relaxed notion of Craig interpolation. The result is established symbolically, capitalizing on the complete axiomatization of the product of matrix logics provided by their meet-combination. Along the way preservation of the metatheorem of deduction is also proved. The computation of the interpolant in the resulting logic is proved to be polynomially reducible to the computation of the interpolants in the two given logics. Illustrations are provided for classical, intuitionistic and modal propositional logics.

Vagueness: Subvaluationism

AbstractSupervaluationism is a well known theory of vagueness. Subvaluationism is a less well known theory of vagueness. But these theories cannot be taken apart, for they are in a relation of duality that can be made precise. This paper provides an introduction to the subvaluationist theory of vagueness in connection to its dual, supervaluationism. A survey on the supervaluationist theory can be found in the Compass paper of Keefe (2008); our presentation of the theory in this paper will be short to get rapidly into the logical issues. This paper is relatively self‐contained. A modest background on propositional modal logic is, though not strictly necessary, advisable. The reader might find useful the Compass papers Kracht (2011) and Negri (2011) (though these papers cover issues of more complexity than what is demanded to follow this paper).

A logic for epistemic two-dimensional semantics

Epistemic two-dimensional semantics is a theory in the philosophy of language that provides an account of meaning which is sensitive to the distinction between necessity and apriority. While this theory is usually presented in an informal manner, I take some steps in formalizing it in this paper. To do so, I define a semantics for a propositional modal logic with operators for the modalities of necessity, actuality, and apriority that captures the relevant ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics. I also describe some properties of the logic that are interesting from a philosophical perspective, and apply it to the so-called nesting problem.

ARITHMETICAL INTERPRETATIONS AND KRIPKE FRAMES OF PREDICATE MODAL LOGIC OF PROVABILITY

AbstractSolovay proved the arithmetical completeness theorem for the system GL of propositional modal logic of provability. Montagna proved that this completeness does not hold for a natural extension QGL of GL to the predicate modal logic. Let Th(QGL) be the set of all theorems of QGL, Fr(QGL) be the set of all formulas valid in all transitive and conversely well-founded Kripke frames, and let PL(T) be the set of all predicate modal formulas provable in Tfor any arithmetical interpretation. Montagna’s results are described as Th(QGL) ⊊ (Fr(QGL), PL(PA) ⊈ Fr(QGL), and Th(QGL) ⊊ PL(PA).In this paper, we prove the following three theorems: (1) Fr(QGL) ⊈ PL(T) for any Σ1-sound recursively enumerable extension T of I Σ1, (2) PL(T) ⊈ Fr(QGL) for any recursively enumerable A-theory T extending I Σ1, and (3) Th(QGL) ⊊ Fr(QGL) ∩ PL(T) for any recursively enumerable A-theory T extending I Σ2.To prove these theorems, we use iterated consistency assertions and nonstandard models of arithmetic, and we improve Artemov’s lemma which is used to prove Vardanyan’s theorem on the Π02-completeness of PL(T).

Actuality in Propositional Modal Logic

We show that the actuality operator A is redundant in any propositional modal logic characterized by a class of Kripke models (respectively, neighborhood mod- els). Specifically, we prove that for every formula φ in the propositional modal language with A, there is a formula ψ not containing A such that φ and ψ are materially equivalent at the actual world in every Kripke model (respectively, neighborhood model). Inspection of the proofs leads to corresponding proof-theoretic results concerning the eliminability of the actuality operator in the actuality extension of any normal propositional modal logic and of any "classical" modal logic. As an application, we provide an alternative proof of a result of Williamson's to the effect that the compound operator A behaves, in any normal logic between T and S5, like the simple necessity operator in S5.

Dynamic measure logic

This paper brings together Dana Scottʼs measure-based semantics for the propositional modal logic S4, and recent work in Dynamic Topological Logic. In a series of recent talks, Scott showed that the language of S4 can be interpreted in the Lebesgue measure algebra, M, or algebra of Borel subsets of the real interval, [0,1], modulo sets of measure zero. Conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are interpreted via the Boolean structure of the algebra, and we add an interior operator on M that interprets the □-modality. In this paper we show how to extend this measure-based semantics to the bimodal logic S4C. S4C is interpreted in ‘dynamic topological systems,’ or topological spaces together with a continuous function acting on the space. We extend Scottʼs measure based semantics to this bimodal logic by defining a class of operators on the algebra M, which we call O-operators and which take the place of continuous functions in the topological semantics for S4C. The main result of the paper is that S4C is complete for the Lebesgue measure algebra. A strengthening of this result, also proved here, is that there is a single measure-based model in which all non-theorems of S4C are refuted.

Intuitionistic implication makes model checking hard

We investigate the complexity of the model checking problem for intuitionistic and modal propositional logics over transitive Kripke models. More specific, we consider intuitionistic logic IPC, basic propositional logic BPL, formal propositional logic FPL, and Jankov's logic KC. We show that the model checking problem is P-complete for the implicational fragments of all these intuitionistic logics. For BPL and FPL we reach P-hardness even on the implicational fragment with only one variable. The same hardness results are obtained for the strictly implicational fragments of their modal companions. Moreover, we investigate whether formulas with less variables and additional connectives make model checking easier. Whereas for variable free formulas outside of the implicational fragment, FPL model checking is shown to be in LOGCFL, the problem remains P-complete for BPL.

Lattice-valued modal propositional logic based on M-lattice implication algebras

The modal lattice implication algebra (i. e., M-lattice implication algebra) is introduced and its properties are investigated. The modal lattice-valued propositional logical system is introduced by considering the M-lattice implication algebra as the valuation field, and the syntax and semantic of the logical system are discussed, respectively.