Propositional Content Research Articles

Absurdity as the impossible command in natural deduction

AbstractIn this paper, we propose a new approach to absurdity in the context of natural deduction for intuitionistic and classical logic. It combines the aspects of both the logical approach, which treats absurdity as a propositional constant, and the structural approach, which treats absurdity as a structural punctuation mark signalling the dead end of derivations. In particular, we will treat absurdity as an impossible command, that is, a speech act composed of an imperative force indicator, and the false propositional constant, that is, a proposition that cannot be true by definition. In return, we obtain a framework that constitutes a middle ground between the logical and structural approaches. For example, it allows us to consider the ex falso quodlibet rule as a kind of structural rule, specifically, a semi‐structural rule, and at the same time also maintain that negation can be reduced to implication of absurdity, specifically, to its propositional content.

Large language models and their big bullshit potential

Newly powerful large language models have burst onto the scene, with applications across a wide range of functions. We can now expect to encounter their outputs at rapidly increasing volumes and frequencies. Some commentators claim that large language models are bullshitting, generating convincing output without regard for the truth. If correct, that would make large language models distinctively dangerous discourse participants. Bullshitters not only undermine the norm of truthfulness (by saying false things) but the normative status of truth itself (by treating it as entirely irrelevant). So, do large language models really bullshit? I argue that they can, in the sense of issuing propositional content in response to fact-seeking prompts, without having first assessed that content for truth or falsity. However, I further argue that they need not bullshit, given appropriate guardrails. So, just as with human speakers, the propensity for a large language model to bullshit depends on its own particular make-up.

Why Frege Did Not Plagiarize the Stoics: More on the Relationship Between Fregean and Stoic Logic

In this paper we give a detailed comparison of the key elements of Frege’s formal language of thought and apparently similar views in Stoic formal logic. That is, we compare their views on the following topics: connectives, negation, simple sentences, propositional content, predicates and their incompleteness, and quantifications. We show that in most of these cases the similarities between Frege’s views and the Stoic views are only superficial. Frege’s views are far more systematic, better developed and can in no case directly or fully be traced back to Stoic ideas. Furthermore, we show that Prantl, pace Bobzien 2021, is in most of these cases not a reliable source with respect to Stoic logic and that it is very unlikely that Frege’s views on logic were influenced by Prantl’s interpretation of Stoic formal logic.

Combining Probabilities with Full Beliefs

AbstractOne of the major problems in formal epistemology is the difficulty of combining probabilistic and dichotomous (all-or-nothing) beliefs in one and the same formal framework. Based on the properties of actual human belief systems, a set of ten desiderata is proposed for belief system models that contain both probabilistic and full beliefs. Previously proposed combined belief systems are shown to fall short of these desiderata. A proof of concept is provided to show that they can be satisfied in a formal model. In the proposed model, the amnesia problem of probabilistic updating is solved by introducing infinitesimal probabilities as carriers of memories of beliefs that have been given up. In the resulting system of probability revision, contingent propositions can be transferred in both directions between full beliefs and beliefs held to a lower degree, in a way that mirrors real-life acquisitions and losses of full beliefs. The subsystem consisting of full beliefs has a pattern of change that constitutes a credible system of dichotomous belief change.

Capturing Changing Concepts: The Case of Humanism

AbstractChanging concepts, understood as social constructs and facets of linguistic expressions, and likewise the mechanisms of change and the dynamicity of their contents, cannot be adequately analysed without a holistic perspective of a language system on the one hand, and a multi-layered perspective of conversational interaction on the other. I take on board a case study of the concept humanism, in particular in its relation to speciesism, to argue for such a broad perspective when discussing concept revision, including its deliberate and automatic aspects. Section 1 sets out the scene and the objectives, emphasising the importance of metapragmatic concerns. In Sect. 2, I briefly introduce some relevant terms and debates surrounding concepts, lexemes, and their dynamicity. Section 3 moves to the question of the foundations of meaning and points out the importance of addressing it in the context of these debates. Section 4 contains the case study of the concept humanism and the insights it offers for carving out the boundaries of inquiry into the life of a concept, focusing on the importance of broadly understood propositional content and the non-propositional overlay as they are dynamically constructed in discourse—and, as such, on the importance of metapragmatic concerns. Section 5 concludes and reiterates my plea against carving out fields of inquiry based on narrowly understood pursuits.

The Application of Zwart’s Shift Model to the English-Arabic Translation of Technology News

The present research paper discusses the applicability of Zwart’s “Comparative–Descriptive Model of Translation Shifts” (1984) to translating Sci-Tech news from English into Arabic. This comprehensive model primarily investigates the translation shifts occurring in literary discourse. To the best of the reCsearcher’s knowledge, very few attempts have been made to apply this shift analysis-based model to the translation of other types of discourse. The paper applies this model to translating scientific discourse, particularly technology news, on several reliable news websites, such as BBC and CNBC. English news on the English websites (ST) and the Arabic translation (TT) on these websites are used as data for the comparative and descriptive analysis. Zwart’s comparative model describes the translation shifts on the microstructural level by comparing the architranseme and the SL and TL transoms. The descriptive model provides insights into the shifts on the macrostructural level. The paper concludes that shifts occurring in the translation of Sci-Tech news can be best described, analysed, and categorised within Zwart’s comparative model. It also concludes that shifts on the microstructural level do not necessarily lead to a noticeable macrostructural change in the primary language metafunctions (interpersonal, ideational, and textual) as in the translation of literary works. Syntactic shifts may, however, result in a macrostructural change of the textual metafunction, which alters the propositional content in some instances.

Remote possibilities in branching time structures

To analyse contingent propositions, this paper investigates how branching time structures can be combined with probability theory. In particular, it considers assigning infinitesimal probabilities—available in non-Archimedean probability theory—to individual histories. This allows us to introduce the concept of ‘remote possibility’ as a new modal notion between ‘impossibility’ and ‘appreciable possibility’. The proposal is illustrated by applying it to a future contingent and a historical counterfactual concerning an infinite sequence of coin tosses. The latter is a toy model that is used to illustrate the applicability of the proposal to more realistic physical models.

Comparative analysis of interactional metadiscursive resources in academic writing by L2 and L1 English writers

Interactional Metadicursive Resources (IMRs) are established as the most common rhetorical features that assist writers in achieving interaction with the discourse community. The purpose of this study was to compare the use of IMRs in research articles (RAs) authored by Yemeni L2 writers and L1 English writers, while also examining the extent to which both groups employ these resources to achieve persuasive purposes. Based on Hyland’s (2019) model, AntConc was used as an analytical tool in a corpus-based methodology to analyze the use of IMRs in their context of use, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Moreover, Swales’ models were adapted to identify rhetorical moves in the different sections of RAs. The findings indicate that L1 writers tended to use IMRs more frequently and effectively to pursue ethos and pathos. However, Yemeni L2 writers tended to use IMRs sparingly, lacking familiarity with their persuasive role. L1 writers tended to express epistemic and affective stances and used these resources throughout their research, while Yemeni L2 writers tended to focus more on propositional content, using limited IMRs in their writing. Furthermore, unlike L1 English writers, who tended to negotiate their claims in the RA introduction and engage their audience in the RA conclusion, Yemeni L2 writers almost exclusively strengthened their line of argument when initiating and concluding their research. The study concludes by discussing the pedagogical implications of the effective use of IMRs in L2 academic writing.

Truth, topicality, and transparency: one-component versus two-component semantics

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.

Pinpointing Linguistic Emphasis in Classical Greek

Abstract Emphasis is a ubiquitous notion in classical scholarship, but its vagueness has repeatedly been criticized (and its usefulness, consequently, questioned) by Greek linguists. This brief study seeks to identify (and secure) a place for this notion in the analytical toolbox for the description of Classical Greek by applying the strict but nuanced definition of emphasis in Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2008) to the identification and classification of linguistic devices in the ancient language. In particular, this study argues for a distinction between emphasis as a rhetorical effect and emphasis as a communicative intention. In the former understanding, emphasis may be produced secondarily by a number of linguistic and rhetorical devices. Conversely, linguistic emphasis stricto sensu would only be conveyed by linguistic devices used primarily to intensify linguistic entities of any level (discourse acts, propositional contents, subacts).

Characteristics of the X ie imperative expression: three criteria for the classification of imperatives

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to reveal the characteristics of the X ie imperative expression (abbreviated to X ie) with reference to other related expressions, such as conditional imperatives and past imperatives, in Japanese and other languages. Three criteria are proposed for a description of imperatives in terms of the realization of the propositional content: (i) possibility of realization, (ii) attitude toward realization, and (iii) preparedness for realization. X ie is an imperative of a reproof, characterized by the unique combination of (i) possible, (ii) negative, and (iii) unprepared. This paper further focuses on a discourse-pragmatic relation of the expression with its preceding and following utterances, a topic not fully discussed in the literature. The analysis in this paper shows that X ie is a marked imperative form of a verb of speech that expresses the speaker’s instantaneous reaction to newly obtained information, i.e., the addressee’s violation of the maxim of quality. This characterization suggests that the Japanese language is sufficiently sensitive to the violation to lexicalize it and that X ie can be considered in terms of mirativity. Finally, this paper systematically compares X ie and non-directive imperatives from other languages.

<i>Skažem tak</i>: Discourse markers originating from verbs of speech in Russian

Based on data from the Russian National Corpus, first and foremost, from its multimedia corpus, we address two members of the family of discourse markers developed from the finite form of the verb of speech skažem (the first person plural present tense form of the verb ‘say’): isolated skažem and its combinations with an adverb or a pronominal adverb such as skažem prjamo ‘let’s put it bluntly’, skažem tak ‘let’s put it this way’, etc. We show that these markers demonstrate a typical pragmaticalization trajectory: unlike the original speech verb, they do not refer to a speech event, their main function is to express a fuzzy nomination, or hedging, i.e., these markers are used when the speaker disclaims responsibility for the possible inaccuracy of the propositional content or of the nomination used in relation to the fixed propositional content. We demonstrate the main shifts in the distribution of these markers, which occur due to the fact that they fall out of the rigid clausal structure and acquire the status of an operator which scopes over discourse segments of various (potentially any) length. We study the main prosodic properties of these markers instrumentally and perceptually and, in addition, discuss the use of markers of this family together with other means of signaling that the speaker needs additional efforts in choosing an adequate expression. These can be other lexical markers of fuzzy nomination, lexical and prosodic indicators of an open list, self-corrections, signals of hesitation (filled pauses, non-phonological lengthening of sounds), etc. The results obtained convincingly show: (1) that even within the same family of markers, the shift from a unit with propositional meaning to a discourse marker can follow different trajectories and lead to larger or smaller shifts in meaning and form; and (2) that the study of discourse markers that uses data on prosody and such specific phenomena of oral discourse as speech disfluencies makes it possible to get more comprehensive lexicographic portraits of single units and their families.

Metadiscursive Boosting in Russian Courtroom Discourse: Enhancing Persuasiveness in Defense Speeches

Recent studies are revealing new aspects of courtroom discourse, examining its generation and applying novel analytical methods. Yet, despite their significance and complexity, the use of metadiscursive tools remains scarce. These tools offer substantial promise for analyzing discursive practices, increasingly seen as not just informative but also interactive and impactful. The inherently interactive and persuasive nature of courtroom discourse underscores the need for metadiscourse as a potent analytical instrument. Such an instrument encompasses mechanisms for expressing attitudes toward the propositional content and for drawing the recipient into a dialogue with the speaker. This article addresses the metadiscursive dimension of defense speeches as a distinct genre within courtroom discourse. The study uses quantitative analysis on a corpus of Russian-language courtroom texts, innovatively applying metadiscursive analysis to identify linguistic elements that enhance the persuasiveness of defense speeches, with a focus on the technique of boosting. Throughout the study, five types of boosters were identified – markers of certainty, evidentiality, intensity, solidarity, and superiority – each serving one of five pragmatic functions: to show the speaker’s confidence in the truth of their assertions, to point to the credibility and reliability of the source, to amplify the emotional impact of the statement, to denote the upper bounds of a continuum, and to reference commonly known facts or shared experiences of events or situations. The study reveals that boosting at the lexical level is predominantly achieved through the use of evidential verbs and nouns, adverbs of measure, degree, and time, as well as superlative adjectives. Additionally, the frequent use of first-person plural pronouns was observed. The findings suggest that adept use of boosters in courtroom discourse is indicative of a lawyer’s pragmatic competence and is crucial for effective communication with the court and the jury.

That's not what you said! Semantic constraints on literal speech

According to some philosophers, a sentence's semantics can fail to constitute a complete propositional content, imposing mere constraints on such a content. Recently, Daniel Harris has begun developing a formal constraint semantics. He claims that the semantic values of sentences constrain what speakers can literally say with them—and what hearers can know about what was said. However, that claim is undermined by his conception of semantics as the study of a psychological module. I argue instead that semantic constraints should be understood as properties of public languages.

A Comparison of Explicit and Implicit Approaches to EAP Teaching to Postgraduate Students

The present study aims to explore the role of explicit and implicit approaches in developing pragmatic competence in postgraduate students as part of the Foreign Language course. 32 students were divided into two groups depending on the type of teaching approach for six weeks of instruction. Research proposals written by each group after the interventions were examined with the aim of comparing the employment of pragmatic features such as stance-taking resources and their frequencies. In order to investigate the effects of stance-taking instruction, this study adopted a combination of quantitative and interpretative analysis methods. The results revealed significant differences in the use of stance resources by the postgraduate students exposed to explicit vs implicit instruction. In terms of compliance with the academic writing norms, the explicit instruction was found to be more effective than the implicit one. The analysis found that while the explicit group tended to mitigate their claims and hide authorial presence, the students exposed to the implicit instruction expressed stronger commitments to propositional content and showed writer visibility in the text, which considers to be inappropriate in English-language academic writing. The findings point to important considerations for EAP teaching and future research into academic discourse and contribute to previous studies of the benefits of instruction in the development of pragmatic competence. The results may be employed by curriculum designers to create materials for L2 writers and EAP instructors in their teaching practice.

A stylistic study of point of view in James Joyce's The dead Basra General Directorate of Education

The aim of this paper is to examine how point of view is signaled in Joyce's " The Dead " and how it is used to exercise control over the attitudes of characters and events in the story. It aims to illustrate who sees and who speaks in the story, whose views or ideas are being expressed as well as how characters and events are represented via the text. It characterizes the predominant stylistic and linguistic capabilities. A unique focus is positioned upon the issue of modality as related to the point of view. Modality expresses the mode within which the propositional content of a sentence is presented as a sure, reliable, or compulsory and it function to order interpersonal relations. Point of view shows a particular manner of conceptualizing and refers to the world view. The present paper used the modal framework of Simpson in doing a stylistic analysis of the story " The Dead " by James Joyce. Since stylistics has always been concerned with how readers interpret the texts by focusing on linguistic choices, the model used based totally on Simpson's modal framework would permit the readers to identify the attitude of the narrator. Key Words: Modality, point of view and stylistics.

Iconic Intuitions about Linguistic Meanings

I identify the nature and the epistemic status of a sub-type of linguistic intuitions that I call iconic intuitions (IIs). The naive speakers are able to detect, through these intuitions, consistent iconic correspondences between linguistic forms and meanings. Firstly, I identify the main features of the linguistic phenomenon detected by IIs: sound symbolism. The correspondences in which it consists are iconic because they are made up of different types of perceived similarities or associations based on similarities between stimuli - one of which is linguistic. Then, I analyze the main alternative philosophical and psychological characterizations of intuitions, and their evidential role, focusing on linguistic intuitions. On these bases, I conclude that intuitions should be conceived as a heterogeneous construct. Secondly, I argue that the IIs are neither beliefs, dispositions to belief, judgments, or intellectual seemings with propositional contents, but rather perceptual seemings. They consist of the ability or sensitivity to detect iconic correspondences or associations. In other words, sound inputs directly “track” the meanings conveyed by them. They are characterized by their peculiar presentational phenomenology and evaluative component. Now, according to the type of content and cognitive processing involved, it would seem convenient to distinguish between the most purely perceptual ones, based on associative processes, and those that also involve accumulated experience, analytical processes, and conceptual manipulation. After reviewing the psycholinguistic experimental literature based on intuitions about sound symbolism, I argue that IIs are first-level intuitions, and as such a reliable source of direct and prima facie evidence about the iconic features in language. Finally, I argue that these IIs offer a privileged “window” to explore the relationships between language and perception (and affection/emotion). I conclude by arguing that this kind of intuition is a non-dispensable input for philosophical reflection and scientific research on language. So, although I vindicate the relevance of intuitions for understanding linguistic meaning, IIs are not of the same kind, nor do they require the same methods for studying them as those that have mainly interested philosophers.

La intuición como fuente de evidencia en filosofía: La visión mínima

In the past two decades, there has been a sudden increase of inquiry within the branch of analytic philosophy on the nature and role of intuition in philosophy. Philosophers began to investigate what intuition is, how it should be defined, what role it plays in philosophy, what its epistemic status is and many more. There is also a growing number of philosophers arguing that the whole debate rests on a mistake: intuition in philosophy plays no role whatsoever and philosophers do not use it as (a source of) evidence for their philosophical claims. This strategy is often conducted by differentiating among the two senses in which intuition is supposed to play an evidential role in philosophy. Intuition, thus, can be understood as a state of intuiting something or a propositional content that is intuited. Intuition in the first sense, the argument goes, cannot be treated as evidence as it would present the risk of psychologizing evidence in philosophy. If, however, we take intuition as evidence in the second sense, there is nothing distinctive about it: ultimately, all evidence in philosophy is of propositional nature, regardless of the intuitiveness of a given proposition. In my paper, I argue that this strategy fails and propose, instead, the view on intuition that, firstly, explains why the aforementioned distinction does not render the intuitiveness of the content irrelevant to its epistemic status, secondly, is in accord with the current findings in psychology, and, thirdly, is minimal enough to allow the different views of intuitions to be incorporated under that umbrella. In particular, I argue that it is an intuitive judgment, characterized by its non-inferentiality and defeasibility, that serves as evidence for particular philosophical claims, while its source is an intuition understood as a state of non-propositional character that can be examined empirically.

Noncognitive religious influence and initiation in Tillson’s Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence

Abstract In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence, John Tillson sets out a clear and convincing case for the view that children ought not to be initiated into religious faith by their parents or others with the relevant ‘extra-parental responsibilities’. However, by predicating his thesis on an understanding of illegitimate religious influence that largely equates initiation into faith with the inculcation of a distinctive type of propositional content, I contend that Tillson misses some of the potential harms such initiation may engender. Here I briefly explain why this is a problem before suggesting three ways he might respond to the criticism.

Referring and quantifying without nominals: headless relative clauses across languages

Nominals can be used to refer to or quantify over individuals, while clauses convey propositional content, with the exception of set-denoting restrictive headed relative clauses. This well-attested crosslinguistic syntax/semantics mapping needs to be broadened. Recent crosslinguistic findings show that headless relative clauses—embedded argument or adjunct clauses with a missing constituent—are widely attested and are used to refer to or quantify over individuals, similar to nominals. The present work contributes to the investigation of the syntax/semantics interface of different varieties of headless relative clauses and begins to develop a much-needed close comparison with the syntax/semantics interface of nominals in order to establish which principles are at play in both families of constructions.