Proportional Representation Electoral System Research Articles

No-show paradox in Slovak party-list proportional system

Abstract The phenomenon of the paradoxes of the largest remainders methods has been studied by numerous authors. Nevertheless, the examples presented in their studies do not deal with the case where a party’s possible additional votes can directly lead to a loss in the party’s number of representatives. This paradox, which can be called the no-show apportionment paradox, has not previously been mentioned in the literature. It is based on the assumption that a voter’s favourite party may lose a seat if the voter votes honestly but get more seats if he or she abstains. The article gives simple examples illustrating the no-show paradox in a party-list proportional representation electoral system using the quota method of apportionment. In these situations it would be better for the party if some of their voters abstained, otherwise it would lose one or more seats.

A Law on Paper Only: Electoral Rules, Parties, and the Persistent Underrepresentation of Women in Brazilian Legislatures

This article advances a party-centric analysis of gender quotas in Brazil. We examine how parties mediate electoral rules, finding that neither the implementation of the Lei de Cotas (Quota Law) in 1995 nor its 2009 mini-reform was sufficient to induce significant change in party strategies for the nomination and election of women. Moreover, we find that while the open-list proportional representation electoral system is an important part of the explanation for the quota's failure to enhance women's representation, an analysis of how those electoral rules interact with decentralized party politics and women's absence from subnational party leadership structures yields superior explanatory power for understanding quota (non)compliance. We marshal extensive evidence on interparty variation in candidacies to Brazil's Chamber of Deputies and state legislative assemblies and interviews with candidates, party leaders, bureaucrats, and activists throughout Brazil to show how electoral rules and party dynamics interact to undermine the gender quota, resulting in a limited increase in the number of female candidates and stagnation in the number of women elected. We conclude that reform efforts must target not only electoral rules but also the subnational party structures that mediate these rules if they are to enhance women's political representation.

Electoral Systems and the Legislative Representation of Muslim Ethnic Minority Women in the West, 2000–2010

Despite growing interest from practitioners, politicians and the media, the political representation of Muslim ethnic minority women in the West has received scant scholarly attention. I address this gap with new data on the representation of Muslim ethnic minority women and men in 20 national legislatures from 2000 to 2010. Results reveal that Muslim ethnic minority women are increasingly elected in countries with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, whereas Muslim ethnic minority men have been elected across a range of electoral systems. The benefits of PR electoral systems to ‘women’ apply to ethnic minority women from Muslim backgrounds.

A surplus of ambition: can Europe rely on large primary surpluses to solve its debt problem?

IMF forecasts and the EU's Fiscal Compact foresee Europe’s heavily indebted countries running primary budget surpluses of as much as 5 percent of GDP for as long as 10 years in order to maintain debt sustainability and bring their debt/GDP ratios down to the Compact’s 60 percent target. We show that primary surpluses this large and persistent are rare. In an extensive sample of high- and middle-income countries there are just three (non-overlapping) episodes where countries ran primary surpluses of at least 5 per cent of GDP for 10 years. Analyzing a less restrictive definition of persistent surplus episodes (primary surpluses averaging at least 3 percent of GDP for five years), we find that surplus episodes are more likely when growth is strong, when the current account of the balance of payments is in surplus (savings rates are high), when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high (heightening the urgency of fiscal adjustment), and when the governing party controls all houses of parliament or congress (its bargaining position is strong). Left wing governments, strikingly, are more likely to run large, persistent primary surpluses. In advanced countries, proportional representation electoral systems that give rise to encompassing coalitions are associated with surplus episodes. The point estimates do not provide much encouragement for the view that high-debt European countries will be able to run a primary budget surplus as large and persistent as officially projected.

Is Proportional Representation More Favourable to the Left? Electoral Rules and Their Impact on Elections, Parliaments and the Formation of Cabinets

How do electoral rules affect the composition of governments? It is a robust finding that countries with majoritarian rules more often elect conservative governments than those with proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. There are three explanations for this pattern. The first stresses the impact of voting behaviour: the middle class more often votes for right-wing parties in majoritarian electoral systems, anticipating governments’ redistributive consequences. The second explanation is based on electoral geography: the regional distribution of votes may bias the vote-seat translation against the Left in majoritarian systems due to the wide margins by which the Left wins core urban districts. The third explanation refers to party fragmentation: if the Right is more fragmented than the Left in countries with PR, then there is less chance of a right-wing party gainingformateurstatus. This study tests these three hypotheses for established democracies over the entire post-war period. It finds the first two mechanisms at work in the democratic chain of delegation from voting via the vote-seat translation to the formation of cabinets, while party fragmentation does not seem to co-vary as much as expected with electoral rules. These findings confirm that majoritarian systems have a substantive conservative bias, whereas countries with PR show more differentiated patterns.

Unionization and the partisan effect on income inequality

Does partisanship matter for income inequality? The empirical evidence is notably mixed. I argue that these inconsistent findings are partly the result of scholars not (properly) modeling the relationship between unionization and the partisan composition of government. If we accept that union members favor greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than non-union members, politicians desire to hold elected office and be popular but also to implement particular public policies, and left party politicians share union members’ policy preferences to a greater extent than center and right party politicians, then partisan differences should be greatest at moderate levels of unionization, a condition that allows all politicians to pursue their policy preferences while maintaining electoral viability. The empirical analysis examines 16 wealthy democracies between 1970 and 2010. The results of error-correction models confirm the theoretical expectation and hold regardless of whether there is a majoritarian or proportional representation electoral system.

Mixed-Member Election and Candidate Selection in Bolivia's 1993 and 1997 Elections

Mixed-member electoral systems became a popular choice for “electoral engineers” in the 1990s. Countries as diverse as Venezuela, Hungary, Lesotho, and Italy adopted the system. The assumption was that introducing single-member districts (SMDs) in countries that used list proportional representation electoral systems would introduce “constituency” oriented legislators who could be more easily held accountable to voters. This paper explores changes associated with the adoption of a mixed-member electoral system in Bolivia through a candidate-level analysis looking at differences in candidate profiles between two elections (1993 and 1997) and between two tiers (list and nominal). The paper relies on portion of a dataset (collected by the author) of Bolivian legislative candidates. The analysis shows mixed results: While SMD candidates were more likely to have municipal level political experience, there was no significant difference in the kind of legislative committees list and SMD candidates had served in.

Mixed-Member Election and Candidate Selection in Bolivia’s 1993 and 1997 Elections

Mixed-member electoral systems became a popular choice for “electoral engineers” in the 1990s. Countries as diverse as Venezuela, Hungary, Lesotho, and Italy adopted the system. The assumption was that introducing single-member districts (SMDs) in countries that used list proportional representation electoral systems would introduce “constituency” oriented legislators who could be more easily held accountable to voters. This paper explores changes associated with the adoption of a mixed-member electoral system in Bolivia through a candidate-level analysis looking at differences in candidate profiles between two elections (1993 and 1997) and between two tiers (list and nominal). The paper relies on portion of a dataset (collected by the author) of Bolivian legislative candidates. The analysis shows mixed results: While SMD candidates were more likely to have municipal level political experience, there was no significant difference in the kind of legislative committees list and SMD candidates had served in.

T-Test for Terrorism: Did the Introduction of Proportional Representation Reduce the Terrorist Threat? A Time-Series Case Study of Algeria and Northern Ireland

Can electoral reform lead to a reduction in the number of terrorist incidents? Economists have shown that the introduction of constitutional institutions such as courts in the early eighteenth century had a direct effect on investment. Could there be a similar link between the introduction of proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and a reduction in the number of terrorist attacks? Previous studies using cross-sectional data have found a negative correlation between the presence of PR-electoral systems and the number of terrorist incidents. However, earlier studies were based on aggregate figures, not on time-series data. They did not provide a direction that could be used to measure the possible effect of the introduction of PR. This research note addresses this problem. Using a paired samples t-test it is possible to show that the introduction of proportional representation in Northern Ireland and Algeria led to a marked reduction in the number of terrorist attacks. The note thus adds strength to earlier studies.

Gender quotas, candidate background and the election of women: A paradox of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems

We study the effects of mandatory (legislated) gender quotas in Poland, a country utilising an open-list proportional representation electoral system. We use a unique data set comprising multiple characteristics of all candidates running in two consecutive elections to the lower chamber of the Polish parliament (the Sejm). The first of them (held in 2007) was the last pre-quota election and the second (held in 2011) the first post-quota one. We show that quotas have an inherently paradoxical nature: they cause a substantial increase in the number of female candidates but the increase is accompanied by a sharp decline in women's electoral performance. This regularity holds even if we account for multiple indicators of candidate background, including previous political experience.

The Inclusion of Excluded Majorities in South Asian Parliaments: Women, Youth, and the Working Class

This article provides a new perspective on parliamentary representation in South Asia, focusing on the collective under-representation of population majorities based on the macro-demographic categories of age, class, and gender. Situating this analysis within debates on descriptive representation, it presents the first comparative analysis of the contemporary demographic characteristics of members of parliament (MPs) in Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Highlighting three major gaps in parliamentary representation, it finds quotas, proportional representation electoral systems, and leftist parties to have positively impacted the descriptive representation of South Asian women, the working class, and young adults.

Pre-electoral coalitions and voter turnout

Research on comparative voter turnout has produced a puzzling set of findings: proportional representation (PR) electoral systems increase turnout, but multiparty systems decrease turnout. This paper provides new evidence to resolve these conflicting findings by developing and testing the hypothesis that the presence of a pre-electoral coalition (PEC) increases voter turnout by reducing uncertainty about the possible government that will form after the election. PECs provide credible signals to voters about the commitment of participating parties to govern together, making the election more decisive as a mechanism for selecting the government by clarifying the possible electoral outcomes. This increased electoral decisiveness increases voters' incentives to turn out. This hypothesis is tested on a data set of 223 national legislative elections in 19 parliamentary democracies between 1970 and 2002, with the results indicating that the presence of a PEC increases turnout on average by more than 1.5 percentage points. This finding provides support for the argument that the electoral context and strategic party behavior have important effects on voter participation.

THE REPRESENTATION OF YOUNGER AGE COHORTS IN ASIAN PARLIAMENTS: DO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

This study examines the descriptive representation of younger age cohorts in Asian parliaments. Drawing from literature on women's parliamentary representation, it develops the hypothesis that proportional representation (PR) elections provide more incentives for the inclusion of younger representatives than do single-member district plurality (SMDP) electoral systems. Analysing an original dataset of over four thousand MPs from 14 countries, I find support for the argument that PR electoral systems favour the election of younger MPs even after controlling for multiple alternative explanations.

Are Environmental Taxes Affected by Legislatures` Ideological Positions?

Environmental taxes have been discussed as one of the main mechanisms to deal with environmental problems. Nonetheless, instruments of this type have rarely been implemented, and the adoption of new or higher environmental taxes has faced resistance in some countries. The purpose of this work is to identify one possible political answer to why adoption of environmental taxes varies. One explanation is that legislatures’ ideological position affects the degree of usage of taxes generally and environmental taxes in particular. For example, right-wing parties tend to be less associated with environmental concerns and more associated with lower government intervention. This paper presents evidence that reflects this relationship, showing the positive association of more left-wing legislatures with higher levels of environmental taxation. A panel of data for 37 developed and developing countries over 16 years is used considering the percentage of total revenue from environmentally related taxes, the ratio of this revenue to total energy use and tax levels in industry and household sectors. The results show that most of these impacts involve environmentally related taxes in the industry sector. Proportional representation electoral systems and high seat concentration by few parties appear to be necessary conditions for the negative relation of right-wing ideology with environmental taxes.

Who gets unequal parliamentary representation? A comparison of India and Sri Lanka

In 2010, India celebrated its 60th anniversary as a democracy and Sri Lanka held its first post-civil war election. Yet, inequalities in parliamentary representation remain strong in both nations. This research note highlights current geographic, ideological, and demographic parliamentary inequalities in India and Sri Lanka. It finds major social groups especially women, those under age 40, the less educated, Indian Muslims, and those employed in the agricultural sector to be significantly under-represented. On the other hand, it finds provisional support for the hypothesis that Sri Lanka's proportional representation (PR) electoral system better facilitates equal representation than India's single member district (SMD) system.

Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies

Which components of power sharing contribute to the duration of peace and what explains the linkages between institutional design and stability? The authors argue that certain types of political power sharing are associated with more durable peace than others, primarily through their positive effects on governance and public service delivery. In particular, closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems stand out among power-sharing arrangements, due to their ability to deliver superior governance outcomes which, in turn, can promote stability by undercutting the initial motivations for conflict or by reducing the feasibility of rebellion. The authors argue that these positive outcomes result from closed-list PR’s ability to increase party discipline and checks on executive power, while reducing incentives for personalistic voting. The introduction of political institutions in postconflict negotiated settlements allows us to test the independent effects of institutions on governance and stability using survival analysis and a case study.

Ditching the pack: Digital media in the 2010 Brazilian congressional campaigns

Over the past decade Brazil has become well known for its open embrace of new media technologies. In tandem, an increasing number of Brazilian candidates have begun to use web and social media sites as an integral part of their overall campaign efforts. The present study is the first effort at large-scale modeling of these relationships in an emerging Latin American democracy. To explore the relationship between using digital media in a candidate’s political campaign strategy and voter support, I built an original dataset of the 2010 elections for the lower house of the Brazilian Congress. I investigate factors such as a candidate’s use of web and social networking sites in conjunction with other traditional influences such as candidate gender, age, incumbency, party affiliation, coalition membership and campaign spending. I demonstrate that having a robust web presence and using social media, holding other factors constant, can be a significant contribution to the popularity of a candidate on election day in an open-list proportional representation electoral system such as that in Brazil. Additionally, I demonstrate how this digital media campaign tactic might be specifically beneficial to traditionally disadvantaged candidates in bridging the gap of their under-representation in Brazilian politics.

Electoral institutions and growth volatility: Theory and evidence

What accounts for the substantial variation in the temporal volatility of economic growth rates in democratic regimes? We claim that institutional differences between the majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems explain why growth volatility is high in some democracies, but not others. Specifically, we suggest that unlike PR democracies, the pronounced career concerns of policymakers in majoritarian systems give them incentives to use their discretionary spending power to alter government spending levels sharply, which generates higher spending volatility in these countries. As a result, policymakers in majoritarian systems cannot credibly commit themselves to stabilizing spending levels. This causes uncertainty among economic actors about future spending levels and leads to unstable investment patterns that generate a higher volatility of growth rates in majoritarian democracies. Results from statistical models provide robust statistical support for our theoretical predictions.

Approximating Democracy: A Proposal for Proportional Representation in the California Legislature

The State of California elects a bicameral legislature through a first-past-the-post electoral system. Beginning in 2012, the election of California state legislators will be through an open primary, two-round system. Neither of these electoral systems provides for proportional representation in the legislature. Accordingly, neither system leads to a truly representative democracy. The author recommends that the state adopt a proportional representation electoral system – specifically, a mixed-member system – as a more democratic alternative plurality/majority systems now in place or projected to be implemented in 2012. In addition, the author explains why the state legislature should be unicameral and increased in size from the current 120 legislators to 320.

Government Inequality Reduction in Comparative Perspective: A Cross-National Study of the Developed World

This article offers an empirical assessment of a number of aspects of the reduction of market income inequality as a result of government taxes and transfers, and of the distributive effect of wage-bargaining institutions and minimum wages, in thirteen developed countries over the last twenty five years. It considers five broad themes in the literature: the median voter approach, which argues that government redistribution is associated with inequality of pre-government income; the power resources approach, which emphasizes partisan political contestation and electoral participation; the institutional approach, which focuses on political institutions such as the electoral system; the labor organization approach, which argues that labor unions play a key role in government efforts to achieve a more egalitarian distribution of market income; and the economic globalization approach, which argues that integration into the global economy has undermined public social protection efforts. The article finds consistent positive relationships between direct government redistribution and four variables: the extent of pre-government inequality; the level of electoral turnout; the share of the labor force that is unionized; and the presence of proportional representation electoral systems. As to wage-bargaining institutions, the article confirms that there is a positive relationship between the degree of coordination of wage bargaining and a relatively egalitarian distribution of earnings across various income groups, and (more weakly) between the level of statutory minimum wages in a country and the earnings share of the lowest-income group.