Damages inflicted by natural catastrophes in recent years have accounted for economic losses of a size hitherto unknown. The estimated loss potential of some catastrophe scenarios seemingly shows the capacity limits of traditional insurance markets. For instance, estimations of insured losses after a major earthquake in the San Francisco area amount to approximately U.S.$ 100 billion; on the other hand, balance sheets of the U.S. property liability insurance industry show a cumulative surplus of about U.S.$ 300 billion, which, of course, is available not only for catastrophic risks. These ‘‘capacity gaps’’ in the industry have been at the heart of many discussions among insurance economists and practitioners in the recent past, largely aimed at the development of possible solution strategies involving the financial markets. Contributions can be expected, if, for example, the issuance of marketable insurance-linked securities was able to attract additional capacity from investors who are not otherwise related to the insurance industry. In practice, rudiments of this kind have been observed in various forms since 1992, even though they have yet to reach a significant market share. To summarize these arguments, the existence of insurance-linked securitization is often explained by its ability to (partly) close the capacity gap of the insurance supply, especially in terms of reinsurance. This line of reasoning is, however, not entirely convincing. Additional risk financing capacity could also be generated through extending capital funds held by the insurance industry or through market entries in the insurance markets. The latter, in fact, could be observed during the 1990s following hurricane Andrew. Immediately after this event reinsurers were very reluctant to cover catastrophe risk and in particular the Lloyd’s reinsurance market went through a major crisis, leading to a decline in