Proof Of Guilt Research Articles

Punishing the Guilty, Not Punishing the Innocent

AbstractDiscussion in this paper focuses on how strongly we should prefer non-punishment of persons guilty of serious crimes to punishment of persons innocent of them. William Blackstone's version of that preference, expressed as a ten to one ratio, is first shown to be untenable on standard accounts of legal punishment's justifying aims. Somewhat weaker versions of that ratio also appear suspect. More to the point, Blackstone's adage obscures the crucial way in which there are risks to be assessed in setting up a criminal justice system – the risk that it will not be eff ective enough at apprehending and punishing serious off enders, as well as the risk that it will expose innocent persons to harsh punishment. I urge a balancing of such risks, and argue that the salient features of many contemporary criminal justice systems can be plausibly interpreted as attempting to achieve and maintain such a balance. We do not grant criminal defendants a presumption of innocence that the state must overcome with proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to institutionally express a strong degree of preference for non-punishment of the guilty to punishment of the innocent. Instead, we do so in order to ensure that institutions of legal punishment have suffi cient scope while preserving their ability to accurately sort the guilty from the innocent.

Paradoxes of proof and punishment: Psychological pitfalls in judicial decision making

Purpose. This study focuses on two psychological mechanisms that may inadvertently affect judges' decisions on proof of guilt and on punishment. It involves mechanisms that are clearly in conflict with formal judicial doctrine. One hypothesis, the conviction paradox, asserts that, faced with very serious offences, a judge's standard of proof will be lower than for less serious, but otherwise comparable, offences. A second hypothesis, compensatory punishment, asserts that in cases with relatively weak evidence, judges who nevertheless render a guilty verdict will be inclined to compensate their initial doubt on the matter of guilt by meting out a less severe sentence.Method. The hypotheses are evaluated in an experiment with Dutch judges and justices who serve in criminal courts. This was done using fictitious but highly realistic dossiers of criminal cases.Results. Neither of the two hypotheses was supported in the present study.Conclusions. Findings are discussed in relation to their implications for theory development and future research in the area of legal decision making.

Aquinas on Torture

Aquinas on Torture

The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850

When it is said that a defendant to a criminal charge is presumed to be innocent, what is really meant is that burden of proving his guilt is upon prosecution. This golden thread ... runs through web of English criminal Unhappily Parliament regards principle with indifference - one might almost say with contempt. The statute book contains many offences in which burden of proving his innocence is cast on accused. (Glanville Williams, The Proof of Guilt: A Study of English Criminal Trial (1955)) No principle in Anglo-American criminal law is more vaunted than so-called of innocence: doctrine that prosecution must both produce evidence of guilt and persuade fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt. The claim that every man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved has been described as dear to hearts of Englishmen and as an omnipresent feature of English criminal In 1895, United States Supreme Court declared of innocence in favor of accused to be the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary - a protection that lies at foundation of administration of our criminal law. Befitting its lofty stature in Anglo-American legal culture, presumption has become associated, over time, with that most famous of Blackstonean maxims: [I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer. Recently, Allyson May has argued that presumption developed in eighteenth century along with a series of procedural and evidentiary protections benefiting defendants tried at London's Old Bailey, including right to counsel, notion of prosecution's case, and beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. But how robust was presumption of innocence in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century English criminal law? This article argues that many English criminal defendants in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not benefit from a presumption of innocence but, rather, struggled against a statutory presumption of guilt. In starkest cases, defendants labored under a presumption of guilt when charged with violating one of numerous statutes passed by Parliament during eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries designed to combat various forms of misappropriation. Under these statutes, persons detected in possession of goods such as metal, rope, textile materials, or wood who failed to account adequately for their possession could be convicted by magistrates of misdemeanors in proceedings, which dispensed with certain important procedural and evidentiary protections applicable in cases of larceny tried in higher courts. Unfortunately, historians still know comparatively little about summary proceedings - this, despite their critically important role in administration of criminal justice in eighteenth and early nineteenth century England (and beyond). This article advances two principal claims: first, English criminal justice administrators from roughly 1750 to 1850 routinely resorted to summary proceedings in cases of suspected petty theft because of challenges of securing convictions in higher courts for felony of simple larceny; and, second, English criminal justice administration in this era is best viewed as a two-tiered system, in which heightened procedural and evidentiary protections for defendants tried for felonies in higher courts coexisted with a system of reduced protections for defendants tried summarily for misdemeanors.

THE RELEVANCE OF BAD CHARACTER

An important rule of criminal evidence is that evidence of a defendant’s previous misconduct (evidence of bad character) is prima facie inadmissible. The usual justification for this rule is that, in most cases, such evidence is either irrelevant or likely to have an unduly prejudicial effect on the fact-finder. This article questions this justification. After reviewing the psychological research on character, it examines statistical data on recidivism. The statistics suggest that those with previous convictions are much more likely to offend than are those without a criminal record, which implies that evidence of bad character will usually be sufficiently probative to justify its admission as proof of guilt. The remainder of the article examines various criticisms which can be levelled at this argument, in particular, that the recidivism data are misleading and that the way in which fact-finders reason renders evidence of bad character uninformative.

Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt

Previous articleNext article No AccessLoss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of GuiltSamuel R. GrossSamuel R. Gross Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 16, Number 2Jun., 1987 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467836 Views: 56Total views on this site Citations: 12Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1987 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Robin Blom Eyes Wide Shut: Failures to Teach Student Journalists About Eyewitness Error, Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 74, no.33 (Dec 2018): 345–357.https://doi.org/10.1177/1077695818816546John F. Hollway, Ben Grunwald Applying sentinel event reviews to policing, Criminology & Public Policy 18, no.33 (Jul 2019): 705–730.https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12457Robert J. Norris Framing DNA, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 33, no.11 (Feb 2017): 26–42.https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986216673014Marvin Zalman Measuring Wrongful Convictions, (Nov 2018): 3047–3058.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_162Vincent Egan, Nicola Gilzeane, Maria Viskaduraki Strategic race blindness: not so black and white?, Journal of Criminal Psychology 3, no.22 (Sep 2013): 127–135.https://doi.org/10.1108/JCP-09-2012-0006Steven E. Clark Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, Perspectives on Psychological Science 7, no.33 (May 2012): 238–259.https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612439584Samuel R. Gross Convicting the Innocent, Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4, no.11 (Dec 2008): 173–192.https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172300Amina Memon, Fiona Gabbert Improving the identification accuracy of senior witnesses: Do prelineup questions and sequential testing help?, Journal of Applied Psychology 88, no.22 (Jan 2003): 341–347.https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.2.341William M. Holmes Illegal Convictions and Sentences to Capital Punishment, Criminal Justice Policy Review 10, no.11 (Jul 2016): 103–116.https://doi.org/10.1177/088740349901000106Alex Stein The Refoundation of Evidence Law, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 9, no.22 (Jun 2015): 279–342.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0841820900003477Peter J. van Koppen Blundering Justice, (): 207–228.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-60327-049-6_12Willem A. Wagenaar Anchored Narratives: a Theory of Judicial Reasoning, and its Consequences, ().https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110879483.267

Jury verdicts and the presumption of innocence

In recent years various developments in the system of trial by jury in England and Wales have given rise to comment and concern. One such development was the abolition by s. 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 of the rule, said to have existed for over 600 years, that a jury must be unanimous in order to reach a verdict. These provisions are now contained in s. 17 of the Juries Act 1974 which allows for majority verdicts where there are no more than two dissentient voices to be returned under certain circumstances. The change in the unanimity rule has been criticised as striking at the root of the principle of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and has been interpreted by some as being the first step on the slippery slope to jury verdicts by simple majority, a development which would do even more to undermine the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt and might also lead to the complete abolition of trial by jury.

Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea

Previous articleNext article No AccessCriminal Justice and the Negotiated PleaKenneth KipnisKenneth Kipnis Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 86, Number 2Jan., 1976 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/291984 Views: 30Total views on this site Citations: 17Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1976 University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Kevin Petersen, Allison D. Redlich, David B. Wilson Where is the Evidence? Comparing the Effects of Evidence Strength and Demographic Characteristics on Plea Discounts, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 6 (Aug 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-022-09555-8Amy Dezember, Samantha Luna, Skye A. Woestehoff, Megan Stoltz, Melissa Manley, Jodi A. Quas, Allison D. Redlich Plea validity in circuit court: judicial colloquies in misdemeanor vs. felony charges, Psychology, Crime & Law 28, no.33 (Mar 2021): 268–288.https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2021.1905813Richard Lippke Plea Bargaining, (May 2019): 1–5.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee036.pub2Richard L. Lippke Plea Bargaining, (Feb 2013).https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee036Jeffrey Reiman Capital Punishment, (Feb 2013).https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee447Douglas Savitsky Is plea bargaining a rational choice? Plea bargaining as an engine of racial stratification and overcrowding in the United States prison system, Rationality and Society 24, no.22 (May 2012): 131–167.https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463112441351James J. Willis Bridging the Normative Gap in Graduate Criminal Justice Curricula: Teaching Theories of Justice, Journal of Criminal Justice Education 23, no.11 (Mar 2012): 81–102.https://doi.org/10.1080/10511253.2011.630675Mark D. White Retributivism in a World of Scarcity, (Dec 2008): 253–272.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511575488.016Ram Orzach, Stephen J. Spurr Lesser-included offenses, International Review of Law and Economics 28, no.44 (Dec 2008): 239–245.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2008.07.010Richard L. Lippke Retributivism and Plea Bargaining, Criminal Justice Ethics 25, no.22 (Jun 2006): 3–16.https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2006.9992198Mark D. White A Kantian critique of neoclassical law and economics, Review of Political Economy 18, no.22 (Aug 2006): 235–252.https://doi.org/10.1080/09538250600571494RUTH W. GRANT Ethics and Incentives: A Political Approach, American Political Science Review 100, no.11 (Feb 2006): 29–39.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406061983Clifton Perry Contraception, (Jan 1993): 145–172.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-59259-446-7_7John D. Wooldredge An aggregate-level examination of the caseload pressure hypothesis, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 5, no.33 (Sep 1989): 259–283.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01062740Dean J. Champion Guilty plea hearings and judicial supervision: Some differences between federal and state judges regarding Rule 11 and a defendant’s right to due process, American Journal of Criminal Justice 12, no.11 (Sep 1987): 62–81.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02887539 Samuel R. Gross Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, The Journal of Legal Studies 16, no.22 (Oct 2015): 395–453.https://doi.org/10.1086/467836GARY D. LaFREE ADVERSARIAL AND NONADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: A COMPARISON OF GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS*, Criminology 23, no.22 (May 1985): 289–312.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1985.tb00338.x

Reviews

Law, Liberty and Morality. By H. L. A. Hart.Law and Justice. By A. J. Kerr.The Modern Law of Employment. By G. H. L. Fridman.The Right to Membership of a Trade Union. By R. W. Rideout, ll.b., ph.d., Lecturer in Law in the University of Sheffield.Trade Unionism in Australia. By Orwell de R. Foenander, ll.m. (Melb.), litt.d.(Melb.), Senior Research Fellow in the University of Melbourne.A Source Book of English Administrative Law. By D. C. M. Yardley.Principles of Administrative Law. Third edition. By J. A. G. Griffith and H. Street.Cripps on Compulsory Acquisition of Land. Tenth edition. By Harold Parrish.Constitutional Protection. By L. A. Sheridan, ll.b., ph.d., Professor of Law in the University of Singapore.Law and Psychiatry. By Sheldon Glueck.Law in a Scientific Age. By Edwin W. Patterson.The Proof of Guilt. Third edition. By Glanville Williams, ll.d., f.b.a.Eighteenth Century Penal Theory. By James Heath.Child Law. By T. E. James.World Economic Agencies, Law and Practice. By C. H. Alexandrowicz.The Fund Agreement in the Courts. By Joseph Gold.Labour Law in Europe with Special Reference to the Common Market. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Supplementary Publication No. 5.

Regina v Robinson-Brannan

This case is recorded on the grounds that it is of unusual interest, both from the legal and medico-scientific points of view; at the same time those interested in the “Psychology of Crime” may find food for thought. The illegitimate son of the deceased was found guilty of his non-capital murder. The immediate motive appeared to be the father's dislike of his son's homosexual associations; to this may be added the psychological insecurity of the accused, arising from his background, and a potential character change in the deceased, arising out of an accident (or a previous attempt at murder). Stress is laid on the ability of a Police Force, deficient in practical experience of the investigation of murder, to adhere to a prearranged plan, on the importance of team work—remembering that the onus of proof is on the prosecution—and on the fact that the proof may require time. Proof of innocence is as important as proof of guilt. Items of potential research are offered, to those who have the time and funds to pursue them, in the field of Finger Prints and Forensic Medicine.

REVIEWS

The Advocate's Devil. By C. P. Harvey, Q. C.Problems Of Legal Philosophy. By Frede Castberg, Professor Of Constitutional And International Law At The University Of Oslo, Rector Of The University.THE PROBLEM OF DIVORCE. By R. S. W. POLLARD.The Composition Of Legislation. By Elmer A. Driedger, Q. C., B. A., LL. B., Of The Saskatchewan Bar; Assistant Deputy Minister And Parliamentary Counsel, Department Of Justice, Ottawa.The Bill Of Rights: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1958. By Learned Hand.Free Elections. By W. J. M. Mackenzie, Professor Of Government In The Victoria University Of Manchester.International Institutions. By Paul Reuter. Translated From The French By J. M. Chapman.The Occupation Of Enemy Territory. A Commentary On The Law And Practice Of Belligerent Occupation. By Gerhard Von Glahn.The Sale Of Goods. By P. S. Atiyah, B. A., B. C. L.Anti‐Trust In Perspective. The Complementary Roles Of Rule And Discretion. By Milton Handler, Professor Of Law, Columbia University.Personal Property. Second Edition. By J. Crossley Vaines, LL. M.The Law Of Tort: A Treatise On The Law Of Civil Wrongs. Fifth Edition. By S. Ramaswamy Iyer, B. A., B. L., Senior Advocate Of The Supreme Court Of India.The Proof Of Guilt. A Study Of The English Criminal Trial. By Glanville Williams. (The Hamlyn Lectures, Seventh Series). Second Edition.

Review: The Proof of Guilt

Review: The Proof of Guilt

Review: The Proof of Guilt

Review: The Proof of Guilt

The Proof of Guilt. A Study of the English Criminal Trial

The Proof of Guilt. A Study of the English Criminal Trial

The Proof of Guilt. A Study of the English Criminal Trial

The Proof of Guilt. A Study of the English Criminal Trial

Glanville Williams; The Proof of Guilt

Glanville Williams; The Proof of Guilt

REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:The Proof of Guilt. A Study of the English Criminal Trial. By Glanville Williams. (The Hamlyn Lectures, Seventh Series.) [London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1955. viii and 294 pp. 17s. 6d. net.]The United Kingdom: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions. (The British Commonwealth Series, Vol. 1) (Part 1: England and Wales, Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man) under the general editorship of George W. Keeton, m.a., ll.d., and Dennis Lloyd, m.a., ll.b., with Specialist Contributors. [London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1955. xiv and 528 pp. including index. £3 3s. net.]The United Kingdom: The Development of its Laws and Constitution. (The British Commonwealth Series, Vol. 1) Part 2: Scotland by T. B. Smith; The Channel Islands by L. A. Sheridan. [London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1955. xii and 554 pp. and (Appendices, Tables and Indexes) 62 pp. £3 3s. net.]Three Great Systems of Jurisprudence. By K. Kahana Kagan, m.litt. (Cantab), Lecturer in Codes, Jews' College, London. [London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1955. 199 pp. (index 7 pp.) and xii. 25s.]

The Proof of Guilt. By Glanville Williams, ll.d., Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge; of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. (Published under the auspices of the Hamlyn Trust.) [London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd.1955. viii and 294 pp. 17s. 6d. net.

The Proof of Guilt. By Glanville Williams, ll.d., Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge; of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. (Published under the auspices of the Hamlyn Trust.) [London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd.1955. viii and 294 pp. 17s. 6d. net.

Review: The Proof of Guilt

Review: The Proof of Guilt

Crimes: Accessory after the Fact: What Proof of Guilt on the Part of the Principal Is Necessary

Crimes: Accessory after the Fact: What Proof of Guilt on the Part of the Principal Is Necessary