EDWIN DE LEON, JEFFERSON DAVIS* PROPAGANDIST Charles P. Cullop The year 1862 was one of fateful decision for both the Union and the Confederacy. The Civil War in 1861 had consisted largely of abortive skirmishes and preparatory maneuvers. The following year would find the struggle joined in earnest—from the broad Mississippi Delta to the rolling Maryland Piedmont. But the two awakened giants would battle not only with sword and cannon, but with words; they would compete not only on the battlefield but in the glittering diplomatic halls of Europe. To achieve European recognition of their independence would be the Southern aim; to prevent that recognition, the Northern. The repercussions of the explosive Trent Affair in 1861 had dramatized to both the North and the South the possibility of foreign intervention in their domestic war. Edwin De Leon, a South Carolinian residing in France, was especially aware of the need for greater Southern efforts in European propaganda as a necessary adjunct to a successful Southern diplomacy. To state his case to the Confederacy, he made his way by steamer to New Orleans , and thence by rail to Richmond. Here in the late winter of 1862, he met with an old friend, Jefferson Davis, gave his observations, and outlined his plans. Davis listened attentively. De Leon painted a dark picture of Confederate affairs in Europe. The first Confederate diplomatic mission sent to Europe in March, 1861, had achieved little. That traveling delegation, composed of A. Dudley Mann, William L. Yancey, and Pierre A. Rost, had been coolly received in England and France. Hardly noted for either distinction or ability, and displaying little imagination and initiative, the members of the commission naively waited for the official recognition that never came. By the fall of 1861 the Richmond government realized the need for more energetic measures, and dismissed the commission. Mann was appointed commissioner to Belgium; Rost was sent to Madrid; Yancey returned home to a seat in the Confederate Senate. The delegation was Charles P. Cullop, a graduate of the University of Virginia, is dean of students at Davis and Elkins College, Elkins, West Virginia. 386 replaced by James M. Mason and John Slidell, both able and energetic men, as envoys to England and France, respectively. But the new commissioners had been captured on the high seas and, by the time of De Leon's departure from Europe, had not yet been released. Although the explosive incident for a time promised English intervention, De Leon and Davis knew that it had impressed on the British mind a deep and abiding fear of war with the United States. England was now, therefore, more resolute than ever in her neutrality. In Richmond doubdess De Leon also impressed on Davis the absence of organized Confederate propaganda. Virtually all news of the war emanated from Northern sources. To compound Confederate troubles, the Federal government in the fall of 1861 had embarked on a strong propaganda campaign. John Bigelow, a prominent journalist from New York, had arrived in Paris to direct the Northern effort. He was followed by Thurlow Weed, influential Republican editor of the Albany Evening Journal; by General Winfield Scott of Mexican War fame; by Archbishop John Hughes of New York, a popular Catholic leader; and by Bishop Charles P. Mcllwaine, an Episcopalian from Ohio. De Leon could testify to the valuable services of Weed and Scott in soothing inflamed British opinion following the seizure of Mason and Slidell. He made it clear at Richmond that work of dedicated Northern propagandists , English fear of war with the United States, and a universally obstinate hostility to slavery in Europe, made European recognition of the Confederacy an unlikely event. As Davis pondered the report from De Leon, his attention was drawn to other significant events transpiring within the Confederacy. Mditary prospects were discouraging. Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen to the Federals, paving the way for a Northern advance down the Mississippi. The recruiting and supplying of Confederate forces in preparation for the summer campaign had encountered obstacles. Moreover , the Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, had been severely criticized for his handling of War Department affairs. Davis had developed a cordial relationship with the Jewish banister...
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