Profits Of Supply Chain Members Research Articles

Advance selling strategy of fresh products under two contracts

PurposeThis paper analyzes the advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain where the e-retailer provides wholesale contract or agency contract to the fresh products supplier.Design/methodology/approachThis paper constructed a two-period sequential-move game of fresh products supply chain members.FindingsThis analysis showed that the supply chain members had different preferences for contracts under different market conditions. The advance selling of fresh products was not a decision of the seller, but also required the support of other supply chain members. And the advance selling strategy was not always beneficial to all supply chain parties. Under the two contracts, there were market conditions in which the profits of supply chain members were Pareto-improved through the implementation of advance selling.Research limitations/implicationsThe model presented in this study focuses solely on the context of monopoly, overlooking the competition from alternative suppliers or retailers. Consequently, exploring the competitive landscape within the fresh products supply chain, particularly in relation to pre-sale pricing, emerges as a crucial avenue for further investigation. By employing empirical research methods, valuable insights are gleaned, thereby significantly augmenting the existing body of relevant theories.Practical implicationsThe decision to pre-sell fresh products should be based on market conditions. Supply chain members can control production costs and fresh products circulation losses to maximize profits.Originality/valueFrom the perspective of game theory, this study analyzed the optimal advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain members under two kinds of contracts. These results can provide practical implications for fresh products suppliers and e-retailers.

Research on Green Supply Chain Formation and Government Subsidy Pricing Strategy Considering an Online Trading Platform

Low-carbon production is currently the development direction of enterprises. The government provides low-carbon subsidies to low-carbon manufacturing enterprises to promote the formation of a green supply chain. To better encourage the development of the green supply chain by determining government subsidies and platform authentication fees, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model that consists of a supplier and a manufacturer, and solves the optimal decisions of each entity using the backward induction method. This study uses the matching method to analyze the payoff matrix for supply chain members when choosing between low-carbon and traditional production. After introducing the online trading platform, the impact of the platform on the profit of supply chain members is studied, considering whether the authentication service provided by the platform is completely accurate. The results show that (1) in the green supply chain, there is a relationship between the enterprises’ profit and the level of emissions reduction, which increases first and then decreases. (2) The online trading platform is conducive to achieving green supply chain coordination. The government can pay fewer subsidies to prompt the formation of a green supply chain and the optimal emissions reduction level of the enterprise is higher. (3) When the authentication mechanism of the platform is imperfect, the authentication fee of the platform and the subsidy coefficient of the government need to be set within a reasonable range to avoid the enterprise adopting traditional production pretending to be the low-carbon type. This study contributes to research on the green supply chain and provides insights into pricing strategies for governments and platforms.

Comparison of different taxation models on cross-border supply chain decisions: Considering disruption forecast and cost differences

In this paper, we consider disruption forecast and channel operating cost differences in a cross-border dual-channel supply chain and construct a dual-channel supply chain strategy game model under different taxation models. We compare the optimal pricing, order volume and profits of supply chain members under four strategies. We also analyze how the tariff rate and channel cost difference coefficient affect each member’s optimal decisions and profits. First, we find that under different taxation models, the impact of tariff rate on optimal order volume is different, but it always has a negative effect on optimal wholesale price. Second, in some threshold intervals of the channel cost difference coefficient, the size relation of optimal pricing is consistent with order volume under either taxation model, regardless of whether to wait for a disruption forecast. Finally, when the supply chain disruption probability and channel cost difference coefficient take different combinations, with the change in tariffs, the e-retailer and overseas manufacturer tend to adopt different strategies.

Enhancing the Efficacy of Pharmaceutical E-Commerce Through Omni-Channel Coordination

In the current era of e-commerce, the pharmaceutical industry has not experienced the same level of growth as regular commodities due to the high costs associated with home delivery and the perceived risks associated with purchasing drugs online. This paper proposes an omni-channel strategy to address these challenges, involving an “order online, home-delivery offline” approach between e-pharmacies and drugstores, with telemedicine serving as a coordination mechanism between e-pharmacies and hospital doctors. The proposed strategy achieves a seamless patient experience during online diagnosis. To analyze its feasibility, the paper employs optimization techniques to compare the profits of supply chain members in both omni-channel and non-omni-channel scenarios. The results demonstrate that the proposed strategy is both practical and efficient, boosting patients' trust in e-commerce and improving the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry.

Optimal decisions and coordination mechanism in a green supply chain with loss‐averse consumers in environmental quality

AbstractWe consider consumers' loss aversion in environmental quality and develop a two‐period game theoretical model to investigate the optimal pricing and environmental quality decisions for a green supply chain where a manufacturer sells products to consumers through a retailer. We then introduce a two‐part tariff contract to coordinate the supply chain for both periods. We suggest that optimal decisions in the second period depend on the reference point of the first period in the decentralized supply chain. A higher reference point leads to the increased environmental quality of products, prices, and profits of supply chain members in the second period. However, when the reference point is sufficiently high, the environmental quality will be lower to avoid excessive environmental investment costs. Furthermore, consumers' loss aversion reduces the environmental quality of products when the reference point is low. As consumers' loss aversion increases, the manufacturer's profit rises, while the wholesale and retail prices and the retailer's profit show a decreasing and then increasing trend. Finally, we find that a two‐part tariff contract enables the two‐period supply chain to be coordinated and achieve Pareto improvements in profit and environmental quality. This study sheds valuable light on understanding consumer environmental preferences and irrational behavior for supply chain decision‐making and green product design.

Low-Carbon Transformation Strategy for Blockchain-Based Power Supply Chain

Carbon abatement in the power sector is essential to achieving the “double carbon” goal, and blockchain technology, one of the most promising emerging technologies, will assist the power sector in efficiently achieving this goal. In terms of the effectiveness of carbon abatement, comparative studies on coordination mechanisms are absent in the existing literature. On this basis, aiming at the cooperative abatement strategy between power generation generators and sellers under the carbon tax policy, this paper has developed four decision models: the Stackelberg game led by power generation enterprises, the simultaneous Nash bargaining decision by both parties, the vertical integration decision by supply chain enterprises, and the cooperative carbon emission reduction game by supply chain enterprises, to analyze the changes in electricity price, sustainability level, power sales, and profits of supply chain members. The results of the numerical analysis show that user preference for blockchain technology and an increase in the proportion of low-carbon electricity information uploaded to the blockchain can significantly improve the sustainability level of the electricity supply chain. The level of investment in green technologies by electricity producers under cooperative abatement decision-making increases compared to the electricity producer-dominated Stackelberg game model. The sustainability level of the electricity supply chain is higher under the Nash simultaneous decision than under the abatement cost-sharing decision, but the decision-maker’s profit is lower. The values of overall profit and sustainability level of the electricity supply chain are both highest under the vertically integrated decision.

Pricing and Coordination of the Extended Warranty Service Supply Chain that Considers Fairness Concerns

For the product dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer with fairness concerns, considering that the decision of products and extended warranty services in the supply chain is affected by the fairness concern behavior of retailers, the Stackelberg game method was used to establish the profit decision model of manufacturers and retailers, solved the product price, extended warranty service price and profit of each member of the supply chain during centralized and decentralized decision-making, and discussed the impact of retailer fairness concern on the optimal decision and profit of supply chain members. The results showed that with the increase of retailers' fairness concern coefficient, the wholesale price of products and the price of extended warranty service decrease, and the price of direct sales channel and retail channel price of products increase. Retailers' profits increase, manufacturers' profits, and the total profits of supply chain systems decrease.

Optimal strategies for a multi-channel recycling supply chain in the clothing industry: considering consumer types

PurposeThis study aims to focus on the clothing recycling supply chain and aims to provide optimal decisions and managerial insights into supply chain strategies, thereby facilitating the sustainable development of the clothing industry.Design/methodology/approachBased on previous single- and dual-channel studies, game theory was employed to analyze multiple recycling channels. Concurrently, clothing consumer types were integrated into the analytical models to observe their impact on supply chain strategies. Three market scenarios were modeled for comparative analysis, and numerical experiments were conducted.FindingsThe intervention of fashion retailers in the clothing recycling market has intensified competition across the entire market. The proportions of various consumer types, their preferences for online platforms and their preference for the retailer’s channel influence the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members. The diversity of recycling channels may enhance the recycling volume of clothes; however, it should meet certain conditions.Originality/valueThis study extends the existing theory from a channel dimension by exploring multiple channels. Furthermore, by investigating the classifications of clothing consumers and their influence on supply chain strategies, the theory is enhanced from the consumer perspective.

Fuel consumption-reduction investment decisions and coordination contracts in fuel vehicle supply chains: A dynamic analysis

The share of carbon emissions from road transport is as high as 14% of global carbon emissions; fuel vehicles account for a significant part of these emissions. Therefore, there is a long way to reduce fuel consumption in fuel vehicles. We consider the government’s choice of two policies, Vehicle Carbon Emission Regulation (VCER) and Dual Credit Policy (DCP), to regulate the fuel vehicle supply chain and construct a Stackelberg differential game model for fuel consumption-reduction investment decision and operation coordination in a fuel vehicle supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer. Furthermore, we analyze the supply chain’s equilibrium strategies under centralized and decentralized decision scenarios. Finally, design a bilateral sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain and verify the theoretical analysis by numerical simulation. The results show that the DCP has a stronger incentive for fuel consumption reduction investment than the VCER; the supplier’s profit increases as the severity of the two policies increases, but the change in the manufacturer’s profit is not consistent under the two policies, where the increase in the penalty rate under the VCER decreases the manufacturer’s profit. However, it falls and then rises with tighter fuel consumption standards under the DCP. At the same time, the two-way cost-sharing contracts can encourage more fuel consumption reduction investments while increasing the profits of supply chain members, which is a Pareto improvement for the ecosystem and the supply chain parties.

Pricing and Carbon-Emission-Reduction Decisions under the BOPS Mode with Low-Carbon Preference from Customers

The need to mitigate the impacts of climate change has been a worldwide consensus. Cap and trade regulations have been introduced to make the world achieve carbon peaks and neutrality. There are also growing concerns regarding low carbon management. Considering both cap and trade regulations and low-carbon preferences from customers, this study focuses on reducing carbon emissions and pricing decisions in the dual-channel supply chain based on game theory. Furthermore, it analyzes the effects of low-carbon preference (LCP) on emission-reduction efforts and the profits of supply chain members. Finally, it investigates the impact of promoting low-carbon products on optimal decisions and profits. The results conclude that (1) the growth of customers’ LCP level motivates the manufacturer to have more investment in emission reduction with the BOPS unit compensation or full-sales transfer mode; (2) the increase in customers’ LCP level would benefit the supply chain members; (3) the joint emission-reduction strategy can strengthen the positive impact of LCP level on the manufacturer’s emission-reduction effort and the profits supply chain members; and (4) the joint emission-reduction strategy is preferable for the supply chain members compared to the single emission-reduction strategy. However, the joint emission strategy is not always better than the single emission strategy with respect to the selling price. Finally, it provides managerial implications for decision-makers and potential issues for future research.

Contract Design for Return Products in a Cooperative Closed-Loop Supply Chain

The importance of considering the End-of-life product (EOL) in the closed-loop supply chain network has led it to model a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain network between the retailer and the manufacturer in this article, considering the redemption guarantee. Consumer products to be paid. Therefore, the model is considered in two modes, in which initially the members of the supply chain under a Stakelberg game are competing with each other for pricing on new products, product redemption and wholesale prices. In this (decentralized) scenario, members of the supply chain (retailer and manufacturer) are a percentage increase in their profit function. In this scenario, the producer, after determining the wholesale price as the leader of the game, maximizes the profit from the sale of its products, and then the retailer, as the leader in the game, determines the price of the products and the redemption price. In another (centralized) scenario, the main goal is to increase the profitability of the entire supply chain. This article also examines a contract related to the rate of purchase of returned products and the sale of new products, which encourages supply chain members to work together to increase their profits over a decentralized scenario. The stated materials lead to the design of models in a focused and decentralized scenario. The results of implementing the model on the sample problem show the high efficiency of this type of contract in increasing the profit of supply chain members compared to the decentralized scenario.

Optimal Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chains in E-Commerce Platform Considering Sales Cooperations under Environmental Effects and WEEE Regulations.

Nowadays, to achieve carbon neutrality, e-commerce platforms participate in the sales and recycling of electrical and electronic products in consideration of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) regulations and environmental effects. This study builds a Stackelberg game model for an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain (ECLSC) under different sales cooperation modes between a manufacturer of electrical and electronic products and an e-commerce platform. Reverse induction is used to obtain the optimal decision-making and profit of the ECLSC under three sales cooperation modes, considering the influence of environmental effects on optimal decision and objective functions. The results show the following: the sales cooperation mode and environmental cost do not affect the WEEE recovery prices of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms, nor do they affect government subsidy standards for dismantling WEEEs; they are, however, positively correlated with environmental benefits. Furthermore, the wholesale and retail prices of electrical and electronic products under different sales cooperation modes are related to sales cooperation modes and environmental costs. Moreover, the processing fees imposed on the manufacturers are related to the environmental costs of the electrical and electronic products; the thresholds of environmental costs of products for government to levy processing fees are different under different sales cooperation modes. Finally, the environmental cost of products required by the government's levying of processing fees are the lowest under a hybrid model. Generally speaking, under WEEE regulations, governments should levy more processing fees for electrical and electronic products with higher environmental costs. Meanwhile, increased environmental benefits will always increase the profits of supply chain members, but increased environmental costs do not always reduce the profits of supply chain members, and multichannel product sales do not always generate profits for manufacturers.

Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

The intelligent transformation of logistics plays a significant role in meeting the diverse needs of customers, improving operational efficiency, and reducing carbon emissions in logistics activities. Therefore, to achieve sustainable development, logistics enterprises need to face the decision-making problem of intelligent logistics transformation. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game model between a financially constrained logistics-service provider (LSP) and a well-funded logistics-service integrator (LSI) and discuss the impact of the wholesale price contract, the cost-sharing contract, the revenue-sharing contract, the two-part tariff contract, and the hybrid cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract on the intelligence level of logistics services, the profits of supply-chain members, and the channel for logistics-service demand. We found that the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract cannot achieve Pareto improvement in the profits of supply-chain members. In addition, the increase in bank-loan interest rates would seriously weaken the level of intelligence and market demand for the entire logistics service. However, when consumers do not have high requirements for the intelligence of logistics services, the two-part power–price contract can create a win–win situation for supply-chain members and increase market demand within a certain range; on the contrary, a hybrid contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing is the best choice. Moreover, in the process of contract design for the intelligent transformation of logistics services, it is necessary to pay attention to the influence of the price-sensitivity coefficient on decision-making.

Retailers' information disclosure strategies with behavior‐based pricing in competitive supply chains

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate information disclosure strategies with behavior‐based pricing (BBP) of retailers in a competitive channel with consumers' valuation uncertainty. We analyze the impacts of disclosure strategies (i.e., disclosing by an individual retailer and disclosing by both retailers) with BBP on the pricing decisions and profits of supply chain members. Then, we investigate the effects of the probability of a high valuation on supply chain members. We find that (i) the profits of manufacturers and retailers with BBP and information disclosure are always higher than those with BBP; (ii) the profits of manufacturers and retailers when both retailers implement BBP and use information disclosure are always higher than those when one retailer implements BBP and uses information disclosure; and (iii) the profits of manufacturers and retailers decrease with the probability of a high valuation first and then increase with it when both retailers implement BBP and use information disclosure.

Pricing Decision of Three-Level Agricultural Supply Chain Based on Blockchain Traceability and Altruistic Preference

The traceability of blockchain is crucial to the quality and safety of agricultural products, primarily when bacterial contamination occurs in the agricultural supply chain. To gain a deeper understanding of the impacts on the quality and safety of agricultural products, we built a three-level agricultural supply chain model comprising one retailer, one manufacturer, and one supplier. We aimed to explore the impact of blockchain traceability and retailers’ altruistic preference on pricing decisions and channel member profit, and to then examine the motivation of enterprises to participate in blockchain technology. Our study showed that: (1) blockchain technology has the potential to improve the prices and profits of supply chain members without considering the cost of blockchain; and (2) blockchain technology has the potential to improve the retailer’s price when the unit variable cost of blockchain is higher than a certain threshold. It can also reduce the manufacturer’s price and the supplier’s output. However, the excessive cost of blockchain can also aggravate the double marginalization effect of the supply chain. When both the unit variable cost and the fixed input cost of the blockchain are low, each enterprise has the incentive to participate in the blockchain. (3) In the scenario of the altruistically-preferred retailer, when the blockchain variable cost is lower than a certain threshold, the retailer’s altruistic preferences can improve the manufacturer’s and supplier’s profit, but it will reduce the retailer’s profit.

Research on the Sales Strategy of Online Brand Owners Expanding to Offline Channels Based on The Online Agent Mode

This paper studies the supply chain system composed of online brand owners based on pure network sales to offline expansion, takes the single network channel model, establishes two dual-channel structure models of offline direct selling model and offline distribution model, and compares and analyzes the influence of different channel structures on the pricing, demand and optimal profit of supply chain members. Research shows that online brands in the offline sales development strategy choice and open offline stores fixed cost and consumer channel preference, when open offline stores fixed cost is very low, or when the fixed cost centered and consumer offline channel preference over a certain threshold, the optimal strategy for offline direct sales model, otherwise for offline distribution model. In order to improve the cooperation efficiency of the supply chain members in the offline distribution model, a bilateral contract mechanism is designed to coordinate the supply chain. When the fixed transfer payment fee is within a certain range, the mechanism can optimize the members of the supply chain and the overall profit.

Pricing and coordination in a green supply chain with a risk-averse manufacturer under the reference price effect

This paper considers a green supply chain using manufacturers and retailers as the research objects. The pricing and coordination strategy of the green supply chain, considering a risk-averse manufacturer, is investigated under the reference price effect. We establish centralized, decentralized, and cost-sharing contract decision-making models and then provide the optimal balancing strategy for each model. Further, we analyzed the optimal equilibrium strategy of different models. In the end, validate them through numerical simulation. We have found that the cost-sharing contract model is better than the decentralized decision model. Besides, manufacturers’ degree of risk avoidance affects the wholesale price, product greenness, retail prices, and profits of supply chain members. It is verified that the cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain system to increase the profit of members of the supply chain.

Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies

Green innovation is the inevitable trend in the development of the supply chain, and thus the government adopts subsidy policies for the relevant enterprises to enhance their enthusiasm for green development. In view of the manufacturers’ fairness concerns in the dual-channel green supply chain that is composed of manufacturers and retailers, we propose a novel Stackelberg game model led by retailers and analyze the impact of manufacturers’ fairness concerns on the decision-making of manufacturers and retailers in the dual-channel green supply chain under government subsidies. The results show that only the wholesale price of products, manufacturers’ profits, and retailers’ profits are affected by manufacturer’s fair concerns. When manufacturer has fair concerns, product greenness and profits of supply chain members rise with the increase in government subsidies. The results can offer an effective reference for the dual-channel supply chain members with fairness concerns to make optimal decisions under government subsidies.

Research on financing strategies of retailers with capital constraints under the effect of showrooms

A supply chain made up of a financially constrained retailer and a well-financed manufacturer is constructed considering the showroom effect. The financing strategy choice of the retailer and the operational decisions of the supply chain members are investigated, in which the retailer can solve the capital constraint problem through a single financing strategy (ML and BL) and a combined financing strategy (MBL and BTL). Meanwhile, the impact of the showroom effect on the optimal decision and profit of supply chain members under different financing strategies and the optimal financing strategy decision is analyzed by numerical examples. The study shows that: (1) the increasing showroom effect has not inhibited retailers' enthusiasm to offer showroom services; on the contrary, it has prompted them to improve the level of showroom services. (2) The price of the products grows with the increases in the showroom effect, but the sales price of the online channel is more greatly affected. In addition, the showroom effect has a greater impact on the sales prices of online and offline channels and wholesale prices under the BL strategy than in other financing strategies. (3) When the showroom effect is small, the optimal strategy for retailers is to choose the ML strategy or the MBL strategy, while the BTL strategy is superior to the MBL strategy only when the equity financing ratio is very small. However, where the showroom effect exceeds a certain threshold, the BL strategy is the optimal funding strategy for retailers. (4) When the bank loan rate is too high, the ML and MBL strategies are better if the retailer's initial capital level is not too low.

Strategic inventory and supplier encroachment under asymmetric information

The existing literature has shown that using a strategic inventory strategy and supplier encroachment strategy exclusively or simultaneously may improve the efficiency of the supply chain. However, most research assumes that the demand information in the supply chain is symmetric. In real life, the retailer often has private demand information, and thus the demand information is asymmetric. The role of an information sharing strategy in the presence of strategic inventory and supplier encroachment has yet to be studied. The gap is filled by considering a two-period model consisting of a supplier and a retailer, for which information sharing, strategic inventory, and supplier encroachment are investigated with a focus on the effect of strategic inventory strategy on information sharing strategy, encroachment strategy, and the profit of supply chain members. We significantly contributed by considering the interaction between the retailer's strategic inventory strategy, information sharing strategy, and the supplier's encroachment strategy. Asymmetric information is first introduced in the strategic inventory model. Furthermore, our other significant contribution is presented to demonstrate that strategic inventory can hurt all firms when the demand information is asymmetric, which is different from the setting of perfect information. The following results are obtained. First, holding strategic inventory will not affect the retailer's information sharing strategy. Second, the use of strategic inventory by the retailer will restrain the use of encroachment strategy by the supplier, whether the information is shared or not. Finally, when the demand information is asymmetric, and the supplier does not encroach in the second period, the retailer can use strategic inventory to bring about 'lose-lose' or 'win-lose' outcomes besides 'win-win' or 'lose-win' outcomes.