Process Safety Management System Research Articles

Modeling the causal mechanism in process safety management (PSM) systems from historical accidents

Process safety management (PSM) underpins reducing major accidents in the process industries. For decades, PSM systems have been implemented globally. However, few studies have modeled the complexities within the PSM system, leading to some underlying chronic problems within organizations that go unnoticed. Here, we investigate causal mechanisms among PSM elements from historical accidents to deliver a practical tool for safety intervention formulation. Specifically, based on the Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS) PSM framework, 100 chemical accident reports derived from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) were analyzed and converted into structured information stored in 22 PSM elements. Then, employing two causal structure learning algorithms, the causal structures among 22 elements were learned from the processed accident information. Finally, the causal effects among PSM elements were estimated by extending Rubin's counterfactual causal framework to an approach applicable to multi-treatment scenarios. We demonstrate that the causal structures and effects learned from accident reports reveal the causal mechanism within the PSM system. A total of 20 significant causal relationships among single elements, nine significant causal relationships among element combinations, and several interesting PSM failure paths were identified. According to these causal patterns, the PSM effort will shift from the traditional "what to do" to "how to do it."

Model of the process safety management system at an airline

The purpose of the process safety management system is to identify hazard factors and develop a set of methods to prevent injuries at an airline, occupational illness, material costs in case of damage to property and the environment. The analysis of the structure of occupational pathology depending on the factors of the production environment and the working process for the period 2013–2022 shows that the percentage of diseases associated with the impact of production physical factors for this period remains at the same level. This fact, in turn, confirms the relevance of the chosen study. Analysis and identification of the current production situation is necessary to assess the impact of adverse production factors. In this study, a new approach to the mathematical model for a process safety management system is implemented. Mathematical modeling allows a deeper understanding of the nature of certain phenomena and to obtain information about the real situation, which in turn stimulates the development of new scientific problems and methods of solving them, and is also the basis for choosing specific solutions for the implementation of certain projects. The successful implementation of strategies in order to create a process safety system for a flexible monitoring and management structure depends on how effective its functional structure is; this provision is explained by the fundamental nature of the tasks that are solved at the management stage. The article discusses the theoretical statements concerning mathematical modeling. When creating the model, the apparatus of abstract algebra-set theory – was used. The model developed in the course of the study makes it possible to introduce a model of the process safety management system into the activities of aviation enterprises.

Maturity model approach for building effective process safety management systems

AbstractUsually, a gap analysis is conducted to address challenges encountered when building a process safety management (PSM) system from scratch, or for improving an already existing PSM program. Business maturity models, on the other hand, are useful management frameworks used to gauge the maturity of an organization in various disciplines or functions. The purpose of this paper is to introduce an adaptation of business maturity models to the PSM area.

Environmental, social, governance: The future of process safety management or repeat of the past?

AbstractSites have implemented process safety management (PSM) systems, initially for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) PSM and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) risk management program (RMP) compliance. Then later, they adapted those systems for risk‐based process safety (RBPS). They discovered the power of leveraging these foundational systems of procedures, tools, and practices for numerous follow‐on initiatives: for example, action management, API‐1173, SIS/IEC‐61511; cybersecurity/IEC 62443; API‐754/Vision 2020 metrics; ISO 14001. Today, companies are increasingly serious about environmental, social, governance (ESG) issues, and demonstrate progress by leveraging the S&P global corporate sustainability assessment (CSA). Interestingly, 63% of the CSA elements rely on information directly or indirectly produced by PSM systems. The existing PSM systems may require additional data collection, or additional lifecycles, in their business processes to satisfy the ESG/CSA requirements. Process safety professionals have a critically important role in supporting local and corporate ESG initiatives. ESG initiatives are indeed the “new game in town” to promote continuous improvement in process safety.

The role of motivation in human performance and in minimizing the impact of human error

AbstractThe role of human error is the subject of various case studies on process safety incidents worldwide. To improve the situation and minimize the impact of human error, efforts are widely focused on the external job situation, such as job design, and the rules of rewards and punishments. Furthermore, organizations have opted to improve individual conditions such as job competencies and skills development. It is the aim of human factors engineering to maximize the potential of human performance in preventing process safety incidents. However, little attention is paid to the internal motivational process that occurs in an individual participating in the incident. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to bridge the gap and to highlight the role of motivational behavior in developing human performance or in executing actions that lead to human error. Human behavior and motivation widely vary within organizations. Therefore, organizations may benefit from the motivational theories that are widely used in the study of organizational behavior. The theoretical approach to motivation is separated into two main categories: inner motivation and outer motivation. Moreover, inner motivational theory is also subdivided into rational factors and irrational factors. The theories applied in this paper exemplify and combine the use of motivational theories in improving human performance and preventing process safety incidents. Based on the analysis, key recommendations are generated that can be implemented to improve human performance as part of the process safety management system.

Evaluating the Efficiency of the Process Safety Management System through Analysis of Major Industrial Accidents in South Korea

The process safety management (PSM) system was introduced in South Korea in 1996, wherein a company voluntarily organizes and manages a chemical accident prevention system, which contributes to reducing chemical accidents. However, large- and small-scale chemical accidents occur frequently. This trend necessitates analysis and improvement of the PSM systems. This study aimed to analyze the correlation between major industrial accidents, their main causes, the status of accidents by company size and industry, and the PSM evaluation grade through an analysis of 130 accidents that occurred in the past 17 years (2005–2021). The results showed that small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with fewer than 100 employees accounted for 36% of all accidents, indicating a higher occurrence rate than large companies. Additionally, the proportion of companies with inadequate PSM levels, rated as M-grade (M+, and M−), were 67.0%, suggesting a high probability of major industrial accidents. The results of this study show that a company’s voluntary safety management can be induced by an improved PSM system and management plan, which is expected to prevent major industrial accidents.

MOC 102: Get more out of MOC systems than “just managing changes”

AbstractManagement of change (MOC) is the cornerstone of a successful risk‐based process safety (RBPS) program. Safe operation and maintenance of facilities that manufacture or store hazardous chemicals require robust process safety management (PSM) systems. The MOC element of RBPS program establishes a formal, documented authorization process to manage changes that may introduce unexpected new hazards or increase the risk of existing ones. Most companies have established MOC systems to evaluate and approve (or reject) proposed changes, leading managers and supervisors to assume that this PSM element is well in hand. Now that the MOC system is up and running, however, have you noticed “backsliding”, complacency, or just going through the motions? Or, perhaps there is reasonably good usage of the system in your company, but you consider that there ought to be more value to be gotten from the MOC system data.

Building urban gas process safety management (UG-PSM) system: Based on root cause analysis with 160 urban gas accidents in China

Urban safety is significantly impacted by the complexity of urban gas accidents. Although China has put forward the goal of “zero fatalities in accidents” for urban gas, unfortunately, the root causes of the unsound safety culture and imperfect safety management system of urban gas enterprises remain unresolved. Therefore, statistical analysis and 24Model analysis of 160 urban gas accidents in mainland China were performed to investigate the proximate causes of the accidents and the current situation of urban gas safety. The CCPS's risk-based process safety elements were used to identify potential deficiencies in the current urban gas process safety management (UG-PSM). During the analysis, it was observed that insufficient implementation of concealed danger investigation and rectification accounted for 76%, which is the primary proximate cause of urban gas accidents. Stakeholder outreach is the most under-represented competency in urban gas safety management. Based on the results, a novel framework for the UG-PSM system was constructed, and the theory of urban gas safety management was further improved. Furthermore, we evaluated the matching degree between UG-PSM elements and the existing measures of the government, urban gas associations, third-party organizations, and urban gas enterprises. Finally, we analyzed the feasibility, challenges, and development directions of the UG-PSM system. This study establishes a foundation for researchers and practitioners in the future research and practice of urban gas process safety and provides theoretical guidance for preventing high-incidence accidents of urban gas in China.

중대산업사고 발생 원인과 통계 기반 중대산업사고 예방을 위한 시사점 연구

The purpose of this study is to draw implications for the prevention of major industrial accidents by analyzing the statistic and causes of major industrial accidents according to the Industrial Safety and Health Act. For this purpose, an empirical analysis of major industrial accidents that occurred over the past 17 years was conducted. As a result of the analysis, it was confirmed that the process safety management system is effective in preventing major industrial accidents. In addition, a lot of major industrial accidents occurred during normal operation and maintenance work by not complying with safe operation guidelines or safe work permit procedures. In terms of material and type of accident, there were many fire and explosion accidents caused by flammable liquids and flammable gases, and the main ignition sources were static electricity and electric sparks. By facility, many accidents occurred during maintenance work in storage tanks, reactors, and piping, or due to runaway reactions.

MOC 101—Fundamentals for effective change management

AbstractManagement of change (MOC) is the cornerstone of a successful risk‐based process safety (RBPS) management program. Safe operation and maintenance of facilities that manufacture or store hazardous chemicals require robust process safety management (PSM) systems. The MOC element of a PSM program establishes a formal, documented, and authorization process for any proposed changes to manage changes that may introduce unexpected new hazards or increase the risk of existing hazards. Furthermore, the MOC process ensures that changes are communicated to potentially affected personnel, as well as ensures that all affected documentation is updated. A poor MOC program has been a root cause of several process safety incidents, including the Flixborough disaster. The temporary modifications did not go through a proper review process; an effective MOC program could have discovered the design flaws before the change was implemented and prevented the explosion. In addition to case studies such as this, this paper will provide an overview of best management practices and essential features for the MOC element, which can be used as a basis to develop or evaluate existing MOC management systems, and as a result, play a role in identifying hazards, managing risk, and sustaining safe operations.

Just a human error…? Case study of a condensate vessel explosion

AbstractIn the early morning of June 28, 2019, a strong explosion occurred at an ethylene plant that fortunately had no impact on lives or injuries, but it provoked significant damage to the assets of the facility, business interruption, and concern in the neighboring community as the loud bang was heard several kilometers around, even producing some glass breaks in some of the nearby plants. This work analyzes what happened, what the consequences were, and the learning experiences from the accident. The failure that originated the explosion was produced in a condensate container of 2 m3. The author analyzes how smaller pieces of equipment with relative relevance in the final operation of a facility can become serious accident triggers. This work also evaluates the accident from the perspective of the risk‐based process safety management system, the selection and appropriate design of the protection hierarchies, and the human factor as a fundamental part of a management system robustness. One of the relatively new learning experiences being analyzed is the appearance of fake news on social media immediately after the explosion occurred. This further potentiated the drama of the situation, increasing the fear of the population, the distress of the staff's relatives who were at the plant at the time of the accident, and the confusion of the authorities and response teams.

Process safety management lessons learned from a fire accident caused by the reverse flow of high‐pressure gas in a residual desulfurization process in Taiwan

AbstractIn 2020, a fire and explosion accident occurred in Taiwan because of the reverse flow of high‐pressure recycle gas. This accident resulted in three minor injuries and caused the Taiwanese government to instruct the top three chemical groups in Taiwan to conduct procedural hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies in addition to normal HAZOP studies. The cause analysis based on the accident timeline and cause factor chart indicated that improper control of the protection logic bypass and the lack of four process safety management (PSM) elements, namely mechanical integrity, process safety information (PSI), operating procedures, and process hazard analysis (PHA), were the root causes of the aforementioned accident. The deficiencies leading to accidents are related to planning problems in PSM promotion but unrelated to the implementation of PSM programs. Maintenance processes should be evaluated and developed according to PHA results or equipment structure to guarantee equipment integrity. The incompatibility of process chemicals with pipeline materials should be considered; then, the construction materials mentioned in PSI should be extended to those of pipelines, not just equipment. In addition to the hazards of normal operations, those of non‐routine operations should be identified to ensure the completeness of the PSM program. Protection logic bypass should be appropriately controlled, and a complete safety evaluation must be conducted before resetting the initiated protection logic. A majority of the deficiencies identified in this study exist in most Taiwanese chemical companies, including the leading ones performing PSM. The lessons learned from the aforementioned accident provide advance information that can be used to develop an improved PSM system.

Paradigm of sustainable process safety management for industrial revolution 4.0: A circular economy and sustainability perspective

AbstractThe integration of process safety management (PSM) in the transition towards a circular economy (CE) has received increased attention and consideration across a number of disciplines in the recent industrial revolution 4.0. However, questions have been raised about the conventional PSM systems lacking sustainability consideration. The purpose of this study is to introduce an emerging paradigm of sustainable process safety management (SPSM) for the industrial revolution 4.0 from the CE and sustainability point of view. By assessing the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 1910 and available global PSM frameworks, this study has identified areas of improvement for corporations and presented an SPSM framework from the social, economic, and environmental perspectives in a CE. The proposed framework makes a contribution that connects the sustainability and CE perspective with the PSM and provides a basis for the future sustainable process safety guidelines for policymakers, practitioners, and industries. Additionally, this study proposed a paradigm umbrella that connects to the PSM by focusing on social, economic, and environmental pillars from sustainability that are relevant and applicable for the industrial revolution 4.0. Furthermore, it engraves a trail of imminent research possibilities in adopting an integrated sustainable PSM framework in a CE.

Analysis of Explosion Accidents in a Chemical Plant using STAMP, a Systematic Cause-and-effect Analysis Technique

The process safety management system for chemical plants was introduced approximately 25 years ago. With the improvement in the safety management levels for the safe operation of the chemical plants, the number of serious industrial accidents has gradually decreased; however, increased damages have been observed when accidents do occur. The cause of accidents has also increased in cases where several factors, including social and cultural factors, are complexly related, in addition to facility and human factors. The need for an overall integrated systemic approach related to society, technology, and organization, and a sequential approach for finding the direct cause of accidents, is growing while analyzing the accidents. For this reason, foreign countries have introduced and applied a method to analyze accidents in an integrated manner from a systemic point of view; however, reports of cases or research results used in Korea. In this study, the case of explosion accidents, which occurred during a trial operation at a domestic chemical plant, was analyzed using Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, a systematic accident analysis technique, to reveal the primary cause, organizational, and operational problems, so that it can be used for future investigations when other accidents occur.

Addressing process safety challenges in downstream industries in Brunei Darussalam

International oil and gas corporations operating in Brunei may apply process safety management (PSM) and analysis techniques, resulting in varying approaches and measures to address process safety issues. Global corporations may have developed their own process safety standards while smaller firms employ established ones. This research compares the local PSM systems and standards with international ones to determine which employers face the most difficulties in implementing or increasing process safety inside their organizations. This study found that Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations are used by 30% of local users in downstream operations. Common challenges encountered by local users are management/leadership commitment to process safety (11.9%), mechanical integrity and management of safety critical devices (5.3%), management review and intervention for continuous improvement (4.9%), communication amongst workers (3.8%), management of change (3.8%), operational control, permit to work and risk management (3.8%) and incident reporting (3.8%).

Analysis of the impact of a pandemic on the control of the process safety risk in major hazards industries using a Fault Tree Analysis approach

The control of the risks associated with major hazard events is critical to the safe and continuous operation of the process industry. Over the last decades, the process industry has been successful at establishing and implementing robust Process Safety Management (PSM) systems to prevent and mitigate the consequences of such major hazard events. While there exist some industry guidelines developed relatively recently for events initiated by natural disasters and security-related threats, for initiating events like outbreaks of pathogens and pandemics, there is currently a clear lack of understanding of the impact of the restrictions and disruption caused by a pandemic on the ability of companies operating major hazard facilities to keep controlling the risks associated to their hazardous operations. Moreover, there is no industry guideline on how to account for such an impact in PSM systems for process safety hazards. The recent COVID-19 outbreak caused serious disruptions to normal operations that have challenged industry in their ability to control risks.The objective of this paper is to perform an analysis of the impact of a pandemic situation on the implementation of selected elements of PSM systems related to the identification and evaluation of the risks of a major hazard and their control. The approach chosen involves the analysis of the root causes of the failure of the selected PSM elements using a Fault Tree Analysis method. The findings provide the first steps in the establishment of recommendations for the upgrade of PSM systems to face events such as pandemics.

Risk‐based decisions: Implementing the asset integrity program

AbstractAt present, there exists a lot of interest in the applications of Process Safety Management (PSM) System in Oil & Gas Industry, and, in particular, in implementing an Asset Integrity Management Program, this paper is offering a Risk‐Based model approach, that help both facilities operations and maintenance crew to achieve their goals in terms of PSM in a rapid and well orientated manner.

A rising tide raises all boats: Regional promotion of process safety through joint government/industry management

With the development of increasingly complex processes and technologies in chemical and manufacturing industries, Process Safety Management (PSM) has been globally recognized as the primary tool for operating companies to reduce process accidents on their industrial sites and the risks posed to their employees and surrounding communities. Yet, industrial facilities are often interdependent and collocated with others. Recognizing this, regional authorities are also applying PSM principles to reduce the cumulative incidents associated with high density industrial areas and the multiplicative risks posed to broader communities. This paper compares Strathcona County Emergency Service (SCES) in Alberta, Contra Costa County Health Service Hazard Material Programs (CCCHSHMP) in California, and Technical Standards & Safety Authority (TSSA) in Ontario and their PSM systems to provide practical recommendations to improve SCES's system. Four aspects of PSM are considered: regulation and guidance, auditing and inspection, annual performance indicators, and public participation. Based on the results of this comparison, we recommend that SCES develop comprehensive PSM regulations based on CSA Z767-17 PSM including clear instructions for assessing technologies and methodologies for consequence analysis. Both worst-case scenarios and alternative scenarios need to be considered as well as the domino effect of primary accidents. Furthermore, regular audits and inspections will ensure compliance with PSM regulations while helping the design of planning, performing, and following-up strategies to ensure effectiveness. In addition, we suggest the use of lagging and leading performance indicators to evaluate the performance of the PSM program. Finally, we recommend using advisory councils or commissions to increase public participation and ensure the representation of stakeholders' perspectives with the PSM system.

Guidance to improve the effectiveness of process safety management systems in operating facilities

The Process Safety Management (PSM) systems at the operating facilities in the Oil & Gas and in Chemical manufacturing industries have matured over the years and have become, at most facilities, very robust and sophisticated. These programs are administrated by Process Safety (PS) teams at both the corporate business units and plant levels and have been effective in reducing the number and severity of PS events across the industries over the past 25 years or so. Incidents however are occurring at a regular interval and in recent times several noteworthy PS events have occurred in the United States which have brought into question the effectiveness of the PSM programs at play. These facilities have been applying their PSM programs with the expectation that the number and severity of PS events would decrease over time. The expected result has not been realized, especially in context to those facilities that have undergone the recent incidents. Current paper reviews a few publicly available PS performance reports of Oil & Gas and Chemical manufacturing industries. The authors identified a few factors at play that have led to these PS events based on their experience, literature review, and incident investigation reports. Most of the factors are intertwined with multiple PSM elements and it requires a holistic approach to address them. Each of the factors is described and the path forward is proposed to improve the effectiveness of PSM programs.

Do not let your safe operating limits leave you S‐O‐L (out of luck)

AbstractCollection and utilization of process safety metrics is an important tool for driving improved safety. Tier three leading indicators (challenges to safety system) indicate failures of process safety management systems and highlight areas that should be improved to prevent a more serious event. Safe Operating Limit (SOL) exceedances are a commonly used Tier 3 leading indicator. Surprisingly, there are many different approaches used in industry to calculate safe operating limits and to apply them. This inconsistency potentially diminishes the usefulness of SOL exceedances as an effective indicator.This paper discusses current industry practices around safe operating limits as established by a recent global benchmark survey of over 150 safety practitioners. Areas explored in the survey of SOLs include; methodology for calculating, how/where information is stored, how/when established values are reviewed and audited, usage as a leading indicator, integration with operations (training, documentation), identification and tracking of when exceedances have occurred, and actions taken on exceedance. Key results and conclusions will be presented as well as recommendations on where industry should focus on improvement.