Process Safety Management Program Research Articles

Review of Hydrogen-Related Accidents: Root Causes, Mitigation Strategies, and Recommendations for secure utilization.

Abstract Hydrogen, acknowledged as a versatile and sustainable energy carrier, is gaining significant attention across industries, becoming a focal point in the pursuit of cleaner energy solutions. However, Ensuring the safe utilization of hydrogen presents inherent challenges, giving rise to a spectrum of related accidents. This study delves into the intricate landscape of hydrogen utilization, acknowledging both its significance and inherent challenges associated with its safety. This comprehensive review examines hydrogen-related accidents from the Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD) within a defined timeframe, analyzing causes and evaluating the effectiveness of current mitigation strategies through categorization and assessment of the root causes of hydrogen-related incidents, this review aspired to provide an in-depth understanding of safety issues and also reviewed the effectiveness of current mitigating strategies, employing risk assessment models. A thorough analysis of these incidents uncovered crucial insights, The findings of the review paper illustrate that human factor and management factors were possibly greater causes of hydrogen accidents than other factors, and management factors to be more hazardous than other factors. Through comprehensive literature review, the study aims to offer practical recommendations for refining safety protocols in hydrogen utilization like the implementation of Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) and Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) for human factor induced incidents and process safety management (PSM) program for management factor induced incidents. Additionally, specific recommendation for reoccurring incidents based on severity are made to enhance safety protocols, thereby fostering its secure application across diverse industries.

Prioritization of control measures in leakage scenario using Hendershot theory and FBWM-TOPSIS.

Currently, there is increasing concern about the safety and leakage of process industries. Therefore, the present study aims to prioritize control measures before and after the leakage scenario by using the Hendershot theory and MCDM techniques. In this study, two proactive and reactive layers were selected before and after leakage of tanks, respectively. Then, criteria and alternatives were selected to perform fuzzy TOPSIS (FTOPSIS) and find the best alternative based on the literature review and Hendershot approach. The linear model of the fuzzy Best-Worst method (FBWM) was constructed and resolved using Lingo 17 software. Subsequently, criteria were assigned weights based on thorough calculations of the inconsistency rate. The weight of study experts was equal to 0.25. The results of FBWM showed that the reliability index with a weight of 0.3727 was ranked first and the inconsistency rate ([Formula: see text]) was calculated to be equal to 0.040. Inherent Safety Design (ISD) (0.899) and passive safety (0.767) also ranked first before and after tank leaks, respectively. Using the FBWM method leads to fewer pairwise comparisons and at the same time more stability. Although ISD and passive strategies are more valid and strict, elements of all strategies are necessary for a comprehensive process safety management program.

Maturity model approach for building effective process safety management systems

AbstractUsually, a gap analysis is conducted to address challenges encountered when building a process safety management (PSM) system from scratch, or for improving an already existing PSM program. Business maturity models, on the other hand, are useful management frameworks used to gauge the maturity of an organization in various disciplines or functions. The purpose of this paper is to introduce an adaptation of business maturity models to the PSM area.

Process safety management lessons learned from a fire and explosion accident caused by a liquefied petroleum gas leak in an aromatics reforming unit in Taiwan

A severe fire and explosion accident was caused by a liquefied petroleum gas leak in Taiwan in 2019. This accident resulted in the loss of approximately US$3.5 billion in output value due to a one-and-a-half-year shutdown after the accident; however, no casualties were recorded at the accident scene. An analysis of the accident pipelines demonstrated that the pipeline leak had been caused by hydrochloric acid corrosion. Cause analysis based on the accident timeline, fault tree analysis, and causal factor charting indicated inadequacies in five elements of process safety management (PSM) namely mechanical integrity (MI), management of change, emergency planning and response, process hazard analysis (PHA), and process safety information (PSI) as the root causes of the accident. Furthermore, insufficient PSI (i.e., a lack of comprehensive understanding regarding corrosion mechanisms) was deemed to have been the core problem leading to the accident. This accident revealed common shortcomings that are often overlooked in PSM implementation in Taiwan; thus, the present research can serve as a vital reference for improving PSM programs in Taiwan.

Development and implementation of a process safety competency development program (PSCDP) for process safety engineers: A unique collaboration between industry (SABIC) and academia (MKOPSC)

Process Safety Competencies are demonstrable knowledge,skills,behaviors and attitudes required to perform process safety related jobs. They are critical to the successful implementation of any process safety management program in the process industry.This paper shares the experience of the collaboration between a major multinational chemical manufacturing company, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and an academic institution, the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC) of Texas A&M University at Qatar (TAMU-Q) for the development and implementation of a comprehensive and long-term Process Safety Competency Development Program (PSCDP) for SABIC process safety engineers. It outlines the fundamental guiding principles and mechanism for building the PSCDP and provides a description of the structure and content of the program as well as its implementation in the 2017–2021 period. The preliminary results and impact of the program on the trainee engineers at SABIC are highlighted along with the benefit of engaging in such a program for both the company and the academic institution.

MOC 101—Fundamentals for effective change management

AbstractManagement of change (MOC) is the cornerstone of a successful risk‐based process safety (RBPS) management program. Safe operation and maintenance of facilities that manufacture or store hazardous chemicals require robust process safety management (PSM) systems. The MOC element of a PSM program establishes a formal, documented, and authorization process for any proposed changes to manage changes that may introduce unexpected new hazards or increase the risk of existing hazards. Furthermore, the MOC process ensures that changes are communicated to potentially affected personnel, as well as ensures that all affected documentation is updated. A poor MOC program has been a root cause of several process safety incidents, including the Flixborough disaster. The temporary modifications did not go through a proper review process; an effective MOC program could have discovered the design flaws before the change was implemented and prevented the explosion. In addition to case studies such as this, this paper will provide an overview of best management practices and essential features for the MOC element, which can be used as a basis to develop or evaluate existing MOC management systems, and as a result, play a role in identifying hazards, managing risk, and sustaining safe operations.

Process safety management lessons learned from a fire accident caused by the reverse flow of high‐pressure gas in a residual desulfurization process in Taiwan

AbstractIn 2020, a fire and explosion accident occurred in Taiwan because of the reverse flow of high‐pressure recycle gas. This accident resulted in three minor injuries and caused the Taiwanese government to instruct the top three chemical groups in Taiwan to conduct procedural hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies in addition to normal HAZOP studies. The cause analysis based on the accident timeline and cause factor chart indicated that improper control of the protection logic bypass and the lack of four process safety management (PSM) elements, namely mechanical integrity, process safety information (PSI), operating procedures, and process hazard analysis (PHA), were the root causes of the aforementioned accident. The deficiencies leading to accidents are related to planning problems in PSM promotion but unrelated to the implementation of PSM programs. Maintenance processes should be evaluated and developed according to PHA results or equipment structure to guarantee equipment integrity. The incompatibility of process chemicals with pipeline materials should be considered; then, the construction materials mentioned in PSI should be extended to those of pipelines, not just equipment. In addition to the hazards of normal operations, those of non‐routine operations should be identified to ensure the completeness of the PSM program. Protection logic bypass should be appropriately controlled, and a complete safety evaluation must be conducted before resetting the initiated protection logic. A majority of the deficiencies identified in this study exist in most Taiwanese chemical companies, including the leading ones performing PSM. The lessons learned from the aforementioned accident provide advance information that can be used to develop an improved PSM system.

Current challenges in performing PSM audits

AbstractIn the last 2–3 years, Process Safety Management (PSM) audits have become more difficult to perform. As time has passed since the adoption of the PSM Standard and Risk Management Program (RMP) rule, as well as state PSM regulations, the guidance published in support of applying the regulations has expanded, while the regulations themselves, at least the federal ones, have remained static. Facilities have become more sensitive to the number and the nature of audit findings, continuous improvement in PSM programs has become somewhat controversial, and the definitions of “overdue” and “timely” have become more difficult to interpret and apply. These issues and others have conspired to create some of these difficulties.

Measuring vital signs of process safety culture

AbstractIn line with Fatima Group's vision and Health, Safety and Environment policy, Fatima Fertilizers Company Limited (FFCL) stipulated a process safety management program (PSM) as the major corner‐stone. It was purely a self‐initiative to implement this model rather than following any regulatory requirement. At FFCL, process safety performance is tracked using global method of leading and lagging indicators. Leading indicators are a set of data that measures performance across various elements of process safety. In 2020, in order to uplift process safety performance at FFCL, we invested in activities keeping in view core principles of process safety culture. While analyzing Leading Indicators for 2019, FFCL performance across various elements was linked with core principles of process safety; this helped to identify strong and weak areas of our culture. To supplement this analysis in pursuit of strong process safety culture, another study was conducted with title “What is it in for me, Two Decades of Process Safety Beacons”. All Process Safety Beacons to date were critically reviewed and relevant information was extracted. Main objective of this activity was to learn from past mistakes and strengthen process safety elements.

A rising tide raises all boats: Regional promotion of process safety through joint government/industry management

With the development of increasingly complex processes and technologies in chemical and manufacturing industries, Process Safety Management (PSM) has been globally recognized as the primary tool for operating companies to reduce process accidents on their industrial sites and the risks posed to their employees and surrounding communities. Yet, industrial facilities are often interdependent and collocated with others. Recognizing this, regional authorities are also applying PSM principles to reduce the cumulative incidents associated with high density industrial areas and the multiplicative risks posed to broader communities. This paper compares Strathcona County Emergency Service (SCES) in Alberta, Contra Costa County Health Service Hazard Material Programs (CCCHSHMP) in California, and Technical Standards & Safety Authority (TSSA) in Ontario and their PSM systems to provide practical recommendations to improve SCES's system. Four aspects of PSM are considered: regulation and guidance, auditing and inspection, annual performance indicators, and public participation. Based on the results of this comparison, we recommend that SCES develop comprehensive PSM regulations based on CSA Z767-17 PSM including clear instructions for assessing technologies and methodologies for consequence analysis. Both worst-case scenarios and alternative scenarios need to be considered as well as the domino effect of primary accidents. Furthermore, regular audits and inspections will ensure compliance with PSM regulations while helping the design of planning, performing, and following-up strategies to ensure effectiveness. In addition, we suggest the use of lagging and leading performance indicators to evaluate the performance of the PSM program. Finally, we recommend using advisory councils or commissions to increase public participation and ensure the representation of stakeholders' perspectives with the PSM system.

Guidance to improve the effectiveness of process safety management systems in operating facilities

The Process Safety Management (PSM) systems at the operating facilities in the Oil & Gas and in Chemical manufacturing industries have matured over the years and have become, at most facilities, very robust and sophisticated. These programs are administrated by Process Safety (PS) teams at both the corporate business units and plant levels and have been effective in reducing the number and severity of PS events across the industries over the past 25 years or so. Incidents however are occurring at a regular interval and in recent times several noteworthy PS events have occurred in the United States which have brought into question the effectiveness of the PSM programs at play. These facilities have been applying their PSM programs with the expectation that the number and severity of PS events would decrease over time. The expected result has not been realized, especially in context to those facilities that have undergone the recent incidents. Current paper reviews a few publicly available PS performance reports of Oil & Gas and Chemical manufacturing industries. The authors identified a few factors at play that have led to these PS events based on their experience, literature review, and incident investigation reports. Most of the factors are intertwined with multiple PSM elements and it requires a holistic approach to address them. Each of the factors is described and the path forward is proposed to improve the effectiveness of PSM programs.

Process safety management in China: Progress and performance over the last 10 years and future development

AbstractIn this work, 790 documents involving Process Safety Management (PSM) published from 1998 to 2018 are collected. These papers are classified and VOSviewer is employed to conduct keyword co‐occurrence analysis. Furthermore, this work discusses the current situation of Chinese PSM in terms of incidents, regulations, and rules involving PSM, and compares the development of PSM in China with that of other countries. Through a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis, this work proposes tasks that are necessary to improve the effectiveness of Chinese PSM. The results show that the numbers of documents involving PSM in China have experienced enormous growth after 2010, and safety management has been the most prominent topic. In addition, severe chemical incidents triggered by similar causes tend to reoccur in China because of failures of PSM. Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of Chinese PSM, much work remains to be done, with the primary task being to ensure that comprehensive PSM programs are implemented effectively. To improve the effects of implementation, strengthened regulations and legal systems related to PSM are the most important measures to be taken. Additionally, China should learn from the experiences of other countries and should share its experiences with other emerging economies.

Waste Solvents to Trash Haulers: Lessons Learned from Hazardous Waste Accidents

Process safety management (PSM) of hazardous chemicals is a core tenet of the chemical, oil, and gas industries. Organizations in these industries have increasingly woven the elements of PSM into their strategic vision, day‐to‐day operations, and interactions with contractors and vendors. This cultural evolution has, in part, been driven by major accidents in these fields. In these industries, the chemicals, their hazardous properties, and their potential interactions, are usually either well‐defined or capable of being well‐defined. Control and mitigation strategies for those chemicals can be developed based on this available knowledge. In contrast, companies that handle wastes have experienced catastrophic accidents due to the ill‐defined nature of the hazards. This industry handles the cast‐offs, dregs, and refuse, which makes identification of the hazards and prevention of incidents more challenging. How do you implement a PSM program when your input streams can vary due to processes at a plant you do not control or monitor? Does the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) provide sufficient guidance of safely handling of wastes? The overriding theme in the incidents is that PSM is more complex to apply to unknown, mixed, and uncontrolled chemicals, both solid and liquid. To assist companies that handle wastes, this paper provides several case studies of fires and explosions involving multiple waste material handling processes at different facilities. The incidents involved numerous matrices from solid industrial wastes, EPA RCRA hazardous wastes, to waste solvents. An analysis of the lessons learned will be presented and used to provide realistic guidelines to reduce safety risks based on a pragmatic implementation of process safety management principles. The paper will also compare OSHA (Occupation Safety and Health Administration) PSM with EPA RCRA approaches to characterizing wastes versus managing the hazards, and will emphasize those elements that played critical roles in the accident case studies. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 37:427–441, 2018

Process safety management in manufacturing industries a review

The most common feature among the best known companies in the world is safety. In fact, process safety and manufacturing productivity go hand in hand. In the last century, a number of catastrophic accidents have drawn the attention of regulators towards process safety. In several developed, industrialized countries, strict regulations and standards are applied to emphasize process safety. In fact, in such countries, these are the required minimum for maintaining business license and permits. However, in developing and in under developed nations, the issue of process safety and their importance is still being debated. Process safety cannot just be driven by a set of rules, regulations, policies, etc. Multitudes of items are required in establishing and maintaining a safe and a reliable work environment. Such items, though can be expressed readily in paper, are quite arduous to establish in a highly competitive environment. The legislation, the government regulations, banking policies, management commitment, cumulatively share the responsibility in establishing organizations judiciously managing process safety. This paper reviews certain critical aspects in establishing a successful process safety management (PSM) program. Furthermore, the paper reviews the various elements that contribute towards the creation of a worthwhile PSM program.

A Journey of Process Safety Management Program for Process Industry

The growth of process industries and global economies are dependent on technology advances and innovations. However, the effects of these advancements often lead to more complex processes and comparatively severe operating conditions such as high pressure, temperature and reactive chemical with exotic chemistry. With the rapidly increasing scale and complexity of the process, it is becoming harder to control accidents in process plants. In most of the past situations, it appears that accidents could not be controlled solely by engineering practices and traditional occupational safety but should be immersed with safety management programs specifically Process Safety Management (PSM) to enhance the effectiveness of technical solutions. This paper addressed PSM program as stipulated by OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119. The PSM standard was implemented following a number of disasters, including accidents in Bhopal, India (1984) and Pasadena, Texas (1989). In Malaysia, Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) 1996 Regulation which has the requirements attribute to PSM standard also discussed.

Interrelations between process safety management elements

OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 74–80, 2017

Competency requirements for process hazard analysis (PHA) teams

Process hazard analysis (PHA) is a cornerstone of process safety management programs. The quality of the PHA performed directly affects the level of risk tolerated for a process. The lower the quality of a PHA, the more likely higher risk will be tolerated. There are few requirements for PHA team members in the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's process safety management regulations. More detailed requirements for participation in a PHA are desirable.A competency management program should be used to ensure PHA practitioners and teams are appropriately qualified. Criteria for selecting PHA team leaders, or facilitators, and other team members are key to such a program and are described in this paper. The criteria cover both technical and personal attributes. Application of the criteria is described and team performance metrics, which can be used to correlate performance with the assessment of competency to validate the criteria and methods used, are discussed.Owing to the importance of the role played by team leaders, certification of their competency is desirable. Criteria for certification are described and their application is discussed.

Compliance Audit Model for Managing Process Safety in Process Industries

Compliance audit for process safety management (PSM) is a technique to verify that the implementation of the PSM program is in compliance with OSHA standards and to identify potential deficiencies in the PSM program used. However, unavailability of an easy audit techniques hinders the compliances to PSM standards in industries. An audit model is introduced based on OSHA PSM standard to provide a standardize format that utilizes the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) as a basis. A case study based on the training element of OSHA PSM is performed to verify the effectiveness and to ensure the PSM standard compliances. The model is based on Microsoft Access which enables the user to input data, manage and track information. The model is useful to the employee as the weaknesses in the PSM program can be identified and rectified to prevent any major accidents.

Enterprise PSM development, implementation, and auditing

Process safety management (PSM) system auditing is evolving into a more business critical function and is receiving far more attention than previously as PSM evolves. The expectation for success in PSM is high and auditing is a key opportunity to validate the process and improve performance. Most auditing processes address the PSM system from an incomplete approach without consideration of the actual design of the management system or goals of the organization. Auditing can be more effective if synchronized to organizational design and goals. PSM management systems and the audit process that review them need to be defined from the fundamentals, including the following considerations: What management model will be used? Which elements will the process comprise? Is the program regulatory driven or performance driven? Are there multiple performance objectives to be met? What key performance indicators (KPIs) will be used to measure performance? With that foundation, the auditing process can be defined to assure compliance to the required system. Many companies are only now facing the rationalization of global PSM performance. This article will outline an approach for defining corporate objectives, understanding options available, defining a PSM program, defining performance objectives and KPIs, designing an audit program, and then executing the audit process. This is a necessity to ensure that the enterprise‐wide process is defined and managed for responsible management of process hazards [9th Global Congress on Process Safety, San Antonio, TX, April 29–May 1, 2013]. © 2014 The Authors. Process Safety Progress published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 94–99, 2015

Tips for the creation and application of effective operating procedures

Specific requirements exist in all Safety Management Systems Requirements (e.g., Process Safety Management and Risk Management Program) for the creation, content, and periodic update of operating procedures (OP). However, the development and actual implementation of OP has challenges that often result in deficiencies, regulatory citations, and in some cases, unfortunate tragedies.Although OP concepts involve the straightforward documentation of specific steps for safe and effective operation, many process facilities struggle with: •securing the focus from operations personnel for the creation of quality procedures •securing feedback from operations personnel if procedural steps do not coincide with actual practices •ensuring the steps outlined in procedures avoid introducing additional process hazards •creating procedures that are in a user‐friendly format •identifying the most effective level of information and depth to include in the procedure •addressing all modes of operations, including defining appropriate responsibilities Good‐quality OP are critical for encapsulating operational best practices and also provide a basis for ensuring consistent quality assurance. The objective of this article is to convey an understanding of the challenges that must be considered with the development of OP and provide specific examples that will facilitate the creation and ongoing application of OP. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 33: 350–354, 2014