Government Formation Process Research Articles

Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

In parliamentary democracies, the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bargain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet. Although these delays can have substantial political and economic consequences, surprisingly little is known about their determinants. Moreover, the few studies that exist reach contradictory conclusions. In this article, the author examines how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in 16 West European countries from 1944 to 1998. In line with the article’s theoretical expectations, the author finds that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments but that factors increasing bargaining complexity, such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature, only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty among political actors. The present analysis helps to resolve the contradictory findings in the literature.

An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures

Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are usually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs (i.e. the parties selected to propose a potential government). The theoretical literature has focused on two selection rules: selection proportional to seat share, and selection in order of seat share. In this paper, we use a new data set on government formations in 11 parliamentary democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data. We find that while there is little empirical support for selection in order of seat share, proportional selection fits the data well. However, we also find that a simple alternative that combines the insights of the two selection rules outperforms both of them in their ability to explain the data.

A Structural Model of Government Formation

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

A Structural Model of Government Formation

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures

Models of government formation processes in multi party democracies are usually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs (i.e., the parties selected to propose a potential government). The theoretical literature has focused on two selection rules: selection proportional to seat share, and selection in order of seat share. In this paper we use a new data set on government formations in 11 parliamentary democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data. We find that while there is little empirical support for selection in order of seat share, proportional selection fits the data well.

Provincial elections and government formation in the Western Cape: The politics of polarisation

Given the new NNP/DP government in the Western Cape, politics in the province have become one of polarisation. This article is a critical analysis of the 1999 provincial elections in the Western Cape and the subsequent process of government formation. Primarily it is argued that a clear set of rules governing the bargaining process would have made the process of government formation more transparent, thus enhancing popular trust in government.

Mapping the Norwegian Political Space

This research note reports the results of an expert survey on party positions in Norway in 1998. This was a partial replication of the 1989 survey conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992). The survey results are used to describe important aspects of Norwegian party competition, including issue ownership and the dimensionality of the Norwegian political space. These results indicate that important elements of the centre-periphery cleavage are now much more aligned with the overall left-right dimension than was the case in 1989. The convergence of positions of the Socialist Left and Center parties is not surprising, given the extensive cooperation between them during the 1994 campaign debate on EU membership. The emphasis on non-material values in the 1997 campaign further contributed to the importance of moral issues for the second dimension in Norwegian politics. The mismatch between traditional party alliances and current party positions has made the process of government formation quite problematic.

The Duration of Cabinet Formation Processes in Western Multi-Party Democracies

Strategic models of coalition bargaining formation have demonstrated the importance of institutional features for an understanding of cabinet formation in West European democracies. Yet little is know about the empirical regularities of government formation processes. In this article we analyse the duration of formation processes using a semi-parametric estimation procedure on a dataset of 304 government formations in thirteen multi-party democracies. The results are consistent with a bargaining approach under incomplete information.

Theories of Government Formation and the 1996 General Election in Japan

This paper takes a number of theories that have been used to analyse government formation in West European parliamentary democracies and applies them to the government formation process in Japan after the 1996 general election. These models underline the continuing importance of the LDP in the government formation process, despite the loss of its overall majority. The application of government formation models to the Japanese case also highlights the weakness of the typical assumption that sees parties as unitary actors. The paper thus concludes with some speculations as to how this assumption might usefully be relaxed to incorporate party factions, splits and fusions and thereby generate more dynamic models of the making and breaking of governments.

Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism

In the early 1970s the Swedish parties designed new rules for government formation. In this study it is shown that the choice of a new voting rule stemmed from a combination of goaloriented behaviour and a process of socialization. In a cross national comparison, it is also shown that there exists an empirical correlation between the Swedish type of rule and (1) a high frequency of minority governments, (2) a high frequency of small minority governments and (3) a short government formation process. From the perspective of coalition formation theory, this is a challenging finding.

Government Formation and Endogenous Parties

I provide a formal theory of government for a political system characterized by a proportional representation electoral system, a parliamentary government that exercises collective responsibility, and a government formation process. Political parties are assumed to be policy-oriented and to serve the interests of those who vote for them. Parties choose policy platforms that determine their representation in parliament; and given that representation, the parties bargain over the government to be formed and the policies that government will implement. The model yields equilibria with the property that parties choose dispersed policy positions. Thus, electoral incentives in proportional representation parliamentary systems need not lead to policy convergence. The theory provides predictions of party locations such as those developed in the manifesto project.

Coalition Agreements in the Italian Political and Institutional System

1. In recent years, negotiations between parliamentary factions in Italy have had an increasing impact on the process of government formation. The frequency of such negotiations and resulting coalition agreements necessitates a more thorough examination of this phenomenon in order to understand the interaction between coalition agreements and government policy.The phenomenon of coalition governments is not a new one. A number of European states have witnessed their emergence since the late 19th century. It is, however, in regimes of extreme multi-party politics — as the Italian system must be considered — that this form of government has found full enforcement.

A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems

A theory of government formation in parliamentary systems is developed from a model incorporating policy-oriented parties with spatial preferences and a formation process in which parties are selected in sequence to attempt to form a government. A government is formed when the policy proposed by the party selected is sustained on a vote of confidence. The equilibria identify the government and the policy it will implement and depend on the configuration of preferences and on the government formation process. For example, in a political system with two large parties and one small party and in which one of the two large parties will be selected to attempt to form a government, the government will be formed by a large party with the support of the small party. The policy will reflect the preferences of the small party but will be closer to the ideal point of the large party.

Government formation and policy formulation : Patterns in Belgium and the Netherlands

Based on a study of three Belgian and Dutch government formations, this article examines the relationship between the formation of government coalition's and the formulation of public policy. The government formation process is disaggregated into three stages : the selection of participants in the bargaining process, the negotiation of the governmental agreement and the allocation of portfolios. These stages are then discussed in the context of a schema which focusses on the effects of contextual, relational and outcome components. By modifying assumptions made in traditional coalition studies, the government formation process is seen as involving the transferof issues from institutional arenas to a non-institutional arena in which bargaining processes are used to map and develop issue specific areas of consensus.