Process Hazard Analysis Research Articles

S172021 変更管理におけるHAZOPレコードの活用([S172-02]化学装置の安全(2))

During lifecycle of chemical plants, various changes of raw materials, products, operation and/or process structure are performed during the plant life cycle in order to cope with the economic environment. However, it may lead to a leak, a fire, an explosion accident if the operating conditions after the change do not satisfy the mechanical integrity of the plant, and the management of change becomes indispensable. The changemanagement is classified into tow; management of changes and process hazard analysis (PHA), and many incidents are taking place for insufficiency of PHA. In this study, applying HAZOP record for PHA in change management is proposed. The HAZOP record protocol is defined, and, the performance of PHA is demonstrated.

Human Factor in Equipment Safety of Hard Disk Manufacturing

The focus of this paper is on the human factors aspect of equipment safety focusing on process hazard analysis and safety programs. The objectives of this study are to determine the level of awareness, involvement and perceptions on occupational safety and health among workers. These are accomplished by conducting a survey using questionnaire and interviews involving 98 respondents in two hard disk manufacturing companies. Majority of the respondents were executives with high academic qualifications and possessed high level of safety awareness. The results conclude that despite the existence of various legislations, human factors and its interactions with facilities and management system is the main contributor to incidents. It is also found that most of the incidents involved power driven machineries. For the improvement of equipment safety, it is recommended that Process Hazard Analysis techniques be used to play significant role, along with both engineering and administrative control measures and safety programs. Keywords: Equipment safety; industrial incidents; process hazard analysis; hard disk industry

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Chemical and petrochemical manufacturing processes have potential for high consequence, low frequency events. Process safety management programs should identify and eliminate or control the conditions leading to the catastrophic hazards associated with these events. In recent years, industry has increasingly turned to quantitative or semiquantitative risk assessment tools to prioritize and manage the hazards they have identified. Risk assessment, whether qualitative, quantitative, or semiquantitative, is a powerful tool when used properly; however, companies must ensure that the safeguards for which they take credit are robust enough to truly manage hazards.This article discusses possible inconsistencies in process hazard analysis (PHA) claims. If a PHA claims credit for a good mechanical integrity (MI) program, what happens when that MI program has numerous deficiencies or violations? When a PHA bases a failure scenario frequency on industry historical experience, how does the site know that this experience is actually applicable to their processes? When a safeguard is challenged, is it available on‐demand? What are the consequences if a claimed safeguard does not perform as designed/credited? © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 8–11, 2013

RETRACTED: Assessment of an accidental vapour cloud explosion: Lessons from the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. accident at Jaipur, India

Abstract On 29 October 2009, at 19:30 IST, a devastating vapour cloud explosion occurred in a large fuel storage area at the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) Depot in Jaipur, India, generating significant blast pressure. As a consequence of this explosion, the entire installation was destroyed, buildings in the immediate vicinity were heavily damaged, and windowpane breakages were found up to 2 km from the terminal. The IOC estimated that the total loss from the fire and explosion was approximately INR 2800 million. Ironically, as a storage site, the Jaipur terminal was not highly congested, and thus was not considered to have adequate potential for a vapour cloud explosion (VCE). Nevertheless, the prima facie evidences indicate that this was a case of VCE. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to quantify the potential overpressures due to vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) using the Process Hazard Analysis DNV Norway based PHAST 6.51 Software. The results are validated by the extent of the damage that had occurred. The estimation of the VCE shows that a maximum 1.0 bar overpressure was generated in the surrounding area. The initial assessment of the accident data roughly estimates the release mode, time, and amount of vaporized fuel. A more accurate estimate has been obtained by modelling the dispersion of vapour clouds in the surrounding atmosphere, which reveals trends and relationships for the occurrence of vapour cloud explosions.

What risk reduction measures should be credited in process hazard analysis?

AbstractProcess hazard analysis (PHA) identifies existing risk reduction measures so that their contribution to reducing risk can be determined in order to decide if the risk of hazard scenarios is tolerable. Unfortunately, PHA practitioners do not follow consistent practices in crediting risk reduction measures as there are no generally accepted standards or guidelines for doing so. This situation leads to inconsistent studies and possibly erroneous results. The meaning of risk reduction measures and their relationship to process safeguards are discussed in this article, and risk reduction measures that could be credited in PHA are identified. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012.

Empirical correlations between cumulative absolute velocity and spectral accelerations from NGA ground motion database

Considering multiple ground motion intensity measures is important in seismic hazard analysis and ground motion selection process. Using the NGA strong motion database and recently developed ground-motion prediction models, empirical correlations are developed between cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) and spectral accelerations (Sa) at periods from 0.01 to 10s. The CAV–Sa correlations at long periods are significantly influenced by rupture distance due to modification of the frequency content and duration of the acceleration time history through travel path. Similarly, the presence of strong velocity pulses in near-source ground motions also affects the correlations at moderate to long periods. On the other hand, the correlations are not particularly sensitive to the earthquake magnitude, orientation of the ground-motion recordings, selection of ground-motion prediction models and local site conditions. Piecewise linear fitting equations are provided to quantify the correlations for various cases. The application of the CAV–Sa correlations in ground motion selection process is also discussed.

Process hazard analysis for phases of operation in the process life cycle

Processes experience various phases of operation during their life cycle. Hazard scenarios may occur during any of these phases, and they may vary by phase. Consequently, it is essential that process hazard analysis (PHA) studies address all phases of operation that a process may experience. Current PHA practices provide an inadequate treatment. This article describes an approach that provides an appropriate treatment for all process phases. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012

Layer of Protection Analysis – Quantifying human performance in initiating events and independent protection layers

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is widely used within the process industries as a simplified method to address risks and determine the sufficiency of protection layers. LOPA brings a consistent approach with added objectivity and a greater degree of understanding of the scenarios and risks as compared to purely qualitative studies such as Process Hazard Analyses. LOPA can be used to address a wide range of risk issues and serves as a highly effective aid to decision making.Incorporation of human performance within LOPA is recognized as an important, though often challenging, aspect of the analysis. The human role in potential initiating events or within human independent protection layers is important throughout the process industries, and becomes even more critical for batch processing facilities and in non-routine operations. The human role is key to process safety and the control of risks, necessitating the inclusion and quantification of human actions in independent protection layers for most companies. Human activities as potential initiating events and human performance within independent protection layers are reviewed and methods for quantification outlined. An extension into Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is provided, including methods to develop Human Error Probabilities specific to the process safety culture and operations at a given plant site.

HASILT: An intelligent software platform for HAZOP, LOPA, SRS and SIL verification

Incomplete process hazard analysis (PHA) and poor knowledge management have been two major reasons that have caused numerous lamentable disasters in the chemical process industry (CPI). To improve PHA quality, a new integration framework that combines HAZOP, layer of protection analysis (LOPA), safety requirements specification (SRS) and safety integrity level (SIL) validation is proposed in this paper. To facilitate the integrated work flow and improve the relevant knowledge management, an intelligent software platform named HASILT has been developed by our research team. Its key components and functions are described in this paper. Furthermore, since the platform keeps all history data in a central case base and case-based reasoning is used to automatically retrieve similar old cases for helping resolve new problems, a recall opportunity is created to reduce information loss which has been cited many times as a common root cause in investigations of accidents.

Prework and precompletion of worksheets for process hazard analysis

Prework in preparation for process hazard analysis (PHA) is vital for an efficient study. Precompletion of PHA worksheets in an effort to reduce the time needed for a PHA study may detract from the quality of the study and also may not be acceptable to regulators. Appropriate prework is described, and proposals are made for when worksheets can be precompleted. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012

An introduction to assessing process hazards

A surprising number of process incidents occur due to a lack of general understanding of process hazards and lack of basic hazards assessment, subsequently resulting in the absence of or inadequate Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) to provide appropriate safeguards for minimizing process risks. Comprehensive assessment of intrinsic hazards that are present in a chemical process or facility is one of the first steps necessary in documenting process safety information and technology prior to conducting PHAs and requires much more than, for example, just a review of the material safety data sheets of materials used in the process. This article reviews practical approaches for conducting and documenting intrinsic hazards assessments. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012

To the editors of Process Safety Progress

To the editors of Process Safety Progress

가스 자동차의 지하 주차 시 위험성 분석

We studied the risk analysis of fire and explosion caused by gas leak in underground-parking of gas vehicle. However, an entrance regulation of gas vehicles (H2/LPG/CNG etc.) to underground garages has not been enacted in Korea. Incase, a gas explodes in an underground parking garage placed in overcrowded residential area, such as an apartment, the scale of the damage would cause tremendous disaster. Faults of vehicle parts and management problems were evaluated by using the Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), which is a qualitative analysis method. The range of the damaged area by the explosion and the damage scale by the explosion pressure were analyzed by using the process hazard analysis software tool (PHAST). The study is expected to facilitate enactment of the regulation for the underground parking to restrict the gas vehicle.

Conducting process hazard analysis to facilitate layers of protection analysis

Many process hazard analyses (PHAs) provide insufficient detail to be able to perform layers of protection analysis (LOPA) studies properly using their results. LOPA teams experience difficulties, when PHA studies are performed without regard to the information needed for LOPA. The LOPA team must develop any needed information missing from the PHA. Not only does this require additional time and effort but it also detracts from performing LOPA. Furthermore, the LOPA results may be inaccurate, as the LOPA team may not develop hazard scenarios correctly. This article provides guidelines for PHA worksheet entries that help avoid these problems to ensure efficient and effective LOPA studies. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012

A work process for revalidating LOPAs and other risk analyses

AbstractThe chemical process industry has long recognized the necessity of periodically revalidating process hazard analyses (PHAs), such as hazard and operability studies and What‐if analyses. Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has published a book which describes this work process titled Revalidating PHAs [1]. However, there is limited guidance for revalidating supplemental risk analyses, such as layer of protection analyses (LOPAs), quantitative risk assessments (QRAs), and fault‐tree analyses. The objectives of performing periodic revalidations are to address the cumulative changes in risk that occur over time and to continuously improve our understanding of that risk. Ultimately the goal is to avoid incidents.An objective revalidation is focused primarily on safety, whereas a project review focuses on many other aspects beyond safety, such as productivity and efficiency. The revalidation is generally more effective at reviewing the external factors that impact the results of an assessment. By revalidating a risk analysis, the team takes a holistic approach to analyzing factors that affect risk to surrounding people or the environment imposed by the continued operation of the facility. Particular focus is placed on changes that impacted the analysis, but may not have been recognized or fully addressed in the management of change review. Some of these external factors include population changes, culture and organizational changes, changes and improvements in the risk analysis methodology and discovery of conflicting data.This article introduces a work process for revalidating various types of risk analyses and discusses many of the factors that need to be considered. This improves the quality of the revalidation while reducing the overall effort expended. The primary discussion centers on revalidating LOPAs, but other types of studies are discussed as well. Case studies and experiences from actual revalidation efforts are incorporated into the discussion. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011

Managing Process Hazards in Lab-Scale Pilot Plant for Safe Operation

In spite of the OSHA Laboratory and Hazards Communication Standards, incidents which result in injuries and property loss continue to occur in the research and teaching locations. Application of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) of OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) to laboratory pilot plant operations has the potential to further reduce risk associated with this location. However, a major challenge is unavailability of the easy and effective system to comply with PHA requirements. This study presents a system to manage the implementation of PHA in pilot plant namely Process Hazards Management for Lab Scale Pilot Plant (PHM-LabPP). It provides organized strategies to manage and track information, documents, recommendations and corrective actions related to the process hazards. Application of PHM-LabPP at High Gravitational Natural Gas pilot plant as a case study is examined and discussed. The implementation of this system could help end users to overcome inadequate of managing and controlling process hazards in pilot plant that had contributed to numbers of accidents.

HAZOP Study with Qualitative Risk Analysis for Prioritization of Corrective and Preventive Actions

Abstract The objective of the Traditional HAZOP study is (with collaboration of multidisciplinary team of employees of contractor) to identify potential hazards operability issues in process (Hazard and Operability Analysis) and to propose preventing actions. But there can be used also quantitative HAZOP study, which is able to estimate the risks in accordance to multi-factor Risk Assessment. The qualitative HAZOP analysis technique uses a systematic approach to identify possible deviations from normal operations and ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to help prevent accidents with keywords for generating deviations from safe condition. Quantitative HAZOP is based on development of scenarios and finding the causes deviations, to identify safety functions and estimate the final effects, but it more complements the assessment of severity and probability of each scenario -it allows selecting the most important preventive recommendations for implementation.

Safety-Management Programs and Standardized Application Equipment Minimize Risks of Nonconventional Chemical Usage

Summary Acrolein (2-propenal) is a highly effective microbiocide and sulfide scavenger that has been commercially available since 1960 and has been used widely in the oil- and gas-production industry. Acrolein is a liquid product supplied in and applied from specialized containers, eliminating potential releases from transfers between tanks. The acrolein containers are built to comply with international transportation regulations. This paper will cover the development of a safety-management program and standardization of application equipment that allow the usage of acrolein for applications with a risk comparable to, or in some cases lower than, that for conventional chemical products. Standardized operating procedures, closed-system application equipment [verified by industrial hygiene (IH) monitoring], and redundant safety devices are built into the system to prevent chemical exposures or misapplications. Applications are performed by trained and certified personnel who have completed a specific competency evaluation under field conditions. A detailed and customized safety-management program is completed and implemented for each application with extensive client participation. This paper will cover the core of the safety-management program, which focuses on developing site-specific elements, including process safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, employee and contractor training, applicator competency and field evaluation, prestartup safety reviews, management of change, and emergency planning and response procedures. A safety audit program is also implemented to ensure that the completed safety management program complies with each element. Audits are conducted at the actual location during the course of the chemical application. A strong safety-management program and standardized application system have been shown to reduce personnel and environmental risks by lowering the potential for misapplications or equipment failures. These systems have allowed successful treatment programs on numerous global production assets. To validate this, a series of case histories will be presented that highlight the best practices that enable the safe application of acrolein.

The challenge to implement and maintain an effective PSM program

AbstractWhile developing responses to help a client respond to occupational safety and health administration (OSHA) citations, we discovered that little or nothing has changed in 14 years at many facilities. OSHA is still finding the same gaps today. Chemical plants generally know how to complete a process hazard analysis (PHA), management of change (MOC), an incident investigation, etc. What is incomplete are the work processes to ensure continuity and completion.It is imperative that you have a functional process safety management (PSM) program. For example, OSHA states that the best defense against a National Emphasis Program (NEP) inspection is a strong PSM program. Failures can result in citations and incidents, which can lead to repeat or egregious citations, financial losses, public disgrace, and fatalities. Once your company has been cited for minor offenses, it becomes a target for repeat inspections.The teachings of this article will reduce failures by designing, implementing, and using complete work processes for PSM‐related activities. Many failures can be addressed by (1) improving the documentation of what you already do, (2) promptly resolving PSM‐related recommendations of all types, and (3) dealing with the challenge of keeping track of the ever‐changing recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) that apply to many aspects of your PSM program. In addition, management support/involvement and systems that follow‐up to ensure all work activities are complete and adequately documented are essential. Instituting complete work processes will improve your PSM program, improve your efficiency, and reduce the chance of citations. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011

Polyfire project- an example of an industrial research project promoting safe industrial production of fire-resistant nanocomposites

New developments based on nanotechnology have to guarantee safe products and processes to be accepted by society. The Polyfire project will develop and scale-up techniques for processing halogen-free, fire-retardant nanocomposite materials and coatings based on unsaturated polyester resins and organoclays. The project includes a work package that will assess the Health and Environmental impacts derived from the manipulation of nanoparticles. This work package includes the following tasks: (1) Identification of Health and Environment Impacts derived from the processes, (2) Experimentation to study specific Nanoparticle Emissions, (3) Development of a Risk Management Methodology for the process, and (4) A Comparison of the Health and Environmental Impact of New and Existing Materials. To date, potential exposure scenarios to nanomaterials have been identified through the development of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) of the new production processes. In the next step, these scenarios will be studied and simulated to evaluate potential emissions of nanomaterials. Polyfire is a collaborative European project, funded by the European Commission 7th Framework Programme (Grant Agreement No 229220). It features 11 partners from 5 countries (5 SMEs, 3 research institutes, 2 large companies, 1 association) and runs for three years (1st September 2009 – 31st August 2012). This project is an example of an industrial research development which aims to introduce to the market new products promoting the safe use of nanomaterials.