Problem Of Evil Research Articles

Proofs for the Existence of God: A Discussion with Richard Swinburne

Over the last 50 years, the English philosopher Richard Swinburne (b. 1934) has been a very influential proponent of philosophical arguments for the existence of God (natural theology). His major philosophical contributions lie in the areas of philosophy of science and philosophy of religion. From a general philosophical point of view, Swinburne stimulated much discussion with his early work in the philosophy of religion. He has also played a role (a) in the recent debate over the mind-body problem, and (b) in the debate on libertarian free will. Swinburne is also noted as one of the foremost current Christian apologists, arguing that faith in Christian God is rational and coherent in a rigorous philosophical sense. My discussion with Richard Swinburne revisits the analytic and non-analytic philosophy of religion. Above all, however, it aims at shedding light on Swinburne’s thought regarding some important philosophical issues, such as the Kantian arguments on the existence of God, the relationship between ratio and one’s immediate experience of God (empireia), “strong possibilities” the problem of the existence of evil in the world, but also the theological significance and value of Orthodoxy in contrast to other Christian creeds or even religions.

Suffering, Islamic Consolation Literature and the Process of Meaning-Making

Abstract Human suffering is one of the most enduring realities that religious believers of all kinds continue to grapple with. Muslim thinkers too have pondered deeply over it, producing imaginative and novel ways to understand and explain this suffering. This article explores how theodicies – ways God’s justice and fairness are compatible with the existence of evil and suffering in the world – by themselves are not adequate to address suffering because of their theoretical nature. The proposal in this article is to adopt a meaning-making approach, one that allows the person suffering to construct meaning rather than have a theoretical solution imposed on them.

Bridging the Mackie–Plantinga Debate on Evil with Ibn Arabi’s Metaphysics

This study examines how Ibn Arabi’s metaphysics can address key challenges in the contemporary philosophical debate on the problem of evil. John Mackie famously argues that the existence of an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil, suggesting that theism must relinquish one of these divine attributes to resolve this contradiction. Alvin Plantinga, through his Free Will Defense, demonstrates that no logical contradiction undermines the coherence of the theistic conception of God. Although Mackie concedes this point, he contends that Plantinga’s defense does not sufficiently explain why God permits evil. With the resolution of the logical problem of evil, the evidential problem has gained prominence in the theistic debate, where Plantinga’s defense remains inadequate. While Plantinga invites theists to explore potential theological reasons for God’s allowance of evil, he acknowledges that this approach may not yield strong philosophical results. In contrast, Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical framework offers a more comprehensive solution. By integrating ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics to establish a coherent relationship between God, the universe, and humanity, Ibn Arabi renders Mackie’s logical critique irrelevant. Furthermore, his approach fills the gaps left by Plantinga’s defense, offering a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between God and evil.

Practice by Unpractice: Taizhou Moral Philosophy Reconsidered

As followers of Wang Yangming, the Taizhou school places significant emphasis on the body, which has led to challenges concerning the potential dissipation of natural desires. Critics argue that Taizhou philosophy, while acknowledging human’s natural state, fails to adequately address the existence of evil and tends to overlook the role of deliberate moral practice by idealizing the natural as morally perfect. This article employs the framework of embodied cognition to present a novel interpretation of Taizhou moral philosophy and to address critiques regarding its views on evil and moral practice. It explores Taizhou’s holistic approach, integrating mind and body, self and others, to offer fresh insights into the balance between deliberation and spontaneity in moral practice. As a comparative and interdisciplinary endeavor, this article bridges Eastern and Western philosophies, connecting moral philosophy with empirical science. It aims to deepen understanding of Taizhou philosophy while highlighting its broader relevance for ethical behavior and moral reasoning in a global context.

An interview with Richard Swinburne

Abstract This article is part of Religious Studies’ new initiative to publish a series of interviews with distinguished philosophers of religion. Each interview explores the personal and academic background of the interviewee and discusses their core philosophical views. The aim is to inspire students and scholars and to provide an overview of some of the most important works developed by contemporary philosophers of religion. In the first interview, Max Baker-Hytch interviews Richard Swinburne, covering such topics as his upbringing, his days as a student in Oxford in the 1950s, and his views on natural theology, the problem of evil, and the mind-body problem.

The Presocratics on the Origin of Evil

This paper argues that reflections on evil and its origin formed part of philosophical inquiry already in the times of the Presocratics. It considers only those thinkers whose contribution to the issue may be characterised as noteworthy: Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and the Atomists. It is undeniable that none of the Presocratics presented an articulate theory of evil or a theodicy; therefore, the suggestions presented here are bound to remain conjectural. Still, it is my conviction that their fragments contain significant ideas related to evil’s origins. Insofar as they turned their attention to the problem of evil, the Presocratics displayed the following tendencies: (a) they declined to ascribe the existence of evil to the will of the gods. Instead, (b) the emergence of badness was seen as instigated by the disruption of the primeval harmony (Anaximander), or (c) coeval opposed principles in constant struggle for dominance were posited, one of which was the cause of good, the other of evil (Pythagoreans and Empedocles). (d) Attempts were made to make good’s existence dependent on the existence of evil or to declare the latter illusory (Heraclitus and Parmenides). (e) Emphasis was placed on the moral agents’ personal responsibility for badness (Democritus).

A New Defence against the Problem of Evil

In this paper, I propose a defence against the problem of evil. This defence does not involve either free will or soul-making, but, rather, is intended as a replacement for the traditional theodicies. The defence will have two components: firstly, a proposal for why a good God would not intervene to eliminate the evil (natural or moral) in the world; and second, a proposal for why a good God would need to allow evil to exist in the world in the first place. I identify four desiderata for defences against the problem of evil and I argue that this new defence achieves all of these at least as well as traditional defences involving free will and/or soul-making.

Divine ambiguity: A philosophical inquiry into God’s uncertain decisions

The debate surrounding the nature and attributes of God as presented in the Bible has garnered significant attention and critique from various philosophical perspectives like Friedrich Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell and David Hume. This philosophical critique emphasises the inconsistency in the nature of God and challenges traditional theological beliefs. The expression of regret by the God of the Bible in Genesis 6:6 raises philosophical dilemmas regarding divine attributes and the problem of evil. The contradiction between God’s regret and the affirmation of his creation as good underscores fundamental questions about divine omniscience, omnipotence and benevolence. The presence of evil and suffering in the world poses a significant challenge to the notion of a loving and all-powerful God. Examples of human suffering, such as slavery, colonisation, apartheid and natural disasters, further highlight the complexity of reconciling divine attributes with the existence of evil. Philosophically analysing biblical narratives, such as the story of Job, Noah’s flood and the plagues of Egypt, raises ethical concerns regarding divine justice and the moral agency of humanity. Additionally, the indiscriminate punishment of innocent individuals in these narratives challenges the credibility of a benevolent and compassionate God. The philosophical inquiry into the problem of evil and natural disasters underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of divine attributes and their implications for human existence.Contribution: The study encourages reflection on key questions about the nature of divinity, the morality of divine actions, and the compatibility of traditional theology with rational thought. It highlights how inconsistencies in certain biblical accounts challenge those trying to balance faith with reason and scientific understanding. While some may view these narratives as metaphors or allegories, others find it difficult to align them with their intellectual beliefs, resulting in tensions between religious faith and scientific rationality.

The image of God: the problem of evil and the problem of mourning (Eleonore Stump) publisher: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, 432 pp, $130.00

The image of God: the problem of evil and the problem of mourning (Eleonore Stump) publisher: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, 432 pp, $130.00

The Problem of Evil and the Simulation Hypothesis

Abstract I argue that the Problem of Evil diminishes the likelihood of the simulation hypothesis being true. In section 1, I present the simulation hypothesis. In section 2, I present the Problem of Evil and how it can be addressed to the simulation hypothesis. In section 3, I strengthen my claim by defending the idea that, on the grounds of the expansion of the moral circle, we can infer that potential simulators would most probably view simulated beings as moral subjects. Section 4 is dedicated to counterarguments and their responses, and section 5 contains a conclusion where I clarify the probabilistic nature of my argument.

Dialogues on the Issues of Theodicy in Late Ming Fujian

This paper aims to illustrate the dialogues on the issue of theodicy in late Ming Fujian. The Catholicism that entered China in the late Ming dynasty had a competitive relationship with indigenous religions in terms of their meaning systems. Catholicism emphasized the omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence of God, which created tensions and contradictions with the reality of phenomena such as the suffering of good people and the existence of evil. In the late Ming period, scholars, believers, and missionaries in the Fujian region engaged in deep exchanges and dialogues on theodicy, reflecting the significant attention and consideration given to the problem of evil. This paper first analyzes the dialogues on theodicy between the Fujian scholar Ye Xianggao (1559–1627) and the missionary Giulio Aleni (1582–1649). Next, it explores the discussions on the problem of evil between ordinary believers in the Fujian region and Giulio Aleni in their daily lives. Finally, it examines how anti-Catholics used the problem of evil to criticize Catholicism, and it also identifies the characteristics and impacts of Catholic theodicy in the late Ming and early Qing periods.

Not a Negation, but a Position: Kierkegaard on Evil and Sin

Abstract For Kierkegaard, the problem of evil is the existential challenge of our entanglement in evil, suffering, and sin. Sin is not a “negation” but a “position,” not a moral wrongdoing or lack of virtue, but a distinctive condition in which humans live. Nor is evil simply a lack or absence of good, but the weakening, obstruction, and destruction of good. This paper traces Kierkegaard’s account of evil and sin in his major writings in terms of despair, boredom, and fear. Sin and evil do not question God’s love, but rather become the occasion for God to create good out of evil, life out of death, being out of nothing.

The Problem of Evil

The Problem of Evil

Beatific Governance and the Problems of Evil

Beatific Governance and the Problems of Evil

Blasphemy! Levinas and the Unjustification of Suffering

Abstract In this article, Severson explores the insights of Emmanuel Levinas regarding theodicy and the problem of evil. Levinas considers philosophical and practical justifications of suffering to be blasphemous, violating the sanctity of the suffering of the other person, even when well-meant. Severson introduces distinctions between “pain” and “suffering” to extrapolate and explain Levinas’s striking rejection of theodicy.

Julian of Norwich's Hazelnut as Paradox

Abstract Using historical rather than philosophical means, this essay responds to a philosophical discussion of the problem of evil. Instead of constructing arguments in support of a general, theoretical position, the author examines a single, paradoxical image from the vision of a medieval anchoress and suggests that those concerned with the problem of evil, including philosophers, should take it seriously. In order to explain or contextualize why, despite the existence of evil, “all will be well . . . and all manner of thing will be well,” Julian of Norwich narrates how, in her vision, God placed in her hand “something small, no bigger than a hazelnut,” which is both contingent and eternal, all and nothing — opposites coexisting. This essay analyzes how Julian's image of the hazelnut as paradoxical is a simultaneity of opposites and argues that paradox, enacted and experienced in ritual, offers a way to assert and live with opposites such as good and evil, life and death, simultaneously.

Christ/Antichrist and Buddha/Māra

ABSTRACT Jung’s view of God as a unity of Christ and Antichrist was rejected by Western theological circles, but a convergence can be found in Chinese Buddhist thought. Both Jungian psychology and Tiantai Buddhism believe that evil is intrinsic to the nature of God/Buddha, which is actually a manifestation of human nature. Only a God/Buddha with a paradoxical and antinomial character could provide a logical explanation for the paradox of the existence of evil and a Supreme Being. And both suggest that for the well-being of the human psyche, people should recognize evil and integrate it into a pursuit of good.

The Problem of Evil and Fr. Zosima’s Responsibility Before All

The Problem of Evil and Fr. Zosima’s Responsibility Before All

The Coherence of the Belief in the Existence of Evil in Traditional Yorùbá Theology: A Process-Relational Analysis

Abstract Due to its domineering Western and Christian influence, philosophy of religion, as a discipline, is hesitant or reluctant to entertain arguments on similar subjects from non-Western and non-Christian traditions even when these traditions may have answers to problems or issues in the discipline. Of these problems, the present research will limit its scope to theodicy. Whereas the problem continues to encounter endless debates and attempts to reconciling a loving, powerful and knowledgeable Deity with the existence of natural and moral evils in the world, the lack of coherence in that tradition of thought cannot be said for “Yorùbá theology”. Through the method of philosophical and hermeneutical analyses, the effort of this research is to unpack the process underpinning of “Yorùbá theology” which helps in formulating a coherent understanding of the reality of evil in the presence of a good, loving and wise “Olódùmaré” that is void of Satan/Devil. On this note, this research submits, having used Yorùbá process theology as paradigm, that the debate over the problem of evil in mainstream tradition of philosophy of religion may be resolved if non-Western and non-Christian traditions are invited into the discourse.

Does the ‘problem of evil’ rest on a mistake?

ABSTRACT Philosophers discuss what they call the philosophical ‘problem of evil’ while sometimes making two assumptions. The first is that ‘God is good’ means that God is morally good. The second is that there is no other sense in which God can be good. I argue against both of these assumptions and conclude that the problem of evil, insofar as it depends on their truth, rests on a failure sufficiently to distinguish between God and creatures.