Problem Of Normativity Research Articles

The radical right and the university: Reclaiming value neutrality in higher education

Radical right parties, movements, and actors on both sides of the Atlantic have reproached universities for creating an intolerant left-wing intellectual and institutional climate. They have made repeated calls to restore neutrality in higher education to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom. A closer analysis reveals that these critiques are less about neutrality and freedom, and more about exerting their own politico-ideological influence on universities. Yet, the insincerity of many such critics should not obscure the broader fact that a problem of excessive normativity (and relatedly, growing public disconnect) may indeed exist in higher education. Rather than engage in political polarisation and partisanship, universities – both at the professorial and administrative levels – could benefit from mobilising a principled notion of value neutrality, as conceptualised by Max Weber, as an academic value in itself.

Nietzsche and the Size of Future History as a Normative Criterion

ABSTRACT Many critics of morality seem nonetheless committed to a normative stance of some kind. This paper uses the context of Nietzsche studies as a laboratory to experiment with a solution to this problem. I argue that Nietzsche’s critique of normativity and his promulgation of normative judgments can be made consistent if we understand Nietzsche as pursuing the criterion of the size of future history. First (§1) I present the problem of normativity as it appears in Nietzsche’s work and the literature. Then (§2), I introduce the criterion of the size of future history and show that it addresses the requirements established in §1. I then address some objections to this criterion (§3). Finally, I suggest some applications of this criterion to specific areas of Nietzsche’s discourse and to some of our broader normative intuitions (§4). I conclude that the criterion of the size of future history, if well understood, can provide a solution to the problem of normative inescapability.

Self-love on Social Media: A Theological Reflection by Means of Paul Tillich

This article considers whether a loving embodied self-relation is of theological relevance and the possibility of a metaphorical conception of self-love as an inherent part of faith by means of Paul Tillich read through a phenomenology with a strong awareness of human embodiment. Additionally, it reflects on whether a theological focus on true self-love sheds light on a predominant and larger problem of normativity in the relationship between self and the world.

Нормативное в цифровом

The problem of normality and normativity in the digital context has become relevant. In the 21st century, digital, which has become to a certain extent an alternative to the physical, is one of the key spaces for the translation of norms, primarily social norms. Digital practices are ontologically different from their real prototypes. This thesis is illustrated in the article by referring to the series "How to Sell Drugs Online (Fast)". The key character of the work, young Moritz, lives the usual life of a nerd and is the founder of the first online drug empire. The article raises the question of what normativity is in digital and whether it is possible. Three levels of normativity are defined: biological (physiological norms), social (linguistic and legal norms), and universal (the normativity of the human being as an actant). These levels of normativity are determined by biological, social, and universal norms. Philosophically significant is the third, universal level. Within its boundaries, we are talking about norms and normativity, which are not necessarily attached to a person. A person is only one of many real and potential actants. In the digital context, on a par with a person, there are phenomena from the fields of technical (computers and any other gadgets) and technological (networks of various scales, including the Internet). The understanding of the norm and normativity in the digital context, therefore, develops in the vision of normativity at all 3 levels, with an emphasis on the universal level, which will create a post-anthropological prism in the digital studies.

The Problem of Normativity in the Genealogical Critique of the Form of Civil Rights

The Problem of Normativity in the Genealogical Critique of the Form of Civil Rights

Нормативность виртуальной коммуникации при выражении отрицательной оценки

The study is devoted to the problem of the virtual language communication normativity, namely the specifics of expressing a negative assessment. It is proved that the formation of the norm of language communication occurs in the system of taxa “norm – non-normal – anti-norm” (according to the concept of V.G. Kostomarov). It is substantiated that the virtual language communication normativity is not a direct reflection of the real language environment normativity, but is formed under the influence of the virtual environment communication stereotypes characteristics, which have significant differences from the current national communication stereotypes adopted in the Russian society. It has been established that a negative assessment in a virtual environment acts as a means of verbal aggression due to the absence of restrictions in the language means choice by which the intention of a negative assessment is verbalized in virtual communication situations that are aimed at achieving extralinguistic communication goals related to the communicant’s self-affirmation with the help language means of taxa non-norm and anti-norm, the exclusive right presumption to an interlocutor negative assessment (verbalization of the insult intention), the rejection of the opponent’s point of view, manifested in the absence of intentions of the interlocutors to seek a compromise. The results of the study allow us to state the special conditions presence for the formation of specific norms of language communication in a virtual communication environment.

Monolingual comparative normativity in bilingualism research is out of “control”: Arguments and alternatives

AbstractHerein, we contextualize, problematize, and offer some insights for moving beyond the problem of monolingual comparative normativity in (psycho) linguistic research on bilingualism. We argue that, in the vast majority of cases, juxtaposing (functional) monolinguals to bilinguals fails to offer what the comparison is supposedly intended to do: meet the standards of empirical control in line with the scientific method. Instead, the default nature of monolingual comparative normativity has historically contributed to inequalities in many facets of bilingualism research and continues to impede progress on multiple levels. Beyond framing our views on the matter, we offer some epistemological considerations and methodological alternatives to this standard practice that improve empirical rigor while fostering increased diversity, inclusivity, and equity in our field.

Towards a Philosophy of Crisis

Abstract Thirty years ago, Fukuyama announced the end of history in the form of the triumph of liberal democracy and free markets. Crises were going to be something of the past. Today, crises abound. Does this mean that the eschatology of the 1980s and 90s should give way to a crisology? Given the many ways in which the vocabulary of crisis is used, and crises are instrumentalized, can the word crisis become a rigorous philosophical concept? In this essay, I analyze the extent to which, and contexts in which, philosophy has claimed crisis as a central concept (section 2); offer a tentative typology of crisis in relation to the problem of normativity (section 3); conclude with a few remarks on critique as the philosophy of crisis (section 4).

Regulation and the Normativity Problem

ABSTRACT The concept of regulation pervades biology, for example in models of genetic regulatory networks and the endocrine system. Regulation has a normative opposite, dysregulation, which figures prominently in biomedical models of disease. The use of normative concepts in biology, however, has been thought to present some challenges for the physicalist view of the world, and various resolutions have been proposed. Up to now the problem of biological normativity has been debated largely in connection with the concept of biological information. In this paper we shift focus to the concept of biological regulation, proposing that it provides a promising new approach to these issues. Models of regulatory systems have several features: they are causal, but they do not deal with the energy exchanges and transformations covered by physics and chemistry; further, and entirely connected, regulatory systems can break down, and this is because they and their causal-regulatory properties are dependent on fragile molecular structures. Biological regulatory systems exhibit normativity, because they are not determined by physical and chemical laws, but their close relationship with physical laws and physicalist ontology is transparent.

Нормативность в философии сознания

The paper deals with the problem of normativity in the philosophy of mind. It points out that the normativity of conscious experience has long been ignored in the discipline. This is largely due to the fact that philosophers paid attention primarily to the metaphysical aspects of mind. The work also notes that the turn to the epistemology of mind makes it important to study the normativity of mental states. Such research can help us not only to clarify a number of epistemological questions, but also to solve some metaphysical questions. In particular, an inquiry into the problem of normativity can justify an acceptance of externalism in the philosophy of mind. In the paper, the problem of normativity in the philosophy of mind is considered through the viewpoint of the rule-following problem, posed by Wittgenstein. It demonstrates that any internalist understanding of the content of mental states either ignores the normative aspect of conscious experience or faces the skeptical paradox formulated by Wittgenstein. The only way to avoid these difficulties is to adopt the externalist view about the content of mental states advocated by John McDowell. According to this position, the content of mental states is understood as an objective state of affairs, which can function as a reason for the conscious activity of the subject.

On Problem of Normativity in the Theory of Life Form

On Problem of Normativity in the Theory of Life Form

On the Relationship between Facts and Legal Concepts: Methodological Analysis

In his paper "The Influence of Normative Reasons on the Formation of Legal Concepts", German legal philosopher Lorenz Kähler attempts to give a theoretical and philosophical understanding of the legal normativity in terms of disclosure of normative reasons that determine the choice and definition of the legal concepts. Despite the broad context of substantiating the problem under study and ways to solve it, the author formulates a number of controversial and disputable provisions. Among them, we can note the ambiguity and uncertainty of the content of legal concepts that are projected by the author exclusively on the field of legal norms, which does not allow us to correctly distinguish the process of cognition of legal phenomena and the application of legal norms. The analysis of the problem of normativity is carried out from the position of separating the normative legal order from the field of empirical facts without the possibility of correlating normative prescriptions with factual circumstances and actions (the normative grounds of which are the main point of L. Kähler, s research). The paper offers a number of critical arguments that demonstrate the methodological incorrectness and unreasonableness of certain judgments of L. Kähler, as well as conceptual decisions about the relationship between facts and norms in the context of the boundaries of normative and factual law.

Normativity of Professional Morality and Metaethics

Introduction . The paper deals with the problem of justification of professional morality. The emphasis is placed on professional and ethical problems of the activity of employees of internal Affairs bodies. The purpose of this paper is to create a version of the justification of the normativity of professional morality (for example, the ethics of an employee of internal Affairs bodies), which combines the traditional sources of normativity and the possibility of metaethical discourse. The need for an updated understanding of normative and professional morals stems from the need for a new methodology for creating a professional and ethical standard for an employee of internal Affairs bodies. Methodology and sources . The paper offers a methodological justification of the professional morality of a law enforcement officer based on the ideas of K. Korsgaard and J. Thomson, who proposed in their works various options for justifying the normativity of morality. We proceed from the recognition that the professional and ethical standard, as well as its justification, is not the final version of our understanding of professional morality. Our approach to understanding them is based on the Tulmin’s principle of intellectual initiative, which allows us to rationally recreate existing constructs. Results and discussion . The translation of professional and ethical issues into the discourse of metaethics creates the prerequisites for gaining the credibility of the requirements of professional morality. Normative ethics as the basis of professional morality is in good agreement with the metaethical response to the problem of normativity, referred to as ‘‘voluntarism‘‘. However, the latter adds little to the reflexivity of our beliefs. The position called ‘‘call for autonomy‘‘ is much more convincing. It is based on the Kantian proposition that moral demands take on reality in the individual's own will. It is the main source of normativity. An important step that gives integrity to the normativity of professional morality is to overcome the absolutism of ethical statements. This is the analysis of normative judgments, taking into account their reference to the context of a particular field of activity. Conclusion . The convergence of the discourses of normative ethics and metaethics allows us to develop a justification of normativity, in which the formal description of the requirements of professional morality is combined with the internal ability of the individual to correlate his own actions and decisions with professional and ethical priorities.

Normatividad y deliberación práctica en John Dewey: elementos para una lectura contemporánea

The aim of this paper is to explore John Dewey’s solution of the problem of normativity that has confronted skeptics and dogmatists for centuries. Dewey’s main strategy is to elaborate a hypothesis to explain how the de jure or normative principles have an anchor and a starting point in practical, de facto activity. In order to reconstruct Dewey’s conception of normativity, and taking into account the misinterpretations it has received, we will first analyze the nature of the problem -a problem that, from Dewey’s point of view, is a political one. Second, we will show how our author’s conception of rationality diverges from the dominant conception, which making reference to the still prevalent distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, takes justification as its basic component. Third, after emphasizing the centrality of the practical problem-solving process as the core of rationality in Dewey’s thought, we will analyze his conception of practical deliberation, which is thus seen as the origin of all normativity.

Different bodies: The problem of normativity in body psychotherapy

This paper primarily addresses the people of effectively mainstream embodiment who make up the bulk of the body psychotherapy profession. It suggests that we need to explore and deconstruct this subject position and to think about how it may set up oppressive assumptions about our task and how we carry it out, as well as about who is capable of becoming a practitioner. Drawing in particular on disability theory, I aim to bring into question notions of “normal,” ideal or optimal embodiment and to argue for a focus instead on the real, imperfect, damaged and unique bodies which we encounter in our practice.

Um sobretudo de argila: afetividade e normatividade na fenomenologia do corpo

No presente artigo, examino o problema da normatividade na relação com a dimensão ancestral das possibilidades legadas pelos mortos. Seguindo o projeto de uma fenomenologia da espectralidade, apresentado por Hans Ruin, esboço uma interpretação de algumas indicações formais, presentes na analítica existencial de Ser e Tempo, a respeito da atmosfera (Stimmung) do ser-com-os-mortos. O sentimento existencial que manifesta uma sintonia já ocorrida com o âmbito da ancestralidade é o respeito (Ehrfurcht): respeito para com as possibilidades que podem ser retomadas no modo da réplica a uma herança. Da análise desse sentimento, resulta que a dimensão ancestral oferece a matéria da individuação histórica, mas não contém a medida da adequada resposta às possibilidades legadas. Concluo ressaltando que o aspecto autonoético do sentimento de respeito em relação às possibilidades ancestrais revela o abandono e a vulnerabilidade dos vivos em face a uma dimensão que comanda sem abrigar em si mesma uma medida da justa resposta.

Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity: The Case of Historiography

This article tackles the problem of normativity in naturalism and considers it in the context of the philosophy of historiography. I argue that strong naturalism is inconsistent with genuine normativity. The strong naturalist faces a difficult dilemma. If he rejects any reliance on conceptual intuitions, his epistemic inquiries will not get off the ground. As a consequence, his analyses of historiography are, in effect, normatively irrelevant: any practice is epistemically as valuable as any other. Another option for the strong naturalist is to relax methodological requirements and accept that epistemic inquiries may begin with nonempirical conceptual reflection or a priori reasoning.

One or many normativities?

The aim of the present investigation is to sketch a new approach to analysing normativity. First (§1–2) I locate the problem of normativity in the landscape of contemporary philosophy and focus on the dispute between naturalism and antinaturalism. Then (§3) I discuss the so-called top-down approach to studying normativity, to which I oppose the bottom-up approach inspired by contemporary philosophy of science (§4). I see the integration of these approaches as enabling investigations of normative phenomena that do not reduce them to just one type of normativity (e.g. morality).

Normatywność pedagogiki chrześcijańskiej w świetle pytań o jej empiryczne podstawy

The problem of normativity in pedagogy stems directly from the structure of this discipline of knowledge. Contrary to common beliefs, formulating the goals of education does not need to prevent the possibility of their empirical justification. One needs to distinguish between normativity in terms of metatheory from normativity in terms of theory. Absence of such distinction results in Christian pedagogy being defined as apodictically justifying educational norms. In fact, in the past, pedagogy was pursued in that manner. Static concepts of Christian inspiration were eventually replaced by dynamic ones. The search for empirical ways of justifying educational norms in Christian pedagogy was accomplished owing to new phenomenological concepts of experience. Contemporary metaethical deliberations offer a direct impulse to change the orientation from non-empirical to empirical. They combine axiological and ontological issues. Thus, educational norms postulated in Christian pedagogy may have empirical foundations.

SPORT PRACTICES IN BIHAR AND UTTAR PRADESH: MAKING OF “SPORTS SOCIOLOGY” IN INDIA

The ‘problem of normativity’ concerns the role that society’s value system, norms and conventions play in legislative regulation. Rapid social change was always problematic, for example the swift displacement of French Revolutionary law by the Napoleonic Code. What validated one or the other, since both broke with previous social norms? Traditionally, both legal and social theories appealed to shared normativity to account for the ‘bindingness’, the sense of obligation held to inhere in the law. However, the intensification of morphogenesis had growing negative repercussions on all the normative components of the legal order: law itself, norms and rules, conventions, custom and etiquette. It is argued that as these elements weaken, ‘Anormative Regulation’ (or ‘Bureaucratic Regulation’) takes over in contemporary society, entailing no ‘ought’, exerting a causal force not a moral one, and operating through penalizations and prohibitions, which are punitive without entailing either a criminal record or invoking social sanction.